Archive for the ‘F P Marinetti’ Category
Entry 1463 — Another Painting with Numerals
Saturday, May 24th, 2014
Saturday, May 24th, 2014
Thursday, October 9th, 2014
Directly below is the cover featuring the design Craig Kaplan and I came up with for the latest issue of The Journal of Mathematics and the Arts. Beneath it, from the bottom up, are my initial rough draft for the cover, then two drafts of mine (from several) combining ideas of Craig’s and mine. The poem is my “Mathemaku No. 10.”
From down&dirty to fairly high-grade commercial art, it seems to me. Two equal but different expressions of aesthetic taste. If we had gone with my initial version, I would have wanted to boost its resolution and possibly made the heart-sequence more like the sequence in the one just above it–i.e., made the upward movement less predictable. I hadn’t realized when I made my first version that the lay-out of the cover was rigidly the way it is in the top image: image in square to top right, name of publication, image in square to bottom right. I’d have a single image take up the entire page with the publication data on top of it around two thirds of the way up. Different strolks for different fokes. Also a good demonstration of why I’ve never made any money from what I’ve done in the arts.
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Tuesday, July 23rd, 2013
I’ve always said that many commercial artists do work as good as “real artists.” The difference is simply their central goal, which is to persuade someone to buy something, however much they may at times also want to create a thing of beauty. So they are not making art, they are making advocature. I find the label below a wonderful specimen of advocary visiotextual art, but not of advocary visual poetry. A main reason I’m posting is to again make a point about what visual poetry is and is not. This is just an ornamented word. Excuse please, I should say that this is a beautifully-ornamented word, and one should be grateful for it, but that a visual poem, even an advocary visual poem, will do much more. Now if my creative brain hadn’t blown all sixteen of its fuses last year, with no new shipments of fuses due from Uranus until my next life, I’d show you what the melloyello logo would look like as a genuine advocary visual poem. That not being possible, I’ll just say it’d do something to make its visual appearance a metaphor for its text.
On the other hand, the lemon and orange slices seem pretty close to o’s–citrically mellowing beyond the o’s ending the text’s two words . . . Note: I think I couldda made a lot of money in advertising.
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Sunday, March 17th, 2013
A day or two ago I was visiting the article on asemic writing at Wikipedia and just an hour or so ago (it’s now 5:41 P.M., Saturday, here in Port Charlotte, Florida) it must have inspired me, for, yow, I created the greatest of the new arts of this century (tah dah): anumeric mathematics, a sibling of asemic writing, for it is visual art using mathematical symbols (including numbers, of course) that makes no mathematically sense. Two samples follow:
Yes, many painters have made paintings using numbers, but they didn’t call it . . . anumeric mathematics!
Frankly, when I came up with the name, I considered it a joke. When I made the top anumeric mathematics piece quickly after that, I no longer considered it a joke. I feel you can do a lot of interesting things in the genre, or whatever. Colored math is the first thing to seemed extremely promising to me. The central value is giving the viewer a work that should put him into the mathematical section of his brain at the same time it puts him in the visual sections of his brain. Manywhere-at-Once.
I’m definitely ridiculously over-excited by this. So far, though, it’s fun stuff!
Notes for posterity: I haven’t thought of titles for either piece but will. The first uses part of my “Mathemaku for Ezra Pound,” slightly altered, as background, the second one of the images I recently posted here with part of one of the works of 17th-Century German calligraphy I showed two samples of here recently layered over it with two symbols from my “symbolic” font file. Oh, and I should cite Sue Simon as an influence. I’ve had paintings of hers that could be considered anumeric mathematics in my Scientific American blog. The one I had of hers in my most recent one, however, has an actual equation, so is not anumeric. I can’t remember whether she had readable math in the others, not that it’s important.
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Friday, March 29th, 2013
As a think, one of my mottoes is definitely, first thought, wrong thought. The other day I changed one of my wrong thoughts–well, not all wrong, but wrong enough to change; and it wasn’t a thought, it was one of my coinages. I’d introduced the mathematics equivalent, I thought, of “asemic writing,” calling it “anumeric mathematics.” But a day or two ago, I realized that “anumeric” is not the equivalent of “asemic” but of “asemantic.” The equaivalent of “asemic” would be “anumric!” One excellent result of this chance, which I now officially make, is that there’s no reason an anumric mathematical work can’t have numbers in it, so long as they are doing nothing numric, by which I can now say I mean, doing no more than possibly signifying a quantity. In the latter case, they would be acting numerically if minimally–but not numricly. That’s important! So, everybody, correct your notes.
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Sunday, July 17th, 2011
My standard arguments against the application of the term, “visual poetry,” to works without words, or without words that contribute significantly to their central aesthetic meaning have long been: (1) expanding the coverage of the term to just about any conceivable somebody or other wants to call a visual poem–which, of course, renders it worthless as a tool of description; and (2) it breaks with the practice of several thousand years of considering poetry a literary art, and therefore requiring words; why change a meaning so drastically that’s worked so well for so long? With regard to (2) let me add that, yes, the meaning of “poetry” was expanded to included free verse, and just about all such terms need to be at least a little flexible, but free verse poems continued to use the majority of devices that metrical verse did, and remained a literary art (and as such, I claim, continued to achieve its most important effects in the verbal area of the human brain, not elsewhere in the brain, and certainly not elsewhere in the brain and not in the verbal area of the brain).
I have a third problem with what I consider the misuse of the term, though–a personal one. It is that as people encounter works like many of those in the new (excellent) collection at Illuminated Script: 30 Years of Visual Poetry & Intermedia that are called “visual poems” although they are without aesthetically significant words or even textual elements and are thus conditioned not to expect anything called a visual poem to be verbally meaningful. Ergo, unless I call my combinations of words and graphics “visual poems containing significant words,” those encountering them will take them as perhaps pleasant designs but not trouble to work out what they much more importantly are due to their words. In short, my own works will suffer because of the way others mislabel theirs.
True, few will care about my works even after alerted to the fact that the words in them are not just graphically-designed into them. Still . . .
Monday, March 7th, 2011
What follows is an excerpt from Geoffrey Bibby’s The Testimony of the Spade, 1956. It’s here as testimony in support of my view of the importance of taxonomy. Thomsen, who was unfamiliar to me until earlier this morning, is credited by most scholars of originating the division of prehistory in the stone, bronze and iron ages. A simple feat of taxonomy but hugely important for raising artifact collection out of empirical scatter into systematic study–i.e., provided what was needed to the science of archaeology out of it, and thus a means to significant understanding of prehistory.
Friday, January 21st, 2011
First, another thought about taxonomy: an effective taxonomy will have lacuna that its structure makes readily fillable. The Periodic Table of Elements is a prime example.
