Entry 59 — Degrees of Absolutism « POETICKS

Entry 59 — Degrees of Absolutism

Just a few unexciting Philosophical Thoughts today, just to record them somewhere.

There are, in my opinion, four or more kinds of absolutes:

1. Philosophical–an absolute 100% certain, usually by definition–e.g. 1 + 1 = 2.  Not applicable to the physical universe.

2. Scientific–an absolute not 100% certain (in the universe as we know it perceptually) but so close to it as to be effectually an absolute with regard to the nature of the universe–e.g., Newton’s laws.

3. Historical–an absolute about what happened in the past not as certain as a scientific absolute but certain beyond rational doubt-e.g., that Shakespeare was the author of the works attributed to himm and Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo.

4. Literary-Critical–an absolute about the meaning of a literary work less certain than a historical absolute but certain beyond reasonable doubt–e.g., Keats’s “Ode to Psyche” is about Psyche and Nostrodamus’s writinghad nothing sane to do with the current political situation in the middle east.

I term absolutes 2 through 4 “effectual absolutes.”  I believe an effectually absolute explanation of everything is possible.  All that is needed is suffcient data.

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Entry 429 — Some Grumman Logic « POETICKS

Entry 429 — Some Grumman Logic

The sentence below this one is false.

The sentence above this one is true.

What can we now say about the two sentences above?  That, if we dispense with the false true/false dichotomy, neither is either true or false: each is true/false or paradoxical.  Parodoxes are inevitable in any human language, which in my thinking includes the language of mathematics and all the sciences.  It seems to me they never occur in nature.  That is, nothing in reality except our attempts to describe is ever paradoxical.  Hence, two parallel lines can meet each other in Non-Euclidean geometry, but not in the real world.

An aside: I’ve always wondered at the fact that many intelligent people with scientific backgrounds find the idea that parallel lines that meet will exist if the universe were the surface of a sphere.  Only in geometry.  In the real world nothing that has less spatial dimensions than two can exist.  Start drawing a line on your universe as the surface of a sphere and your first tiny dot with burst out if it on both sides.

Related to this absurdity is the idea of curved space.  But that’s just an absurdity of expression–saying, for instance, that a curving ray of light curves due to the effect on space of gravity rather than due to the effect of gravity on it.

It applies, too, to the idea of transfinite numbers.  The idea behind that, according to George Gamow is that you can’t form a list of infinitely-repeating decimal fractions that contains them all as shown by the fact (and this is true) that if someone brings up a fraction he claims is not on your list, giving you the first ten digits, say, and you show him it is on your list, he can show it isn’t by showing you the eleventh digit on his is different the eleventh digit on yours,  or–in the one in ten chance thatthe digits match, that some other later digit on his fraction is different from the one in that spot on yours.

But that procedure can work oppositely: you can make a list of all possible decimal fractions including infinitely-repeating ones and challenge him to find an infinitely-repeating decimal fraction of a given length that’s not on your list.  If you take all the integers in order, reversed, and make them infinitely-repeating decimal fractions by putting a point in front of each one as here:

.1 .2 . . .  .9 .01 .11 .21 . . .  .91 .02 . . .  .99 .001 . . .

he will not be able to give you any decimal that you can’t immediately indicate the location of on your list of a decimal fraction matching whatever string of digits he gives you.  Say it’s 00958746537 . . .  That will be the 73564785900th number on your list.  He can’t then say his number’s twelfth digit is different from your number’s because you can honestly say you don’t know what your number’s twelfth digit is.  But that his second number can be as easily found as his first.

So you have two true statements about mathematics that contradict each other.  I say they are therefore true/false statements, or paradoxes.

I don’t believe any real object can be infinite.  Space may be said to be, but it doesn’t exist, in my philosophy.  But I doubt that there’s any way of testing the truth of what is just my opinion.

Note to anyone concerned about my health: I managed to get through a stress test yesterday without having a heart attack or stroke.  I’m now wearing a heart monitor that will come off in three hours, at ten a.m.  I felt peculiar a few times while wearing it.  I hope they don’t turn up as problems on the monitor’s record.

I had trouble walking properly on the stress test treadmill.  My doctor and the woman overseeing me got quite frustrated.  I felt incredibly stupid.  I think I know what happened: there are rails to hold onto that I couldn’t grip without slightly stooping because I’m tall but have the arm-length of a 5′ 9″ white man, so I felt very awkward–until I just let my fingers touch the rails.  I also tried too hard because I thought I was going to be tested with stress.  When it was over, I asked why they’d never speeded it up.  No stress at all except the stress of feeling physically incompetent.

Hmmm, my spell-checker doesn’t like “speeded up.”  But surely “sped up” is not correct.  Weird.  I’d automatically say, “I sped home,” not “I speeded home.”  But that’s great.  The language should be crazy–as long as it tries for maximal stability.

I have opined on occasion that people who can remember rules of usage like sped/speeded may be use them to show their superiority to those who can’t–in other words, the lay/lie distinction that I hold to, for example, I hold to partly to show I’m not low-class.  But I hope my main reason is that I like ways to break out of universal rules as a literary artist.  I do believe in social classes, though.  It slightly simplifies relating to people, which is incredibly complex.  Not that my believing in it matters since a classless society is impossible.

2 Responses to “Entry 429 — Some Grumman Logic”

  1. endwar says:

    Bob,

    I don’t think your transfinite number statements make sense. Basically, you can show that the infinite number of fractions is equal to the infinite number of integers is equal to the infinite number of positive whole numbers, by showing a way to map them all. But you can also show that the (infinite) number of real numbers is greater than the infinite number of integers.

    the way to show that that the number of fractions (or rational numbers) is to find a way to list them so that you can count them all, so that then given a fraction you can figure out what number it is on your list of fractions. Since all fractions are written as ratios of numbers, you can write them like this:

    1/1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 . . . .
    2/1 2/2 2/3 2/4 2/5 . . . . .
    3/1 3/2 3/3 3/4 3/5 . . . . .
    4/1 4/2 4/3 4/4 4/5 . . .
    5/1 5/2 5/3 5/4 5/5 . . .

    Then you can count by starting with at the corner with 1/1 and then moving around to 1/2, 2/1, 1/3, 2/2, 3/1, 1/4, 2/3, 3/2, 4/1, and so on. Now you are counting them in a pyramid, and you can label the rows of the pyramid by the sum of the numerator and denominator, so the first pyramid row consists of 1/1, which we label row 2 because 1+1=2. Then there’s row 3 with two members 1/2 and 2/1, and for each 1+2=2+1=3. The next row is 4 with 3 members, and 1+3=2+2=3+1=4. Now if you give me any (positive) fraction a/b, i can compute it’s position in my pyramid scheme — it is the a-th term in row (a+b), so it’s number is the Sum of 1+2+3+4+. . . +(a+b-1)+a. In other words I count up the terms in the preceding rows in my pyramid and add a because that’s where it is in the last row of fractions. So there’s a way to count fractions, which means that the total number (that degree of infinity) is the same.

    But the number of real numbers is greater, and the proof works this way. Suppose you have some scheme for counting real numbers (we can even limit it to real numbers between 0 and 1, if you like), then take your first number on your list and write it as a decimal. If the decimal repeats, fine. If it ends, you can always add 0s on the end, after all 0.25=0.250=0.25000=0.25000000000000000000, etc.

    Then i can take your list and generate a new decimal number that isn’t on your list. Suppose the first number starts 0.1, so i pick a different digit than 1, say 2,and start my new number as 0.2. If your next number starts 0.037763902, then i look at the second digit, 3, and pick a different digit, say 2, and so my number 0.22 . . . isn’t the second one on your list either. For the third digit, i look at the third digit of your third number and pick something different (I have 9 choices), for the fourth digit i look at the fourth digit of your fourth number and pick something different there. If you would prefer an algorithm to pick each digit, you can always add 1 cyclically, so that if the nth digit of your nth number is 9, i pick 0 for my nth digit. So thus you see that for any counting scheme you have for real numbers, i can make a number that isn’t on your list.

    You can also show that the infinite number of points (real numbers) between 0 and 1 is equal to the number of points greater than one, because you can draw a one-to-one correspondence between x and 1/x.

    Infinite numbers are pretty crazy, but there are actually rigorous ways of working with them.

    – endwar

  2. Bob Grumman says:

    Cantor wants a list of decimal fractions you can count. I don’t. I just want a list that every decimal fraction will eventually show up on, and I have it. The fact that when I find some decimal fraction asked for on my list, a second decimal fraction can be named of greater length that may not be the number I’ve just found on my list is lrrelevant. Bringing in non-repeating decimals is just a con game like bringing in lies and non-lies into linguistics to produce paradoxes. I’m sure transfinite numbers are fun for mathematicians but also sure they are inapplicable to anything in the real world. According to my philosophy. (And my neurophysiology, which holds that numbers are real secondary characteristics of real things, and that–possibly–addition and subtration and may be further processes are real the way motion is. I’m working on an attempt coherently to show how this is that may take me a while because it’s currently low on my list of priorities.)

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Entry 298 — The Realities « POETICKS

Entry 298 — The Realities

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I don’t have anything for today so will philosophize.  I’ve been going over what reality is.  Latest axioms:

Subjective Maxolute Reality (that reality whose existence comes closest absolute certainty): my mind plus all that it can directly experience through my body’s sensors.

Subjective Probsolute Reality (that reality that exists beyond reasonable doubt): the constituents of maxolute reality according to logic (pure rationality), and is not contradicted by anything I know about maxolute reality.  It is not necessary for it to parallel what I know to be maxolutely real, but it helps.  Others’ minds, for instance.

Objective Maxolute Reality: That portion of my maxolute reality that (I believe) a majority of others accept as mazolute reality.

Objective Probsolute Reality: That portion of my probsolute reality that (I believe) those (I consider) knowledgeable about the portion involved agree with me about.

Metaphysical Reality: Anything outside the above realities; fun to think about, but irrelevant

Note: I’m sure some real philosophers have written things similar to what I just have.  My way to understanding, though, is (primarily) to go as far as I can on my own, and then check with others.  I say “primarily” because I also unmethodically read and listen to others.

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Entry 213 — More Really Intellectual Chatter « POETICKS

Entry 213 — More Really Intellectual Chatter

Re: egotomic reality or the least possible full-scale universe, it serves nicely as the basis of practically any religion you want to believe in.  It can have a God, maybe even an omniscient one, so much more able to expand than other egotoms that it could come into contact with all other egotoms and push them where it wanted to.  I can’t see how it could be omnipotent, though, for there should always be uncovered parts of egotoms they could use to do something on their own.

No God is in my own egotomic reality because it’s more elegant to think of all egotoms as equal but slightly different from one another, and nicer.  On the other hand, I like the idea of demi-gods–egotoms slightly superior to others, me, of course, being one of them.  Being the greatest of them, in fact!  Such an egotomic reality would explain why it does seem that perceived reality consists of a number of material entities ranging from the nearly infinitesimally simple–and able to effect perceptual reality–to extremely complex entities like you and I who seem able to effect perceptual reality relatively greatly.

It seems likely, if something like egotomic reality exists, that non-living entities are not manisfestations of egotoms, but perceived matter rather than real matter.  Put oppositely, I’m saying only living creatures and perhaps carbon atoms are egotomic, everything else being part of some egotom’s semblance to us.  Simple example, the egotom that I’m aware out of touches egotom 539,750 at location 3.  Wait, I need to start being more precise.  Location 3 of the egotom I’m aware out of touches  location 87 on egotom 539,750.  As a result, I perceive my friend Ed, who is aware out of egotom 539,750 and his awarenessless clothes, shoes,  scent of his after-shave lotion, and three square feet of the floor he’s standing on.

