The Human Instincts « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘The Human Instincts’ Category

Entry 1328 — My Stupidest Idea?

Thursday, January 2nd, 2014

About a month ago I had an idea so stupid I never wrote it down.  But somehow I more than half believe in it!  In any case, it may be entertaining, and I need something for today, so here it is: when we struggle to answer some problem and fail, our brain will eventually connect it to–here’s my idea–a False Solution.  Here’s what makes it wacko: we know it’s false but accept it as our solution, anyway!  And it explains nothing, it just says to you, you got it without telling you why.

Here’s what I tentatively think happens: a mechanism recognizing great puzzlement sticks this false solution to our thinking about the problem, with it clearly labeled “crap”; but the mechanism also lowers the pain that failed solutions generally cause, and which make us keep struggling with the problems causing them.  So we accept it.  It keeps us from ever solving the problem BUT makes up for that by keeping us from wasting too much time and energy trying to solve a problem we can’t solve, because we’re too inept, or have no likelihood of acquiring sufficient data to solve it, or it’s unsolvable (e.g., why iz we here).

To cast a better light on it, I could call it the Unsolvability Urceptual Knowlecule (UUK).  A form of x is x because.

The alert amongst you may well see how such a thing may just explain . . . You-Know-Who, Almighty.  In fact, I think certain things some find animistic vague answers to may connect to the UUK, which strengthens and personifies them.  In other words, if it exists, it would be the basis of a human instinct to form and believe in religions.  Always in tension with the instinct to be rational, even–I suspect–for the most devout.  And, in reverse, for the least devout.
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Entry 946 — Pronouncements & Blither, Part 7

Saturday, December 8th, 2012

This entry was to consist of two paragraphs I wrote yesterday in which I tried to get a start on something major about the definition of “definition”–as a first step toward my final attempt at definitive book on poetry.  Except that I soon realized my first step should be about names.  Anyway, according to my diary, I thought my efforts lame.  I still thought them worth posting here–but somehow they got deleted.  So, instead, the beginning of something I threw together earlier today after getting a yen to list all the major human instincts I could think of:

1. The Fundaceptual Awareness

None I can think of.

2. The Behavraceptual Awareness

None I can think of.

3. The Evaluceptual Awareness

The Pleasure-Seeking Instinct

The Pain-Avoidance Instinct

The Evaluative Instinct

4. The Cartoceptual Awareness

The Self-Location Instinct

5. The Objecticeptual Awareness

None I can think of.

6. The Reducticeptual Awareness

The Analytic Instinct

7. The Sagaceptual Awareness

The Reproductive Instinct

The Hunting Instinct

The Escape Instinct

The Heroic-Self Instinct

8. The Anthroceptual Awareness

The Love Instinct

The Friendship Instinct

The Maternal Instinct

The Hostility Instinct

The Dominance Instinct

The Servility Instinct

The Individualism Instinct?

The Collectivism Instinct?

9. The Scienceptual Awareness

The Cause and Effect Instinct

10. The Combiceptual Awareness

None.

I’m trying to arrange them by which of my Knowlecular Psychology’s ten kinds of major awarenesses they belong in.  The list, of course, is almost entirely for me–to give me something to look at and think about.  It’s already given me ideas: the possibility of an instinct causing us to seek solitude and/or be different from others, and an opposite one to seek a herd to be part of and/or avoid being or seeming different occurred to me for the first time.

I know there are omissions, probably important ones.  But it’s a start.

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Entry 346 — The Definition of Visual Poetry, Yet Again « POETICKS

Entry 346 — The Definition of Visual Poetry, Yet Again

In a comment to the entry Geof Huth made to his blog about my taxonomy, Kaz Maslanka said, “I like what I understand to be Karl Kempton and Karl Young’s definition of: ‘Visual Poetry is a Poetry that has to be seen.’ This is such a simple yet powerful definition that seems to me to be true in every case of vizpo that I have seen.”

