Richard Wilbur « POETICKS

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Entry 1376 — Rocks Are Not Clouds

Wednesday, February 19th, 2014

Tad Richards quoted something by Richard Wilbur at New-Poetry that I’ve seen elsewhere several times.  It always annoys me:

Kick at the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones:
But cloudy, cloudy is the stuff of stones.

If rocks are cloudy, what are clouds?  Solids are things that we can’t penetrate.  It’s silly to think of them as anything else.  As for Sam, technically he didn’t refute Berkeley, but I’m with him.  Reality is by definition that which is kickable, as opposed to that which is not, because not present to our senses.

Note: I’m deep in my Null Zone again.  Didn’t think I’d be able to post an entry today, in fact.  Then Tad came to my rescue. Then, moron that I am, I once again neglected to change the entry’s designation from “private” to “public” until the next day.
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Entry 448 — Another Terminological Change « POETICKS

Entry 448 — Another Terminological Change

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Although many of my coinages sound pretentious, I always aim for ordinariness.  It’s not that easy to achieve.  Hence, “xenological poetry” as one of my main categories of poetry.  Well, I suddenly saw yesterday that “dislocational poetry” could takes its place.  Ironically, that was the very first name I gave such poetry–surrealistic and jump-cut poetry–thirty or forty years ago.  I don’t know why I dropped it.  I see no reason not to use it now, though, so will.

Meanwhile, I also realized that “vaudevillic” as a term for all varieties of jump-cut poems is unfair since some of them cohere quite nicely.  So I’m bringing back “jump-cut” to its previous position, and demoting “vaudevillic” to a secondary position as an adjective describing one kind of jump-cut poems, the other kind being, “convergent jump-cut poems.”  Be sure to update your copies of A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry,” students.

I’ve made a change in what constitutes aesthetic pleasure, too: one of two things, fundaesthetic pleasure or pleasure due to fundaceptual stimuli, and anthraesthetic pleasure, or pleasure due to anthroceptual stimuli.  Then there’s a sort of new word, “osmoticism,” for the ability to learn osmotically, and its antonym, “unosmoticism,” which I use to represent one of the many intellectual dysfunctions of people who don’t believe in Shakespeare.

Last, and close to least is, “lifage,” my word for anything a person uses to trade when attempting to  increase the pleasure-to-pain ratio of his life.  An economics term.  There are two kinds of lifage, “inborn” and “acquired,” the latter of which is a person’s private property.  I came up with it because I needed some such term for what one trades to another when one rents a house to the latter in return for (the lifage) of money.  It’s not the lifage of the house (assuming for the sake of argument that it is as good after the rental period as it was before it) but the actual hours of life the landlord gives up, hours he could have used enjoying the house himself and which are permanently lost.  In other words, the term, “unearned income,” is nonsense.

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Entry 367 — Reality, Truth–Stuff Like That « POETICKS

Entry 367 — Reality, Truth–Stuff Like That

Definition of reality: all combinations of matter (i.e., that which can be directly sensually perceived by human beings) for which some definition obtains that will specify the thing defined to at least 99.99% of those to whom it is told.

Definition of truth: any statement that describes reality without contradicting standard logic, or  any definition of a portion of reality that at least 99.99% of those knowing it agree on, or including anything  supernatural, which 99.99% of those with at least ten years experience in the field involved accept as 99.99% certain of being valid.

There is also possible truth, which is a statement satisfying all the requirements of truth except that fewer than 99.99% of those with at least ten years experience in the field involved accept as 99.99% certain of being valid.

Definition of error:  any statement that describes reality but contradicts either standard logic, or some definition of a portion of reality that at least 99.99% of those knowing it agree on.

Metaphysics is any statement that describes reality without contradicting standard logic, or  any definition of a portion of reality that at least 99.99% of those knowing it agree on, and includes something  supernatural.

4 Responses to “Entry 367 — Reality, Truth–Stuff Like That”

  1. nico vassilakis says:

    happy birthday, bob

    may things ease and things thrive and may clarity visit you repeatedly

    allbest and sinceres

    yrs,

    nico

  2. Bob Grumman says:

    Thanks, Nico! I need all the clarities I can get to visit!

    all best, Bob

  3. marton koppany says:

    (I’m a bit belated but) Happy Birthday, Bob!

    Marton

  4. Bob Grumman says:

    Well, I’ll accept the happy birthday this time, Marton, but don’t be late again!

    –Bob

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Entry 529 — Old Man Philosophizing, No. 1 « POETICKS

Entry 529 — Old Man Philosophizing, No. 1

I often kick around the question as to whether life is worth living or not–or What Makes Life Worth Living (Assuming It Is Worth Living)?  Actually, my question much more usually is, what makes my life worth living?  It’s not a practical question for me–my inborn wiring makes it impossible–or close to impossible–for me to kill myself.  My inborn ability to reason does allow me to overcome some moronic instincts I’ve also been born with, but not that one.  I seem also to have an inborn endocrinological mechanism that lights up whenever I’m really low, and overcomes my reason with an injection of optimism–I never am, but will be blest.

