Entry 1662 — More on Prac- & Cerebra-ceptuality
Questions in the Night: Big words only make it into the cerebrasipience zone? Algebra and higher math goes to cerebraceptual awareness only? Only strongly activated anthroceptual data gets in the cerebraceptual awareness? High charactration required for use of cerebraceptual awareness?
Later I remembered enough of my model of the brain to begin making a little sense (I hope). First off, I remembered how many awarenesses it contains, from the main ones like the reducticeptual (or conceptual) awareness through lesser ones like the matheceptual (or mathematics) sub-awareness down to even smaller ones I have not yet gotten down to but know are there. Each basically contains little but master-cells (m-cells), associative-cells (a-cells) and a mnemoduct. It is the activation of m-cells that gives us our experience of existence in the form of knowlecules, those being a sort of understood datum: “horse,” for instance, or “hoof” or “mammal,” depending on the context. Each active m-cell contributes a knowicle to the experience—i.e., a unit of knowledge, perhaps a syllable or something much smaller. They are activated either by sensory-cells reacting to stimuli in the outer or inner environment, or to memories of previously experienced knowlicles stored in their associated mnemoduct.
The a-cells are what count for this new cerebral set-up of mine, for they connect to m-cells in lower-order awarenesses unlinked to sensory-cells. This allows me to hypothesize an entire cerebraceptual awareness with sub-awarenesses in touch through a-cells with many or all the awarenesses making up the practiceptual awareness. Hence, the possibility that the latter sends only certain, potentially-“higher” to the cerebraceptual awareness. Meanwhile, the cerebraceptual awareness may have sensory-cells in the practiceptual awareness (I’m really brainstorming here, so may not be making sense) that are aware of data beyond the competence of the practiceptual awareness—perhaps relationships in the latter’s knowlecules. Hence, some m-cells in the cerebraceptual awareness will be activated by what is going on in the practiceptual awareness—and cause one to experience some new kind of knowledge.
To try feebly to give an example: a cerebraceptual sensory-cell in the practiceptual awareness’s matheceptual awareness might perceive some knowlecule as algebraic, tag it as such and activate an m-cell in the cerebraceptual awareness that causes us to experience something the practiceptual awareness could not have: “a3,” say. But probably not.
The point is, that the cerebraceptual awareness could easily share only some data with the practiceptual awareness, and be sensitive to data the practiceptual awareness can’t be—except maybe in some roundabout way due to an exceptionally good popular science book for laymen.
In any case, I now believe that the brain’s attention center is important. It’s where the brain determines where one’s attention should be focused. I now think it could allow this new cerebral organization of mine by sensing when some awareness in the practiceptual awareness has been stymied by something requiring verosophical attention, and in effect shuts down the practiceptual awareness and turns on the cerebraceptual awareness.
Or a poet experiences something in his practiceptual awareness that becomes in effect a problem for him to solve as a poem. He has fragments of thoughts that strike him as material for a poem but they bewilder him enough to cause his brain to flip his attention (assuming nothing important is happening in this day-to-day, that always over-rides cerebraceptual needs, although the two awarenesses may struggle). Eventually he will be able to control his attention—more easily by simply by (1) reducing his day-to-day as much as possible, and (2) working his way into a frustrated mental state that will flip him into his cerebraceptual awareness.
Meanwhile, his cerebellum may help out by going automatic, thus leaving his practiceptual awareness with nothing to do, which will shut it down. (Until something environmental alerts it powerfully enough—a loud sound, for instance.) I think of Wordsworth’s turning his practiceptual awareness over to his cerebellum by taking long walks that the cerebellum tended to while he was (mostly) composing away in his cerebraceptual awareness.
Random thoughts: that much of the anthroceptual awareness is blocked from the cerebraceptual awareness. It is in the latter that a person becomes impersonal, and the people in his life become objects.
Superior minds are those able to stay in their cerebraceptual awarenesses the longest. This will require the ability to raise one’s cerebral energy and maintain a high level of it—although dropping it when appropriate.
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from that par-graph that be:gins w/: “The point is,”
you pin-it-all on this Donkey Mind.
It’s like, as Larry Eigner says/said/wrote: “we’re all windows” ?
where “opening” and “closing” is also ( as you posit) a duality…
or, what do the Intelligent Academics call “it”…. a “dichotomy”
not only doe “the people in his life become objects” but
he also…. be:comes [ material } to use ?
the problem, if it is a problem, is that dropping even dropping
is not so easy…. or to drop even “good” habits ain’t either ?
well: enough about you. Let’s talk about me. and/ or the Reader/Viewer as
the Voyeur that he is…. that any poem or painting needs him to co:mplete
?