I like that better than a perceptual reality all of whose quarks, or whatever entities are the true atoms of our universe, have an awareness.   (I say there are such things as the  smallest entities in this universe even though it could as well consist of infinitely divisible entities and remain as simple because I don’t like infinity and won’t allow it on the premises.)

Good and Evil fit easily into any religion based on egotomic reality, Good being orderliness, Evil being disorder, as they are in most religions.  This contradicts my belief that in perceptual reality, the Good is a balance between excessive order (boredom) and excessive disorder (confusion).  So my egotomic religion supposes that once an egotom achieves stability at more than eighty percent, say, of its locations, it experiences pain and shivers its surface out of near-stasis, and begins again to seek eighty percent stability, but not a jot more.  I think this condition may be a necessary one even for an egotomic reality at its simplest.  Otherwise, total stasis might occur.  Great for Buddhists but–well, it’d be Nirvana, or everlasting near-infinite happiness–which my irrational human brain doesn’t like although it’d have to be the best possible state.  Ah, in that case, time being infinite (the one infinity I’m compelled to accept), egotomic reality would have already achieved total stasis and I wouldn’t be writing this.

It wouldn’t be fair to the egotoms on the outside of the egotomic universe, for they would have exposed locations.

As I’ve mentioned in my other writings about the versions of universe I’ve hypothesized that allow for a form of re-incarnation (here it would be egotomic continuation sans memory), a wonderful result of the existence of such a universe is that it gives one a rational reason for trying to make the universe better, to wit: by doing so you will make it better for you the next time you are a human being.  You will also make it better for others, which will make them more likely to be nice to you then, too.    I like that much better than your doing your best for others in order to escape damnation.  I can’t conceive of any universe run by an entity that would punish anyone for anything since one can’t help the body something gave him, and because there are so many easier ways for omnipotence or even extreme immortal power to deal with harmfully defective entities, like isolation.

I think that may be all I have to say about egotomic reality.  Surely it should make me famous.  It’s as interesting as Jung’s baloney and makes more sense.  It won’t.  But if a world-religion is derived from it, I hope they give it a good name.  Not “Grummananity.”  I like “Bobbianity,” though.

2 Responses to “Entry 213 — More Really Intellectual Chatter”

  1. Kaz Maslanka says:

    And the ones that mother gives you doesn’t do anything at all.
    :)

  2. Bob Grumman says:

    Glad someone’s out there visiting this site, Kaz, but not sure what “the ones” you speak of are? Age is definitely slowing me down.

    –Bob

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Entry 212 — The Simplest Final Universe « POETICKS

Entry 212 — The Simplest Final Universe

After rambling through yesterday’s entry, I remembered that the main thing I had wanted to discuss was my theory of a primary universe.  I’ve chattered about it before here.  I haven’t change it any, though I’ve added details, I guess.  What interests me now about it, though, is that I believe it is the simplest possible universe that can exist.  That, I think, makes it a significant contribution to the study of what existence ultimately is, whatever branch of philosophy that is.   (By “universe,” incidentally, I mean all of existence.)

Initial assumption: that the universe consists of nothing but space, or emptiness (not the thing with properties that modern physics takes space to be), and egotoms.  “Egotom” is my coinage for the awareness each of us finally is, and which each of us thinks he calls “I” or “me.”  He isn’t: his brain is calling his body that.  But, at the time, one’s egotom coincides with one’s body.  All of which is irrelevant to this discussion but I have a tendency–I mean, my brain has a tendency–to  go off on tangents.

An egotom is permanent.  Its ultimate size is very small, say about as small compared to a period as a period is to what current science says this universe is.  But it can expand to become possible as large as our universe is said to be, or larger, though not infinitely large.  Most egotoms are far larger than they are at their smallest.

An egotom has two properties: materiality and awareness of other egotoms.  Its materiality allows them to touch neighboring egotoms, its awareness to sense the contact.  An egotom automatically moves toward anything it touches, in effect trying to maximize the area of contact.  This results in egotoms pushing each other around and continually changing shape.   If it pushes hard enough, an egotom can protrude from the mass of egotoms that the ultimate universe (the universe under the one we know as human beings) is.  It will continue to move in the direction it has ben moving in, but only for a certain time period.  At the end of that time period, it will move in an direction opposite to the one it has been moving in.  Hence, the ultimate universe will never fragment.

Besides its ability to sense other egotoms, an egotom has an evaluatory sense.  It is happy to the degree that it attains stability, unhappy to the degree that it fails to.  The rest of the universe it will experience in accordance with what egotoms it is in contact with and where it is in contact with each.  It will “perceive” this experience in many possible ways, perhaps an infinity of ways, one of which is the way each of us is now perceiving it.  For instance, an egotom in contact with egotoms 2,6 and 908 at points 77, 423 and 888,746 may perceive existence at that moment to be what a human being experiences in a rowboat drawing close to a beach on Long Island one summer.  A slight change in where egotom 6 touches it may change its experience to hearing a seagull.  Etc.

Space is infinite.  It has to be unless what it’s in is.  Simplicity requires minimization of the number of terms in an explanation.  So space is infinite.

This description of the ultimate univers explains everything, as far as I can see.  That doesn’t make it true.  Nothing can do that, or make it false.  It’s just the description of the universe that accounts for everything using the least unexplained objects and characteristics of objects.

To complicate it to make it fit what I as a human being want to feel it does, I add that each egotom innately prefers certain egotoms to others, and uses more of its energy to get in and stay in contact with those eogtoms and ways from other egotoms.  That allows love of a mother and others to dominate an egotom forever, which my brain considers a nice idea.

I also like the idea of my egotom’s being better able than any other eogotom to understand existence in detail–which being in contact with a maximun number of other egotoms would be.

This is metaphysics, needless to say.  It does not negate the quest to understand this secondary universe of ours, for that can be thought of as simply how we experience our egotom’s under-quest to understand its existence.  That is, both our this-world-quest and our ultimate-universe-quest are going on simultaneously, so I can think of my investigation of quarks as simply a marker for my egotom’s simultaneous spreading over egtoms 487 and 836.847,008.

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Philosophy « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Philosophy’ Category

Entry 1740 — Of Meaning & Meaningfulness

Monday, March 2nd, 2015

I think a lot of gush and counter-gush in philosophical discussions has been caused by the use of the word, “meaning,” to mean two different things: (1) a description of a named entity in material reality that relates it to one or more named and defined entities in material reality in such a way that a person knowing the language its name is part of will, upon hearing or reading that name, be able to distinguish it from what it is not—by pointing to it on a table or the equivalent; and (2) a description of some real or alleged function of a real or unreal named entity that allows the entity to carry out or contribute to the carrying out of some mission important to whoever defines it as having this kind of meaning.

I’m satisfied with my definition of the first meaning of “meaning,” but consider my definition of the second meaning rough.  The following examples should help clarify it:

Keats’s bust of Shakespeare had a great deal of meaning for him for reminding him of the possibilities of poetry.  That is, the function of the bust was its help in encouraging him to follow Shakespeare’s lead as a poet.

The New Testament has a great deal of meaning for a sincere Christian for reminding him that Jesus died to allow him a chance for Heaven–i.e., its function (or one of its many functions) is to remind a Christian that immortality is possible.

Winning the first world series game has special meaning for a baseball manager because winning the first game in the other team’s ballpark gives a team an advantage, and winning it in one’s own ballpark prevents the other team from having an advantage–i.e. winning the first game regardless of where played has the function of increasing a team’s chance of winning the series (in addition to the advantage an victory will have.

Each time I list one of these “meanings,” it is plain to me that the word I should be using is not “meaning,” but “meaningfulness.”  So my simple insight concerning the meaning of “meaning,” is that the second meaning should be junked.  The main place it crops up is in the phrase “life’s meaning.”  I maintain that “life’s meaning” should be, simply, “a state of being certain entities in material reality possess which allows the entity to move of its own volition, and in other ways act as living organisms in accordance with the latest scientific understanding of the state,” not “life’s purpose.”  If you want to discuss the latter, the correct term should only be “life’s meaningfulness.”

And the question central to much of philosophy should be, “What gives life meaningfulness? not what gives life meaning?  Linguistics with the aid of biology gives the word, “life,” its only proper meaning, a meaning that it is important to point out is objectively-arrived at, because based solely (for the rational) on the material attributes of the state of being the word, “life,” represents.  (I’m ignoring the inexpressible intangibles those who believe in the existence of immaterial entities or substances consider part of life’s state of being as irrelevant because either non-existent or existent but not material, so incapable of having any effect on anything.)

There, another attempt to form a minor understanding of an over-rated question without great success.  But if I’ve only gotten a few people to use “meaning” only in its linguistic sense, never in its philogushistic sense, I’ll be happy.

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AmazingCounters.com

Entry 1714 — Further Beyond the Decimal Point

Wednesday, February 4th, 2015

Right of the Decimal Point, Part Two
(An Extreme Rough Draft)

Back to Calasso’s text, “How can we know something that doesn’t let itself be known? In only one way: by becoming to some extent that thing itself.”  If one accepts my definition of “knowing something,” it is vacuous.  Note: I would try to determine Calasso’s definition if I were concerned with addressing what he thinks his text means, but I’m more interested at the moment in what I think it means.  Perhaps later I’ll try to understand it from his point of view.  I just want to emphasize here that what some writer means by what he said is not necessarily the only its meaning, or even necessarily its best meaning.

For me, Calasso’s first statement is, “How can we know something unknowable?”  Answer: we can’t.  If the thing is material, we can perceive it.  It has nothing to do with whether or not it lets us.  I see I may be expressing another dogma of mine: that every bit of matter in the universe acts in accordance with what it is, and no other way.  There is no such thing as will,  If billiard ball A is hit by a second billiard ball, it will react in accordance to what it is (mainly a sphere of a certain hardness and weight), where it is, and what laws of nature pertain to its being struck the way it has been.  It has no say in the matter.

Ditto the behavior of the atoms in an H2O molecule—and the atoms in each molecule of a person’s body.  The universe’s behavior is determined by what it is, period.  Now, then, if we jump into metaphysics, we can hypothesize a randomizer that can emit chance-rays from time to time that minutely make a few quarks misbehave, so that the universe will be unpredictable, each minute change eventually having extreme effects.  But the universe will remain deterministic, but with its behavior determined by laws in absolute effect almost all the time instead of all the time, and to some degree determined by chance.

I can’t see how any piece of matter can have will.  How, for example, can a man tell himself to throw a ball to one of two friends and not to the other “freely?”  The question for me would be, “how can he prevent what he is from doing exactly and only that which what he is and his circumstances force him to do?  There’s an infinite regress involved.  Let’s say the man “decides” to throw the ball to his friend Jack.  I say that what happened (in effect) is that a mechanism in his behavraceptual awareness will have analyzed the data transmitted to it about what’s going on, and evaluated all appropriate responses to it in its repertoire and activated the one with the highest score.  Ergo, the man did what he did because what he is includes an executive mechanism that is what it is.

The man’s brain will cause him to experience a feeling his language will have attached some words like “I am throwing a ball” to, although he won’t ordinarily track down the words for the feeling, just feel he is in charge of throwing the ball as he does so.

In a sense, the man’s arm is in charge, but only because it is what it is, not because it will ever have more than one choice about what it does.  What we call free will, then, is most often (or always, I’m not sure which), that which we exercise when what we are determines an event we participate in more than what the other elements part of the event are: when the man throws the ball, the ball goes where it does partly because it is what it is in shape and weight, partly because of the relevant laws of nature, but mostly because of the thrust given to it by the man’s arm—which in turn was determined by a brain state due to the way its machinery chooses behavior.

This is one of the many areas of philosophy that I consider ridiculously simple but have trouble using words to describe.  We do what we do because of what we are because of our genome because of some coming together of those genes in our genome at some previous time because of the presence before then of various atoms and molecules, etc., etc., down to because of the what the universe is.