To be fullestly accurate, I would have to say that my main question along these lines is “what would have made my life worth living?” for I’ve been convinced for a long time that it hasn’t been, and won’t be.    There’s probably no answer.  I could say, genetic immunity to early-onset male pattern baldness, but I’m afraid that such immunity would also have cost me 20% of what I consider to be my superior mentality.  Perhaps I would have considered my life worth living then, my lower intelligence being more easily satisfied than my present intelligence.  Certainly I would have had much greater worldly success than I’ve had (the mediocrities in charge of that being much more likely to smile on my efforts), and I’m not silly enough to claim I would not have enjoyed worldly success, just that my own belief in the value of what I do, and am, is more important than the world’s.  I don’t think it could have brought me the pleasure my present level of intelligence has.  I would never have come up with my psychological theory which, valid or not, has seemed wonderfully brilliant to me at times.  Nor achieved what I consider to have been my success (in my own mind) as a literary critic.   I couldn’t have composed the poems and plays I did, either, although I suspect I didn’t need all of it for those.  It’s even possible that it was a bit of a hindrance for me as a poet, and that I needed a different kind of intelligence for playwriting, which is the one area of serious endeavor that I feel I did poorly in, and probably should have stayed out of.

Perhaps my life would have been, or at least seemed, worth living to me had I been less aesthetically critical of my bald-headed appearance been more forgiving–but I wouldn’t like to have lived without that or the self-honesty applying it to myself requires.   Lack of them, too, would have lowered my intelligence considerably.

Bynow, I guess I’ve fairly clearly implied what would have made my own life worth living: vocational success.  To feel that I’d made a major contribution to the culture of my time would almost have been enough to have satisfied me with my life.  Alas, I would also have needed the corroboration of others, at least of those reasonably conversant with the fields I’ve worked in.  That I’ve gotten to some degree in poetry and literary criticism, but only from fringers, like myself, so not quite enough.  I would need the recognitionof the certified, as well.  However near-worthless it is in the short run, in the long run, it is the only valid recognition.  The academy is always incredibly slow to accept the best, but it invariably eventually does so.

So, vocational success and recognition were essential for me.  Anything else?  Yes, I would like to have had a successful marriage, and kids.  I think.  That might have cut badly into my vocational efforts–it may well be that I didn’t have, even could not have had, the energy required to have had the kind of marriage and family I would have liked and done all I wanted to as an artist/verosopher.  In fact, my belief that such would be the case was a main reason I never got married, I’m sure.  Vocational success, both personal and public, and a family, would have been wonderful, but I would not want to hate looking at myself in a mirror.  Yes, being bald-headed alone is sufficient for me to rate my life not having been worth living.  (It is not a subjective view but an objective absolute, by the way, that a desert is aesthetically inferior to a forest.)  It may even be that had I not had a bald head, I would not have needed the recognition of the certified to feel my life had been worth living.

That does it for my personal specific answer to my question.  It’s time for me to return to its initial formulation: what makes life worth living for anyone.  That’s easy enough to answer: it’s whatever provides a person with a maximal pleasure-to-pain-ratio for his life.  As I’ve stated here and elsewhere a number of times.  I would add that the ratio should probably be multiplied by the number of years–or days, or hours–the person has lived; that way, a person who has lived 70 years whose p-to-p ratio is 4-to-1 will get twice the rating as one with the same p-to-p ratio who had only 30 years of life, which seems reasonable.  No, better would be a multiplication by 1.2, I think.  Or multiplication by something.

Dimwits will find many things wrong with my universal answer, but I can find only one large problem with it (which I’ve also previously discussed): which is better, a life the pleasure of which has been twice its pain but never extreme, or a life the pleasure of which has been only 1.2. times as great as its pain, or even less than its pain, but was once or more times maximal?  I claim that this is a (or maybe even the) centrally-important question of ethics–and absolutely unanswerable.

There are many small problems with my universal answer.  How to count the hours one is asleep, for instance.   I may get into them at some later time; I don’t consider them significant enough to bother with for now.

