Entry 376 — An Ultimate Definition of Poetry « POETICKS

Entry 376 — An Ultimate Definition of Poetry

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First, to get my latest coinage out of the way before I forget it: “urentity.”  I’m not keen on it but need something for more or less fundamental things like photons and electrons–both larger like atoms, and smaller like quarks; for light, too, and maybe gravity.  There may be  good term for this already out there; if so, I’m not aware of one, and I’ve often wanted one.  “Bit of matter” would be good enough if there weren’t some things not considered material, like light.

Maybe “fundent.”  “Urentity” is pissy my ear now tells me.

What follows are notes written yesterday toward a discussion of how to define poetry.

Last night I felt I was putting together a terrific monograph on the subject but now, around 3 in the afternoon, I’ve found I haven’t gotten anywhere much, and am out of gas, so will add a few thoughts to what I’ve said so far, without keeping it very well organized.

The best simple definition of poetry has for thousands of years been “literary artworks whose words are employed for substantially more than their ability to denote.”  With “literary artworks” being defined as having to have words making some kind of sense whose purpose is to provide aesthetic pleasure to a greater degree than indoctrination or information, the other two things words can provide.

A more sophisticated definition would list in detail exactly what beyond denotation poetry’s words are employed for, mainly kinds of melodation (or word-music), figurative heightening, linguistic heightening (by means of fresh language, for instance) and connotation.  Arguments have always risen about what details a poem should have to qualify as a poem–end-alliteration, the right number of syllables, meter, end-rhyme, etc., with philogushers almost always  sowing confusion by requiring subjective characteristics such as beauty, high moral content, or whatever.

Propagandists work to make salient words ambiguous.  They never provide objective, coherent definitions of their terms.  Diana Price, the anti-Shakespearean, for instance, attacks the belief that Shakespeare wrote the works attributed to him but saying there’s no contemporary personal literary evidence for him, but in her few attempts to define what she means in her book against Shakespeare does so partially, and inconsistently.  I bring this up because I hope someday to use her book in a book of my own on the nature and function of propaganda.

I’m not bothering with that right now.  I’m intent only on establishing that poetry has always been, basically, heightened language used to entertain in some way and/or another, with different poetic devices being required by poets of different schools of the art.  At present a main controversy (although now over a century old)  is whether verbal texts using only the device of lineation (or the equivalent) can qualify as poetry, but it would appear that for the great majority of poets and critics, the answer is yes.  The most recent controversy has to do with whether poetry making in which non-verbal elements are as important as verbal elements can be considered poetry.  the outcome is uncertain but it would seem that another yes will result.  Amazingly enough–to me, at any rate–is the belief of many visual artists who make letters and other linguistic symbols the subject of painting that such . . . “textual designs,” I call them . . . are poetry, “visual poetry.”  The question has not reached enough people in poetry to be considered controversial yet, I don’t believe–however controversial in my circles.

My newest and best definition of visual poetry is: “poetry (therefore verbal) containing visual elements whose contribution to its central aesthetic effect is more or less equally to the contribution to that of the poem’s words.”

It is constantly claimed how blurry and ever-changing language is, but I’m not sure it is.  It seems to me that most of our language is quite stable, and that only language about ideas, which are forever changing, is to any great extent capricious.  Sure, lots of terms come and go, but only because what they describe comes and goes.  “Poetry,” was reasonably set for millennia, and uncertain only now because for the first time  a significant number of artists are fusing arts, thus requiring new terms like “visual poetry,” and amendments to definitions like “poetry.”

A precise, widely agreed-on definition of “poetry” is essential not only for critics but for poets themselves, no mater how little many of them realize it.  They want to use it freely, and should if you believe with me that “poetry is the appropriate misuse of language.”  A metaphor is a misuse of language, a lie.  Calling me a tiger when it comes to defending the rational use of language is an example.  I’m not a tiger.  But I act in some ways like a tiger.  A metaphor actually could be considered an ellipsis–words left out because understood, in this case saying “Bob is a tiger” rather than “Bob is like a tiger.”  In any case, if we don’t accept the definition of tiger as a big dangerous cat, the metaphor will not work.

To say a word can have many meanings according to its context does not make it polysemous, although if provides the word with connotational potential the poet can take advantage of.

James Joyce’s “cropse’ is a neat misspelling but useless if one does not accept the precise meanings of “crops” and “corpse.”

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Aram Saroyan « POETICKS

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Entry 470 — Thoughts about Language Poetry

Thursday, July 21st, 2011

I define on the basis of material details: what is materially
done in a poem, so I have trouble with statements like,
language poets are those poets “engaged pretty self-
consciously with the problematics of signification.”  What
problems?  How are they engaged–that is, how is their
engagement manifested in their poems?

I ignore who claims or is claimed by others to be or not be a
language poet.  My concern is with poems that use what I
consider language poetry devices.  Which I’m trying
haphazardly to list.

I’m gonna jump on you for this, Jerry–because I don’t think
you’ll take offense, and because you might say something
back that ain’t dumb.  What’s “languagey” about Lauterback
or C. D. Wright’s work?  I’m not baiting you or New-
Poetry.  I’ve have trouble pinning down what language
poetry is, or should be, since my (belated) first exposure to
it around 1980.  I’ve long since decided the jump-cut poetry
I think many poets have been doing since “The Wasteland”
is in any sense, “language” poetry.

Vaguely, I think of a language poem as something that
makes you consider the poetic effect of the non-prose, or
unconventional, punctuation, spelling, grammar of
something in a text.  Cummings, for instance, when he
writes, “What if a much of a which of a wind,” or Gertrude
Stein when she wrote “rose is a rose is a rose.”  Each
forcing a reader to consider what grammar is and does–
more than a poet using a noun as a verb as Dylan Thomas
beautifully does, say.   Language-centering versus
language-heightening.  To say a start to what I hope
someday about language poetry.

Saroyan’s “lighght” is, for me, a perfect example of a
language poem, although called a visual poem.  What it
means as language is secondary; what counts is what it does
as language–to wit: make metaphoric use of the strange
fact that “gh” can be silent.

Another thought: that a language poem uses language for
more than denotation and connotation.  It goes beyond what
can be done with those two things.

Hey, that may be my definition of language poetry: poetry
whose central aesthetic effect depends not of what its
language denotes or connotes but what it does.

> what it does?
> which leaves us what?
> diagraming sentences?

Diagramming sentences was one of the very few things I
liked doing in school.  You wouldn’t need to do it here
unless your understanding of sentence structure is really
bad.

I think I can’t explain it to you, at least now, if my “lighght”
example doesn’t make sense to you.  Think about what
makes it work as a pooem, if not for you, then for others
like me for whom it definitely works.

What makes it for me is what its “gh” is as a fragment of
language, not what it denotes or connotes (which is zero).
Think about Cummings’s “What if a much of a which of a
wind” and Stein’s “rose is a rose is a rose.”  Neither is
anything without its abuse of syntax, and that abuse does
much more than simply distort a text sufficiently to slant it
interesting–the way the sentence I just typed does, or tries
to do–or the way an impressionistic painting distorts a
pretty scene enough to make it appealing to those capable
of appreciating it.

I think Stein’s passage does something important
neurophysiologically (according to my post-Chomskian
theory of linguistics): it disrupts the brain’s reception of
what the passage denotes in such a way as to let it start
again out of a blank context, which will give a reader (or
some readers) a feeling of the word, “rose,” which is much
closer to what most persons’ first experience of an actual
rose was than to something more conventional, like Burns’s
“My love is like a red, red rose” (although his expression
has other virtues).

I’m not sure about the Cummings passage, which I haven’t
thought about too deeply.  I first made an intense analysis
of the Stein passage 30 years ago–in what I believe was my
first published piece of criticism, in my college literary
magazine.

The fact that this way of considering language poetry seems
to stymy you suggests to me that I may be on to something
of consequence (which is not to say I’m saying anything
original).  A genuine poet or serious engagent of poetry
would be thrilled to discover words might be used to do
something more than denote, connote, appeal to the ears,
appeal to the eyes.  A Philistine would feel threatened.  Too
threatened to ask questions the way you are, Stephen.  For
which, I thank you.

I believe many poets called language poets just assaulted
grammar in their poems for the sake of problematizing
language, which they took to be a way to opposing the
political status quo.  Many didn’t have any aesthetic
motives, being (I strongly suspect) almost bereft of
aesthetic sensitivity.  Not that their accidents, like many of
the accidents of the Dadaists, couldn’t be put to far betters
uses than they were able to.