Political free will is everything you can do, or elect not to do, because of what you are versus everything you have to do, or keep yourself from doing, because of what the state is as well as because of what you are.  Social free will is a little different.  It is what your society rather than the state allows you to do, and includes the ability to ignore the external determinant involved (i.e. society) whereas you lack that ability concerning what the state make you do or avoid doing.

The ability of the state to punish you for disobedience to its rules make it able to curtail the size of your free will, but you can still exercise all your free will if willing to risk punishment or even suffer it.  That, of course, depends on what you are.

Yes, I definitely feel like I’m a third-grader trying to teach a very simple subject to first-graders (with sixth-graders making fun of me behind my back).

Anyway, to get back to free will, there are three kinds of will: (1) the will freely to do or avoid doing everything that what you are allows you to do or not do; (2) the will to do or avoid doing everything that what you are allows you to do or not do except that which some entity or group of entities will punish you for doing or not doing; and (3) the will to do nothing except what your external environment makes you do (because of what you are).

Will number two is what religions that believe in free will allow you to have.  It is idiotic because you either have to do what your priests tell you to do or be punished, but you have no control over whether you are able to obey your priests: that depends on your executive mechanism, and you were stuck with that, you are the slave of that, you did not visit a shop selling executive mechanisms, or brains with such mechanisms or the equivalent in them before you were born.  Or, if you did, the equivalent of a brain you then had, or what you then were, determined your choice.  (See what I earlier said in passing about the eternal regress involved.)

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AmazingCounters.com

Entry 1702 — The Three Meaningfulnesses

Friday, January 23rd, 2015

“Meaning in life is a matter of meaning to others,” writes Wayne L. Trotta, encapsulating a central view of Philip Kitcher’s Life After Faith in his review of it the February/March 2015 issue of the secular humanist periodical, Free Inquiry.  It seemed an excellent expression of what I’ve recently been writing about our need to matter to others . . . except for one significant thing: it suggests that the only meaning in life is what I’d slightly change to “meaningfulness to others.”  And that reminded me of the liberal compassion that was a subject of one or two recent entries of mine.  It reminded me how tunnel-visionedly liberals (and all secular humanists are wholly liberal) over-value their idea of compassion.

I immediately saw that my life was ruled (as far as I know) by three meaningfulnesses, anthroceptual, reducticeptual and aesthetic meaningfulness, of which the first is the least important.  I would not be surprised if this turned out to be a premature conclusion, but right now I can’t think of any other meaningfulness–for me, at least.  Mere survival is as important as any of the three meaningfulnesses, but not meaningful, just something we have to do.  One might call reproduction biologically meaningful, but I’d call that, and survival, sub-cerebral meaningfulnesses, if meaningfulnesses at all.

There are many different varieties of the three main meaningfulnesses.  Liberal compassion, for instance, is only one kind of anthroceptual meaningfulness, and mathematical meaningfulness just one kind of reducticeptual meaningfulness.  But I would call the final goal of each goodness, truth and beauty.

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Entry 1639 — Choice of Ethotactic, Part 4

Saturday, November 22nd, 2014

What I’ve said so far suggests a question to me: can something a person does with no ethical intentions be ethotactical?  For instance, say I am with a friend I know to be much more poor than I and we  come upon an apple tree in a public forest with one apple on it, and I pick it and eat it, not thinking of my friend.  Or, for a more colorful example, say I have been taught that Irishmen are subhuman creatures without the ability to feel pain, and that hunting them will be good practice in the use of firearms that one may one day need to fight off aliens from outer space.  So I shoot a few Irishmen between the eyes, inflicting pain on them without realizing it, and even perhaps killing one or two of them.  Have I behaved immorally?

According to my theory of knowlecular psychology, no.  That’s because an ethotactic, or the choice of a moral or immoral action, can only be the result of some anthroceptual decision based on living in harmony with a known social code.

I think I would go so far as to say that my killing an Irishmen or two in such a case is not immoral even according to most people’s standards.  Many would protest, but because it would seem that I would be excusing a Nazi taught to consider Jews sub-human for gassing them.  I would excuse the Nazi, but only morally.  For me, he would be not immoral, but homicidally stupid—and therefore deserving to be reprimanded!  Sorry.  I have a weakness for black humor.  What I believe is that such a person should be prevented from continuing to gas Jews by being executed—unless one truly believes some kind of re-education can make him accept Jews as human, and he is compelled to repay society for his social stupidity by spending the rest of his life shining the shoes of Jews for free or something.

Ultimately, I believe all reprehensible acts are acts of stupidity, and that what kind of stupidity is involved—moral stupidity or some other kind of stupidity—is irrelevant.  Society should be maximally protected from the person acting reprehensibly (and protected from his genes, for I believe criminals [real criminals], and that’s who I’m talking about, should not be allowed to breed).  Of course, I realize I’m making a complex subject seem much more cut&dry than it is.  Just ideas to counteract simple-minded bad/good anti-continuumism and the insensitivity of certain sentimentalists to Evil.

About evil I will say that all definitions of it are necessarily subjective, but that it does exist, and can be defined sociobjectively.  Sociobjectivity is a view of an idea that is held by such a large majority of the members of a society and which has an objective neurophysiological basis as to be close enough to true objectivity as to be taken as such.  Take the evil of killing an innocent child.  Almost everyone would disapprove of that, and (I believe) almost all of us are instinctively repelled by the deed, and—in fact—would instinctively try to prevent a child, innocent or not, from being killed.

Not that our instinct to use reason would necessarily not be involved.  If effective, it might tell us that our standing in society will go up if we stop someone from murdering a child.  Although our instinct to advance statoosnikally would be part of that.  Actually, I think in most cases, protecting the child would be reflexive whereas our explanation would be taken care of mostly by our reasoning.

To be honest, if I were dominated by reason, I would never risk my life, even as the old man I now am, for some child, because what I believe I may contribute to World Culture is almost sure to be more than what the child will, however long he lives.  The problem with that, of course, is that my ability to reason may be defective, in which case, my not saving a child at the risk of losing my own life would be stupid integrity–that is, acting according to my code that I should protect my own life at all costs because of its great value to the world.  I claim that following that code would be absolutely valid if I were another . . . Nietzsche, without his breakdown.

Needless to say, the idea that Evil is what some deity has said it to be is absurd; various deities have universally defined certain acts as evil because the men who invented them were instinctively against those acts.  Other non-universal acts, like saying something contemptuous about some deity, have also been said to have been ordained Evil by a deity invented by men not because their inventors were instinctively against such acts but because the definition of Evil helped them gain power or destroy other tribes, or simply because of some personal dislike—of a priest once clawed by a cat that made him claim his main god had defined cats as evil, for example.

I do think that reasoning should dominate every moral choice one makes, but it can’t overcome one’s instincts, all of which are ultimately moral, for a given person.  We can only argue about whose individual morals would work best for the society we want to live in, and perhaps use reason to show that giving in to a society’s chosen code will be better for each individual in the long run, the long run excluding some never-seen Heaven or anything like it.

Which brings to mind the question of whether or not it is moral to lie to the masses and tell them some God will do horrible things to them if they don’t accept a society’s code.  I realize that there are those who don’t believe that our species naturally, due to our genes, divides into different social classes–three of them, roughly speaking:  masters, slaves, and . . . cerebreans.  They’re nuts.

I divide ethics into the study of socioethotactics and the study of egoethotactics . . . I think.  There are two major problems: formulation of a maximally fair and biologically advantageous set of socioethotactics by a society, and an individuals’ reconciling his inevitably conflicting set of egoethotactics with his society’s socioethotactics.

More on this eventually, if I think I can say anything at all interesting about it.

* * *

Note: on the day I made my first entry here about ethotactics, 36 people checked up on me at my Wikipedia entry; rarely do more than 4 people visit it on a day, and none since the first month it was up have anywhere near that many done so.  Were they fans of Jonah Goldberg, whose article I was commenting on?  The visits after that have been few, for or five in a day at most.

Last, and definitely least, here’s this SURVEY again:

Please, Dear Reader, I implore thee: when you have read as much of this entry as you feel like reading, let me know whether you have found it worth reading in full or not by clicking “YES” or “NO” below. You would help me a great deal, and might even get me to make my entries more reader-friendly. (And for the love of Jayzuz, please don’t try to spare my feelings by politely declining to click the NO although you think the entry Vile Beyond Imagination. Oh, some of you may need to know that I am not asking you whether you agree with me or not!)

YES

NO

Note: I will be repeating this request in some of my entries to come. Feel free to click one of my buttons each time I do, but please don’t click either more than once a day.

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Entry 1638 — Choice of Ethotactic, Part 3

Friday, November 21st, 2014

A Note to the Fore:

Please, Dear Reader, I implore thee: when you have read as much of this entry as you feel like reading, let me know whether you have found it worth reading in full or not by clicking “YES” or “NO” below.  You would help me a great deal, and might even get me to make my entries more reader-friendly.  (And for the love of Jayzuz, please don’t try to spare my feelings by politely declining to click the NO although you think the entry Vile Beyond Imagination.  Oh, some of you may need to know that I am not asking you whether you agree with me or not!)

YES

NO

Note: I will be repeating this request in some of my entries to come.  Feel free to click one of my buttons each time I do, but please don’t click either more than once a day.

* * *

A new start.  What I think I think now is that an ethotactic is any choice of action that is made fully or to a great extent on the basis of anthreval- uceptual input.  Do I need to say more?  Surely that clarifies the subject satisfactorily?  (I’m exercising my wit here because I’m scared that if I go on, I’ll horribly bungle the amplification what I’ve just said requires.  But my verboceptual awareness—along perhaps with some part of my scienceptual awareness—has convinced my socioceptual awareness, that I have a verosophical moral duty to expose my full thinking on this in spite of how bad my egoceptual awareness, trying to stop me, will feel about my exposing the lameness of my brain.  More exactly, my evaluceptual awareness, which right now I think has offices in each of the rest of the cerebrum’s awarenesses as well as a brain area all to itself where it collects the votes pro and con about all the choices available to the behavraceptual awareness, where a final choice of action will generate the action the person involved takes.

You know, I truly do not know whether I’m making sense at all.  I’m fairly sure that I have a good idea what I’m saying, but am also certain that I am over-simplifying what I think is occurring.  Which may not be.  Not that it matters, since I don’t think I can make any headway toward a reasonably intelligent rough description doing anything other than taking a series of very simple steps of description.

Note: it is at this point that I thought of constructing the YES/NO buttons above.

Okay, what happens in slightly more detail is that (1) a person experiences instacon A (i.e., “instant of consciousness A”), or the contents thereof, which I probably have a name for but can’t now recall.  (2) Instacon A activates a number of possible actions out of the awarenesses participating in it.  Let us say, for instance, that it contains data depicting an ant on his kitchen counter that activate cells in his visioceptual awareness (a sub-awareness of his protoceptual or fundaceptual awareness [whose name I haven’t permanently chosen], data activating cells representing “me, innocently going about my daily business, in the egoceptual sub-awareness of my anthroceptual awareness (I’m going into detail to try to keep things straight for myself), data activating cells in the socioceptual sub-awareness of my anthroceptual awareness representing “enemy deleteriously approaching my food,” data activating cells representing the word, “ant,” in the verboceptual sub-awareness of the linguiceptual sub-awareness of my reducticeptual awareness, and maybe data activating cells causing a barely perceptible reaction to fear of the sting of a fire ant.

All these active cells will send attempt to activate behavraceptual cells capable of causing appropriate behavioral responses like moving a hand that’s near the ant, carefully sliding a piece of paper under the ant and removing it from the house without injuring it, splotting the damned thing, or singing a song about “Aunt Delores,” if I knew one.  Meanwhile, instacon A would probably have continuing sequences of information in it with nothing to do with the ant—something to do with why I’d come into the kitchen, for instance.  Behavraceptual cells responsible for various appropriate behavioral responses (or behavioral responses that seem appropriate to me) would activate those responses.