I tend to believe that one’s intelligence is equal to one’s final rating.  If you’ve had a relatively unhappy life, you’ve been stupid.  Which means I’ve been stupid, yes.  Probably.  It’s terribly difficult to pin down how happy/unhappy one has been.  I know I can be happy most of a day, then ecstatic for a few minutes because of some vilely sarcastic insult I’ve dealt the Poetry Establishment at New-Poetry, then annoyed at having misplaced yet another book I wanted to look up something in, and decide I’d had a lousy day.  One thing I’ve noticed about myself–or think is true about myself–is that I tend to dwell on the unhappinesses I’ve experienced more than the happinesses.  This is a ridiculous flaw, but I don’t know how I got it or how I can get rid of it.  Oddly, I don’t think about the times I’ve looked bad, but the times I’ve mistreated someone else.  Whiteboy guilt, I suppose.  Fortunately, I do get continuing pleasure from many of my compositions, when I happen to see one after not having seen it for a while.  “Happen to see them” is accurate: I rarely seek them out simply to enjoy them.  My greatest happinesses have been daydreams concerning the wonderful things that might happen as the result of my current literary or theoretical psychology work.  (Yeah, Pope, again.)

Due to reasons already given, I consider my p-to-p ratio too low, although it may be higher than that of people who are quite content with their lives.  Is that possible?  Surely if I am not satisfied with how much more pleasure I’ve had than pain, that’s pain that should bring my ratio down below that of the contented.  Except that maybe I’m only dissatisified with it when I think about it . . .   (As opposed, I suppose I need to add, to most of my life, which consists of thoughts about subjects other than my happiness/unhappiness, or thoughtlessness.)  No matter: the reasoning part of my brain will be the one to choose between repeating my life and escaping into eternal non-existence, and it will choose the latter.

I seem to have finished.  Why do I feel like I haven’t?

 

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Entry 121 — Definition of Scientific Account « POETICKS

Entry 121 — Definition of Scientific Account

Many of my thoughts and hypotheses keep getting hammered for being unscientific, including my poetics (which I consider definitely scientific, which is why so many poets hate it).  So, here once again, although newly formed, is my definition of what a scientific account of some aspect of reality is:

An account of some aspect of reality is scientific if it satisfies the following four criteria:

1. It contradicts no law of nature held by the consensus of intelligent, informed observers.

2. Data accepted by the consensus above as factual can be shown by standard logic directly to support it.

3. No data accepted by the consensus above as factual can be shown by standard logic directly to refute it.

4. It is falsifiable.

Note: satisfying the four criteria only makes an account scientific; it doesn’t necessarily make it valid or of any importance.  Moreover, it will always be temporary since new data can always show up.

Because many highly regarded accounts of aspects of nature do not satisfy my four criteria but are accepted by a great deal of experts in the fields they are concerned with, such as physics’s big bang theory, which some facts contradict (the ones requiring the further hypothesis of the existence of unobserved “dark matter”) and which breaks certain laws of nature (the ones requiring such certain laws of nature to be different when the big bang occurred),  I also have a definition of what I call “Near-Scientific Accounts.”

An account of some aspect of reality is near-scientific if it satisfies the following four criteria:

1. If it contradicts a law of nature held by the consensus of intelligent, informed observers, the same consensus agrees that some end-around (like dark matter) is plausible.

2. Data accepted by the consensus above as factual can be shown by standard logic directly to support it.

3. If some data accepted as factual can be shown by standard logic directly to refute it, experts agree that some end-around is plausible.

4. It is falsifiable.

An account of some aspect of reality that is neither scientific nor near-scientific is unscientific.

Okay, in a few hours I should be an a Greyhound bus on my way to South Carolina.  I hope to post at least once from there.  If not, expect a new entry around April Fools’ Day.

6 Responses to “Entry 121 — Definition of Scientific Account”

  1. Sheila Murphy says:

    Glad you are here, Bob. Good luck on your VENTURE to SC. I hope it’s good. I love science, but not quite so much as I love your work. There you have it. Infinitely verifiable :)

  2. […] Entry 121 — Definition of Scientific Account 2 days […]

  3. Connie Tettenborn says:

    You may be interested in the following URL: http://www.sciencebuddies.org/science-fair-projects/project_scientific_method.shtml which explains the steps involved in the scientific method. My point being that a scientific account of something is only arrived at through proper use of the scientific method, as out lined in the link. (That link is simpler than the Wikipedia explanation or the Caltech intro to Scientific method:
    http://web.ipac.caltech.edu/staff/jarrett/talks/LiU/scien_method/AppendixE.html.

  4. Bob Grumman says:

    Connie, without really thinking about it (I’m kinda tired right now) I would say that probably following the standard scientific method would result in a scientific account of something, but I claim (violently!) that one can come up with a scientific account of something without an experiment–or, at least without performing an experiment. That is, one can use one’s empirical knowledge to construct a scientific account of something, with one’s empirical knowledge including knowledge of various experiments already performed, informally as well as formally. For instance, I can theorize that men get excited at football games without hooking up ten thousand football fans in a football stadium to blood pressure machines. I think that the obsession with experimentation in science has held it back, and that experimentation rarely leads to anything very significant. Einstein, I think, did few or no experiments.