My definition is not so simple–because while the double-Karl definition probably does cover every case of visual poetry, it fails to distinguish certain works that I do not consider visual poetry: illustrated poems and captioned or labeled visimages; ordinary poems whose visual appearance has been improved by calligraphy or special graphic touches like ornate capitals at the beginning of stanzas–poetry, in other words that has been graphically decorated enough to make it more pleasing but not enough to significantly increase its aesthetic effect; certain infraverbal texts like Joyce’s “cropse,” which must be seen to be appreciated but are not visual, if by “visual” we mean “of any special interest to the eye.”  Of course, the definition works for those for whom just about any combination of textual and graphic material is visual poetry–but then we would still need a special term for artworks in which the interrelation of words and graphics causes has a significant aesthetic effect (or is intended to).  For that, the double-Karl definition won’t work, and that more than any of the other combinations of text and graphics is what requires definition.  Because, in my view, only that will jolt an engagent in both the reading section and the seeing section of his brain simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously.

This latter, by the way, is only one example of the way that my taxonomy of poetry is, like a proper theory of science, falsifiable.   Eventually superior forms of cat-scans will be able to determine where in the brain different forms of poetry are appreciated.  I claim each of the main kinds I classify will have a unique brainprint.  Moreover, that brainprint will prove close to exactly what one would expect it to be: visual poems, by my definition, will have a visioverbal brainprint (which will be different from textual designs’ visiotextual brainprint); linguexclusive poems will have a purely verbal brainprint–initially, for most of them will give rise to visual imagery; avisual mathematical poems will have a purely verbomathematical brainprint, but visiomathematical poems will have a visioverbomathematical brainprint.   The brainprints of more specialized poems–particular kinds of visual poems should–if my taxonomy is valid and my theory of psychology right–each have its own unique visioverbal brainprint.

One brainprint that especially intrigues is the one a cryptographic poem would have.  It’d have to be verbal, of course, but also something caused by a conceptual part of the brain I haven’t worked out yet.  Okay, crazy maybe, but don’t be too sure about that until it’s tested.

9 Responses to “Entry 346 — The Definition of Visual Poetry, Yet Again”

  1. karl kempton says:

    the word ‘poetry’ within the two word term ‘visual poetry’ frames the discussion. we are not saying visual calligraphy nor graphics poetry, nor comix poetry etc.

    as long as you focus on your self centered lexicon rather than seek an universal point of viewing, all this is perhaps a talking passed each other.

    to continue: because of the steady decline since its peak in the early 1990′s, and because the term visual poetry was coined circa 1965 to break away from the limits of what became concrete poetry, i now prefer the use of sound illumination or illuminated language/s to cover all the visual (must see to fully grasp) use of language that can be composed. the best visual poetry is but a small subset as a result of what took place in the 1990’s. the following is a very abridged outline as to my shift.

    just as concrete became cliché, what has become american vizpo/vispo (a term i used since the late 1970′s onward in my correspondence as an abbreviation for visual poetry), much american vispo, since the mid 1990’s attempted take over by a certain click of the language poets, has become neo/retro concrete. many american visual poets aloud themselves to be hypnotized (or consciously gave themselves over) by a perceived center of power of the moment to serve in order to gain recognition and or power, rather than serve the eternal muse of poetry.

    vispo is now a cliché. it is no wonder the title of a forthcoming anthology is called the last vispo anthology. the editors themselves not only unconsciously have announced its death but also date its birth as 1950’s concrete movement (: “The Last Vispo Anthology extends the dialectic between art and literature that began with the concrete poetry movement fifty years ago.”) they themselves and those within this particular group consciousness admit they work in a temporal moment without homage to the eternal muse.

    visual poetry roots are many thousands of years deep. illuminated language and its ancestral pictorial pictographic petroglyphic images even deeper. those not knowing history are condemned to repeat it. that is obviously true for those cutting history of this form off at 1950.

  2. Bob Grumman says:

    Interesting entirely unself-centered take on the history of visual poetry, Karl. But, as I point out, your definition of visual poetry is too general. If you disagree with that, you need to present an argument against it. You need to show, for instance, either that poems like “cropse” are visual poems, or why such poems need not be considered visual poems by your definition.