In effect, they would vote for the action begun, or continued—make that actions, because we generally carry out more than one action during each instacon.  Each activated cell or cell-group would try to send energy to the muscles or glands responsible for carrying out its desire.  But much of that energy would be blocked by the greater energy another cell or cell-groups responsible for a behavior in conflict with the behavior the first cell or group was trying to cause.  In other words, a lot of votes would be cast, and the evaluceptual awareness, where they were being cast, would determine which candidates receiving votes would win, and succeed in causing action.  If any.  For I may take no action, no cell or cell-group’s transmission being strong enough to cause me to do anything.I suspect that in this case, the word, “ant,” would make me say to myself, “Damned ants.”  This would be an ethotactical response based on my perception of the ant as an intruder, and—possibly—my empathy for the robotic damned thing.  Perhaps my laziness would be a factor, too.  Would it have any ethical component?  I think not.  I think I would have a musclaceptual reaction of “don’t squash, too much work” that would be purely, amorally, protoceptual—i.e., having to do with my desire not to exert myself, nothing else.

Which suggests a question to me: can something a person does with no ethical intentions be ethotactical?

TO BE CONTINUED

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Entry 1636 — Back to Goldberg

Wednesday, November 19th, 2014

Okay, back to my response to an essay by Jonah Goldberg.  I was writing about the effect of ethotactical intelligence on ethotactical duration but also the width of said duration.  An “ethotactic” is a person’s moral choice of action in a given situation.  I ended my writing for that day with the following:

“Obviously, the situation will have a lot to do with the length of a person’s ethotactical durations, there seldom being little point in trying for a long one regarding what to do morally about a piece of candy one has been offered.  Short-term moral behavior will not depend much on ethotactical intelligence.  That means day-to-day behavior will generally be intelligent enough (and considered acceptable enough) although not based on long ethotactical durations or particularly high ethotactical intelligence.

“Now for a scattering of points, because I don’t see right off how to present a better organized response to Goldberg’s essay.  First is his suggestion that too many people, especially young people, believe that “if it feels right, do it!’ by which he means all they think is necessary to make an ethotactical decision is passion.  Goldberg amplifies this when he quotes a character in the movie, Legally Blonde, as follows: “On our very first day at Harvard, a very wise professor quoted Aristotle; ‘The law is reason free from passion.’  Well, no offense to Aristotle, but in my three years at Harvard, I have come to find that passion is a key ingredient to the study and practice of law—and of life.’”

“Well, I would agree with Goldberg that the character is an airhead  . . .” I stopped there, cutting the paragraphs above from the text because I thought it had come to a good stopping point before them.  When I came back to them just now, three days later, and wrote the paragraph beginning this entry, to set the scene, I was immediately unsure what I was talking about.    There’s a person’s plain choice of action.  How is it different from his moral choice of action?

Okay, a person’s choice of action depends on a vote from each of his active awarenesses at the time.  These votes will probably never be equal.  How much weight the vote of a given awareness will have will depend on the person and on the situation.  And now I suspect I’m constructing a different theory or set of ideas than I was describing in part one of this cluster-dementia of an intellectual exploration.

I should probably re-start but I’m too lazy too.  It is also possible that I’ve got an idea begun that may lead somewhere worthwhile.  Question: what awareness provides the ethical portion of a person’s choice of action?  Immediate answer: the evaluceptual awareness, because it is the awareness that determines on the basis of past experience what path is most likely to maximize the pleasure-to-pain ratio.  This answer is wrong.

The moral content of the evaluceptual awareness’s choice will be determined all or mostly in the anthroceptual awareness, because it will try to make one act properly in order to satisfy one or more social instincts like the need to conform, the empathic need not to cause pain . . . there must be others but I can’t think of them now.  The instinct not to cause pain probably has many sub-instincts under it: like the need not to boast (because it may make others feel smaller) . . .

I wonder if there’s an egoceptual instinct to be honest in appraising oneself.  No one else need see that you dishonestly rate yourself a better poet than some Nobel Prize Winner, so it’s not a socioceptual instinct, if it exists.  I think it may exist because it would be advantageous for preventing unrealistic behavior.  But would it be moral?  And what about the embarrassment of missing five lay-ups in a row in your backyard where no one can see you.  You have immorally failed to live up to your own expectations just as missing one layup in a game would be immorally failing to live up to your group’s expectations.  If doing what you’re supposed to in a team effort hasn’t to do with morality, what does it have to do with?

My problem is to intelligently describe a person’s choice of action, which I now see is a matter of describing the many choices it is a combination of—basically the votes of various awarenesses (and sub-awarenesses) I’ve already mentioned.  Too much work for me now, so I’m outta here.  I hope I return to this matter, for my own sake.  (It would be immoral for me to deprive the world of my further thoughts about it.)  Not sure I will.

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Entry 1633 — Moral Integrity

Sunday, November 16th, 2014

Jonah Goldberg is one of my favorite writers.  I consider him funny enough to steal material from, and agree with (most of) his political outlook.  Often, though, I find myself partially disagreeing with some position of his.  At the moment, I’m disagreeing with portions of his latest essay in National Review, “Empty Integrity.”  Goldberg believes the world is opting for a kind of “integrity” that Irish philosopher David Thunder categorizes as “purely formal accounts of integrity (which) essentially demand internal consistency within the form or structure of an agent’s desires, actions, beliefs, and evaluations.”  Opposed to this is a kind of integrity, Thunder describes as “fully substantive accounts.”  The difference between the two is that a person with the first kind acts in accordance with ethical principles designed to maximize his pleasure-to-pain ratio whereas a person with the second kind “desires to do what is morally good in all of his decisions,” according, again, to Thunder.

Goldberg implies that the first kind of integrity, which—because he associates it with the philosophy of Nietzsche, one of my idols—I will hereafter term Nietzschean Integrity, is “empty.”  It isn’t.  What he is really bothered by, first, is that a person possessing it does not “apply reason to nature and our consciences in order to discover what is moral” but simply does what “feels right.”  This is wrong for Goldberg because it ultimately means understanding integrity “only as a firm commitment to one’s own principles—because one’s own principles are the only legitimate principles. The god of a person’s morality is thus not Jehovah but the person.”

Nietzschean Integrity is “empty” only inasmuch as there is no imaginary being running it.  It seems to me that a truly empty integrity would be one that was devoid of rules to follow.  That is not the case with Nietzschean Integrity.  What makes it empty for Goldberg is merely his dislike of its rules . . .  No, what is wrong with it for him is not its rules but the rules he believes it will be based on if some entity outside it is not their source.  Actually there is no reason a person with Nietzschean Integrity might not “apply reason to nature and (his) conscience in order to discover what is moral” and, as a result become firmly committed to absolutely standard good old George Washington principles—because they lead him to rules of morality that “feel right” to him.

Ultimately, we all must follow the internal moral rules that feel right regardless of where they come from.  Everything we do, we do because it feels right.  Reason may tell someone that if he sticks his hand in a fire, he will experience pain, but he will accept what it tells him because it feels right.  To give just one example of why you should accept my generality that should suffice to clinch my case—which, I suppose, reduces the question to one of simple semantics.

In any case, the real problem for Goldberg (and me) is what I have some up with the brilliant name for of “Stupid Integrity.”   And here I bumble into boilerplate I feel bad about repeating but, I fear, is all I have to say about the topic.  I claim that one necessarily tries always to maximize his P2P (i.e., his “pleasure-to-pain ratio”), as he at the time believes—I should say, “guesses”—it to be for a length of time dependent on his . . . anthreffec- tiveness, or effectiveness as a human being, which includes but is quite a bit more than his “cerebreffectiveness,” which includes what those less picky about such matters than I would call “intelligence” but is significantly more than.  To make it easier to plow through what I will go on to say, though, I will replace “anthreffectiveness” with “intelligence.”

The stupider a person is, the shorter the period of time I’m speaking of will be.  Since my greatest defect as a thinker is a need to name just about everything I discuss, I am now going to call this period of time the “ethotactical duration.”  It’s a term I’ve come up with on the spot, so probably won’t last long.  It’s how long ahead a person plans (in effect, since usually the “planning” will be nothing like formal planning, and won’t even involve what most people think of as thought)—or, to put it more simply, it’s how long a person will take to decide, based on his (conscious or unconscious) moral code, what he will next do.  (A “behavratactical duration” is how far ahead a person plans before initiating any behavior.)

Note to Goldberg: please tell your couch that I am not purposely trying to distract my readers from my essentially empty ideas by overloading them with terminology, and that—while I do feel he’s almost as good an influence on my as he is on you, I’d prefer that he not bother me until I’ve finished saying what I want to say here.  I should add that if he wants me to continue referring to him in the future, thus improving his chances of immortality by at least 0.62%, he needs to try harder to be my friend.)

To be fastidious to a nauseating extreme, I must say that by “how long ahead a person thinks before making an ethotactical decision about what he will do next,” I actually mean “how long ahead the wide variety of facts, feelings, and who-knows-what-else a person will (in effect) consult before making an ethotactical decision regarding what he will next do.

Now then, while the length of a person’s ethotactical duration has a great deal to do with the intelligence of his moral acts, the width and depth of his moral decisions (i.e., their intelligence) will have significantly more to do with it.  Does he just consider the taste of a piece of candy he has been offered, or also its effect on his health and/or its effect on his reputation, and/or its effect on a child with him if you don’t offer it to him and the effect of that on you, and/or its effect on his mood and the effect of that on the poem he is composing . . . and the effect of that on what the world thinks of him in the year 2222?

As you can see, ethotactical intelligence will effect ethotactical duration but also the width of said duration.  In the case just described, if the person is concerned only with the taste of the candy bar and the immediate effect of his giving it versus not giving it to the child, he will only be concerned with a duration approximately equal to the time it takes him to eat the candy, or the same length of time (let’s assume) that he will enjoy the child’s enjoyment of the candy if he gives it to the child, or feel guilty about not giving it the child if he eats it but the width of the duration will be greater than it would have been had he only considered how the candy would taste.

(My thanks to Goldberg’s couch for not telling me how clumsily I just expressed myself.)

TO BE CONTINUED (alas)

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Entry 1519 — Thoughts on Morality, Continued

Saturday, July 26th, 2014

When writing about morality yesterday, I puttered on after finishing the part I post in yesterday’s blog entry.  That resulted in this:

When I first had my little cluster of ideas, I thought I could describe how what I consider the central innate human drive, the pleasure-to-pain ratio maximization (P2P) drive, leads to a person’s internalized morality (also innate).  Further reflection on this was what put me in my null zone.  What follows are fragments from the system I thought I could come up with.

To begin with, the P2P drive, as its name, indicates, compels a person to try to maximize his pleasure (or minimize his pain). The “try” is important for he won’t necessarily know what will lead to a maximum pleasure and/or minimum pain.  Hence, his attempt may result in the opposite of what he wants.

By maximum pleasure, by the way, I mean anything that causes happiness or diminishes pain, not just wine, women and song, or the like.  It is most important to note, too, that I am speaking of a person’s lifetime of pleasure.  Hence, heavy, unpleasant physical exercising, or piano-practice, or studying–because of the pleasure the person believes his sacrifices will lead to.  The same reasoning holds for minimum pain.

I feel pretty much out of ideas about my subject now–the ones I had didn’t last very long.  But I going to try now to add a few thoughts about the innate mechanisms I think most of us have that influence our moral behavior.  “Ethiplexes,” I think I’ll call them for now.