Glossary « POETICKS

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Entry 272 — Final Definition of Visual Poetry

Tuesday, November 2nd, 2010

Strange, but my latest definition of visual poetry is much simpler than my previous ones, and I really think it does the trick.  Here it is:

Visual Poetry: poetry containing visual elements whose interaction with its words results, in the view of the majority of reasonably knowledgeable, objective observers, in something of central significance to the poem’s full aesthetic meaning.  I may tinker a bit with the wording, but don’t think I need to make any consequential changes.  It’s for my taxonomy of poetry, by the way.  Those who want their asemic visual works to be called “visual poetry” won’t like it, but I think it will be accepted eventually by the more rational participants in poetry, who will find it foolish to ignore the fact that “poetry” has referred to collections of  words for well over two thousand years in every known culture–although some  of them will deny anything not wholly verbal should be termed “poetry.”  Which, of course, leaves the problem of what to call it.

My definition also requires a a visual poem’s verbal and visual elements to fuse in some way, thus disqualifying collages containing both graphics and words separate from one another as visual poetry.   So the definition does not have to state explicitly, I hope, that one experiencing visual poetry will experience it as simultaneously both verbal and visual, which I’ve always considered a necessary characteristic of visual poetry–because it distinguishes it from illustrated poems and pictures with poetic captions.

The mention of “reasonably knowledgeable, objective observers” should remind everyone of the ultimate subjectivity that will come into play in classifying visual poetry, beginning with the problem of who should count as such an observer.  I don’t think it matters: if the definition proves acceptable, it will come to be the one used in criticism, colleges, visual poets.  If not, it won’t.  And I contend that most specimens of visual poetry will be clear-cut.  Only in a few cases will people have to debate whether in a given specimen visual and verbal elements interact enough, and/or produce a significant central effect.

Gertrude Stein « POETICKS

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Entry 470 — Thoughts about Language Poetry

Thursday, July 21st, 2011

I define on the basis of material details: what is materially
done in a poem, so I have trouble with statements like,
language poets are those poets “engaged pretty self-
consciously with the problematics of signification.”  What
problems?  How are they engaged–that is, how is their
engagement manifested in their poems?

I ignore who claims or is claimed by others to be or not be a
language poet.  My concern is with poems that use what I
consider language poetry devices.  Which I’m trying
haphazardly to list.

I’m gonna jump on you for this, Jerry–because I don’t think
you’ll take offense, and because you might say something
back that ain’t dumb.  What’s “languagey” about Lauterback
or C. D. Wright’s work?  I’m not baiting you or New-
Poetry.  I’ve have trouble pinning down what language
poetry is, or should be, since my (belated) first exposure to
it around 1980.  I’ve long since decided the jump-cut poetry
I think many poets have been doing since “The Wasteland”
is in any sense, “language” poetry.

Vaguely, I think of a language poem as something that
makes you consider the poetic effect of the non-prose, or
unconventional, punctuation, spelling, grammar of
something in a text.  Cummings, for instance, when he
writes, “What if a much of a which of a wind,” or Gertrude
Stein when she wrote “rose is a rose is a rose.”  Each
forcing a reader to consider what grammar is and does–
more than a poet using a noun as a verb as Dylan Thomas
beautifully does, say.   Language-centering versus
language-heightening.  To say a start to what I hope
someday about language poetry.

Saroyan’s “lighght” is, for me, a perfect example of a
language poem, although called a visual poem.  What it
means as language is secondary; what counts is what it does
as language–to wit: make metaphoric use of the strange
fact that “gh” can be silent.

Another thought: that a language poem uses language for
more than denotation and connotation.  It goes beyond what
can be done with those two things.

Hey, that may be my definition of language poetry: poetry
whose central aesthetic effect depends not of what its
language denotes or connotes but what it does.

> what it does?
> which leaves us what?
> diagraming sentences?

Diagramming sentences was one of the very few things I
liked doing in school.  You wouldn’t need to do it here
unless your understanding of sentence structure is really
bad.

I think I can’t explain it to you, at least now, if my “lighght”
example doesn’t make sense to you.  Think about what
makes it work as a pooem, if not for you, then for others
like me for whom it definitely works.

What makes it for me is what its “gh” is as a fragment of
language, not what it denotes or connotes (which is zero).
Think about Cummings’s “What if a much of a which of a
wind” and Stein’s “rose is a rose is a rose.”  Neither is
anything without its abuse of syntax, and that abuse does
much more than simply distort a text sufficiently to slant it
interesting–the way the sentence I just typed does, or tries
to do–or the way an impressionistic painting distorts a
pretty scene enough to make it appealing to those capable
of appreciating it.

I think Stein’s passage does something important
neurophysiologically (according to my post-Chomskian
theory of linguistics): it disrupts the brain’s reception of
what the passage denotes in such a way as to let it start
again out of a blank context, which will give a reader (or
some readers) a feeling of the word, “rose,” which is much
closer to what most persons’ first experience of an actual
rose was than to something more conventional, like Burns’s
“My love is like a red, red rose” (although his expression
has other virtues).

I’m not sure about the Cummings passage, which I haven’t
thought about too deeply.  I first made an intense analysis
of the Stein passage 30 years ago–in what I believe was my
first published piece of criticism, in my college literary
magazine.

The fact that this way of considering language poetry seems
to stymy you suggests to me that I may be on to something
of consequence (which is not to say I’m saying anything
original).  A genuine poet or serious engagent of poetry
would be thrilled to discover words might be used to do
something more than denote, connote, appeal to the ears,
appeal to the eyes.  A Philistine would feel threatened.  Too
threatened to ask questions the way you are, Stephen.  For
which, I thank you.

I believe many poets called language poets just assaulted
grammar in their poems for the sake of problematizing
language, which they took to be a way to opposing the
political status quo.  Many didn’t have any aesthetic
motives, being (I strongly suspect) almost bereft of
aesthetic sensitivity.  Not that their accidents, like many of
the accidents of the Dadaists, couldn’t be put to far betters
uses than they were able to.

Literary Taxonomy « POETICKS

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Entry 925 — Literary Characterization 6, Maybe

Saturday, November 17th, 2012

It’s past two in the afternoon, 14 November.  I have just today and tomorrow to take care of four more entries in this series, and tomorrow morning I have to play league tennis, leaving the afternoon for getting ready to leave for the airport at 5 A.M. the following morning.  Ergo, I’m going to try to do all four remaining entries now, even though I only have one idea to use–which I just got.  But I’ll be working off one of my zow-doses (caffeine pill and opiate pain pill) so relaxed and not as unenergetic as usual.  So I may well get all four done.  However shablowly.

To begin, I want to say a little more about the compreceptual awareness and its self.  I conceive this awareness as basically synthesizing data from all the other awareness active at a given time and taking care of one’s general behavior, with specific awareness taking over partly or completely as appropriate.  The data it receives will only be obviously significant data–or seemingly significant data.  It is probably in the compreceptual awareness that a cerebral executive center is located which is sensitive to how active the compreceptual awareness and each of the other awarenesses is and automatically distribute energy to any awareness or awarenesses significantly more active than the other awarenesses.  No doubt some sense of the short-term importance of some awareness or group of awarenesses at the time is taken into account–a threatening tiger, for example, causes all awarenesses to shut down but the one operating the flight or fight reaction–which, come to think of it, may mean shutting down the cerebrum itself, to leave the cerebellum in charge.  But keeping itself ready to to issue other directions.

When somebody finally subsidizes me finally to get my full theory down on . . . I mean, into the computer, I’ll provide more details.

The compreceptual self is simply the self the compreceptual awareness uses to make a person’s final self–yes, what religion thinks of as the soul, but I prefer to call the urwareness–awareness of the main things that are going on, with–sometimes, but not always–a soundtrack.  I wonder what proportion of the compreceptual self’s stream of consciousness (which I want a different name for, and probably have, although I don’t suppose it needs one) consists of one’s internal monologue, and what is averbal.

I think many different selves, such as, in my case, the little brother self (from the anthroceptual awareness, the part of it devoted to social interactivity), take over for the compreceptual self, but always accompanied by it, with data being supplied by data-supplying awarenesses, and other selves contributing to what the dominant “second self” does.

Hey, I realize I’m straying farther and farther from what any of my readers can keep up with–not because it’s over their heads, but because they haven’t the background to keep up with it, and because it may well be unkeepable-up-with.  If anyone thinks he’s getting the gist of it, please let me know.  I would so like to learn I’m not 100% into a person world no one else can enter.  As I believe Gertrude Stein often was, which has kept her world from being entered–with enjoyment–but lots of people.  Is it possible for any human being to disconnect entirely from everyone else?