    I would add that naming things for political reasons the way you say visual poetry was, retards the search for truth. But “visual poetry” is a good term. It is a good term because it specifies a kind of poetry that is specifically verbal and visual, and not, like concrete poetry, concrete in some other way, such as tactilely. That is why it is in my taxonomy. I would add that almost all concrete poetry is also visual poetry.

  3. serkan isin says:

    ‘Visual Poetry is a Poetry that has to be seen.’ can be taken as a definition maybe. But lots of problems here, first of all, written poetry can be seen also. There is a form there and it is not always the same, especially after the free verse. Second, we have to ask maybe where a poem happens? This answer has to be relative. If it is in the paper, well, but what if it is in readers mind, relation to these signs (word, punctuation, structure etc)? If we can define where a poem happens, then we can talk about the eye and visual? But usually a poem happens between reader and the paper, reader “completes” the work as Duchamp mentioned.

  4. Bob Grumman says:

    Your problem with the definition can be taken care of easily by amending it to “Visual Poetry is a Poetry that has to be seen for full appreciation of its main aesthetic cargo.” The way a conventional poem looks on the page is not part of its main aesthetic cargo. Nor would the calligraphication of its letters be. The problems with it that I point out remain: it would cover too much that is not visual poetry, such as the pwoermd, “cropse,” and illustrated poems (which many artists who make them consider visual poems. A definition should always be as simple as possible, but simplicity rarely works.

    As for where a poem happens, it seems clear to me that it happens in the mind. But rationally to define poetry, one needs to consider only what a poem is materially, which is generally word-shaped ink on a page, but which can include visual and other kinds of elements. And, of course, can be in the air as word-shaped sounds.

  5. serkan isin says:

    @Grumman; “The way a conventional poem looks on the page is not part of its main aesthetic cargo” How about thinking Mayakovski and other Russian Formalists and Futurists poems? I know these are not “conventional” but in a certain way they are modern now. How about haiku? and how about arabic or persian poetry for ages that has lot to do with the typography or calligraphy, ideograms etc where language or the sign is not just a carrier for meaning, it has the meaning only by itself. In western thinking these are not may be considered or not taken as main-frame but visual poetry has lots of roots with the “graphic-writing” history of the writing. If you are a verbal poet or as Ong say “verbomotor poet” these has minor importance but other way, every structural element has critical importance i guess. And how can we be sure that cargo, can be carried easily by any means and chance of the Language? Is poetry that good at that kind of information (communication)?

  6. Bob Grumman says:

    I think it’s a matter of a case by case decision whether a given poem’s aesthetic cargo is visual enough to make the poem a visual poem. I simply subjectively do not feel calligraphy (in most cases) does so. It’s decorative only. Spacing in poems isn’t enough, either, in my subjective view. I don’t see how haiku are visual. Chinese ideagrams may seem very visual to westerners but are essentially composed of symbols that are read, not seen.

    As for language’s ability to carry an aesthetic cargo, I assume without the help of its visual arrangement and decoration, I simply subjectively believe that words can carry huge amounts of meaning and that in a good poem that meaning makes things like calligraphy minor.

    One has to make subjective decisions like that or give up defining things. It seems to me that you are basically calling for a definition of visual poetry too broad to be useful. What isn’t visual poetry if haiku are or, apparently, any hand-written poem is?

  7. nico says:

    i would have to say, the use of the phrase ‘eternal muse of poetry’ seems ridiculous here. taking wide sloppy swings at people you do nothing but miss and waste our time.

  8. huseyin kaya says:

    karl kempton sevişelim mi?

  9. Concrete poem represents deep feeling

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theoretical psychology « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘theoretical psychology’ Category

Entry 1389 — “Cerebrogovernance”

Tuesday, March 4th, 2014

Yeah, another coinage, this one finishing off my full definition of the “G-factor” (or, in my psychology, general cerebreffectiveness component–or full-scale intelligence as opposed to what most credentialed psychologists consider it) as a combination of four cerebral mechanisms: charactration, accommodance, accelerance and–now–cerebrogovernance.  Mechanism in charge of basal cerebral energy level; mechanism in charge of reducing cerebral energy level; mechanism in charge of increasing cerebral energy; and supervisory mechanism in charge of directing cerebral energy (which is effectually the same as directing attention) to and from various awarenesses (or areas of the cerebrum such as the auditory or verbal awarenesses–e.g., the cerebrogovernance might turn off all the awarenesses of a person silently reading except his verbal awaresness and verbal/visual and verbal auditory association areas, then switch him out of all three to his auditory awareness if someone suddenly screams his name).