Two are the empathy instinct and need for social approbation drive that I’ve already mentioned.  It occurred to me that a sub-instinct of the empathy instinct might be the maternal drive, narrowly defined here as a human need to nurture and protect children, infants in particular, and much more developed in most women than in men.  But it is definitely present in most men–which is why there is so much more grief when a homicidal lunatic’s victims are children rather than adults.  I think it may well be the basis of the nanny-state western nations have turned into.  It has something to do with the perception of losers as infants by those with strong maternal drives.

I’m not sure how to discuss this without mortally offending just about everybody.  I’ll just add that evidence in support of my contention is the way exploration of space halted once we got to the moon, with almost no complaints.  Which reminds me of another drive that is too morally influential in my opinion: the species-preservation drive.  It seems like the more people we have in the world, the more horrifying events like the Challenger disaster seem.  I suppose the media is part of that.

The social approbation drive is also a conformity drive; an offshoot may be the drive to make others conform, the totalitarian drive.  “Do what you’re told” is a leading moral tenet.  Because utter conformity wouldn’t work for a species, I believe a few of us have an anti-authoritarian drive.  Perhaps most boys (and many fewer girls) have one that weakens as they age.

Yes, I’m really dragging today.  Not thinking clearly or deeply.  I was hoping I’d get going but it doesn’t look like I will today.  Maybe tomorrow.

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Entry 1441 — Can a Stone Feel Pain?

Friday, May 2nd, 2014

Whether or not a stone can feel pain is key question in philosophy although few would recognize as such.  I keep coming back to it.  The unreflective answer is, “Of course not.”  The insane answer is, “Certainly.”  The correct answer is, “We have no way of knowing, probably ever.”  You see, we only know a stone would have no way of telling us it was in pain, if it ever were.  Moreover, even if it did, how could we know it to be in pain rather than signalling that something hit it–without being conscious of pain, as such?  It may even experience it as pleasure.

What difference does it make?  Well, if one is a liberal suffering from empathophilia, or excessive need to express empathy, one–recognizing that a stone could feel–would forbid one from kicking one.  Of course, to those of us not so afflicted, it makes no difference.  We recognize that we can mistreat a stone because a stone is not us.  And can’t fight back.

There–another dumb entry because I take my vow of a blog entry a day seriously.  My computer would be in deep pain if I didn’t, not to mention the Internet.  How about someone reading this?  Well, I didn’t force him too.  Besides, he’s not me.  (Note: this last was a joke. My theory of ethics holds that other human beings, and many other creatures, are in most contexts, as almost-us as members of our family. Unless we iz psychopaths.)

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Entry 1377A — Taxonomy Construction, Cont.

Thursday, February 20th, 2014

I left out something important in Entry 1377.  (I probably should say that I realized that I just thought of one of important things I left out.)  It has to  with the helpfulness of showing how one’s taxonomy evolved from earlier ones.  For instance, to help show the validity of accepting visual poetry as a class of art that my poetry taxonomy should cover, I go back in history to the earliest (significant) visual poems (in English, since that’s my main focus, although pre-English culture should be investigated (as I have, I maintain, without finding anything useful to my particular project).  I’m speaking of the shaped poems of Herbert (and perhaps others).  They consist of nothing but words but are importantly visual.  Hence, I can argue that the first visual poems (of those I’m concerned with) were too verbal for any reasonable person to call not poems.

From there it seems to me the evolution of visual poetry is clear, with a side trip to France and other more purely verbal poems that are partly or wholly visually presented like Mallarme’s scatter of letters, and Apollinaire’s visual onomatopoeia (letters arranged to suggest rainfall, for instance), then on to more sophisticated visual arrangements of the purely verbal carried out by Cummings.  How can anyone argue against his visual poems as not poems?  What else can a lineated text doing other things poetry has long done, as well as a few thins visual art has done, but containing nothing but words?  And make sense only if their words are taken into consideration?  Concrete poetry was much more sophisticated than the work of Cummings, but remained in its purest form entirely verbal.  But some of it took on averbal graphic matter (and in my view sometimes stopped being poetry).  Combinations of the verbal and the purely graphic were at first no greater a step from what had previously been accepted as visual poetry than Herbert’s shaped poems were from entirely unvisual poems.  How could anyone argue that it was not reasonable to call them visual poems?

And so it can be shown, in my view, that the most complexly visual poetry of today has evolved, one small step at a time from Herbert’s shaped poetry, so should be accepted as a kind of poetry.

 

Philosophy « POETICKS

Posts Tagged ‘Philosophy’

Entry 59 — Degrees of Absolutism

Wednesday, December 30th, 2009

Just a few unexciting Philosophical Thoughts today, just to record them somewhere.

There are, in my opinion, four or more kinds of absolutes:

1. Philosophical–an absolute 100% certain, usually by definition–e.g. 1 + 1 = 2.  Not applicable to the physical universe.

2. Scientific–an absolute not 100% certain (in the universe as we know it perceptually) but so close to it as to be effectually an absolute with regard to the nature of the universe–e.g., Newton’s laws.

3. Historical–an absolute about what happened in the past not as certain as a scientific absolute but certain beyond rational doubt-e.g., that Shakespeare was the author of the works attributed to himm and Napoleon lost the Battle of Waterloo.

4. Literary-Critical–an absolute about the meaning of a literary work less certain than a historical absolute but certain beyond reasonable doubt–e.g., Keats’s “Ode to Psyche” is about Psyche and Nostrodamus’s writinghad nothing sane to do with the current political situation in the middle east.

I term absolutes 2 through 4 “effectual absolutes.”  I believe an effectually absolute explanation of everything is possible.  All that is needed is suffcient data.

Linguistics « POETICKS

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Entry 1740 — Of Meaning & Meaningfulness

Monday, March 2nd, 2015

I think a lot of gush and counter-gush in philosophical discussions has been caused by the use of the word, “meaning,” to mean two different things: (1) a description of a named entity in material reality that relates it to one or more named and defined entities in material reality in such a way that a person knowing the language its name is part of will, upon hearing or reading that name, be able to distinguish it from what it is not—by pointing to it on a table or the equivalent; and (2) a description of some real or alleged function of a real or unreal named entity that allows the entity to carry out or contribute to the carrying out of some mission important to whoever defines it as having this kind of meaning.

I’m satisfied with my definition of the first meaning of “meaning,” but consider my definition of the second meaning rough.  The following examples should help clarify it:

Keats’s bust of Shakespeare had a great deal of meaning for him for reminding him of the possibilities of poetry.  That is, the function of the bust was its help in encouraging him to follow Shakespeare’s lead as a poet.

The New Testament has a great deal of meaning for a sincere Christian for reminding him that Jesus died to allow him a chance for Heaven–i.e., its function (or one of its many functions) is to remind a Christian that immortality is possible.

Winning the first world series game has special meaning for a baseball manager because winning the first game in the other team’s ballpark gives a team an advantage, and winning it in one’s own ballpark prevents the other team from having an advantage–i.e. winning the first game regardless of where played has the function of increasing a team’s chance of winning the series (in addition to the advantage an victory will have.

Each time I list one of these “meanings,” it is plain to me that the word I should be using is not “meaning,” but “meaningfulness.”  So my simple insight concerning the meaning of “meaning,” is that the second meaning should be junked.  The main place it crops up is in the phrase “life’s meaning.”  I maintain that “life’s meaning” should be, simply, “a state of being certain entities in material reality possess which allows the entity to move of its own volition, and in other ways act as living organisms in accordance with the latest scientific understanding of the state,” not “life’s purpose.”  If you want to discuss the latter, the correct term should only be “life’s meaningfulness.”

And the question central to much of philosophy should be, “What gives life meaningfulness? not what gives life meaning?  Linguistics with the aid of biology gives the word, “life,” its only proper meaning, a meaning that it is important to point out is objectively-arrived at, because based solely (for the rational) on the material attributes of the state of being the word, “life,” represents.  (I’m ignoring the inexpressible intangibles those who believe in the existence of immaterial entities or substances consider part of life’s state of being as irrelevant because either non-existent or existent but not material, so incapable of having any effect on anything.)

There, another attempt to form a minor understanding of an over-rated question without great success.  But if I’ve only gotten a few people to use “meaning” only in its linguistic sense, never in its philogushistic sense, I’ll be happy.

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AmazingCounters.com

Entry 1657 — Back to Witheo

Wednesday, December 10th, 2014

I consider myself a subauthority, third-class, concerning linguistics, but (as long-time readers of this blog will know) that hasn’t kept me from working on a theory of linguistics of my own, and frequently sounding off on the subject, as I’ve now been doing for two or three days at a thread at Aeon about an article claiming Chomsky’s theory of an innate grammar is invalid that has drawn a bunch of excellent comments, as well as many silly ones–and the usual yes or noes that airheads seem to think it worth posting to threads like this.

Hmmm, I see this is the fourth day I’ve been in and out of the thread I’m speaking of, and have already used some of what I’ve said here.  I’m afraid I’m committed nonetheless to bringing you my latest comments–’cause I think parts of one or two are brilliant!  Included is a post by one of the two my comments are replies to, a person using the name “Witheo.”  (He’s the one I was last dealing with here.)

* * *

ME: “Just a note to indicate that I read your long reply to what I said about your linguistic nihilism, Witheo, and see that you have some goofy concept of “meaning” that I can’t deal with. Mine is simple: it is what is obviously conveyed when I show someone who speaks English a picture of an animal and ask him what it is: if it is of what I call a “cat,” then he will just about always answer, “a cat.”  He and I will then have converged on the meaning of “cat” by my simple standards.

“As for Dr. Johnson, if he did not demonstrate that the rock was real, he demonstrated that it was an unreal object that had the ability to make people think it was real, and there is no difference between a real rock and a non-existent rock that human beings perceive in every possible way as a real rock.”  (Note: Dr. Johnson famously kicked a rock to refute the philosopher Berkeley’s contention that nothing was real–or whatever Berkeley’s contention was–as I know most of you will have known, but perhaps not all the kids who are no doubt reading this as a fourth-grade davincianation assignment.)  (Note #2: Isn’t that hilariously funny note alone worth reading this blog for a year? [Yes, I have a hydrocodone in me, with a caffeine pill.  Just couldn’t get going otherwise.  {Ooops–kids, don’t tell your teachers I said that! /Dang, I’m getting so inexhaustibly funny, I’ve run out of parenthetical brackets.  Gotta go back to the Serious Stuff./}])

* * *

WITHEO: “How nice. That you decided to deal anyway, with my “goofy concept of meaning that you can’t deal with”. I just wish it wasn’t necessary for you to resort to ridicule everything that, by your own admission, you don’t understand. What moral advantage can you possibly hope to gain?

(Editor’s Note: When I first read the last sentence above, I thought to myself that trying for some “moral advantage” was what my opponents too-often seemed to be doing but that I almost never did; just now, though, I wondered whether or not I perhaps do try not for a moral advantage, but a sort of moral disadvantage. Why would I do that?  One possibility I refuse to accept is that by coming across as a nasty fellow, I can believe opposition to my thinking is due to my opponent’s hostility to me rather than my ideas: i.e., I’m giving myself up to protect my ideas.  I think a better answer, however unusual, is that I want to get my opponent to do his very best against me, fueled by RAGE.  But I may be trying unconsciously to get him off-balance due to rage.  Actually, my best explanation, which I’ve had for a long time, is that I truly want fully to express myself, which means expressing not only my ideas, but my feeling about those ideas, and about my opponent’s opposition–but not my opponent, because I expect an emotionally mature debater to treat the debate he’s in the same way I expect a tennis opponent to treat a match he’s in–as a fight to the death against Absolute Evil, which has nothing to do with what I think of my opponent when the debate or match is over.)

“As it happens, I would like to sincerely pretend that I can empathise, perhaps just a little, with your evident frustration. Do you feel better, when you habitually denigrate those you don’t agree with?