On the other hand, I sometimes worry that everyone is following me, and bored by my re-inventions of the whale.

So much for my first entry of the day–and I didn’t use the idea I first had!  I enjoyed it, too, and learned from it, so it fulfilled what I believe is a blog’s mainest function: acting as a laboratory of ideas, regardless of their value as entertainment or anything else.

(Note, at HLAS I’m making prodigious attempts to understand how the mind of a fellow there works.  Paul Crowley, whom I’ve spoken of here more than few times, is the fellow.  I swear that his method of verosophical endeavor is to assert something, and challenge other, implicitly or explicitly, to prove it wrong.  Then he rejects whatever anyone says against the assertion, not just as an invalid argument, but as no argument, at all.  When asked to support his rejection, it says things like, “it’s obvious nonsense.”   He will never say why.  When I say, as I did in my latest reply to one of his post, “Again, I ask, in whose opinion?” he says things like the following, which is his latest retort, ” The Grumman Gambit is the epitome of  intellectual dishonesty.  You should market  it, much like a snake-oil salesman . . .

“‘. .  Lost your argument?  Nothing to say?  You’ve no evidence, and you’ve forgotten whatever logic you thought you once had?  Don’t worry  . . .  you can always rely on the Grumman Gambit . . . . only $10 per use each time . . .”

He’s very good at this sort of thing.  He truly seems as intelligent or more intelligent than anyone else at HLAS, including me.  Well, except that he’s insane.  Or, as I more than half believe, the output of a fiendishly clever computer program concocted by sociologists or the like to see how such a person affects others, perhaps even to find out how successful his tactics are–maybe they are mere pranksters, although I find that hard to believe.  It does also cross my mind that some person or group is for some reason out to try to reveal how stupid I am, for this Paul-figure does trip me into fairly awful blunders at time, for he can be very confusing, and defective arguments are far more difficult to counter than intelligent ones.  And or the person or group is just trying to tempt me away from the many more important things I could be doing.  Or who knows what.  But Paul’s fun for me, recreational fun, most of the time.  And he makes me think about the origin and nature of human error, a primary interest of mine.

I began this note thinking it’d be short.  All I wanted to do was wonder why no one was trying to figure out the workings of my strange mind the way I was trying to figure out the workings of his.)

(Note Number Two: the–opiate, I’m sure–has me feeling wonderfully pleased with myself; not feeling superior to anyone, just pleased with Me.  Which, as it always does, certifies to me the complete absurdity of existence.  Still, it’s nice to know that such a feeling is possible.  I’m sure I’ve written here before how I used to feel this way without pharmaceutical help, mainly when I was in my super-creative zone: I always said then that perfect happiness was to be making something one thought of value, remembering similar things one had made and thought of value, and dreaming of similar things one would make–and consider of value . . .  My present feeling is not vocation-related, though.  It is the pleasure of being alive in such a mood.  Is that okay?  I have a lot to say about that, but will wait till later–in one of the three entries I have left to do, or somewhere else.  I don’t think I have anything novel to say about it, though.)

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Entry 545 — $4437.67

Thursday, October 27th, 2011

$4457.67 is how much I earned as a writer from the beginning 0f 1988 until the end of 2010.  I just found that out today when I came across a missing zip drive with biographical information about me on it.  A month of so ago when I made $20 for a review, my only earnings as a writer this year, I was eager to give myself credit for it in the “Earnings” file on said zip drive but couldn’t find the drive.  Very weird.  Well, today, on impulse I went through my zip drives again, thinking my biographical data might be on a mislabeled drive.  I’d already checked that possibility in vain, but thought maybe I’d overlooked one drive or something, so tried again.  All my drives were properly labeled. 

BUT in one of the little plastic holders, wedged under a shelf so hard to see all the way into, that I have my zip drives in, I noticed on the bottom of the container what looked like some kind of colored ad.  When I tried to pull it out I found that it was a zip drive container!  Yes, it was the missing one.  I’m so relieved.  I do so much want to make things easy for posterity.  I owe them untold gratitude for their support, belated though it is.  And I’m sure those of them who are also creative artists and/or critics will be encouraged by my lack of commercial success.  I also wanted you, mine faithful readers, to see how well I’ve done at meta-commerciality–enough to postpone my second go at Gregory’s poem.  I trust it will inspire you to equal or even greater success at it.

$4437.67 for 22 years, by the way, is just over $200 a year.  I need someone to buy a signed poem of mine for $142.33 before year-end or I’ll  drop under $200-a-year.  Or just send me a check for that amount for “services to poetry.”  I deserve it.  (Which reminds me: I didn’t subtract my expenses, sometimes large, such as the cost of a bus ticket to and from an affair I got paid much less than the ticket cost to give a presentation–but by people as improverished as I so I didn’t mind.)

Hey, Gregory’s poem hasn’t gotten me stumped.  It is a challenge, though.  Nonetheless, I’ll overpower it even unto its final dot.  Make that its final letter.  Gregory’s only punctuation marks in this poem are commas, and there isn’t one at the end of his poem.  I tend to doubt he likes punctuation marks very much–certainly not as much as I do.  Nobody does, except Marton Koppany–and maybe Geof Huth.  And some Canadian or other.  Which calls for an Announcement before I forget it forever: punctuational poetry is a subclass of infraverbal poetry, an important subclass–except for people like the editors of Poetry.

I’m not sure when I’ll get to the n at the end of “Skips.”  Maybe not for several days.  Tomorrow is my latest surgical procedure (outpatient).  Who knows how I’ll feel the next few days.  By then I’ll have new excuses, I’m sure.  I do plan to have an entry tomorrow, just to let you all know I’m back home, okay.  If I don’t post an entry, don’t be too worried–I may just have had to stay overnight, and won’t have access to a computer.

Note: I did post this entry yesterday but forgot to mark it “public.”  Sorry it’s late.

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Entry 470 — Thoughts about Language Poetry

Thursday, July 21st, 2011

I define on the basis of material details: what is materially
done in a poem, so I have trouble with statements like,
language poets are those poets “engaged pretty self-
consciously with the problematics of signification.”  What
problems?  How are they engaged–that is, how is their
engagement manifested in their poems?

I ignore who claims or is claimed by others to be or not be a
language poet.  My concern is with poems that use what I
consider language poetry devices.  Which I’m trying
haphazardly to list.

I’m gonna jump on you for this, Jerry–because I don’t think
you’ll take offense, and because you might say something
back that ain’t dumb.  What’s “languagey” about Lauterback
or C. D. Wright’s work?  I’m not baiting you or New-
Poetry.  I’ve have trouble pinning down what language
poetry is, or should be, since my (belated) first exposure to
it around 1980.  I’ve long since decided the jump-cut poetry
I think many poets have been doing since “The Wasteland”
is in any sense, “language” poetry.

Vaguely, I think of a language poem as something that
makes you consider the poetic effect of the non-prose, or
unconventional, punctuation, spelling, grammar of
something in a text.  Cummings, for instance, when he
writes, “What if a much of a which of a wind,” or Gertrude
Stein when she wrote “rose is a rose is a rose.”  Each
forcing a reader to consider what grammar is and does–
more than a poet using a noun as a verb as Dylan Thomas
beautifully does, say.   Language-centering versus
language-heightening.  To say a start to what I hope
someday about language poetry.

Saroyan’s “lighght” is, for me, a perfect example of a
language poem, although called a visual poem.  What it
means as language is secondary; what counts is what it does
as language–to wit: make metaphoric use of the strange
fact that “gh” can be silent.

Another thought: that a language poem uses language for
more than denotation and connotation.  It goes beyond what
can be done with those two things.

Hey, that may be my definition of language poetry: poetry
whose central aesthetic effect depends not of what its
language denotes or connotes but what it does.

> what it does?
> which leaves us what?
> diagraming sentences?

Diagramming sentences was one of the very few things I
liked doing in school.  You wouldn’t need to do it here
unless your understanding of sentence structure is really
bad.

I think I can’t explain it to you, at least now, if my “lighght”
example doesn’t make sense to you.  Think about what
makes it work as a pooem, if not for you, then for others
like me for whom it definitely works.

What makes it for me is what its “gh” is as a fragment of
language, not what it denotes or connotes (which is zero).
Think about Cummings’s “What if a much of a which of a
wind” and Stein’s “rose is a rose is a rose.”  Neither is
anything without its abuse of syntax, and that abuse does
much more than simply distort a text sufficiently to slant it
interesting–the way the sentence I just typed does, or tries
to do–or the way an impressionistic painting distorts a
pretty scene enough to make it appealing to those capable
of appreciating it.