And an anecdote in support of the high value of taxonomization. It concerns one of my many small possible discoveries while working on my knowlecular psychology. It was that despite the standard view of certified psychologists, there is no such thing as “short-term memory,” there is only “memory.” In other words, we don’t store recent events in one section of the brain for some short period than release the unimportant ones, and shift the important ones to another section of the brain devoted to long-term memories. I always had trouble with this because I could see no way of evaluating short-term memories–how, for instance, could the brain pick out some memory that might be crucially important ten years down the road however irrelevant at the moment? Where taxonomization came in was that I was at the same time driven to make my taxonomy as compact as possible. Limit the number of classifications. That’s a prime goal of any taxonomist. So I worked to eliminate the short-term memory and long-term-memory as subcategories of “memory.” It was many years before I found a very simple, elegant solution–a way the brain could tag all incoming data in such a way that one’s faculty of remembering would tend to choose recent events before older events (of equal contextual attractiveness–i.e., if you just met someone named Mary and your wife is named Mary, the name Mary will probably still more likely bring up a memory of your wife than of the new Mary you’ve met, but if your wife’s name is Judy, than the name will bring up a memory of the new Mary faster than it will bring up some other acquaintance of yours who has that name, to put it very simply).
I claim that taxonomization significantly helped me to my breakthrough this time, and many other times. If my psychology proves invalid that may seem a so what, but I also claim that taxonomization is similarly helpful to successful theorists.
I think the reason I’m such an advocate for taxonomy is my work throughout the years to construct a full-scale psychology. Reflecting on it, I realize that what I’ve mostly done has been taxonomization–defining items and systematically classifying them. Such informal taxonomization is essential for any serious full understanding of a versosophy (any verosoplex, that is), including ones more respected than mine. I’ve read about some of the research that’s been done in this area, by the way, and don’t find any of it to contradict my theory; in fact, the researchers seem to me empiricists without little idea of what they’re doing. They’re certainly not concerned with a big picture.
When I have more pep, I hope to be a little more specific about how I’ve worked out my theory, beginning with the universe, the activity of the brain, which I divide into perception, retroception (memory) and behavior.
Wednesday, January 19th, 2011
The more I think about it, the more I feel like superciliously saying that Truth is one of the two primary values in life beyond survival, and therefore of the highest value for itself alone, and that a taxonomy is the basis of every significant form of Truth, so of the highest value for itself alone. It is an understanding the value of which can only be appreciated by those able to perceive the full size, if not fully understand a form of verosophy and follow its taxonomical base into “ever-smaller mysteries, and ever-vaster interconnections.”
But I contend that a taxonomy also has valuable utilitarian uses. A cardinal one is its use for helping people understand a given poem. To demonstrate that, let’s take an untitled language poem with no author’s name that someone not knowing anything about such a thing encounters, and for some obscure reason doesn’t dismiss it as nonsense but wants to understand it. Let’s assume it has some normal words in it. If he knows about my taxonomy, he can go to it and figure out from it that the object he has is 1. material and therefore matter, 2. part of life because printed as a human artifact, 3. part of human life because a human artifact, 4. m0re than likely something resulting from mentascendancy, 5. a form of art since it certainly isn’t a form of versosophy–nor recognizable as religious though he may have to investigate that further, by perhaps taking it to a minister of some kind, 6. literature since it certainly is neither persuasive or utilitarian (although it may take him a while to reach that conclusion), and 7. poetry, because not having the set right margin that prose has.
It is obviously 8. linguexclusive and 9. not songmode, so plaintext poetry, and 10. not orthological, so xenexpressive (the class I have now, thanks to Geof, replaced xenological and language poetry with). Under xenexpressive, he’ll find language poetry with jump-cut poetry and surrealistic poetry, neither of which fit, so he’ll identify it as 11. language poetry. He should be able to tell which main kind of language poem it is–let’s say, 12. sprungrammatical. In the full taxonomy I hope one day to put together, he’ll be able to determine what kind of sprungrammatical poem it is–one to three levels down. Now, with a name, he’ll be able to study anthologies of such poems and read articles about them. Then he can dismiss them as nonsense with a clear conscience!
What is his alternative? I can’t think of any–assuming he’s alone–i.e., has no educated friends to help him–except to consult a typology, or list of poetries–after somehow deducing that the text is a form of poetry. He must then read the description of every kind of poetry until coming on one that seems to be of his text. A long j0b, and even then he’ll not have learned anything about what such poems are like and unlike.
A taxonomy can work in the opposite direction, too. Let’s say our subject finds a text labeled a language poem and finds it interesting, but puzzling in part. He looks it up in a reference book and finds a fair but finally unsatisfying vague definition of it. If in a typological reference book, he’ll have nowhere else to go. Of course, few if any references are entirely typological; most of their definitions will mention what general kind of poetry a specific poem is. He might find, for instance, that his language poem is “postmodern,” and read about that, which may help a bit. But if he learns what it is taxonomically, he’ll soon be able to learn more about its xenexpressive qualities, and its plaintext qualities, and so forth And see why it is not surrealistic but illuminatingly somewhat like surrealistic poetry. Etc.
Tuesday, January 18th, 2011
Shortly after he got my booklet, A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry, Geof Huth wrote an excellent review of it at his blog, here. It is also a critique, which I will not respond to in detail.
Bob Grumman has released a new book, really a chapbook, entitled A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry, and it combines the two halves of Bob’s intellect into one. The first of these is an interest in clear thinking, in making distinctions even if only for distinction’s sake, an interest in definition and categorization. And the second is its opposite, though it is the second that Bob rarely sees. The second is a tendency to simplify distinctions by setting rules that are not in evidence in the facts, a tendency to muddle things a bit, to wander.
And I love both these halves of Bob, even though, or probably because, they both can annoy me and enchant me, because their annoyance is often a possibility for illumination and because their enchantments lead me terribly astray. These two halves of Bob are the two halves of his visual poetry as well. He creates some of the most considered visual poetry, a poetry interested in the word and new senses of syntax, and he sometimes creates with this intellect visual poems that seem to care little about their visual presentation. Then he will create visual poems almost totally inscrutable from a verbal point of view but which are still among the most beautiful visual poems around. His best work is among my favorite being created these days.
Somewhere I gave my opinion of this idea of Geof’s but I’ve been unable to find what I said. It wasn’t much, only that I wouldn’t call my intellect divided in two: it’s just the tool I use to define, distinguish and classify reality, among other things. Sometimes it is effective, sometimes not, but it’s the same intellect at all times. As for its creating “visual poems that seem to care little about their visual presentation,” this goes back to an ongoing difference of ours as to the importance of what I consider trivial decorative effects and he considers centrally important effects–because, I feel, I’m more committed to the conceptual meaning of poetry than he is, and less to the sensual meaning. A complicating factor is that I lack the means–e.g., a superior computer and printer–often to create poems that look as well on the page as I’d like them to. All of which may seem to have little to do with our taxonomy debate but which, I think, parallels his greater interest in trees than in forests compared with my greater interest in forests than in trees.
It would have been helpful if he’d provided an example of my “setting rules that are not in evidence in the facts, a tendency to muddle things a bit, to wander.”
So there’s the context for this, a little accounting of my point of view, which might be only an accumulation of my own biases. I’ve left a few things out. I’ve known Bob for just under 25 years. He is my oldest visual poetry friend. And we almost never agree on anything. We come to visual poetry with much different ideas. As a matter of fact, when Bob says “visual poetry” he means something considerably narrower than I mean when using the same term. We are not sympatico in that way.