“You seem proud to claim that your concept of meaning is ‘simple’. I prefer to avoid that word. What may seem ‘simple’ to you (always within a certain context, specific to time and place) is not necessarily, I would venture to suggest almost certainly never, so easy to accept for another.

“You conclude, on the basis of a “simple” scenario (showing someone a picture of a cat and coming to an agreement that it is in fact a picture of a cat), that “he and I will have converged on the meaning of cat”.

“I beg to differ. What you have agreed on is that the picture is of a cat. You have not agreed, as, typically, the question did not even arise, on “the meaning of cat”. To your self-evident satisfaction, which, I hasten to acknowledge, is all that matters to us most of the time, “the meaning of cat was obviously conveyed”.

“As if ‘the meaning of cat’ could be meaningfully encapsulated in a single image. It’s not a cold silent picture that destroys our furniture and is a fussy eater and wants to be let out and then refuses to budge …

“Of course, the word ‘cat’ can be invested with numerous, often surprising, widely divergent meanings. ‘Wild cat’, ‘cool cat’, ‘alley cat’, ‘pussycat’, even an iconic brand of heavy agricultural machinery is commonly evoked as ‘a Cat’. In a court of law, the question will seem simple enough. ‘Please tell the court whether, in your expert opinion, this is a picture of the cat in question.’ (Please just say, yes or no.) Note the essential qualification. Not just any cat, but ‘the cat in question’.

“Many people like to talk about their pets. The ‘simple’ remark that ‘I have a cat’, inevitably begs the next questions, ‘what breed, male or female, how old etc.’ Suddenly, it isn’t enough that I have ‘“just a cat’.

“I guess the point I’m trying to make is that what we habitually treat as obvious ‘statements of fact’ are never the whole story. It’s the story – the narrative, if you will – that is intuitively attached to every experiential observation, that we then adopt as ‘the meaning for me’. It behooves us to keep in mind, I think, that, like it or not, each of us sees ‘the world’ differently. It’s those moccasins again, I’m afraid.”

* * *

ME: “How do you know I was replying to you with ridicule, Witheo? Haven’t you established that language can’t convey meaning. However, I agree with you that I do enjoy injecting my personal feelings into my arguments on the grounds that it will make what I’m saying more entertaining, and–I confess–because it will make me feel better by annoying someone who has annoyed me (for I have in my opinion a revenge instinct). I’m not out for moral advantage, just intellectual advantage, which I feel I always get when someone I mock makes such a big deal of it. Particularly when the mocker himself, as seems nearly always the case, has been using various kinds of mockery, such as sarcasm and superciliousness.

“To get to the meat of what I’m saying, and you would be missing if my words had meaning, is that you are saying that language has no meaning when you merely mean something very trivial: that language cannot communicate any meaning with absolute accuracy. So what? It can in all but a very few cases communicate meanings sufficiently. It really reduces to the problem of absolute truth. So far as human beings are concerned, there is no such thing–BUT there are many truths that are so far beyond reasonable doubt as to act as absolute truths, or be maximally objectively true. “Maxobjective Truths,” I call them.

“That many people–all of us at times–inappropriately perceive a text’s meaning as what we take it to be does not mean language can’t convey meaning, only that human beings can’t always use it effectively. Another dictum: any text’s meaning can require additional context to determine, as the meaning of a picture of a cat as simply “a cat” does not.

“I note you didn’t deal with what I said about Johnson.

(Editor’s Note: I’ve been defending Johnson for years, but I think my defense of him in my previous response the Witheo is as good a one as I can make.: )

* * *

ME, this time to someone named Steve Hudson, who had earlier revealed how, when he first read the article under discussion in this thread, found Chomsky’s theory be “unfounded and spurious, stupid really: “You’re sounding more sensible to me now, Steve (in merely saying the article convincingly refuted Chomsky’s but not mentioning its stupidity), but I still can’t see the article as convincingly against Chomsky rather than perhaps interestingly opposed to him.  I haven’t read Chomsky myself, but what the idea of our having some sort of innate neurophysiological mechanism or set of mechanisms that greatly facilitate early language acquisition makes too much sense to me to drop on the basis of what you and others on this thread and the author of the article itself have said.  Considering how important language is for us, how could we not have an innate ability very quickly to recognize a noun or a verb, tag them as such, and use them as the basis of some sort of grammar that helps us pick up language?

“Common sense also tells me that we instinctively can tell human speech from other sounds, including (most) sounds animals make, except cats, although they mostly keep their supra-human intelligence to themselves.”

* * *

My theory, I think, is a clumsy mess so far, with gaps I have no idea yet how to remove, but it’s fun for me to work on it, and I think I’ve said one or two interesting things in it.  So I’m afraid I’ll keep talking about linguistics here as long as I continue blogging.

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AmazingCounters.com

Entry 1382 — The Prescriptive Approach to Language

Tuesday, February 25th, 2014

I stealed a whole entry to Mark Newbrook’s excellent blog for this entry–in order to publicize the writings of a highly intelligent, entertaining linguist I agree with 93.7% of the time, but more to argue a bit with him (politically-incorrectly).

New post on Skeptical Humanities

Linguistics ‘Hall of Shame’ 39

by marknewbrook

39: MARK HALPERN

Hi again, everybody!  ‘Hall Of Shame’ resumes (again not sure at what intervals).

Some critics of mainstream linguistics explicitly reject the non-prescriptive approach to language adopted by linguists (see the Introduction). One such writer is the Australian journalist Mark Halpern.

Halpern’s views are partly grounded in a belief which he knows is shared by very few indeed, at least among those who think seriously about language, but which he nevertheless regards as clearly correct: namely, the belief that most linguistic change is deliberate and a matter of choice, because linguistic features (he believes) depend on the conscious minds of speakers or writers, especially when they are actually changing. He contrasts this view with a diametrically opposed ‘straw man’ view which he mistakenly attributes to mainstream linguists, the idea that grammatical and other structures ‘have a life of their own’ and do not depend at all upon the minds of language users. Halpern apparently fails to discern the actual viewpoint (intermediate between these two extremes) adopted by (most) mainstream linguists, according to which linguistic features are indeed epiphenomena of human minds rather than independent entities but are mostly not accessed by the conscious minds of native speakers of the language in question in the absence of explicit study – and which are liable to systematic change without conscious decisions being made and indeed without there necessarily being any awareness of a given change while it is in progress. This mainstream viewpoint, of course, is well supported from evidence and argumentation.

Halpern exemplifies mainly with vocabulary changes, the study of which requires much less understanding of linguistic theory or descriptive techniques than that of changes at more heavily structured linguistic levels such as grammar. It is true that some vocabulary changes are deliberate or semi-deliberate, or at least readily accessible to the conscious minds of language users without study. In these respects, linguists will disagree with Halpern less than he suggests they would. But he is mistaken in extending this observation (albeit implicitly and without exemplification) to grammatical and other structural changes.

Furthermore, Halpern regards many of the vocabulary changes which he cites as very unwelcome and as constituting degradation of the language in question (in this case English). He berates linguists for refusing to accept this prescriptivist folk-linguistic stance (which of course is very widely shared).

More next time (when pos)!

Mark

For my book Strange Linguistics, see:

http://linguistlist.org/pubs/books/get-book.cfm?BookID=64212

As those of you who have come here more than a few times before know, I wholly believe in the responsibility of linguists to do their best to counter imbecilic misuse of the language, usually for propagan- distically political, and/or purely sentimental, but always for anti-verosophical reasons, by the leaders of the masses and their air-headed serfs.  Yes, most language changes are unconscious.  Most are innocuous, some make sense.  But more than a few do not, and should be consciously, loudly resisted by the linguistically responsible.  However unlikely of success.  No one that I know of has ever agreed with my general definition of “marriage” as the union of two opposites and therefore inapplicable to a union of two men or two women.  I specifically define it in the traditional manner, so what if fundamentalist Christians agree with me.

Note: one of my opponents who did argue with me on the subject claims that two males are not opposites–because both are human beings.  Right.  And up and down are not opposites because both are directions.

I have given up doing more than lashing out at the use of “marriage” once in a while nowadays.  Smilingly imagining the beauty of a marriage of H2O and water.  And coining “mirrorge” for kind of marriage homosexuals are being joined in.  When they mirry (meery) each other.  I haven’t yet come up with a coinage for “marriage of a man and a woman.”  One will definitely be needed.

To repeat, I’m no more homophobic than I’m Anglophobic (as–mostly–a descendent of English settlers whom I–mostly–very much admire).  Their lifelong unions should be equal in law to marriages.  Only the unmarried should be discriminated against.  That’s a joke.

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AmazingCounters.com

Entry 1176 — Natural and Learned Concepts

Thursday, August 8th, 2013

A few days ago while discussing conceptual poetry, which seems to be attracting a lot of attention amongst poetry people, I got mired in confusion: I realized I didn’t know what I was taking about.  This morning  (no, yesterday morning since I’m writing this a day in advance) I suddenly felt I did, so wrote the following to New-Poetry:

I think I’ve solved my question about what Grumman was trying to put into words.  It is that there are two kinds of concepts, those we perceive “naturally” the way we perceive the color red, and those we learn, which are more complex and ordinarily the only mental objects considered to be concepts (so far as I know).  I realized this while thinking about numbers.  The number one is a natural concept, I claim, because–I claim–one perceives a thing’s “oneness”  the same way one perceives a thing’s redness.  Thinking about it further, I decided that what we experience (due to a simple innate brain counting mechanism) is “absence of duplication.”  The mechanism consists of a storage chamber holding everything a person has seen (I’m considering the visual only for simplicity’s sake) over the past minute or so; and matching chamber with a slot for the object being tested for “oneness” and a slot into which each of the things in the storage chamber are inserted.  The matching chamber has a second compartment where one image overlaps the other and differences and samenesses are counted and a percentage arrived at that indicates match or non-match.

If nothing matches, the object being tested gets a one.  One match gives it a two.  Beyond that, who knows, but I’m sure four or five matches give the object a many.  Words labeling each of these, like “one,” “alone,” “unique,” “twin,” etc.  Larger numbers are learned.  Five dots gets a many from the counting mechanism–but eventually is learned as a hand of fingers or the like, which is reduced to the word, “five.”

I believe more complex mathematical mechanisms may have evolved, but haven’t thought any out.  I can’t believe I’m saying anything very wrong or new.  But I work from introversion almost entirely–being too lazy for research and related work.

So, to get to POETRY, I suppose it doesn’t matter whether a conceptual poem’s concept/s is/are natural or learned.  But I think all concepts are natural at the core.

Boy, I wish I were 25–and able to focus on ONE area of investigation the way Darwin did!  This would be a good such area to spend a life on.

Note: in knowlecular psychology, natural concepts are termed “urceptual concepts.”
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Entry 1077 — Thoughts about “Me & Chomsky”

Thursday, April 18th, 2013

I’ve gone through 6 of the 16 pages of my “essay” about innate grammar, and disappointed but not at all surprised at how disjointedly uncogent it is.  So far, I’ve had little trouble picking out incoherences, contradictions and plain bad writing, but I’ve not been able to fix, or start even to see how to fix, anything of significance.  I remain convinced that grammar is innate, though.  I don’t see how I could change my mind about that.  Am I dogmatic?  I prefer to say I’m loyal to my premises, and do not choose them readily.  The healthy-minded person must form premises to which he clings dogmatically till he croaks–certainly in the case of premises there is insufficient data now available to falsify.

Note: I see that I began this clump of text in 1987 but added to it in 1989.

A page or two later I’m now reading myself regarding the “imagination center” in the brain.  This is something I completely forgot.  It’s like reading someone else.  I hope I soon understand what the guy is talking about.