I think of cerebrogovernance as “little g” and all four cerebreffective mechanisms “big G.”  All the major awarenesses are “big S’s” (for big specific “intelligences”), and their many sub-awarenesses (e.g., the reducticeptual awareness’s matheceptual and linguaceptual sub-awarenesses) are “little s’s.”

I’m gearing up for a Major little essay on my theory of cerebreffective- ness.  But, first I have to finish the first blog entry to the continuation of my Scientific American blog.  I’ve almost finished it, honest, but I keep finding spots to repair, delete or expand, and seem to be avoid what I believe is the thing’s final section (where I went off on a tangent about tragedy, then realized what I had to say about it was too confuse to try to add to my entry).

Meanwhile, I had my cystoscopy.  It went very well, but my problem turned out to be due to a bladder stone the doctor couldn’t removed for some reason so I’ll have to go back next Monday for, I guess, a similar procedure to remove it.  Will find out more Thursday.  Meanwhile, I’ll have to endure another week of sometimes painful difficulty urinating.  Right now I’m in a good mood, though–even though I’m not on hydrocodone.

Speaking of that, I just read in the paper that I’m a hydrocodone-abuser because I sometimes take “just to feel better”–instead, apparently, for a headache back-ache or the like that other pain remedies don’t do much for, which is what my hydrocodone was prescribed for.  It’s so stupid.  A person semi-incapacitated because of a headache should be given a pill but a person unable to do anything that will give his life meaning because he’s in the kind of null zone I get into at times should not be given a pill–unless, I gather, worse off than I am.

My doctor can no longer prescribe the dosage of Hydrocodone he used to, so my latest prescription from him is for half the dosage.  A little silly, since it only means I have to take two pills instead of one to get the effect one was giving me.  I’m going to see how the half-dosage works, though.  I suspect I don’t really need any dosage; I think I only need the caffeine pills.  But who knows, I may end up seeing a shrink to get genuine anti-depressive pills, legitimately.

Of course, the thing that most disgusts me is that I’m not allowed to buy the pills from anyone who wants to sell them to me without a prescription, and take them as I see fit, on the grounds that I should make all final decisions about my body.  Which, of course, could include my decision to put one of my doctors in charge of my thyroid gland, for instance, as I’ve done.

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Entry 1176 — Natural and Learned Concepts

Thursday, August 8th, 2013

A few days ago while discussing conceptual poetry, which seems to be attracting a lot of attention amongst poetry people, I got mired in confusion: I realized I didn’t know what I was taking about.  This morning  (no, yesterday morning since I’m writing this a day in advance) I suddenly felt I did, so wrote the following to New-Poetry:

I think I’ve solved my question about what Grumman was trying to put into words.  It is that there are two kinds of concepts, those we perceive “naturally” the way we perceive the color red, and those we learn, which are more complex and ordinarily the only mental objects considered to be concepts (so far as I know).  I realized this while thinking about numbers.  The number one is a natural concept, I claim, because–I claim–one perceives a thing’s “oneness”  the same way one perceives a thing’s redness.  Thinking about it further, I decided that what we experience (due to a simple innate brain counting mechanism) is “absence of duplication.”  The mechanism consists of a storage chamber holding everything a person has seen (I’m considering the visual only for simplicity’s sake) over the past minute or so; and matching chamber with a slot for the object being tested for “oneness” and a slot into which each of the things in the storage chamber are inserted.  The matching chamber has a second compartment where one image overlaps the other and differences and samenesses are counted and a percentage arrived at that indicates match or non-match.

If nothing matches, the object being tested gets a one.  One match gives it a two.  Beyond that, who knows, but I’m sure four or five matches give the object a many.  Words labeling each of these, like “one,” “alone,” “unique,” “twin,” etc.  Larger numbers are learned.  Five dots gets a many from the counting mechanism–but eventually is learned as a hand of fingers or the like, which is reduced to the word, “five.”