I think Stein’s passage does something important
neurophysiologically (according to my post-Chomskian
theory of linguistics): it disrupts the brain’s reception of
what the passage denotes in such a way as to let it start
again out of a blank context, which will give a reader (or
some readers) a feeling of the word, “rose,” which is much
closer to what most persons’ first experience of an actual
rose was than to something more conventional, like Burns’s
“My love is like a red, red rose” (although his expression
has other virtues).

I’m not sure about the Cummings passage, which I haven’t
thought about too deeply.  I first made an intense analysis
of the Stein passage 30 years ago–in what I believe was my
first published piece of criticism, in my college literary
magazine.

The fact that this way of considering language poetry seems
to stymy you suggests to me that I may be on to something
of consequence (which is not to say I’m saying anything
original).  A genuine poet or serious engagent of poetry
would be thrilled to discover words might be used to do
something more than denote, connote, appeal to the ears,
appeal to the eyes.  A Philistine would feel threatened.  Too
threatened to ask questions the way you are, Stephen.  For
which, I thank you.

I believe many poets called language poets just assaulted
grammar in their poems for the sake of problematizing
language, which they took to be a way to opposing the
political status quo.  Many didn’t have any aesthetic
motives, being (I strongly suspect) almost bereft of
aesthetic sensitivity.  Not that their accidents, like many of
the accidents of the Dadaists, couldn’t be put to far betters
uses than they were able to.

Entry 448 — Another Terminological Change

Tuesday, May 24th, 2011

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Although many of my coinages sound pretentious, I always aim for ordinariness.  It’s not that easy to achieve.  Hence, “xenological poetry” as one of my main categories of poetry.  Well, I suddenly saw yesterday that “dislocational poetry” could takes its place.  Ironically, that was the very first name I gave such poetry–surrealistic and jump-cut poetry–thirty or forty years ago.  I don’t know why I dropped it.  I see no reason not to use it now, though, so will.

Meanwhile, I also realized that “vaudevillic” as a term for all varieties of jump-cut poems is unfair since some of them cohere quite nicely.  So I’m bringing back “jump-cut” to its previous position, and demoting “vaudevillic” to a secondary position as an adjective describing one kind of jump-cut poems, the other kind being, “convergent jump-cut poems.”  Be sure to update your copies of A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry,” students.

I’ve made a change in what constitutes aesthetic pleasure, too: one of two things, fundaesthetic pleasure or pleasure due to fundaceptual stimuli, and anthraesthetic pleasure, or pleasure due to anthroceptual stimuli.  Then there’s a sort of new word, “osmoticism,” for the ability to learn osmotically, and its antonym, “unosmoticism,” which I use to represent one of the many intellectual dysfunctions of people who don’t believe in Shakespeare.

Last, and close to least is, “lifage,” my word for anything a person uses to trade when attempting to  increase the pleasure-to-pain ratio of his life.  An economics term.  There are two kinds of lifage, “inborn” and “acquired,” the latter of which is a person’s private property.  I came up with it because I needed some such term for what one trades to another when one rents a house to the latter in return for (the lifage) of money.  It’s not the lifage of the house (assuming for the sake of argument that it is as good after the rental period as it was before it) but the actual hours of life the landlord gives up, hours he could have used enjoying the house himself and which are permanently lost.  In other words, the term, “unearned income,” is nonsense.

Entry 445 — Vaudevillic Poetry

Saturday, May 21st, 2011

I’ve coined another term, “Vaudevillic Poetry,” for what I’ve been calling “Jump-Cut Poetry.”  This is a somewhat derogatory term inspired by my bias against short-attention span art, the kind of art that presents discontinuous acts.  It reminds me of why I never much liked television variety shows like Ed Sullivan’s when young, and have rarely looked forward to visits to museums.  Lots of fun stuff but within an hour I start getting a headache.  I’m too much of a convergent thinker, I guess.

Lately I’ve decided that the “language poetry” now gaining Official Recognition is really not much different from Ashbery’s vaudevillic poetry, so really is not extending what the academy recognizes as poetry of value.  Ergo, Wilshberia remains the only part of the contemporary American poetry continuum the Poetry Establishment has any really knowledge of.

Additional note: I’m renaming “Sprungrammatical Poetry” “Grammar-Centered Poetry.”  Accessibility and all that.  So: in my taxonomy, there are two kinds of Language poetry: grammar-centered and infraverbal.  I’m thinking, too, that there are two kinds of vaudevillic poetry: phrase-length and sentence-length.  “Jumbled-Text” may be a third–one beyond Wilshberia.  But possibly beyond what I conceive as poetry, as well–i.e., hyperhermetic or Steinian, if you consider her short texts poems (although I feel I get some of them).

Entry 376 — An Ultimate Definition of Poetry

Saturday, February 12th, 2011

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First, to get my latest coinage out of the way before I forget it: “urentity.”  I’m not keen on it but need something for more or less fundamental things like photons and electrons–both larger like atoms, and smaller like quarks; for light, too, and maybe gravity.  There may be  good term for this already out there; if so, I’m not aware of one, and I’ve often wanted one.  “Bit of matter” would be good enough if there weren’t some things not considered material, like light.

Maybe “fundent.”  “Urentity” is pissy my ear now tells me.

What follows are notes written yesterday toward a discussion of how to define poetry.

Last night I felt I was putting together a terrific monograph on the subject but now, around 3 in the afternoon, I’ve found I haven’t gotten anywhere much, and am out of gas, so will add a few thoughts to what I’ve said so far, without keeping it very well organized.

The best simple definition of poetry has for thousands of years been “literary artworks whose words are employed for substantially more than their ability to denote.”  With “literary artworks” being defined as having to have words making some kind of sense whose purpose is to provide aesthetic pleasure to a greater degree than indoctrination or information, the other two things words can provide.

A more sophisticated definition would list in detail exactly what beyond denotation poetry’s words are employed for, mainly kinds of melodation (or word-music), figurative heightening, linguistic heightening (by means of fresh language, for instance) and connotation.  Arguments have always risen about what details a poem should have to qualify as a poem–end-alliteration, the right number of syllables, meter, end-rhyme, etc., with philogushers almost always  sowing confusion by requiring subjective characteristics such as beauty, high moral content, or whatever.

Propagandists work to make salient words ambiguous.  They never provide objective, coherent definitions of their terms.  Diana Price, the anti-Shakespearean, for instance, attacks the belief that Shakespeare wrote the works attributed to him but saying there’s no contemporary personal literary evidence for him, but in her few attempts to define what she means in her book against Shakespeare does so partially, and inconsistently.  I bring this up because I hope someday to use her book in a book of my own on the nature and function of propaganda.

I’m not bothering with that right now.  I’m intent only on establishing that poetry has always been, basically, heightened language used to entertain in some way and/or another, with different poetic devices being required by poets of different schools of the art.  At present a main controversy (although now over a century old)  is whether verbal texts using only the device of lineation (or the equivalent) can qualify as poetry, but it would appear that for the great majority of poets and critics, the answer is yes.  The most recent controversy has to do with whether poetry making in which non-verbal elements are as important as verbal elements can be considered poetry.  the outcome is uncertain but it would seem that another yes will result.  Amazingly enough–to me, at any rate–is the belief of many visual artists who make letters and other linguistic symbols the subject of painting that such . . . “textual designs,” I call them . . . are poetry, “visual poetry.”  The question has not reached enough people in poetry to be considered controversial yet, I don’t believe–however controversial in my circles.

My newest and best definition of visual poetry is: “poetry (therefore verbal) containing visual elements whose contribution to its central aesthetic effect is more or less equally to the contribution to that of the poem’s words.”

It is constantly claimed how blurry and ever-changing language is, but I’m not sure it is.  It seems to me that most of our language is quite stable, and that only language about ideas, which are forever changing, is to any great extent capricious.  Sure, lots of terms come and go, but only because what they describe comes and goes.  “Poetry,” was reasonably set for millennia, and uncertain only now because for the first time  a significant number of artists are fusing arts, thus requiring new terms like “visual poetry,” and amendments to definitions like “poetry.”

A precise, widely agreed-on definition of “poetry” is essential not only for critics but for poets themselves, no mater how little many of them realize it.  They want to use it freely, and should if you believe with me that “poetry is the appropriate misuse of language.”  A metaphor is a misuse of language, a lie.  Calling me a tiger when it comes to defending the rational use of language is an example.  I’m not a tiger.  But I act in some ways like a tiger.  A metaphor actually could be considered an ellipsis–words left out because understood, in this case saying “Bob is a tiger” rather than “Bob is like a tiger.”  In any case, if we don’t accept the definition of tiger as a big dangerous cat, the metaphor will not work.