Why Taxonomy?
Bob opens the booklet with “A Defense of the Taxonomization of Poetry,” which is an impassioned defense of taxonomies and the effort it takes to produce them. Part of the reason for his passion is that Bob has suffered through a few sometimes heated arguments over the years from poets, especially visual poets, who are themselves passionate in their opposition to taxonomies. These people see a taxonomy as the equivalent of an autopsy that produces no results. In this opening section, Bob does a reasonable, though quick, job of directly disputing the ideas of the critics of taxonomy, but he provides no justification for taxonomy at all, except to say that “an effective taxonomy” allows “the clarification of discussion.”
This is a big weakness to me. In the face of enormous criticism of taxonomy, Bob undermines the arguments of his opponents, but not in a way that argues the case for his own. All of his arguments are negative. None is positive. The one above is actually my reversal of his refutation of his detractors’. Bob needs to prove how his taxonomies do something valuable. What he does is insist that they do something valuable without clarifying those values or giving any evidence of any.
As I’ve elsewhere noted, I provided much more justification for taxonomy: for instance, I called it the basis of the conceptual appreciation of art, and declaimed that “At their best, taxonomies (and analysis in general) reveal ever-smaller mysteries, and ever-vaster interconnections to discover down or up to–while allowing us a vocabulary greater than ‘oooh’ and ‘ahhh’ with which to share our pleasure with others.” Geof has since shrugged these off as trivial. I’m in the processing of making much more elaborate points, but I consider these pretty good ones.
Upper Levels of the Taxonomy
This taxonomy of Bob’s is the most formal he’s ever created. It begins with the Universe of the taxonomy (in this case “Matter”), and narrows down from there:
Domain: Life
Kingdom: Human Life
Phylum: Mentascendancy (“the pursuit of meaningfulness”)
Class: Art
Order: Literature
Family: Poetry
Immediately, I’m thrown into a quandary, one of definitional confusion and doubt. Is Poetry really divided into Matter (instead of its opposing universe: Mind) or into Life (instead of Non-Life). Even if stored inside a human, aren’t poems really only inanimate? and are they not more things of the mind rather than of matter? A poem on a page is not so much the poem as a poem accepted into a mind. This is a serious issue, one that needs justification in the taxonomy.*
Frankly, I feel Geof has been thrown into goofiness here. But maybe that’s my fault, for not having defined “human life” as “everything having to do with human beings, including their activities and products.” I didn’t define “mind,” either. For me, it is irrelevant–a consciousness that observes matter but does not otherwise interact with it. It has no subclasses. I only put it in my taxonomy to be complete.
I agree with Geof that poems are only inanimate. However, while they are products of the brain, which I’m sure is what Geof means by the “mind,” so are cars. What counts in my taxonomy are what they are as matter, to wit: verbal expressions, oral or written. That they become sets of activated brain-cells is interesting, and I believe will ultimately vindicate the validity of my taxonomy (by showing which brain-cells are activate for each different kind of poetry in my taxonomy), but my taxonomy only deals with what’s out there in the real material world.
Even if that were not the case, I don’t see that it would make much difference. What defines poetries as written or spoken material artifacts would define them as mentally accepted artifacts.
At the Level of Prose and Poetry
Bob divides all literature into two main families, Poetry and Prose, and this might be a satisfactory division, though I would have, at least, discussed dramatic works and addressed the question of apparent hybrid forms, such as the verse novel and verse play. Here, Bob posits that “poetry is intended to be read slowly, read into rather than through: connotations, sounds, rhythms, flesh being emphasize rather than denotation only.” In general, the general direction of this definition is fine, but it’s too absolute and doesn’t take into account such facts as the inclusion of doggerel in the family of poetry, or that fact that many prose works depend on all the effects mentioned by Bob and also do not depend on denotation alone. This definition is complicated by Bob’s paragraph that consists of this sentence: “Literary prose is simply literature that is not poetry,” which seems to assume that any works that depend on denotation alone (or, let’s say, principally) are thus prose. This situation is quickly complicated again by Bob’s not-quite-stated-but-clearly-implied point that poetry is text that includes flow-breaks, the most well known of which is the linebreak. Whatever poetry or prose is or isn’t isn’t clarified here.
In other writings I’ve done, I’ve gotten into verse plays and other such things. In my unpreliminary taxonomy, I will, too. I didn’t here, which is a minor flaw Geof is right in pointing out. His main criticism may have resulted because I for got to say, as I usually do when differentiating poetry from prose, that poetry is verbal expression in which flow-breaks (as I define them) are clearly significant. Prose is verbal expression in which flow-breaks occur relatively very infrequently. Yes, it’s a subjective matter, and yes, there will be instances of works of verbal expression whose category will be difficult to decide. But expecting a taxonomy to be perfect is absurd.
The same argument holds for poetry’s being “intended to be read slowly, read into rather than through: connotations, sounds, rhythms, flesh being emphasize rather than denotation only.” I suppose I should have written that it is significantly more than prose “intended to be read slowly, read into rather than through: connotations, sounds, rhythms, flesh being emphasized rather than denotation only.” Again the problem of subjectivity (which no attempt to define or classify can avoid, but must only try its best to minimize) arises, and of the borblur where rare works of verbal expression occur that are hard to define. Note well, however, that what I say about poetry here is descriptive only. It has nothing to do with the classification of poetry, which depends entirely on whether or not its ratio of flow-breaks to words is sufficiently high to make it poetry or not.
I would add in passing that doggerel is, even without truning to flow-breaks, poetry on the basis of its sounds–since doggerel always has rhyme ends.
Flow-Breaks
Bob, next discusses, flowbreaks (I’m discarding the hyphen): 1. the linebreak, 2. variable indentation, 3. interior line-gap (which is simply a caesura), and 4. the intrasyllabic linebreak. Here is the genius of Bob Grumman. He sees and defines topographic features of poetry that others have virtually ignored and he sees how they fit together into one set of poetic tools. My only problem with this is that one of his examples of an intra-syllabic linebreak is really intersyllabic, and the the fact that a line breaks within a word or a syllable doesn’t make it significantly different from a traditional linebreak. What he should have used as his fourth category of a flowbreak was an instance of visual tmesis, which would be a different form of flowbreak.
I checked and was surprised to find that in obsolete verse, blocks of more than one space are used to form caesurae. I always thought of them as rhetorical breaks with nothing special indicating them but the sense of the text where they are, or a simple punctuation mark. The term, “line-gap” is still necessary, however, because it applies not only to blocks of spaces but blocks of anything else that clear put a blocking gap int&&&o a line.
My two examples of intrasyllabically broken words were “dev/ice” and “i/t.” line-break. For me, “device’s” two syllables are “de” and “vice,” but maybe I’m wrong.
I like “flow-break” as opposed to “flowbreak,” by the way, because I think the hyphen emphasizes its meaning.
Types of Poetry
This lengthy discussion has brought us only to the saddle-stapled middle of the chapbook, which is where Bob divides poetry into three classes: linguiexclusive poetry (poetry dependent on words alone) and pluraesthetic poetry (poetry that mixes “expressive modalities,” such as the verbal and the visual. This distinction is solid, though I have questions with the subsubtypes of poetry Bob identifies.