    But thanks for the interest!

    –Bob (late with this because only today finding out this blog was getting comments and how to deal with them)

  5. Connie Tettenborn says:

    The (violently!) remark suggests you won’t change your mind. Einsitein actully perfomed “thought experiments.” Mathematical proofs and theoretical physics are different, but in the fields of biological and physical science, the only way to confirm a theory is through experimentation. And the development of pennicillin, vaccines and cancer chemotherapy, to name a few, are indeed significant. Regarding your football example, you actually followed the scientific method by hypothesizing that men get excited, testing that hypothesis by reviewing previous data and using observable criteria (instead of BP) to measure excitement (eg., any memory of a game where men stood up and cheered).

  6. Bob Grumman says:

    Hi, Connie.

    > The (violently!) remark suggests you won’t change your mind.

    It does, but the suggestion is wrong. That I tend to violently defend certain of my views doesn’t mean I won’t change my mind about them.

    > Einstein actually perfomd “thought experiments.”

    Sure, but I was referring to physical experiments.

    > Mathematical proofs and theoretical physics are different, but in the fields of biological and physical science, the only way to confirm a theory is through experimentation.

    That would depend on your definition of experiment. I claim that formal experiments are often unneeded, and by “experiment,” I mean formal physical experiment. Not that such experiments are not often extremely useful, and in some cases necessary. But, just as one can construct a scientific account of something without experiments by basing it on one’s experience of the past, and one’s thoughts about that, one can confirm a hypothesis (which is different from a scientific account) by checking it against the past and thinking about it. Also by further investigation, which is similar to experimentation but not really experimentation, for me. For instance, I hypothesize certain brain mechanisms. One needn’t set up an experiment to find out if they exist, one need only keep investigating the brain physically, or even research old investigations. I admit that this is hair-splitting. Obviously, if your scientific account is of something not available to normal sensory experience, you need to experiment or do something close to it to validate it.

    In many fields, particularly what you might call macroscopic psychology, the experiments have been done in the real world. We don’t have to do a formal experiment to find out if children will go to a man handing out free ice cream cones on a hot day or to a man handing out religious pamphlets.

    > And the development of penicillin, vaccines and cancer chemotherapy, to name a few, are indeed significant. Regarding your football example, you actually followed the scientific method by hypothesizing that men get excited, testing that hypothesis by reviewing previous data and using observable criteria (instead of BP) to measure excitement (eg., any memory of a game where men stood up and cheered).

    Right. No formal experimentation necessary. Empirical knowledge necessary.

    thanks for your response, Bob

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Entry 344 — Reason Can Explain Everything « POETICKS

Entry 344 — Reason Can Explain Everything

Too worn-out today, who knows why, to have anything for this entry but an opinion.  It’s the one in my title.  I believe that every question will result in one of three answers: a rational answer, a failed attempt at a rational answer, and a willfully false answer.  The first will come about when someone intelligent uses reason on a question that proves tractable.  The second will come about either when person of limited intelligence is unable to use reason on a tractable question, or when an intelligent person uses reason on a question that proves untractable–because the person lacks the intelligence or knowledge to deal with it.  The third will come about when a person consciously or unconsciously needs it to be to his liking much more than he needs it to be true, so he does not use reason on it.

A good example of the latter is the answer of many to the question, “What is poetry?”  Some poets need this answer to be “something too sublime to be defined,” because that seems to them to raise them to the level of supreme priests of some sort, wise in the ways of secrets beyond the ken of the uninitiated.   Others need it bo be “something too vaguely defined not to apply to just about anything,” which allows anyone to call himself a poet, which will gratify a egalitarian, and win him followers since those happy with criterialessness are always much more numereous than those who are not.  Finally, many will need it to be beyond reason because they are deficient reasoners, so don’t want reason to be consider of any real value.

I’ve left something out of this discussion: the fact that ost people concerned with the question of what poetry is, are really concerned with the question of what a moving poem is.  It is that which they claim reason can’t begin to explain.  But I am sure it can be.  I feel fairly confident that I’ve done it–essentially as something that causes pleasure in certain inter-related parts of the brain, a sort of poetry center that neurophysiologists will eventually pin down.  I have detailed ideas as to exactly what will cause that center to experience pleasure, too: in brief, a text, with or without averbal matter, that qualifies as a poem by my definition (i.e., a text with a certain percentage of flow-breaks), that is neither too familiar or too unfamiliar to the person encountering it.

Similarly other supposedly beyond-reason things like love and hatred can be similarly explained rationally by the existence of love and hatred centers.

That it is sometimes extraordinarily difficult to find an answer to a question does not mean that reason will never find an answer to it.

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