To say a word can have many meanings according to its context does not make it polysemous, although if provides the word with connotational potential the poet can take advantage of.

James Joyce’s “cropse’ is a neat misspelling but useless if one does not accept the precise meanings of “crops” and “corpse.”

Entry 360 — Thoughts about Definitions

Thursday, January 27th, 2011

Mathematical Poetry is poetry in which a mathematical operation performed on non-mathematical terms contributes significantly to the poem’s aesthetic effect.

Mathematics Poetry is poetry about mathematics.

Neither is a form of visual poetry unless a portion of it is significantly (and directly) visio-aesthetic.

The taxonomic rationale for this is that it allows poetry to be divided into linguexclusive and pluraesthetic poetry–two kinds based on something very clear, whether or not they make aesthetically significant use of more than one expressive modality, with the second category dividing cleanly into poetries whose definition is based on what extra expressive modality they employ–visual poetry, for example, employing visimagery; mathematical poetry employing mathematics; and so forth.

Directly.  I mentioned that because there are some who would claim that a linguexclusive poem about a tree so compellingly written as to make almost anyone reading it visualize the tree is a “visual poem.”  But it sends one to one’s visual brain indirectly.  A genuine visual poem about a tree, by my definition, would use a visual arrangement of letters to suggest a tree, or graphics or the like directly to send one to one’s visual brain.

A confession.  I’ve been using the pwoermd, “cropse,” as an example of a linguexlusive poem that muse be seen to be appreciated, but is not a visual poem.  Yet it is almost a visual poem, for it visually enacts the combination of “corpse” and “crops” that carries out it aesthetic purpose.  To call it a visual poem, however, would ignore its much more potent conceptual effect.  I claim that it would be experienced primarily in one’s purely verbal brain, and very likely not at all in one’s visual brain.  One understands its poetry as a conception not as a visimage.  When I engage it, I, at any rate, do not picture a corpse and crops, I wonder into the idea of the eternal life/death that Nature, that existence, is.  It is too much more conceptual than visual to be called a visual poem.

I had a related problem with classifying cryptographic poetry.  At first, I found it clearly a form of infraverbal poetry–poetry depending for its aesthetic effect of what its infraverbal elements, its textemes, do, not on what its words and combinations of words do.   It was thus linguexclusive.  But I later suddenly saw cryptography as a significant distinct modality of expression, which would make cryptographic poetry a kind of pluraesthetic poetry.  Currently, I opt for its being linguexclusive, for being more verbo-conceptual than multiply-expressed.  A subjective choice.  Taxonomy is difficult.

For completeness’s sake, a comment now that I made in response to some comments made to an entry at Kaz’s blog about my taxonomy: “Visual poetry and conventional poetry are visual but only visual poetry is visioaesthetic. The point of calling it ‘visual’ is to emphasize the importance of something visual in it. In my opinion, the shapes of conventional poems, calligraphy, and the like are not important enough to make those poems ‘visual.’ Moreover, to use the term ‘visual poem’ for every kind of poem (and many non-poems) would leave a need for a new term for poems that use graphics to their fullest. It would also make the term of almost no communicative value. By Geof’s logic we would have to consider a waterfall a visual poem because of its ‘poetry.’ Why not simply reduce our language to the word, ‘it?’”

Entry 352 — More on the Value of Taxonomy

Wednesday, January 19th, 2011

The more I think about it, the more I feel like superciliously saying that Truth is one of the two primary values in life beyond survival, and therefore of the highest value for itself alone, and that a taxonomy is the basis of every significant form of Truth, so of the highest value for itself alone.  It is an understanding the value of which can only be appreciated by those able to perceive the full size, if not fully understand a form of verosophy and follow its taxonomical base into “ever-smaller mysteries, and ever-vaster interconnections.”

But I contend that a taxonomy also has valuable utilitarian uses.  A cardinal one is its use for helping people understand  a given poem.  To demonstrate that, let’s take an untitled language poem with no author’s name that someone not knowing anything about such a thing encounters, and for some obscure reason doesn’t dismiss it as nonsense but wants to understand it.  Let’s assume it has some normal words in it.  If he knows about my taxonomy, he can go to it and figure out from it that the object he has is 1. material and therefore matter, 2. part of life because printed as a human artifact, 3. part of human life because a human artifact, 4. m0re than likely something resulting from mentascendancy, 5. a form of art since it certainly isn’t a form of versosophy–nor recognizable as religious though he may have to investigate that further, by perhaps taking it to a minister of some kind, 6. literature since it certainly is neither persuasive or utilitarian (although it may take him a while to reach that conclusion), and 7. poetry, because not having the set right margin that prose has.

It is obviously 8. linguexclusive and 9. not songmode, so plaintext poetry, and 10. not  orthological, so xenexpressive (the class I have now, thanks to Geof, replaced xenological and language poetry with).  Under xenexpressive, he’ll find language poetry with jump-cut poetry and surrealistic poetry, neither of which fit, so he’ll identify it as 11. language poetry.  He should be able to tell which main kind of language poem it is–let’s say, 12. sprungrammatical.  In the full taxonomy I hope one day to put together, he’ll be able to determine what kind of sprungrammatical poem it is–one to three levels down.  Now, with a name, he’ll be able to study anthologies of such poems and read articles about them.  Then he can dismiss them as nonsense with a clear conscience!

What is his alternative?  I can’t think of any–assuming he’s alone–i.e., has no educated friends to help him–except to consult a typology, or list of poetries–after somehow deducing that the text is a form of poetry.  He must then read the description of every kind of poetry until coming on one that seems to be of his text.  A long j0b, and even then he’ll not have learned anything about what such poems are like and unlike.

A taxonomy can work in the opposite direction, too.  Let’s say our subject finds a text labeled a language poem and finds it interesting, but puzzling in part.  He looks it up in a reference book and finds a fair but finally unsatisfying vague definition of it.  If in a typological reference book, he’ll have nowhere else to go.  Of course, few if any references are entirely typological; most of their definitions will mention what general kind of poetry a specific poem is.  He might find, for instance, that his language poem is “postmodern,” and read about that, which may help a bit.  But if he learns what it is taxonomically, he’ll soon be able to learn more about its xenexpressive qualities, and its plaintext qualities, and so forth  And see why it is not surrealistic but illuminatingly somewhat like surrealistic poetry.  Etc.

Entry 351 — Debating Huth on Taxonomy

Tuesday, January 18th, 2011

Shortly after he got my booklet, A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry, Geof Huth wrote an excellent review of it at his blog, here. It is also a critique, which I will not respond to in detail.

Bob Grumman has released a new book, really a chapbook, entitled A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry, and it combines the two halves of Bob’s intellect into one. The first of these is an interest in clear thinking, in making distinctions even if only for distinction’s sake, an interest in definition and categorization. And the second is its opposite, though it is the second that Bob rarely sees. The second is a tendency to simplify distinctions by setting rules that are not in evidence in the facts, a tendency to muddle things a bit, to wander.

And I love both these halves of Bob, even though, or probably because, they both can annoy me and enchant me, because their annoyance is often a possibility for illumination and because their enchantments lead me terribly astray. These two halves of Bob are the two halves of his visual poetry as well. He creates some of the most considered visual poetry, a poetry interested in the word and new senses of syntax, and he sometimes creates with this intellect visual poems that seem to care little about their visual presentation. Then he will create visual poems almost totally inscrutable from a verbal point of view but which are still among the most beautiful visual poems around. His best work is among my favorite being created these days.

Somewhere I gave my opinion of this idea of Geof’s but I’ve been unable to find what I said. It wasn’t much, only that I wouldn’t call my intellect divided in two: it’s just the tool I use to define, distinguish and classify reality, among other things. Sometimes it is effective, sometimes not, but it’s the same intellect at all times. As for its creating “visual poems that seem to care little about their visual presentation,” this goes back to an ongoing difference of ours as to the importance of what I consider trivial decorative effects and he considers centrally important effects–because, I feel, I’m more committed to the conceptual meaning of poetry than he is, and less to the sensual meaning. A complicating factor is that I lack the means–e.g., a superior computer and printer–often to create poems that look as well on the page as I’d like them to. All of which may seem to have little to do with our taxonomy debate but which, I think, parallels his greater interest in trees than in forests compared with my greater interest in forests than in trees.

It would have been helpful if he’d provided an example of my “setting rules that are not in evidence in the facts, a tendency to muddle things a bit, to wander.”