Linguiexclusive Poetry
Just one i in “linguexpressive.”
Bob divides linguexclusive poetry into three subsubtypes: orthological, xenological, and language. The first is fairly standard poetry (subdivided yet again into categories), the second is poetry that breaks with the conventions of normal sense and syntax in various ways, and the third subsubtype is both confusing and unnecessary. All of its pieces should appear under xenological. Bob has divided to use a term here (“language poetry”) that already has a meaning, though a taxonomically unhelpful one, and he gives it a new sense to no particular purpose.
Geof may be right, but I think of xenological poetry as breaking with logic, not breaking with syntax, although I can see that a breaking of syntax will also cause a break in logic . . . I think. Not to argue but for background, the reason for the split is that in an earlier version of my taxonomy I divided poetries on the basis of their innovativeness, and put surrealistic and jump-cut poetry under “xenological poetry” among the uninnovative poetries, since their innovations where much older than language poetry’s, and not, in my opinion, as great.
“Language poetry” has no real meaning. At least I’ve never seen it defined. well, unless you consider “language-centered poetry” a definition. In any case, I long avoided using it but finally decided that it was popular enough and appropriate enough to use, and that I could use it to mean “language-centered,” but go on to define it in much greater detail. I think I will keep it, but perhaps put it under “xenological”–after changing “xenological” to “xenexpressive.”
The definition he gives is “Language poetry is poetry in words [that?] seem to be used with almost maximum communicational responsibility. Language is at the center of such poetry, not semantics or sound.” This definition does not seem at all helpful to me, and I cannot imagine a poetry without semantics that still focuses on language.
I would guess my computer screwed me up when I wrote my “definition” of language poetry. However, the three kinds of language poetry I went on to define should have clarified everything sufficiently. Language poetry is poetry whose words seem to be used with almost maximal communicational IRresponsibility (I’m sure i mistake was mine, not my computer’s) Language is at its centr, not semantics or sound. That semantics is not at its center does not mean it does not have semantics. I’m trying to say that it focuses on what words do rather than what they mean. Then in my three kinds of language poetry, I show some of the ways it does that.
Pluraesthetic Poetry
In discussing the types of pluraesthetic poetry, I’ll skip any discussion of the fact that Bob redefines “visual poetry” for his own uses, because it is important for him to do it here in order for “visual poetry” to fit neatly into his definition of poetry. Bob, however, also distinguishes mathematical poetry and flowchart poetry (“poetry that uses the symbols of computers or other flow-charting in significantly expressive ways”) from visual poetry, but I do not. Mathematical poems add mathematical features that visualize the poetry, so I consider them visual poems, and to have a category for flowchart poetry assumes that process symbols are textual and thus not visual. I’d argue, again, that they are not orthodox text, so these poems are also visual poems.
I’ll just state my disagreement–and the reason for my disagreement, which is that the point of my taxonomy is to separate different members of the set, “Poetry.” A term is of value only to the degree that it is specialized. I should add that I flubbed my definition of flow-chart poetry; it should be simply “poetry that uses flow-charting symbols in significantly expressive ways.”
Also, Bob’s definition remains indefensible: “poetry that uses mathematical symbols that actually carry out mathematical operations.” These mathematical operations are not actual; they are apparent. That is a big different. Duck cannot be divided by yellow in any mathematical way, though it could in a metaphoric way that has nothing to do with math directly.
See my previous entry discussing this.
For reasons I don’t understand, Bob distinguishes between “cyber poetry” and “hypertextual poetry,” which is not a distinction. Hypertext poetry would be a subset of cyberpoetry. But the real taxonomic distinctions in the category would be between non-interactive and interactive digital poetries, not by the types of computer languages used in the coding of the poems.
To me the distinction is between poetry that consists of computer language and poetry that consists of regular language but may have embedded computer instructions that allow it to do things poetry without them can’t.
Bob leaves out of his poetry videopoetry, which might have some overlap with cyberpoetry that Bob will have to work out.
Videopoetry is just animated visual poetry.
Numbering
Finally, since Bob is presenting a complex nested taxonomy, he should design a numbering system that allows the user to determine their level in the taxonomy and, thus, be able to identify relationships more easily. At points I was briefly confused because I did not understand what certain headings were subsets of. Even the traditional outlining system once taught in school to students drafting essays could work here, but I think, given the number of levels in play, something direct though a little more complex, such as the number system in the Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary, would work better.
Good point.
Coda
Bob’s “Final Comment” includes this unsupportable statement: “I think no members of any other vocation care less about what they do than poets.” I’d say this is an unprovable statement, so it’s opening “I think” saves it, but I also believe everything after those first two words is false. Poets, in my experience, care more about poetics than about poetry. They are more likely to read someone writing about poetry than to read the poetry. They prefer, for instance, blogs on poetics over blogs that reproduce poetry. Poets are thinking people, even when guided by the heart, the spleen, the bone. But sometimes that interest in how poetry works does not extend to an interest in categorization. A general interest is not equivalent to an interest in taxonomy.
At the end of this, I realize that I’d like to see the next draft of this book. I like the idea of seeing how poetry can fall into categories, though I’m sure those categories will dissolve into one another. And I’m happy that Bob has made this book and glad that he has. But he still needs to prove how these defined categories could help us think about poetry. I don’t see it, even though I like the effort to make these categories and the entertainment of the results of that effort.
Finally, my thanks to Bob for giving me a special limited edition of one of the book, with a copy of one of his mathemaku pasted in. I’ve filled my copy with pencil marks of various kinds and notes to myself, but it is still a perfect copy. And I used pencil because I’m an archivist.
I truly thank Geof for his efforts. One of the reasons I say things like “no members of any other vocation care less about what they do than poets” is because, yes, they IN GENERAL are indifferent or hostile to projects like this of mine, even to my simple attempt over twenty or more years to get a list of contemporary poetry schools assembled. Two people suggested schools I didn’t have on my preliminary definitely incomplete list. I would add that I don’t think my idea of what poetics is comes very close to what most poets who think they’re discussing it think it is. But, hey, I’m a bitter old man long ignored by the public at large while tenth-raters make it big.
Not really. Just when I think about my situation in the world of poetry while writing entries like this one.
Monday, January 17th, 2011
My good friend Geof Huth has challenged me to demonstrate why taxonomization is of value. At first, I was somewhat dumbfounded by his belief that it was, if not useless, not of major importance. Able occasionally to illuminate but not able to do so well enough for one to make a life-long project of, as I have. I have always taken it as a given that an effective taxonomy is of value–of crucial value–in all fields. Linnaeus’s Taxonomy, Mendeleyev’s Periodic Table of Elements, Euclid’s Geometry . . . I termed it “the basis of the conceptual appreciation of art” (in a slightly different arrangement of those words), in the introductory defense of it in my A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry. I also mentioned “the clarification of discussion that an effective taxonomy can accomplish.” Later, I may have gone off the lyrico-mystical deep end when I said, “At their best, taxonomies (and analysis in general) reveal ever-smaller mysteries, and ever-vaster interconnections to discover down or up to–while allowing us a vocabulary greater than ‘oooh’ and ‘ahhh’ with which to share our pleasure with others.” Granted, the idea that without taxonomy’s help, our vocabulary would be limited to ooohs and ahhhs is absurdly exaggerated. Still, as I hope to show, only a taxonomy-based vocabulary is of maximal usefulness in the search for significant truths.