Later.  I have much less confidence in the existence of the imagination center than I do in everything else I’ve been speculating about, but will try to work out an idea of it, in spite of its vagueness, even to me.  I’ve already invented a new term for it!  Fantacept, or knowlecept based on fantasy only–i.e., with no genuine perceptual basis.  The Fantaceptual Zone is where they are gathered, if they exist.  (Ho ho: fantacepts are fantacepts.)  What I have to do is figure out what fantacepts are.  Basically, pure words.  To define them exactly, I believe I’ll need to define all the other knowlecepts to show what they are not.

* * * later.  One thing a fantaceptual word is, is a word read or with no connections to a percept either then perceived (because its stimulus is in the environment at that time) or remembered. I don’t know if fantacepts are a useful concept but will try to improve my definition of what they would be if existent. Perhaps  by example. When a child hears the spoken word, “cow,” for the first time while looking at an actual cow, his brain will record the word as a percept.  If he later reads it, he will activate a retrocept of it–as a percept; i.e., as something he knows. Whether it really is or not–in spite of the cow he saw when he first heard the word was really a kangarooo, for instance.  If a child is told an invisible sprite is standing before him, his brain will record the word, “sprite,” as a fantacept.  Also as a noun.

I feel certain there are many other factors involved in fantaceptuality, but will leave it at that until the subject clarifies for me, if it does.

I will say that abstract nouns–“beauty,” for instance–may seem fantacepts but, in my psychology, are not, because they represent actual attributes the same way colors do.  Demonstration: a child sees a red ball; certain light rays strike his eyes that result eventually in his perceiving the color red.  Beauty is more complicated, but in my psychology the brain of a child seeing a sunset most people would consider beautiful, will compare the spectacle to similar things stored in the child’s brain and evaluate it as “beautiful”–materially, objectively beautiful (for the child).  A better comparison to compare it to than red would be to “high”: when the brain carries out a comparison of the height of one tree, which is physically perceived, to the height of another, and evaluates it as “high,” it is again dealing with something perceived, however indirectly, and contextually.

I think hallucinacepts may well exist, and are different from fantacepts. Fantacepts are words for matter without a material stimulus in reality OR bad wiring inventing a stimulus, which is what causes hallucinacepts.

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Entry 1058 — Poetry Appreciation Accommodance

Saturday, March 30th, 2013

(Note: I suddenly realized that I’ve been treating my texts like they are world class poems, or excerpts of world-class poems. What I’m doing, if it isn’t clear, is showing how a very simple example of a use of metaphor in an attempt at poetry will work for someone who appreciates it–someone, in other words, who is at its level, as we all were once at the level of nursery rhymes.)

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mathephor03a

What’s going on in the illustration above is accommodance at work.  It could just as well be called “dipping into the subconscious.”  I got the idea for it from Aldous Huxley when he was discussing his experiences with drugs—hallucinogenic  drugs, I believe.  All he said was that they opened a door that admitted data we normally blocked out.  I was considering the possible effect of variable cerebral energy levels at the time—being sure, as I still am, that everything we do mentally depends on energy-requiring mechanisms.  Not being well-read in formal psychology I’m not sure those in the field with the proper credentials believe that, but I think most of them do.  It’s the mystics who don’t.

Anyway, for some reason, I jumped into the idea that “blocking” the entrance of data might require energy pushing the involved door shut.  Hence, a weakening of energy might be what allows those doors to swing open.  Other simple ideas of mine in development lead me to conclude that a sense of wrongness can cause a lowering of cerebral energy which causes something to happen somewhat like what Huxley described, except much less dramatic.

To put it most simply, what happens (according to knowlecular psychology) is that a person’s normal tendency to find his way from his ongoing experiences into habitual knowleculations is weakened by a lowering of the energy needed for it.  The person’s ability to remember is weakened which, oddly, increases his memories (although it may take a few moments before it does).  One of the things that must be understood is that normally one goes from one strongly-remembered understanding of what is going on in one’s life to another—because they have become familiar, something that will not usually happen if they are defective.  Hence, if it rains, we remember previous times when it rained and how we avoided getting wet, and open our umbrellas, or run for shelter.  That’s all there is to it.

If a person starts to open an umbrella and it explodes (harmlessly), the experience will be unexpected because unfamiliar—radically unfamiliar.  One will become appropriately stupid, in effect, due to a decrease in cerebral energy due to his accommodance.  He will have no remembered understandings to draw on.  He will still try weakly to find memories that pertain to his circumstance, but activate very few.  At the same time, much of his cerebral energy will be transmitted to varied memories that will not become active but will become primed to become active.  Bits and pieces of memories primed before the explosion may be randomly activated by the environment, which will be able to activate more percepts than it had because of lack of competition from retroceptual activation.  Eventually, he will remember recent events, but not necessarily in order (which will enhance their ability to re-order themselves effectively, although they will most often re-order themselves counter-productively—which won’t matter much, usually, due to the brain’s ability to recognize their flawedness and ignore them.)

Finally, sometimes during one’s first reflection on a poetic passage with a metaphor like the one under discussion here, enough of the . . . accommoflow? will clump into a resolution or partial resolution.  That will cause one’s accelerance to come into play, strongly activating the new understanding (or, too many times, the potential new understanding that isn’t).  And one will have resolved his frustration—or realized he hadn’t, which will turn on his accommodance again.

The process could take a week or more in the case of a poem.  Ergo: some poems need to be read many times, and reflected on before they make sense.  One can’t expect to enjoy a dramatically new technique like a mathephor as easily and quickly as one can enjoy a rhyme.

 mathephor03a

 Now we know that the above, shown again, depicts something I’m tentatively calling an accommoflow.  A very simplified one.  With a focus on the part of it in the mathelexical zone although much will be going on importantly at the same time in the lexical zone, and probably in both the visiolexical and audilexical zones.  In the best cases, important mental activity will be occurring in non-lexical zones, too—where we feel a moment of some long ago spring just after a shower, say.

Crucial to the effectiveness of the mathephor here, is the colored x, which is my symbol for everything multiplication is, everything that makes it much more for those sensitive to it than a mechanical switch (which it certainly also is).

Ooops, I see I left out the importance of the multiplication algorithm, which is really the primary agent in the creation of the mathephor because (I claim) it will have been strongly activated before the “explosion” occurred by both the multiplication sign (“x”) and the line under the second term.  Moreover, it will be a very strong habitual knowleculation, so able to do more even when the cerebral energy available is low than most other data.  It will cause a person to find a multiplier and a multiplicand and then use the logic of multiplication he should have learned to determine why it makes sense for the product of the two to be “flowers.”  Eventually, understandings like the three shown in darker ink must occur if the mathephor has any chance of being a success.

 mathephor04

The above depicts a successful resolution of the knowlexplosion.  A multiplication serves as a metaphor for the transformation of a meadow/ the coming of spring/ the birth of flowers, all of these with vivid connotations that will be activated by the energizing effects of the resolution.  I would add that there are “under-metaphors” present to the sensitive aesthcipient—for me, one is the metaphor of spring as some kind of machine like a long division “machine” churning out beauty from ordinary constituents.

It is important to note–or am I re-noting it?—that the resolution of this particular knowlexplosion will occur in different parts of the mathelexical zone while at the same time many of the knowlecules involved with be activated in the lexical zone—[flowers], for instance.  I fall goes as well as it sometimes can, remembered images of flowers, flower-smells, pleasant dampness and other sensual knowlecules will enter the final experience.

Apologies my not articulating all this very well.  It’s not a first draft, either—more like a fiftieth draft.  Each one is saying more, but remaining less coherent than I’d like.

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Entry 1055–Manywhere-at-Once, the Rhyme, 2

Wednesday, March 27th, 2013

Okay, here goes my attempt to give my knowlecular explanation of rhyme-appreciation.  In the upper illustration the auditory knowlecule [ght] is carefully differentiated from the audiolexical knowlecule [ght] (a ‘knowlecule” being a “molecule” of knowledge in my theory, as you should all know by now!), and shown highlighted in gray to indicate that it is “primed,” which means that it is partially on the way to being activated because it contains stored . . . neuro-transmission chemicals of the kind that provide cell-activating energy when available in sufficient quantity.  The illustration is intended to depict the knowleculation–in this case, an audiolexical one ending in [x]–just created in a given subject’s brain.  [x] is whatever connotations knowlicles (final units of knowlecules) [“a lovely sight”] activated along with random “noise”–i.e., random knowlicles that will come alive in every instacon (or moment of consciousness) almost entirely out of context.  I include it for completeness, but it is of no importance for my story here.

SightFlight02

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SightFlight03

The lower illustration shows  the subject having just heard “these swans in fli–”  in the process of experiencing [ght] audiolexically.  Of pivotal importance, though, is that he is shown also experiencing [ght] as a retrocept in his auditory zone.  This results because the audiolexical knowlecule (or partial knowlecule) [fl] must send a small amount of neuro-transmitter to the primed [ght] in the subject’s auditory zone.  Now, this may not be enough for the latter’s activation, but in most cases ought to be, for the auditory [ght] will probably have gotten a bit of activation-causing neuro-transmitter from the expectation of rhyme-occurence he, like most people, would have learned that poems of the kind he is hearing cause.  Be that as it may, I’m assuming the second shot of neuro-transmitter causes the activation of the subject’s auditory [ght].  This puts him in a Manywhere-at-Once because he will experience a [ght] in each of two separate places.

It’s all ridiculously simple.   According to my theory of pain and pleasure, pleasure is a matter (for the most part) of the number of  neuro-transmitters an instacon’s releases that succeed in causing cellular activation compared to number that fail to do this.  Ordinarily, the neuro-transmitters [fli]’s sent to the auditory zone would not activate anything, so would keep the audiolexical [fl] from causing much, if any, pleasure.  Not so, this time.

There are many other complexities involved that I won’t get into here to avoid confusion.  It should be remembered that what I’ve said is a simplification.  I stand by its being close enough to what will happen if my theory is not too wrong.  I further contend that even if my theory is 90% hooey (no, my good friends, it is nowhere near 100% hooey), my account of rhyme-appreciation is better than any other one out there.  And it applies, too, to all the varieties (nearly) of what I call “melodation”–to wit, alliteration, consonance, etc.  “Nearly,” because it does not account for the pleasure of euphony.  That, and perhaps others, is due to our innate predisposition to derive pleasure from certain sounds like “ah.”  We may also have such a predisposition to enjoy any repeated verbal sound.  Only when neurophysiological lab technicians have the means to test my ideas, and they eventually will (if they don’t already), will we know how valid they are.

Yes, they are readily falsifiable.  They also break no long-accepted laws of science.  Hence, they are scientific.

Note, what I’m calling the auditory zone could probably more aptly be called the lexical-auditory association area.

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Entry 1050 — FromandTos, Fromandnottos and Fromandnulltos

Friday, March 22nd, 2013

FromandTos-FirstSketch

For about a week I was having trouble with different parts of my knowlecular psychology theory.  It seemed to come down to how my theory of the way I think the brain deals with cause and effect.  I think the brain has mechanisms that recognize various stimuli as causes and tags its records (our memories) of those stimuli with “cause-tags” of some sort.  These greatly facilitate scientific reasoning.

I was trying to pin down how rigidniks carry out scientific reasoning so poorly for my book on the Shakespeare authorship controversy.  There I describe those whose situational psychosis makes them incapable of accepting Shakespeare as the poet he was as suffering from rigidnikry, a condition which causes, among other defects, an inability to perform scientific reasoning effectively.  But I was floundering in my attempts to show exactly why this was so.

I almost gave up trying but kept coming up with slants at a solution and last night everything came together.  The solution may be my most important knowlecular insight, even though it only took me a minute or two this morning to scribble the diagram of it above.  I think it tells its story pretty well, albeit very superficially.  Now to try to explain it.

1. First of all I need to tell you my concern changed from cause and effect to from and to after I realized it would apply to many related kinds of reasonings besides cause and effect ones.