So there’s the context for this, a little accounting of my point of view, which might be only an accumulation of my own biases. I’ve left a few things out. I’ve known Bob for just under 25 years. He is my oldest visual poetry friend. And we almost never agree on anything. We come to visual poetry with much different ideas. As a matter of fact, when Bob says “visual poetry” he means something considerably narrower than I mean when using the same term. We are not sympatico in that way.

Why Taxonomy?

Bob opens the booklet with “A Defense of the Taxonomization of Poetry,” which is an impassioned defense of taxonomies and the effort it takes to produce them. Part of the reason for his passion is that Bob has suffered through a few sometimes heated arguments over the years from poets, especially visual poets, who are themselves passionate in their opposition to taxonomies. These people see a taxonomy as the equivalent of an autopsy that produces no results. In this opening section, Bob does a reasonable, though quick, job of directly disputing the ideas of the critics of taxonomy, but he provides no justification for taxonomy at all, except to say that “an effective taxonomy” allows “the clarification of discussion.”

This is a big weakness to me. In the face of enormous criticism of taxonomy, Bob undermines the arguments of his opponents, but not in a way that argues the case for his own. All of his arguments are negative. None is positive. The one above is actually my reversal of his refutation of his detractors’. Bob needs to prove how his taxonomies do something valuable. What he does is insist that they do something valuable without clarifying those values or giving any evidence of any.

As I’ve elsewhere noted, I provided much more justification for taxonomy: for instance, I called it the basis of the conceptual appreciation of art, and declaimed that “At their best, taxonomies (and analysis in general) reveal ever-smaller mysteries, and ever-vaster interconnections to discover down or up to–while allowing us a vocabulary greater than ‘oooh’ and ‘ahhh’ with which to share our pleasure with others.” Geof has since shrugged these off as trivial. I’m in the processing of making much more elaborate points, but I consider these pretty good ones.

Upper Levels of the Taxonomy

This taxonomy of Bob’s is the most formal he’s ever created. It begins with the Universe of the taxonomy (in this case “Matter”), and narrows down from there:

Domain: Life

Kingdom: Human Life

Phylum: Mentascendancy (“the pursuit of meaningfulness”)

Class: Art

Order: Literature

Family: Poetry
Immediately, I’m thrown into a quandary, one of definitional confusion and doubt. Is Poetry really divided into Matter (instead of its opposing universe: Mind) or into Life (instead of Non-Life). Even if stored inside a human, aren’t poems really only inanimate? and are they not more things of the mind rather than of matter? A poem on a page is not so much the poem as a poem accepted into a mind. This is a serious issue, one that needs justification in the taxonomy.*

Frankly, I feel Geof has been thrown into goofiness here. But maybe that’s my fault, for not having defined “human life” as “everything having to do with human beings, including their activities and products.” I didn’t define “mind,” either. For me, it is irrelevant–a consciousness that observes matter but does not otherwise interact with it. It has no subclasses. I only put it in my taxonomy to be complete.

I agree with Geof that poems are only inanimate. However, while they are products of the brain, which I’m sure is what Geof means by the “mind,” so are cars. What counts in my taxonomy are what they are as matter, to wit: verbal expressions, oral or written. That they become sets of activated brain-cells is interesting, and I believe will ultimately vindicate the validity of my taxonomy (by showing which brain-cells are activate for each different kind of poetry in my taxonomy), but my taxonomy only deals with what’s out there in the real material world.

Even if that were not the case, I don’t see that it would make much difference. What defines poetries as written or spoken material artifacts would define them as mentally accepted artifacts.

At the Level of Prose and Poetry

Bob divides all literature into two main families, Poetry and Prose, and this might be a satisfactory division, though I would have, at least, discussed dramatic works and addressed the question of apparent hybrid forms, such as the verse novel and verse play. Here, Bob posits that “poetry is intended to be read slowly, read into rather than through: connotations, sounds, rhythms, flesh being emphasize rather than denotation only.” In general, the general direction of this definition is fine, but it’s too absolute and doesn’t take into account such facts as the inclusion of doggerel in the family of poetry, or that fact that many prose works depend on all the effects mentioned by Bob and also do not depend on denotation alone. This definition is complicated by Bob’s paragraph that consists of this sentence: “Literary prose is simply literature that is not poetry,” which seems to assume that any works that depend on denotation alone (or, let’s say, principally) are thus prose. This situation is quickly complicated again by Bob’s not-quite-stated-but-clearly-implied point that poetry is text that includes flow-breaks, the most well known of which is the linebreak. Whatever poetry or prose is or isn’t isn’t clarified here.

In other writings I’ve done, I’ve gotten into verse plays and other such things. In my unpreliminary taxonomy, I will, too. I didn’t here, which is a minor flaw Geof is right in pointing out. His main criticism may have resulted because I for got to say, as I usually do when differentiating poetry from prose, that poetry is verbal expression in which flow-breaks (as I define them) are clearly significant. Prose is verbal expression in which flow-breaks occur relatively very infrequently. Yes, it’s a subjective matter, and yes, there will be instances of works of verbal expression whose category will be difficult to decide. But expecting a taxonomy to be perfect is absurd.

The same argument holds for poetry’s being “intended to be read slowly, read into rather than through: connotations, sounds, rhythms, flesh being emphasize rather than denotation only.” I suppose I should have written that it is significantly more than prose “intended to be read slowly, read into rather than through: connotations, sounds, rhythms, flesh being emphasized rather than denotation only.” Again the problem of subjectivity (which no attempt to define or classify can avoid, but must only try its best to minimize) arises, and of the borblur where rare works of verbal expression occur that are hard to define. Note well, however, that what I say about poetry here is descriptive only. It has nothing to do with the classification of poetry, which depends entirely on whether or not its ratio of flow-breaks to words is sufficiently high to make it poetry or not.

I would add in passing that doggerel is, even without truning to flow-breaks, poetry on the basis of its sounds–since doggerel always has rhyme ends.

Flow-Breaks

Bob, next discusses, flowbreaks (I’m discarding the hyphen): 1. the linebreak, 2. variable indentation, 3. interior line-gap (which is simply a caesura), and 4. the intrasyllabic linebreak. Here is the genius of Bob Grumman. He sees and defines topographic features of poetry that others have virtually ignored and he sees how they fit together into one set of poetic tools. My only problem with this is that one of his examples of an intra-syllabic linebreak is really intersyllabic, and the the fact that a line breaks within a word or a syllable doesn’t make it significantly different from a traditional linebreak. What he should have used as his fourth category of a flowbreak was an instance of visual tmesis, which would be a different form of flowbreak.

I checked and was surprised to find that in obsolete verse, blocks of more than one space are used to form caesurae. I always thought of them as rhetorical breaks with nothing special indicating them but the sense of the text where they are, or a simple punctuation mark. The term, “line-gap” is still necessary, however, because it applies not only to blocks of spaces but blocks of anything else that clear put a blocking gap int&&&o a line.

My two examples of intrasyllabically broken words were “dev/ice” and “i/t.” line-break. For me, “device’s” two syllables are “de” and “vice,” but maybe I’m wrong.

I like “flow-break” as opposed to “flowbreak,” by the way, because I think the hyphen emphasizes its meaning.

Types of Poetry

This lengthy discussion has brought us only to the saddle-stapled middle of the chapbook, which is where Bob divides poetry into three classes: linguiexclusive poetry (poetry dependent on words alone) and pluraesthetic poetry (poetry that mixes “expressive modalities,” such as the verbal and the visual. This distinction is solid, though I have questions with the subsubtypes of poetry Bob identifies.

Linguiexclusive Poetry

Just one i in “linguexpressive.”

Bob divides linguexclusive poetry into three subsubtypes: orthological, xenological, and language. The first is fairly standard poetry (subdivided yet again into categories), the second is poetry that breaks with the conventions of normal sense and syntax in various ways, and the third subsubtype is both confusing and unnecessary. All of its pieces should appear under xenological. Bob has divided to use a term here (“language poetry”) that already has a meaning, though a taxonomically unhelpful one, and he gives it a new sense to no particular purpose.

Geof may be right, but I think of xenological poetry as breaking with logic, not breaking with syntax, although I can see that a breaking of syntax will also cause a break in logic . . . I think. Not to argue but for background, the reason for the split is that in an earlier version of my taxonomy I divided poetries on the basis of their innovativeness, and put surrealistic and jump-cut poetry under “xenological poetry” among the uninnovative poetries, since their innovations where much older than language poetry’s, and not, in my opinion, as great.

“Language poetry” has no real meaning. At least I’ve never seen it defined. well, unless you consider “language-centered poetry” a definition. In any case, I long avoided using it but finally decided that it was popular enough and appropriate enough to use, and that I could use it to mean “language-centered,” but go on to define it in much greater detail. I think I will keep it, but perhaps put it under “xenological”–after changing “xenological” to “xenexpressive.”