I soon admitted that I had not done much more than assert the worth of taxonomy, although it still seems to me that anyone who has done serious work in any kind of verosophy (i.e., field of significant material knowledge) would find plenty of support in his experiences for those assertions. Ergo, I now must present a detailed case for taxonomy. Not easy, for that requires a discussion of knowledge, a main contention of mine being that taxonomies are either necessary or hard to do without in all attempts significantly to understand a discipline. Here I ought to stop, for the possibility that I could convince anyone that my understanding of what knowledge is, and how we acquire and use it is valid is less than point oh one percent. Nevertheless, I’ll try. If I can figure out how to.
Warning: I’m now going to think out loud. I will be hard to follow as I will probably jump around. My logic will at times be very lax, and I’ll use coinages of mine unfamiliar to all but me. Don’t expect too much in the way of articulateness, either.
I’m going to start with the knowleplex. That’s what I call the complex of knowlecules (bits of knowledge) that a person’s brain forms when learning his way around a portion of reality containing interrelated matter–one’s neighborhood, for instance, or marine biology, or the study of the photon. There are many kinds of knowleplexes. The most effective, for verosophers, is the verosoplex. That’s because it is systematically organized. Not perfectly, but always aiming for maximal systemization.
I would claim that one reason many plenty dislike taxonomy (and reductive thinking and everything else having to do with science and related fields) is that they are incapable of forming verosoplexes. Some whom I call “milyoops, tend because of their innate temperaments, mainly to form sloppy clumps of knowlecules some of which interrelate with some of the others in the knowleplex but few of which interrelate to all or even a majority of the others in it. The milyooplexes, as I call these, lack a unifying principle, something that makes a big picture possible. An effective taxonomy is the ultimate such unifying principle.
It’s just like a city: an ideal system of streets will get you with maximal efficiency wherever you want to go; streets designed merely to connect one building to one or two others, will be worthless outside a give neighborhood. Similarly, a city with an effective system of streets will tend to fill up with building at eay to find and get-to locations. A really well-organized city (impossible because Nature must make it so) would have a center from which the whole of the center would be in view.
Another kind of knowleplex is the rigidniplex. It’s formed by people I term rigidniks whose innate temperament compels them to create unsound unifying principles–conceptual skeletons, so to speak–that are too inflexible to form a unifying basis for sufficient knowledge to provide a rational understanding of a field. They over-unify too little data.
Milyoops are satisfied by their milyooplexes because they allow pleasurable short-term connections–the pleasure of vaudeville versus the pleasure of a well-written full-length play. Or pop songs versus classical symph0nies. They can’t experience long-term pleasure or be other than bored by anything aimed to provide that, so they oppose it. They love to learn small facts, but avoid systematic knowledge. Another way of putting it is that a milyoop lacks much of an attention span–a pop song’s immediate variation on its initial theme will give them pleasure, but forget a second movement of a symphony’s providing a (probably more complicated) variation on a (probably more complicated) theme played ten minutes previously. They can’t use a taxonomy, which does, basically, what a fine symphony does, so they reject it.
The whole idea is that a small understanding of some small portion of a knowleplex will give pleasure, but if one also can connect it to some other portion of the knowleplex, one can enjoy the second portion at the same time, and if one can also–do to one or more such connections, intuite something of the way everything in the knowleplex interrelate, one can enjoy a truly superior pleasure. Indeed, such an understanding can suggest the sense of the oneness of all things that religions hype as the ultimate happiness–and which I believe all verosophers experience in their best moments, and have spoken of. Artists, too–although not by means of a verosoplex, but by means of (this is a new idea of mine) an intuiplex–a knowleplex whose unifying principle is protoceptual rather than reducticeptual. Or sensual rather than conceptual.
This is a good moment for me. Due to the taxonomical thinking I always do when working with my theory of psychology. I classify artistic temperaments as different from scientific temperaments on the basis of their brain make-up, which I won’t go into here. And suddenly perceived how I could be nice to artists with this intuiplex, which I genuinely see can be a route to large truths equal to the verosoplex. But also what causes the two cultures C. P. Snow wrote about, and which I fully accept.
The intuiplex much more than the verosoplex aids the pursuit of beauty, which I hold to be as important as the search for truth, but probably hinders the latter–except when used by someone who also is capable of verosoplexes. Similarly, verosoplexes tend to get in the way of the pursuit and appreciation of beauty.
Again, I yield to the temptation of using my present reasoning to support the value of taxonomy. Only because of taxonomy have I been able on the spur of the moment to hypothesize an intuiplex–because it is based on the knowleplex, which is only a taxonomical level one step above it, and the verosoplex, which it is recognizably identical to (to me) except for one thing, its being an arrangement of primarily protoceptual knowlecules (think of the somatic knowledge that some highly unintellectual highly effective athletes have) instead of reducticeptual knowlecules–which, by the way, is taxonomically very similar, and in the same taxon as protoceptual knowlecules, differing from them only in that their ultimate source is the data conveyed to the brain more or less directly from the senses rather than extracted from the senses pre-cerebralling and converted to reducticepts (or conceptual knowledge, like words, numbers or geometrical shapes).
An important point to recognize is that the validity of my theory of psychology is irrelevant so far as the value of its taxonomy is concerned: its taxonomy greatly facilitates my navigation of it, and ability to understand it–and find gaps worth trying to fill I’d never find without it,
I really think I know what I’m talking about, however little it may seem so. I hope someone somewhere in time and space gets something out of this installment of my adventure in Advanced Thought. More, I hope, tomorrow.
Sunday, January 16th, 2011
I’m excited this morning, for I have a brand-new enthusiasm: a taxonomy devoted entirely to classifying the attributes of a single poem! Athena herself told me to work one out last night while I was in bed when I was pondering how poor the 30-box rectangle and its contents represented the taxonomy of a poem it was intended to be in my “Mathemaku in Praise of Taxonomy.” I’d not intended to rectangle to be more than suggestive but the more I thought about it, the more I felt a serious taxonomy of the single poem would be useful. More important, I thought I’d enjoy working on one. I admit that the strong possibility that it would be the world’s first enthused me, too. It also me me laugh since I’m sure almost everyone would consider it much too trivial to bother with.
Anyway, here goes–extremely preliminarily:
1. The Poem (i.e., something with words and flow-breaks)
2. A. Poetic Form & 2.B. Poetic Content
By poetic form I mean every generalized attribute of a poem: rhyme, for instance; by “poetic content,” I mean every specific attribute of a poem such as the specific “rhyme/grime” rhyme–in spite of what those nullinguists who abhor clarity of communication contend. The abstract container and the concrete contained. Very simple.