I believe more complex mathematical mechanisms may have evolved, but haven’t thought any out.  I can’t believe I’m saying anything very wrong or new.  But I work from introversion almost entirely–being too lazy for research and related work.

So, to get to POETRY, I suppose it doesn’t matter whether a conceptual poem’s concept/s is/are natural or learned.  But I think all concepts are natural at the core.

Boy, I wish I were 25–and able to focus on ONE area of investigation the way Darwin did!  This would be a good such area to spend a life on.

Note: in knowlecular psychology, natural concepts are termed “urceptual concepts.”
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Entry 711 — A Visit With Paul Crowley

Tuesday, April 10th, 2012

For anyone coming here who doesn’t realize I’m a lunatic, I thought I’d give you a look at my latest post to HLAS.  In it I argue about what intelligence is with Paul Crowley.  No, what I’m now trying to do is get him to agree that such a thing exists.  I believe you will find him unbelievably out of it.  I often believe him to be a computer program designed to see how rational people interact with the completely irrational.  Or perhaps just for the fun of seeing me make a fool of myself trying to refute someone too dense to be refuted.  In any case, I believe my participation in discussions with Paul Crowley (which have been going on for around fifteen years) are near-proof that I am a lunatic.  But there is method in my madness, heheheheheh.  I am the foremost explorer of irrationality in the world, you see!  I’m not out to defeat this boob, but to spark manifestations of every conceivable insanity out of him so that I may list them as a lepidopterist collects butterflies for display!

On Apr 9, 11:48 am, Paul Crowley wrote:

> n 07/04/2012 00:09, Bob Grumman wrote:

> > And if you really think no one discusses intelligence,
> > and who is intelligent, who not, and what precisely it
> > is, and so forth, you’re–why, you’re Paul Crowley.

> The world is much more than the acquaintances
> of Bob Grumman. No one, outside of those born
> in the 20th century in a modern western scientistic
> culture discusses ‘intelligence’ in a manner that
> is remotely similar. To all other societies and
> cultures, the concept is either quite alien or
> utterly strange.

> >>> Is there a necessity to postulate an entity that allows
> >>> us to see–which I would call “sight?”
> >> Certainly not. People and other creatures see.
> >> That is enough.

> > Where did the word, “sight,” come from? (Truly,
> > you’re at your finest here, Paul–I’m sure I’ve never
> > tried to answer such incredibly stupid opinions
> > before.)

> It is convenient, in the English language (and
> in some other languages), to sometimes use
> abstract nouns. I’d advise you not to let that
> fact fool you into believing that such things
> have a real existence — but you are already
> hopelessly lost in a world of fantasy.

> > Ophthamologists should not be concerned with
> > some entity that allows people to see?

> There is no such entity.

What are the eyes?

> >> There is nothing to define. There is nothing
> >> that can be defined. It’s classic case of the
> >> Emperor’s new clothes.

> > Right. There is no such thing as intelligence
> > because there is no such thing as intelligence.

> Sorry, but pointing at the nakedness of the
> Emperor is enough to demonstrate that he
> has no clothes. It’s up to those claiming that
> he really has clothes to demonstrate that fact.
> For example, they could put him on a
> weighing scales and show that he weighed
> more with them on than with some off.
> You can’t off course. The clothing (i.e. here
> ‘intelligence’) exists because you want it to
> exist, so it must exist. You can’t imagine a
> world without it, but you have no conception
> as to how you’d prove or disprove its
> existence.

[note: amazing how much cranks love the dead metaphor of the emperor’s new clothes.]

> >>> And now I’m to what I thought I’d write about just
> >>> now: how we should tackle what I want to tackle,
> >>> which is to determine if each of us possesses a
> >>> mechanism I would call “intelligence” that allows
> >>> us effectively to interact with the environment–
> >>> biologically, I mean: i.e., in such a way as to
> >>> keep us alive and comfortable.

> >> No one in the real world asks such a question.
> >> It’s entirely fake.