The definition he gives is “Language poetry is poetry in words [that?] seem to be used with almost maximum communicational responsibility. Language is at the center of such poetry, not semantics or sound.” This definition does not seem at all helpful to me, and I cannot imagine a poetry without semantics that still focuses on language.

I would guess my computer screwed me up when I wrote my “definition” of language poetry. However, the three kinds of language poetry I went on to define should have clarified everything sufficiently. Language poetry is poetry whose words seem to be used with almost maximal communicational IRresponsibility (I’m sure i mistake was mine, not my computer’s) Language is at its centr, not semantics or sound. That semantics is not at its center does not mean it does not have semantics. I’m trying to say that it focuses on what words do rather than what they mean. Then in my three kinds of language poetry, I show some of the ways it does that.

Pluraesthetic Poetry

In discussing the types of pluraesthetic poetry, I’ll skip any discussion of the fact that Bob redefines “visual poetry” for his own uses, because it is important for him to do it here in order for “visual poetry” to fit neatly into his definition of poetry. Bob, however, also distinguishes mathematical poetry and flowchart poetry (“poetry that uses the symbols of computers or other flow-charting in significantly expressive ways”) from visual poetry, but I do not. Mathematical poems add mathematical features that visualize the poetry, so I consider them visual poems, and to have a category for flowchart poetry assumes that process symbols are textual and thus not visual. I’d argue, again, that they are not orthodox text, so these poems are also visual poems.

I’ll just state my disagreement–and the reason for my disagreement, which is that the point of my taxonomy is to separate different members of the set, “Poetry.” A term is of value only to the degree that it is specialized. I should add that I flubbed my definition of flow-chart poetry; it should be simply “poetry that uses flow-charting symbols in significantly expressive ways.”

Also, Bob’s definition remains indefensible: “poetry that uses mathematical symbols that actually carry out mathematical operations.” These mathematical operations are not actual; they are apparent. That is a big different. Duck cannot be divided by yellow in any mathematical way, though it could in a metaphoric way that has nothing to do with math directly.

See my previous entry discussing this.

For reasons I don’t understand, Bob distinguishes between “cyber poetry” and “hypertextual poetry,” which is not a distinction. Hypertext poetry would be a subset of cyberpoetry. But the real taxonomic distinctions in the category would be between non-interactive and interactive digital poetries, not by the types of computer languages used in the coding of the poems.

To me the distinction is between poetry that consists of computer language and poetry that consists of regular language but may have embedded computer instructions that allow it to do things poetry without them can’t.

Bob leaves out of his poetry videopoetry, which might have some overlap with cyberpoetry that Bob will have to work out.

Videopoetry is just animated visual poetry.

Numbering

Finally, since Bob is presenting a complex nested taxonomy, he should design a numbering system that allows the user to determine their level in the taxonomy and, thus, be able to identify relationships more easily. At points I was briefly confused because I did not understand what certain headings were subsets of. Even the traditional outlining system once taught in school to students drafting essays could work here, but I think, given the number of levels in play, something direct though a little more complex, such as the number system in the Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary, would work better.

Good point.

Coda

Bob’s “Final Comment” includes this unsupportable statement: “I think no members of any other vocation care less about what they do than poets.” I’d say this is an unprovable statement, so it’s opening “I think” saves it, but I also believe everything after those first two words is false. Poets, in my experience, care more about poetics than about poetry. They are more likely to read someone writing about poetry than to read the poetry. They prefer, for instance, blogs on poetics over blogs that reproduce poetry. Poets are thinking people, even when guided by the heart, the spleen, the bone. But sometimes that interest in how poetry works does not extend to an interest in categorization. A general interest is not equivalent to an interest in taxonomy.

At the end of this, I realize that I’d like to see the next draft of this book. I like the idea of seeing how poetry can fall into categories, though I’m sure those categories will dissolve into one another. And I’m happy that Bob has made this book and glad that he has. But he still needs to prove how these defined categories could help us think about poetry. I don’t see it, even though I like the effort to make these categories and the entertainment of the results of that effort.

Finally, my thanks to Bob for giving me a special limited edition of one of the book, with a copy of one of his mathemaku pasted in. I’ve filled my copy with pencil marks of various kinds and notes to myself, but it is still a perfect copy. And I used pencil because I’m an archivist.

I truly thank Geof for his efforts. One of the reasons I say things like “no members of any other vocation care less about what they do than poets” is because, yes, they IN GENERAL are indifferent or hostile to projects like this of mine, even to my simple attempt over twenty or more years to get a list of contemporary poetry schools assembled. Two people suggested schools I didn’t have on my preliminary definitely incomplete list. I would add that I don’t think my idea of what poetics is comes very close to what most poets who think they’re discussing it think it is. But, hey, I’m a bitter old man long ignored by the public at large while tenth-raters make it big.

Not really. Just when I think about my situation in the world of poetry while writing entries like this one.

Entry 275 — A Definition of Literature

Friday, November 5th, 2010

A short entry today, just to show I’m making some progress on my taxonomical essay:

In classifying poetry, I need to go back a way, for it’s necessary first to define art.  That’s because when I first was advancing my notion of what a poem was, saying (in my Of Manywhere-at-Once),

.                             I, for
.                     example, could
.                          call myself a writer of poetry here
.               because I am now lineating
.                                        what I’m writing.

a wise ass sneered that in that case my name and address on an envelope,

.                                   Bob Grumman
.                                   1708 Hayworth Road
.                                   Port Charlotte FL 33952

would have to be considered poetry.  Here’s where the need for a formal taxomomy comes in.  I think very few intelligent persons would see no reason to take the name&address text as poetry: clearly, it is different in kind from a literary text.  That is only according to common sense, however.  Alas, common sense is too close to saying something is because it is, for me.  I therefore felt compelled to Euclidize it.  Hence, I placed texts like a name&address under a coinage of mine for human activities to make survival easier, and more comfortable and secure: medicine, roadmaking, farming, and the like, “utilitry.”

This necessitated my creating a phylum I’m now tentatively calling “ultracerebration” for art and utilitry to be members of.  Joining those two were verosophy and religion.

Entry 360 — Thoughts about Definitions « POETICKS

Entry 360 — Thoughts about Definitions

Mathematical Poetry is poetry in which a mathematical operation performed on non-mathematical terms contributes significantly to the poem’s aesthetic effect.

Mathematics Poetry is poetry about mathematics.

Neither is a form of visual poetry unless a portion of it is significantly (and directly) visio-aesthetic.

The taxonomic rationale for this is that it allows poetry to be divided into linguexclusive and pluraesthetic poetry–two kinds based on something very clear, whether or not they make aesthetically significant use of more than one expressive modality, with the second category dividing cleanly into poetries whose definition is based on what extra expressive modality they employ–visual poetry, for example, employing visimagery; mathematical poetry employing mathematics; and so forth.

Directly.  I mentioned that because there are some who would claim that a linguexclusive poem about a tree so compellingly written as to make almost anyone reading it visualize the tree is a “visual poem.”  But it sends one to one’s visual brain indirectly.  A genuine visual poem about a tree, by my definition, would use a visual arrangement of letters to suggest a tree, or graphics or the like directly to send one to one’s visual brain.

A confession.  I’ve been using the pwoermd, “cropse,” as an example of a linguexlusive poem that muse be seen to be appreciated, but is not a visual poem.  Yet it is almost a visual poem, for it visually enacts the combination of “corpse” and “crops” that carries out it aesthetic purpose.  To call it a visual poem, however, would ignore its much more potent conceptual effect.  I claim that it would be experienced primarily in one’s purely verbal brain, and very likely not at all in one’s visual brain.  One understands its poetry as a conception not as a visimage.  When I engage it, I, at any rate, do not picture a corpse and crops, I wonder into the idea of the eternal life/death that Nature, that existence, is.  It is too much more conceptual than visual to be called a visual poem.

I had a related problem with classifying cryptographic poetry.  At first, I found it clearly a form of infraverbal poetry–poetry depending for its aesthetic effect of what its infraverbal elements, its textemes, do, not on what its words and combinations of words do.   It was thus linguexclusive.  But I later suddenly saw cryptography as a significant distinct modality of expression, which would make cryptographic poetry a kind of pluraesthetic poetry.  Currently, I opt for its being linguexclusive, for being more verbo-conceptual than multiply-expressed.  A subjective choice.  Taxonomy is difficult.