3.A.i. Classiform & 3.A.ii Idioform
By “classiform,” I mean those sets of “form-traits” making up a kind of poem that more than a few people repeat, or, to put it simply, an established poetic form; an “idioform” is simply a poetic form that used only for the poem it is in, or–if more than that, not enough to be considered established. A traditional sonnet versus one of my free verse Poem poems.
3.B.i. Words and the equivalent alone & 3.B.ii. words and other matter
This is basically a repeat of my division of poetry into linguexclusive (words only) and pluraesthetic (words and other matter) except that I mention “the equivalent,” by which I mean all symbols that act, in my view, as words, such as the plus sign and other mathematical symbols and such verbal symbols as the ampersand.
4.A.i.I. Metrical Shape & 4.A.i.II. Set Length
By “metrical shape,” I mean things like number and length of lines using some metric foot as the unit of measure. By “set length,” I mean length of lines or poem as a while using any unit of measure; most often that would be a syllable, as with the classical American haiku, which is suppose to be 17 syllables long, in three lines. I think there are few established forms that are set length. I can’t think of any other criteria traditional poems have to conform to but suspect there may be some.
4.A.ii.I. Width & 4.A.ii.II Length
I admit that I really had no idea what to put here. Idioformular poems come in too many varieties to be easily classifiable–I think.
4.B.i.I. Figurative & 4.B.i.II Plaintext & 4.B.i.III. Melodational & 4.B.i.IV. Imagistic
These are based on what is most prominent about the words and word-equivalents in a poem. Plaintext will have little or not figurative, melodational of imagistic language. The other three can be mixed if more than one variety of words is prominent: e.g., figurative-imagistic or even figurative-imagistic-melodational.
4.B.ii.I Words and Graphics & 4.B.ii.II Words and Heightened Sounds & 4.B.ii.III Words and Mathematics & 4.B.ii.IV Words and Cryptography & 4.B.ii.V Words and Computer Language & 4.B.ii.VI Words and Tactile, Gustatory or Olfactory Elements
All the pluraesthetic kinds of poetry, if I have them all.
5.A.i.I.1 Locked & 5.A.i.I.2 Flexible
The first would consist of relatively rigid forms like the sonnet and limerick, the second of fairly informal forms of no particular length but requiring rhyme (doggerel) or strict meter. At Level 6. all these varieties would be listed; there would be no Level 7.
5.A.i.II.1. Non-Classical Haiku & 5.A.i.II.2 Other Free Verse Poems
Not much more to be said about the form of free verse poems.
5.B.i. This level would divide figurative poems by what figures–metaphors, puns, etc., they have; melodational poems by what melodations–rhyme, alliteration, etc.-they use; and imagistic poems by what images (in general–such as animal) they have. 5.B.ii. would divide various pluraesthetic poems similarly–mathematical poems into kind of math used, crytographic poems into kind of code, etc. At Level 6, every variety in the Content Section of the Taxonomy would be divided based on subject matter, and that could continue into any desired level of specificity–say from animal to mammal to rabbit to variety of rabbit, or more.
Okay, I got tired toward the end. An okay start, though, I feel. But I’ve lost my excitement–and fear I see why nobody else (probably) has tackled this problem before.
Saturday, January 15th, 2011
Endwar had such intereseting comments to contribute to the discussion going on at Geof Huth’s blog concerning my A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry that I decided, with his permission, to give them a second printing here, with a few stray comments of mine to follow:
On mathematical poetry and mathematics: I’m not sure I agree completely with anyone here. It seems to me that in a mathematical poem one sees a mathematical operation with words (usually) operating in a metaphorical way (thus the poetry enters). That said, the mathematical operations involved are usually well-defined for numbers, but not for various words and concepts. “3+1=2” is something everyone (is taught to) agrees on in a literal way, and it follows from the definitions of each number and the signs “+” and “=”. The statement “candy cane + child = happiness” is also probably pretty generally understood, but not with the same level of definiteness (or definition, as per the previous sentence) as the numerical example earlier. You could write “candy cane + child = obesity”, which would probably also be understood, but because of the metaphorical nature of the math, you can’t conclude (via the law of substitution) that “happiness = obesity” (though some may point out the phrase “fat, dumb, and happy”, which could then lead us to conclude “happiness = obesity = stupidity” . . . You can see, then where the multiple meanings of words (bifurcations of meaning, to throw in another mathematical metaphor popular in some at one time trendy lit-crit circles)) can lead.)
I would argue that a mathematical poem is a statement that represents a mathematical operation on the words involved, but which isn’t necessarily one that can be checked the way mathematical statements with numbers can be. I will even go one step further and assert that one can create a mathematical poem that is mathematically wrong but which still makes a metaphorical point. I have done this using matrix multiplication – a 2×2 matrix times a 2×1 vector is set equal to a 3×1 vector. That’s not something you can do with real number (or even imaginary number) math, but I think it works as a poem.
Written mathematics is inherently visual, not verbal>: I can grant Bob’s point that “3-1=2” is visually not interesting, and furthermore it hardly matters what font is used. It does matter a bit what numbers are used – roman numerals will say “III-I=II”, and binary says “11-1=10”, and ternary says “10-1=2”, which are all the same numerically. But it becomes evident for large numbers that roman numerals are unwieldy for calculating, and we are used to the decimal number system, so the non-decimal numbers need cumbersome subscripts or context to be read as intended. I would argue, though, that the real test of whether we have something verbal versus something visual is whether the statement can be read aloud. Again “Three minus one equals two,” is pretty straightforward, but that is merely because of the simplicity of the expression. Try reading, say, a passage out of the middle of J.D. Jackson’s <I>Classical Electrodynamics</I> or any other graduate physics or mathematics text, and it will be immediately obvious why these equations aren’t written out in words and why mathematicians and scientists do nearly all their professional discussions with slides or in the presence of a blackboard. And even if one does manage to put the text purely into words read aloud, you will find nobody in the audience who will understand what has been said who hasn’t at least written down some equations or a drawing as a guide. One of the most tedious reading experiences I had was a few pages out of an algebra text written by Leonhard Euler, who felt it was necessary to write down an equation and then repeat the equation in words, such as:
“E=mv ²/2The kinetic energy is equal to half the product of the mass and the square of the velocity.” This continues for page after page.
If you’re still not convinced, show me how to do read calculus aloud and make it intelligible. Two pages minimum.
Because the visual representation is integral to the intelligible communication of all but the simplest mathematics, I would argue that mathematics is inherently visual language, and that by extension, mathematical poetry is also inherently visual poetry. The visual poem may still not depend on which font is used (though I have examples where that is the case as well), but it still can’t be read aloud and have the same meaning, because it will not then register as mathematical.