[note: one of the most comic of Paul’s traits is his inability to avoid using “no one” and “entirely” and the like every chance he gets. If really pushed on the practice, he will call me too literal-minded to accept that he “really” means “the probability against anyone’s acting in such a way is astronomical,” of the like. But it’s clear he truly means what he says. As a rigidnik, he can’t accept not being 100% on the right side of any significant question.]

> > Yet I have reference books that define the term, and
> > books about it.

> If you had any historical perspective you would
> know that throughout history nearly all libraries
> consisted of books that were nearly all
> worthless junk. Those of the 20th century
> must be by far the worst in this respect, with
> Pssyycholistic and other pseudo-scientific
> ‘works’ being manifestly mindless junk from
> the moment they were published.

“Nearly all worthless junk.” Absolutely incredibly obtuse statement. Since I have something called intelligence, I know that to the contrary no book ever created was worthless junk. Many books about intelligence seem to me not to have very effectively advanced the search for truth regarding it, but the possibility that any of them was discussing something non-existent is ludicrous. But I’ll keep playing this insane game you have me in, the goal of which is to nail you in a contradiction no sane person can deny–although you will.

Here’s a starting question:  What did Shake-speare have that I do not have that was responsible for his creation of plays vastly superior to the ones I’ve written?

> >> You are talking about a nothing.

> > I am speaking of a physical mechanism humans
> > have that allow for problem solving.

> Nope. You are missing every point that can
> be missed. As an analogy, let’s say you
> are explaining to some young person how
> important the New York Times was in the
> 20th century, and what it was like. But, at best
> — and you are even a long way from that — you
> would be saying what kind of ink was used for
> its printing, and where they got the paper.

> >> There is no entity which “allows us to solve
> >> problems”. We either solve them or we don’t.
> >> We either walk or we don’t.

> > Ah, so my legs have nothing to do with my ability to
> > walk?

> How do you come to this conclusion?
> You need a lot of things to be able to walk,
> and working legs are one of them. Being
> able to balance is another. Having a fair
> amount of practice around the ages of one
> or two is another. Having nerve connections
> in the lower spine is another. And so on
> and on

So anything that’s complicated does not exist? What happens to allow a car to move is complicated: does it therefore not have the ability to move?

> Possessing an entity called ‘walking ability’
> does not figure in mind (or the books) of any
> physiotherapist or doctor or other specialist
> in the field. It would only be imagined by some
> specialist in Pssyychologostical bull-shit.

Wouldn’t a physiotherapist investigate certain physical mechanisms and not others? Would he give a person having trouble walking a color discrimination test?

> >> We either eat or
> >> we don’t. You can talk about whole ranges
> >> of pre-conditions that “allow us” to eat, or
> >> walk, or solve problems; for example, being
> >> fit and healthy helps. But none of these pre-
> >> conditions have some over-riding power.
> >> [..]

> > All you’re saying is that intelligence is a mechanism
> > has many constituents.

> NO, I am not. I am saying it is far less useful
> an idea than ‘walking ability’ would be to a
> paediatrician or a doctor in a hospital for foot
> or leg amputees.

I had a bad hip, Paul. It was operated on last June. After the operation I could walk, but not well. All the doctors and nurses and therapists I was involved in were concerned with my ABILITY TO WALK, not with whether it was there or not there as  a lunatic like you apparently would, but whether or not I had an EFFECTIVE ABILITY TO WALK. Certain muscles needed exercise for me to fully to recover THE ABILITY TO WALK. I soon had that ability again, but not a reasonably good ABILITY TO RUN, which they next worked on, and that is nearly back, as well.

> >> There is NO ability. Giving a name to a nothing
> >> and then defining it is (I fully agree) the raison

> >> d’etre of Pssyychologism.

> > Can a normal person solve some problems? If so,
> > what does he possess that allows him to do that?
> > Nothing?

> Take a relatively simple concept like ‘walking’

I can walk because I have legs and a brain that directs those legs.

> or ‘left-handedness’, and ask the same kind
> of question. You will (hopefully) then see that
> such a question is absurd or close to absurd,
> and that it has no reasonable answer.  THEN
> you might realise that to imagine you have a
> meaningful question as regards ‘intelligence’
> is only to fool yourself.