For completeness’s sake, a comment now that I made in response to some comments made to an entry at Kaz’s blog about my taxonomy: “Visual poetry and conventional poetry are visual but only visual poetry is visioaesthetic. The point of calling it ‘visual’ is to emphasize the importance of something visual in it. In my opinion, the shapes of conventional poems, calligraphy, and the like are not important enough to make those poems ‘visual.’ Moreover, to use the term ‘visual poem’ for every kind of poem (and many non-poems) would leave a need for a new term for poems that use graphics to their fullest. It would also make the term of almost no communicative value. By Geof’s logic we would have to consider a waterfall a visual poem because of its ‘poetry.’ Why not simply reduce our language to the word, ‘it?’”

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Entry 448 — Another Terminological Change « POETICKS

Entry 448 — Another Terminological Change

.

Although many of my coinages sound pretentious, I always aim for ordinariness.  It’s not that easy to achieve.  Hence, “xenological poetry” as one of my main categories of poetry.  Well, I suddenly saw yesterday that “dislocational poetry” could takes its place.  Ironically, that was the very first name I gave such poetry–surrealistic and jump-cut poetry–thirty or forty years ago.  I don’t know why I dropped it.  I see no reason not to use it now, though, so will.

Meanwhile, I also realized that “vaudevillic” as a term for all varieties of jump-cut poems is unfair since some of them cohere quite nicely.  So I’m bringing back “jump-cut” to its previous position, and demoting “vaudevillic” to a secondary position as an adjective describing one kind of jump-cut poems, the other kind being, “convergent jump-cut poems.”  Be sure to update your copies of A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry,” students.

I’ve made a change in what constitutes aesthetic pleasure, too: one of two things, fundaesthetic pleasure or pleasure due to fundaceptual stimuli, and anthraesthetic pleasure, or pleasure due to anthroceptual stimuli.  Then there’s a sort of new word, “osmoticism,” for the ability to learn osmotically, and its antonym, “unosmoticism,” which I use to represent one of the many intellectual dysfunctions of people who don’t believe in Shakespeare.

Last, and close to least is, “lifage,” my word for anything a person uses to trade when attempting to  increase the pleasure-to-pain ratio of his life.  An economics term.  There are two kinds of lifage, “inborn” and “acquired,” the latter of which is a person’s private property.  I came up with it because I needed some such term for what one trades to another when one rents a house to the latter in return for (the lifage) of money.  It’s not the lifage of the house (assuming for the sake of argument that it is as good after the rental period as it was before it) but the actual hours of life the landlord gives up, hours he could have used enjoying the house himself and which are permanently lost.  In other words, the term, “unearned income,” is nonsense.

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Entry 445 — Vaudevillic Poetry « POETICKS

Entry 445 — Vaudevillic Poetry

I’ve coined another term, “Vaudevillic Poetry,” for what I’ve been calling “Jump-Cut Poetry.”  This is a somewhat derogatory term inspired by my bias against short-attention span art, the kind of art that presents discontinuous acts.  It reminds me of why I never much liked television variety shows like Ed Sullivan’s when young, and have rarely looked forward to visits to museums.  Lots of fun stuff but within an hour I start getting a headache.  I’m too much of a convergent thinker, I guess.

Lately I’ve decided that the “language poetry” now gaining Official Recognition is really not much different from Ashbery’s vaudevillic poetry, so really is not extending what the academy recognizes as poetry of value.  Ergo, Wilshberia remains the only part of the contemporary American poetry continuum the Poetry Establishment has any really knowledge of.

Additional note: I’m renaming “Sprungrammatical Poetry” “Grammar-Centered Poetry.”  Accessibility and all that.  So: in my taxonomy, there are two kinds of Language poetry: grammar-centered and infraverbal.  I’m thinking, too, that there are two kinds of vaudevillic poetry: phrase-length and sentence-length.  “Jumbled-Text” may be a third–one beyond Wilshberia.  But possibly beyond what I conceive as poetry, as well–i.e., hyperhermetic or Steinian, if you consider her short texts poems (although I feel I get some of them).

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Entry 470 — Thoughts about Language Poetry « POETICKS

Entry 470 — Thoughts about Language Poetry

I define on the basis of material details: what is materially
done in a poem, so I have trouble with statements like,
language poets are those poets “engaged pretty self-
consciously with the problematics of signification.”  What
problems?  How are they engaged–that is, how is their
engagement manifested in their poems?

I ignore who claims or is claimed by others to be or not be a
language poet.  My concern is with poems that use what I
consider language poetry devices.  Which I’m trying
haphazardly to list.

I’m gonna jump on you for this, Jerry–because I don’t think
you’ll take offense, and because you might say something
back that ain’t dumb.  What’s “languagey” about Lauterback
or C. D. Wright’s work?  I’m not baiting you or New-
Poetry.  I’ve have trouble pinning down what language
poetry is, or should be, since my (belated) first exposure to
it around 1980.  I’ve long since decided the jump-cut poetry
I think many poets have been doing since “The Wasteland”
is in any sense, “language” poetry.

Vaguely, I think of a language poem as something that
makes you consider the poetic effect of the non-prose, or
unconventional, punctuation, spelling, grammar of
something in a text.  Cummings, for instance, when he
writes, “What if a much of a which of a wind,” or Gertrude
Stein when she wrote “rose is a rose is a rose.”  Each
forcing a reader to consider what grammar is and does–
more than a poet using a noun as a verb as Dylan Thomas
beautifully does, say.   Language-centering versus
language-heightening.  To say a start to what I hope
someday about language poetry.

Saroyan’s “lighght” is, for me, a perfect example of a
language poem, although called a visual poem.  What it
means as language is secondary; what counts is what it does
as language–to wit: make metaphoric use of the strange
fact that “gh” can be silent.

Another thought: that a language poem uses language for
more than denotation and connotation.  It goes beyond what
can be done with those two things.

Hey, that may be my definition of language poetry: poetry
whose central aesthetic effect depends not of what its
language denotes or connotes but what it does.

> what it does?
> which leaves us what?
> diagraming sentences?

Diagramming sentences was one of the very few things I
liked doing in school.  You wouldn’t need to do it here
unless your understanding of sentence structure is really
bad.

I think I can’t explain it to you, at least now, if my “lighght”
example doesn’t make sense to you.  Think about what
makes it work as a pooem, if not for you, then for others
like me for whom it definitely works.

What makes it for me is what its “gh” is as a fragment of
language, not what it denotes or connotes (which is zero).
Think about Cummings’s “What if a much of a which of a
wind” and Stein’s “rose is a rose is a rose.”  Neither is
anything without its abuse of syntax, and that abuse does
much more than simply distort a text sufficiently to slant it
interesting–the way the sentence I just typed does, or tries
to do–or the way an impressionistic painting distorts a
pretty scene enough to make it appealing to those capable
of appreciating it.

I think Stein’s passage does something important
neurophysiologically (according to my post-Chomskian
theory of linguistics): it disrupts the brain’s reception of
what the passage denotes in such a way as to let it start
again out of a blank context, which will give a reader (or
some readers) a feeling of the word, “rose,” which is much
closer to what most persons’ first experience of an actual
rose was than to something more conventional, like Burns’s
“My love is like a red, red rose” (although his expression
has other virtues).

I’m not sure about the Cummings passage, which I haven’t
thought about too deeply.  I first made an intense analysis
of the Stein passage 30 years ago–in what I believe was my
first published piece of criticism, in my college literary
magazine.

The fact that this way of considering language poetry seems
to stymy you suggests to me that I may be on to something
of consequence (which is not to say I’m saying anything
original).  A genuine poet or serious engagent of poetry
would be thrilled to discover words might be used to do
something more than denote, connote, appeal to the ears,
appeal to the eyes.  A Philistine would feel threatened.  Too
threatened to ask questions the way you are, Stephen.  For
which, I thank you.

I believe many poets called language poets just assaulted
grammar in their poems for the sake of problematizing
language, which they took to be a way to opposing the
political status quo.  Many didn’t have any aesthetic
motives, being (I strongly suspect) almost bereft of
aesthetic sensitivity.  Not that their accidents, like many of
the accidents of the Dadaists, couldn’t be put to far betters
uses than they were able to.

One Response to “Entry 470 — Thoughts about Language Poetry”

  1. Ed Baker says:

    nothing ‘haphazard’ about this essay , Bob

    it posits a “fragmwent of a language-heightening much “to let it start out again out of a blank context” “content” ? which from I just
    got
    an entire page of notes in my own ‘scribble-script from which I will scan and send
    aux vous

    I too got ALL A s in my diagramming sentences course it was a full semester course.. 3-credits

    subject is always predicated upon its dangling participles with or without conjunctions or signifiers… or Points/Counterpoints ?

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