On hypertext: I think Bob is right that hypertext is not necessarily computer poetry, though the number of sequences need not be infinite. There are primitive hypertexts preceding the web, if not the computer, perhaps the most literarily respectable being Julio Cortazar’s 1963 novel Hopscotch, or the near equivalent in the many children’s books where the reader gets to decide the adventure, where one reads the first page and at the bottom of each page one sees a sentence like “If Joe enters the gate, go to page 23. If Joe continues down the road, go to page 42,” and continues until one reaches an ending. (I suppose one can write out a tree or flow chart to describe the plot and then label it some sort of finite state machine or finite automaton, which is sort of a representation of a simple computer, but I digress.) The point that I am agreeing with Bob is that a hypertext does not necessarily require a computer, though using a computer and particularly one with html, greatly facilitates the process. Hypertext is thus distinct from code poetry like that which might be like that of Sondheim (or Jim Andrews or Ted Warnell (poems by Nari)). And just as there is a difference between mathematics with numbers and mathematical poetry, a poem written in/with computer code need not be an actually compileable program. There are of course many other approaches to poetry using a computer (starting with using a text editor to pound out cantos), for which I will refer the reader to the books of Jorge Luiz Antonio, who is trying to catalog them all (to see his long list of links to Brfazilian digital poetry samples, see http://vispo.com/misc/BrazilianDigitalPoetry.htm).
BTW, for another experience of the difference between computer code and a written document, try viewing the source code of this web page (or the dbqp blog itself), and contrast the instructions for the computer (the part read and understood by the machine) and the human readable part.
endwar
First a very quick acceptance, I think, with Endwar’s definition of mathematical poetry, except that I’d use different words to define it than he has: mathematical poetry is poetry that carries out mathematical operations, metaphorically, on non-mathematical terms. This is, I believe, the first time I’ve accepted that the operations are metaphorical, as Gregory St. Thomasino tried to convince me six months or so ago. My trouble (still) is that the operations seem actual to me–the sun really does multiply a field to get flowers!
Then my two comments at Geof’s blog:
Thursday, January 13th, 2011
In a comment to the entry Geof Huth made to his blog about my taxonomy, Kaz Maslanka said, “I like what I understand to be Karl Kempton and Karl Young’s definition of: ‘Visual Poetry is a Poetry that has to be seen.’ This is such a simple yet powerful definition that seems to me to be true in every case of vizpo that I have seen.”
My definition is not so simple–because while the double-Karl definition probably does cover every case of visual poetry, it fails to distinguish certain works that I do not consider visual poetry: illustrated poems and captioned or labeled visimages; ordinary poems whose visual appearance has been improved by calligraphy or special graphic touches like ornate capitals at the beginning of stanzas–poetry, in other words that has been graphically decorated enough to make it more pleasing but not enough to significantly increase its aesthetic effect; certain infraverbal texts like Joyce’s “cropse,” which must be seen to be appreciated but are not visual, if by “visual” we mean “of any special interest to the eye.” Of course, the definition works for those for whom just about any combination of textual and graphic material is visual poetry–but then we would still need a special term for artworks in which the interrelation of words and graphics causes has a significant aesthetic effect (or is intended to). For that, the double-Karl definition won’t work, and that more than any of the other combinations of text and graphics is what requires definition. Because, in my view, only that will jolt an engagent in both the reading section and the seeing section of his brain simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously.
This latter, by the way, is only one example of the way that my taxonomy of poetry is, like a proper theory of science, falsifiable. Eventually superior forms of cat-scans will be able to determine where in the brain different forms of poetry are appreciated. I claim each of the main kinds I classify will have a unique brainprint. Moreover, that brainprint will prove close to exactly what one would expect it to be: visual poems, by my definition, will have a visioverbal brainprint (which will be different from textual designs’ visiotextual brainprint); linguexclusive poems will have a purely verbal brainprint–initially, for most of them will give rise to visual imagery; avisual mathematical poems will have a purely verbomathematical brainprint, but visiomathematical poems will have a visioverbomathematical brainprint. The brainprints of more specialized poems–particular kinds of visual poems should–if my taxonomy is valid and my theory of psychology right–each have its own unique visioverbal brainprint.
One brainprint that especially intrigues is the one a cryptographic poem would have. It’d have to be verbal, of course, but also something caused by a conceptual part of the brain I haven’t worked out yet. Okay, crazy maybe, but don’t be too sure about that until it’s tested.
Friday, April 19th, 2013
A few people have told me (I don’t know how seriously) that they have not been able to figure out all the pieces I have in my latest entry in my Scientific American blog, and a few of mine colleagues even claim I can’t multiply. Ergo, I have an excuse to blither about one of my poems. I’ve chosen one I think the easiest to defend. First, though, here’s Monet’s The Regatta at Argenteuil. It’s important for one trying to understand my poem to know of it because it is central to the poem (as the third poem in my triptych makes clear with a full reproduction of it).
Okay, to begin with the simplicities of the poem below, a person encountering it must be aware that it is a long division example. That is indicated by two symbols: the one with the word, “poem,” inside it, and the line under the sailboat. The first, so far as I’m aware, has no formal name, so I call it a dividend shed. The line is a remainder line. The two together, along with the placement of the other elements of the poem, one where a long division’s quotient would be, one where its divisor would be, one where the product of the two would be, and one under the remainder line where a remainder would be, clinch the poem’s definition as long division.
Now, then, anyone remembering his long division from grade school, should understand that the poem is claiming five things:
(1) that the text the painter who is unsleeping a day long ago multiplied times the scribbled sketch, or whatever it is to the left of the dividend shed equals the sailboat shown;
(2) that the sailboat is larger in value that either the painter or the sketch;
(3) that the addition of the letter fragments under the remainder line to the sailboat image makes the sailboat equal the poem referred to above it;
(4) that the the sailboat should be considered almost equal to the poem;
(5) that the letter fragments, or whatever it is that they represent must be less in value than any of the other elements of the poem with the possible exception of the quotient.
(2) and (5) are decidedly less important than the other three, but can still be important.
I could easily claim that the poem is wholly accurate mathematically by giving the painter a value of 2, the sketch a value of 7, the sailboat a value of 14, the fragmented letters a value of 3 and the poem a value of 17. Arbitrary? Sure–but by definition as Grummanomical values of the elements mathematically correct however silly. (And I would contend that if I had time, I could given them Grummanomical poetic values most people would find acceptable, and–in fact–I believe one of the virtues of such a poem is that it will compel some to consider such things–at least to the extent of wondering how much value to give a painter’s activity, how much to a sketch, and whether a poem is genuinely better than either, or the like.)
I am including the above in my entry to help those a little fuzzy about long division (and I was definitely not unfuzzy about it when I began making long division poems, and still sometimes have to stop and think for more than a few minutes at times to figure out just what one of my creations is doing). My poem imitates it in every respect except that it does what it does with non-numerical terms rather than with numbers. I hope, however, that someone encountering it without knowing much or anything about such poems will at least find things to like in it such as the little poem about the painter, or the idea of the childish sketch as perhaps the basis of what would become a Grand Painting. Some, I believe, would enjoy recognizing the sailboat as the one in Monet’s masterpiece, too. But what is most important aesthetically about the work is what it does as a mathematical operation. That operation must make poetic sense if the work is to be effective. Needles to say, I claim it does.