2. The basic idea is that cerebral mechanisms (and there are a similar ones in the cerebellum and–probably–elsewhere in the nervous system) monitor active memory-cells (as I will call them here although it’s actually various organs I call menmoducts but don’t want to get into here) and become active themselves when sensing the development of a potential fromandto knowleculation, a knowleculation being a series of remembered matter.  (I think I have some other name for such a series which I can’t now recall but don’t want to spend time looking for, since it’s irrelevant so far as what I’m writing here is concerned.)  Such a knowleculation will go form records of moments whose contents change only very slightly each step of the development until it reaches an endpoint, which I call its “to-point.”  It must have a certain minimal number of such steps to qualify as a one.  Throwing a ball would be an example.  It would consist of one moment for each movement the throwing arm makes until it releases the ball, its to-point.

A to-point is the first moment whose content ceases to be similar to the knowleculation’s previous moment’s.  It can be of three kinds, positive, negative and null.  Which it is depends on how the brain’s evaluceptual mechanisms evaluate it.  If they find it gives a certain amount or more of pleasure, the fromandto monitor involved will label it positive; if the evaluceptual mechanisms determine it to give a certain amount or more of pain, it will be labeled negative.  If found to be neither pleasurable or painful, it will label it null.

Note to Posterity: I just saved the above for the second time, a record for me.

Okay, once the monitor has ascertained a knowleculation to be a fromandto knowleculation, it puts a “to-tag” (which it had kept stored from the beginning of the process) in the first unit of it, the knowleculation’s “from-point,” and a “from-tag” in the to-point.  The monitor will also add a link forward to the to-point to the from-point, and a link back from the to-point to the from-point.  It will make these links strong to the degree that the pain or pleasure of the to-point involved is great.  The strength of a link will also depend on the importance of the from-point at the moment it is active, which will depend on several things.  One important one is how focused on the stimulus a person is when it is active; the more focused he is, the more energy he will have to use the short-cut.  An to-point will also tend to be strong is leading anywhere to which it leads to the degree that is important to the person, which will be evident by how many memories it leads to, and how important they are.

The bottom line is that the existence of fromandto monitors and knowleculations will will give a person a short-cut from his experiencing a stimulus to his memory of  what it will cause, including nothing.  Exactly why this is so would take many words to elucidate, which I ain’t got time to go into right now.  Nor, I confess, am I sure I I’m clear enough about it to do a good job of elucidation.

One problem with my thinking that I see is that it requires just about any knowleculation to be some sort of fromandto knowleculation.  Can that be so?  Perhaps.  It’s not clear to me.  Ergo, I must think about it more.  I think what I’ve said is otherwise valid.

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Entry 1046 — Mathematical Semantics

Monday, March 18th, 2013

I’m fairly sure “real” linguists have gone where I’ll be going in this entry, and farther–but I’m not sure they have, and wouldn’t be surprised if they haven’t, such is my opinion of most academics. Anyway, I’m going on this little exploration self-indulgently, hoping to self-teach myself a few new understandings. As always, I don’t expect many to enjoy following me but do hope that some linguistical layfolk will enjoy companioning me. My exploration begins with a few notes I made a week or so ago after thinking to what I said in them in one of my philosophical sessions abed before sleeping one night.

The front door OF my house is red.

The positive square root OF four is two.

I came up with these sentences after suddenly wondering if there was truly such a thing as mathematical reasoning. Perhaps, thought I, I have been all wrong about there being a mathematical section of the brain; perhaps we do math in the same place we do our work with words. Perhaps when asked what the positive square root of four is, a person finds “two,” a word, the same way he finds “red,” when asked what color the front door of his house is (assuming–as I my being in my super-exactness zone compels me to say) that is the door’s color. The process, according to knowlecular psychology (and–really–common sense), is simple (although much more complex than my description of it will indicate). Being asked about one’s door, the verbal sequence, [what] [color] [is] [front] [door] [of] [my] (automatically changing “your” to “my”) [house] will form in the verbal portion of his brain.  The “[what]” will cause that “knowleculation” to produce  [color] [of] [front] [door] [of] [my] [house] [is] . . . [red] OR [image of the front door] [the red of the door] [“red”–i.e., the word for its color].

Give me a few more decades of mentally healthy life and I will write a full book about that one knowleculation. And consider it fun! Here is how it might start: [wuht] [what]{pronoun}<interrogative>, meaning the heard sound of the word “what”/the symbol for “what”/its general grammatical class/its grammatical subclass. (Note: I like the way an interrogatory pronoun is described at the Grammar Untied website, which I visited to check my understanding of it: “Interrogative pronouns are aptly named. They basically stand in for the answer to the question being asked.”) Actually, that would have to be preceded by something about the individual sounds involved, the w-sound, “uh” and “tuh.”  And other things?  Like what would share the instacon (smallest temporal unit of consciousness) [wuht] is in. But here my only concern is to show how, in my view, the verbal section of the brain comes up with the color of the front door by simply plucking it out of one’s memory, each step of the knowleculation getting closer to it until it reaches it the way a mailing address gets closer to a house until it reaches it. The answer to what the positive square root of four is could be grabbed the same way. In the verbal section of the brain.  I think it may be–or in effect, it may be.

My tentative fraction of a hypothesis is that there is a mathematical section of the brain, but that it is part of the verbal section.  I think it evolved from that.  (Note, my thoughts now a first-time so may well be incoherent or absurd or both–but interesting, too, I hope.)  As is obvious, I go along with the idea of an innate grammar, although I don’t know how close my model of it is to Chomsky’s or to any other linguist’s since I’ve read almost nothing about it, only that Chomsky came up with the hypothesis that it exists.  I believe the brain tags words with their grammatical function, and that eventually it came to label identify words–such as + and the numbers, which I regard as words–as mathematical parts of speech.  Hence,  “=” came to be considered a mathematical (intransitive) (linking) verb, and take a knowleculation it is in (unless the context strongly prevents it) into the mathematical section of the brain. There, it would be able to focus on pure math.

It probably was first devoted to counting, “one” and “two” being originally normal adjectives, albeit describing something slightly more complex than a color. My guess is that we developed a mechanism for recognizing the similarity of two objects: a locus holding a short-term memory of various stimuli and comparing each to every other stimulus the person perceives, and tagging, for example, both the stored memory of a cow, and a second cow seen with “[same as]” and putting the first in the memory recorded when the person saw the second, with some kind of tag indicating the first was a remembered part of the new memory–a memory within a memory.

Or the first would be tagged [remembered same][cow], the second [second same cow], or symbols meaning remembered, same and second. I think I worked out something along these lines that worked. No matter, what I saying should give a reasonable gist. As pairs and groups of many became important, it would have evolutionary sense for the verbal section to provide a separate “room” for them. Numbers would develop as a pair became known as “two,” and solitary things become known as “one.” At that point, “more” and “less,” then “plus” and “minus.” The truest beginning of mathematics would occur when an algorithm (procedure for solving a problem, which I present up because for a long time I didn’t know what this word meant, and still sometimes forget) for addition evolved in the proto-mathematical section of the brain (the matheceptual sub-awareness of the brain, to give it its knowlecular name). More and more algorithms of ever-increasing complexity would come to be stored in the math section, and making use of that section would require greater and greater ability at what I call reducticeptual thinking, for analytical or conceptual or symbolic reasoning. It may be that simply having one’s thoughts enter the math section automatically increases one’s attention–i.e. reduces the ability of data not tagged as mathematical to enter.

Could all the algorithms in the math section ultimately be translations of math procedures into grammatical knowleculations like the one used to find the square root of four?  So that particular algorithm might be just one of many similar steps in solving some very difficult problem in calculus, or something further beyond me in the discipline?  I don’t see why not but am too ignorant of higher math to know.

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Entry 970 — “Lingueffect,” “Existuent” and “Mattribute”

Tuesday, January 1st, 2013

I’m into the fourth day a Serious Work on Getting a New Book done.  This one is to be specifically about Shakespeare’s “Sonnet 18,” and generally about poetry and poetics.  I’m sure I’ve mentioned my Sonnet 18 project here before.  I forget when I started work on it–two or three years ago?  Anyway, I should be able to make a book of it, and I must make a book of something this coming year or admit that the significant portion of my life is over.  (If any portion of my life has been significant.)

As part of what I’m calling my current Major Project, I spent yesterday going through entries in my Comprepoetica blog, looking for material to use in the book.  I have nearly two thouasnd entries to go through.  I got through 600 yesterday, and 200 so far today, by eleven in the morning.  Along the way, I came across a few entries concerned with the old form/content poetics question–is form separate from content or just part of it.  I say it’s separate.  Thinking about that yesterday, I came to the tentative conclusion that actually a poem is form and content–and–what meaning an engagent of the poem gets from both of those.  What I feel has confused people about form and content is that both express something, although each does something entirely different from the other.  Content is simply the concrete verbal (or other expressive) matter in the poem: its words, phrases, and other locutions–as well, in some cases, letter, punctuation marks and the like–and their syntactic organization; form is the abstract, general arrangement of that verbal matter–i.e., not, for example, a specific rhyme at the end of line 3, but some rhyme there.  I have dubbed the third constituent of a poem its “lingueffect,” short for “linguistic effect.”

Coming up with that term, made me think about what different kinds of words do–adjective and nouns, for instance.  What do nouns name I wondered for a minute or so, then answered my wonder with another coinage, “existuent.”  At first I had, “existent,” but that seemed too close to “existent,” the adjective; hence, “existuent.”  Every material entity in existence.  Attributes of existuents I named, “mattributes.”  What adjectives describe.  Not material.  Color, motion, shape, but not essence.  Or so it seems to me.  A mattrimattribute is what adverbs describe.  Verbs describe a change in how an eistuent is perceived.  Prepositions describe relationships.

I have to leave the subject however much it interests me, and it does interest me enough to be tempted to spend the rest of my life expanding on the little I’ve just said.  There’s really nothing in life but what we perceive and how we use words to communicate our perceptions to others.  I need to stay with my Sonnet 18 book, though!

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Bishop Berkeley « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Bishop Berkeley’ Category

Entry 1376 — Rocks Are Not Clouds

Wednesday, February 19th, 2014

Tad Richards quoted something by Richard Wilbur at New-Poetry that I’ve seen elsewhere several times.  It always annoys me:

Kick at the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones:
But cloudy, cloudy is the stuff of stones.

If rocks are cloudy, what are clouds?  Solids are things that we can’t penetrate.  It’s silly to think of them as anything else.  As for Sam, technically he didn’t refute Berkeley, but I’m with him.  Reality is by definition that which is kickable, as opposed to that which is not, because not present to our senses.

Note: I’m deep in my Null Zone again.  Didn’t think I’d be able to post an entry today, in fact.  Then Tad came to my rescue. Then, moron that I am, I once again neglected to change the entry’s designation from “private” to “public” until the next day.
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Samuel Johnson « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Samuel Johnson’ Category

Entry 1376 — Rocks Are Not Clouds

Wednesday, February 19th, 2014

Tad Richards quoted something by Richard Wilbur at New-Poetry that I’ve seen elsewhere several times.  It always annoys me:

Kick at the rock, Sam Johnson, break your bones:
But cloudy, cloudy is the stuff of stones.

If rocks are cloudy, what are clouds?  Solids are things that we can’t penetrate.  It’s silly to think of them as anything else.  As for Sam, technically he didn’t refute Berkeley, but I’m with him.  Reality is by definition that which is kickable, as opposed to that which is not, because not present to our senses.

Note: I’m deep in my Null Zone again.  Didn’t think I’d be able to post an entry today, in fact.  Then Tad came to my rescue. Then, moron that I am, I once again neglected to change the entry’s designation from “private” to “public” until the next day.
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