To consider the question, we must break down the long division operation the poem depicts into its components. First of all, there is the multiplication of the sketch by what the painter is doing to get the sailboat–the painting of the sailboat, that is, sketch times something done by a painter almost having to yield a picture of some sort. Does this make sense? Clearly, a painter must carry out an operation on some initial sketch or idea or equivalent thereof to get into a painting, so I don’t see how one can wholly reject painter operating on sketch yields portion of painting as analogous to . . . 2 operating on 7 to yield 14. But there is more to it than that, if only to those of us who think of multiplication as magic, and are still in touch with the way we felt when the idea that 2 times 7 could make 14 was new to us. That is, just after we had internalized the remarkable mechanism for carrying out multiplication. For us, the poem’s painter is using his painting mechanism to hugely enlarge a sketch the way the operation of multiplication (usually) hugely enlarges a number. Doing so in a kind of concealed magical way unlike mere addition does. A three-dimensional way.
At this point, the question arises as to whether the sailboat nearly equal to a poem. That’s obviously a subjective matter. Those who like sailboats (and poems) will tend to say yes. Note, by the way, that “poem” here does not mean what I say it mean verosophically, but as what one of my dictionaries has it: “something suggesting a poem.” Here the context–a work of art–makes it impossible to take the word literally,–and moreover, of taking it to mean not just something suggesting a poem, but something suggestion a master-poem.
Well, not quite here: the penciled informality of the word, “poem,” counters the idea that a super-poem is being referred to, and the sailboat is only a black and white portion of a great painting, not a great painting by itself. We know it’s on its way to being that, but the multiplication is only telling us of it as a pleasant step, not anywhere close to being a realized goal.
The remainder, fragmented words, add very little to it, but we will later see that they are fragments of the phrase, “the faint sound of the unarrestable steps of Time.” Again, it’s a subjective matter as to whether these words could deepen anything sufficiently to enable it to suggest a poem. I say it does. But even if not, I think it would be hard to claim that the addition of such words to a visual image could not be called a plausible attempt to mathematically increase the image’s value.
In conclusion, I claim that the poem carries out the operation of long division in two steps, one multiplicative, the other additive, to valuable aesthetic effect. Elsewhere I have shown how, according to my thinking, it will put someone one appreciative of it into a Manywhere-at-Once partly in the verbal section of his brain and partly in the mathematical section of it. The next poem in the triptych goes somewhat further; the sequence’s final poem brings everything to a climax–I hope.
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Friday, November 23rd, 2012
Finally into my creative-flow zone this morning after thinking I never again would be, I produced the following, which is the fourth frame in a sequence devoted to Monet I hope to continue:
Here’s the frame just before the above one, to provide context:
I’ve had it here before, I’m pretty sure, but if you look carefully, you’ll see a few small changes I’ve made to it since then. I still think it’s stupendously fine. Urp.
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Saturday, June 1st, 2013
This also is from the June issue of ARTnews.
Okay, Weatherly is a fine craftsman, and his still life is interesting–a fine expression of a now widely-accepted value of superior art: its reminding us of the ability of the ordinary to provide aesthetic delight. But nothing more. Thinking about why brought to mind Williams’s red wheelbarrow, but much better. Or does it? I think so because both works present ordinary objects sensitively-arranged. But Williams’s arrangement is also a poem. Weatherly presents a cup, Williams a wheelbarrow–and something made of words, beautifully-made of words.
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Monday, September 10th, 2012
Stephen Dean: “Untitled (Crossword),” 1996–from http://www.artequalstext.com/stephen-dean.
I’m not sure what to say about this. Emily Sessions says interesting things about it and similar pieces by Dean at the website I stole the above from (which has two other Dean works–and, as I’ve mentioned here before, a large quantity of combinations of text and graphics that visual poets should definitely take a look at. The website, which is curated by Rachel Nackman, will soon be updated, I understand.
After reflection, I’ve classified this as a visimage (work of visual art). Whereas Emily Sessions thinks of it as an entrance to an underlying universe of colors, it seems to me an act of–well–desecration; Dean has stolen the crossword grid from anyone who wanted to solve it. His repayment, needless to say, more than makes up for the crime (the crossword, after all, will still be available in many other copies of the newspaper it’s in) by doing what Sessions says it does–although it seems more an overlaying of another universe than an entrance into one, for me. Klee seems to me the magician these magick squares are most in the tradition of. But they enter the day-to-day of social interactivity in a way Klee’s works do not (as Sessions points out).
My thought at this point, as I consider the work for the first time from my critical zone, is that it surprises one out of a readiness to obey rules, pursue a goal, use analysis–in the familiar context of a newspaper’s entertainment section–and into . . . colors, nothing more. Or, to elaborate, into a purely aesthetic experience one can flow unanalytically, goallessly, freely with. Yet, a final, numbered order remains ever-so-slightly visible . . . this newness is safe.
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Monday, June 24th, 2013
I spent three hours on the next installment of my Scientific American blog. It’s almost ready, but I feel done for the day. So, I tried an experiment: I pulled out an issue of ARTnews from one of my many stacks of the magazine, intending to use the first work in it that I liked here. October 1996. I found only one work by a contemporary I even liked:
I was unfamiliar with the painter–although I must have seen this work before. .
Tuesday, July 2nd, 2013
It’s late, so I’m just posting the following from the February 1998 issue of ARTnews due to my ongoing interest in visiotextual art I don’t think much of but that gets written up much more frequently than the similar work done by people calling it “visual poetry.”
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Tuesday, June 4th, 2013
One of my very lazy entries, just two steals from ARTnews.
This one is an example of what many Spidertangle artists would call “asemic poetry,” but which, unlike just about everything with that tag, gets into New York galleries or the equivalent. Why? It certainly is no better than much of the pieces shown at Spidertangle, although I do like it–the colors and shapes much more than the scribbling. Is it only because made by certified painters rather than people coming out of, or too associated with, poets. For one thing, artists like Brooker never think of their work as poetry of any kind.
A related example that I don’t at all like. In the spirit of Jenny Holzer. Yeah, makes yuh think but who in the world would hand it on their walls? On the other hand, like the Weatherly Dixie Cups, these bookspines could work as elements of my long divisions. That, needless to say, would complicate them beyond all possibility of being written up in ARTnews.
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I don’t care whether a poem can be read aloud or not. Mathematics is written in text just as ordinary verbal material is. Text printed standardly is effectively not visual, as far as I’m concerned: it’s symbolic. So a purely mathematical poem, in my definition, would be expressed in verbal and mathematical symbols.
On further thought, it seems to me all mathematics can be read out loud. So what if one needs to see it on the page to understand it? That would be true of many linguexclusive poems, too. Even relatively simple ones. I’ve almost never understood poems I was unfamiliar with when read at poetry readings.
As for the child and candy cane, I like your reasoning, but it now seems to me you have simple shown that “candy cane + child = happiness” and “candy cane + child = obesity” are both incorrect! They should be “candy cane + child = happiness + X” and “candy cane + child = obesity +Y.” And “happiness – obesity + X – Y.”
One futher note: even if we admitted that difficult math must be seen to be understood, that would not make “candy cane + child – X = happiness” a visual poem since that particular poem would not have to be seen to be understood. That said, I can’t wait for the first mathematical poem based on mathematics you have to see on the page to understand.
–Bob