As far as I can make out, you are claiming that there is no such thing as an ability. Or that abilities exist but nothing physical causes them to be manifested.

> >> Not the supernatural. We are what we see we
> >> are. There is no point in trying to pretend that
> >> we are explicable in terms of electrical signals
> >> or whatever. You could say that today’s New
> >> York Times is just a combination of paper and
> >> ink. But to reduce it to ‘paper and ink’ misses
> >> its entire nature, and to respond in the wrong
> >> dimension. You are (somehow) thinking you can
> >> do something similar with human beings and
> >> their brains — reduce them all to bio-electrical
> >> bits and signals. You are simply missing the
> >> point.

Block the bio-electrical bits and signals to the cerebrum and the person involved will have no ability to solve problems. Doesn’t that tell you something, Paul?

> > If it is not bio-electrical bits and signals, and not
> > supernatural, what is it?

> It’s the hopeless inapplicability of your
> reductionist approach to anything human.

Seriously, Paul, have you had a relapse? You seem at least one order
of magnitude more insane than ever before.

–Bob

Few people visit HLAS nowadays, for Paul and I dominate it and there are few who are willing to wade through our exchanges.  I think they are very funny, some of my inept attempts against Paul being close to as funny as his almost-always bizarre irrationalities.  The very few who have commented on Paul or I lump us together.  No one yet has ventured to take sides in this particular thread (or the two or three other threads the discussion has also been going on in).  So I would appreciate it if someone would be good enough to reassure me that it is not absurd to believe that human beings possess a mechanism it makes sense to call intelligence that, among other things, allows them to solve problems (or try to).  I’m curious, too, if anyone finds Paul as hilarious as I do.  Sometimes I think there may be less that a thousand people in the whole world who love the ravings of nuts as much as I.  And, as I’ve said more than once, I empathize with nuts, knowing full well that I may be one myself.  Although I am convinced I am leagues less a nut than Paul Crowley is.  (I’ve tried to find out who he is in the real world and gotten nowhere, by the way; he refuses to disclose anything at all about himself–amusingly, I find it hard not to disclose everything about myself.)

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Entry 232 — New Knowlecular Terminology!!!

Saturday, September 25th, 2010

After so many near-worthless entries, at last a really really exciting one!  A very lame school marm type at HLAS, one of my Shakespeare Authorship “Question” sites, got me thinking about rigidniplexes.  They are fixational systems rigidniks form that are the basis of the authorship theories of the most dedicated and rigidly doctrinaire anti-Stratfordians.  One of their main functions is defending the rigidnik against non-conformity.   I had always thought of them as necessarily irrational.

But it seemed to me  the school marm, Mark Houlsby (which may be a pseudonym), has one,   because of  the way he constantly gets after people for rude remarks, going off-topic, and disregard of what he thinks is grammatical correctness, as well as any view he disagrees with, which are mostly non-conformist views.   Yet Houlsby is not an anti-Stratfordian nor does he  seem any more irrational than every normal person is, just set in his narrow ways.  So, I decided there are two basic kinds of rigidniplexes, “hyperrigidniplexes” and “hyporigidniplexes,” the first being highly irrational, the second not particularly irrational.

Actually, I’ve always believed in more than one kind of rigidniplex, but I hadn’t come up with names for them I liked, and my definitions of them were vague.    Now I think I’ll call the most rigidnikal of rigidniplexes, the ones suffered by genuine psychotics, “ultrarigidniplexes.”  Such rigidniplexes are either not “sensibly” irrational, the way hyperrigidniplexes are, or are based on unreality rather than the irrational, although they are no doubt irrational as well.  For instance, an ultrarigidnik may believe unreal aliens from another dimension are after him whereas a mere hyperrigidnik will only believe, say, that no one whose parents are illiterate can become a great writer, which is idiotic but but is merely a misinterpretation of reality, wholly irrational, but not drawing on pure fantasy.

There are probably two levels of hyporigidniks–no, make that three.  Managerial hyporigidniks are the most successful rigidniks, common in the officer corps of the military, and on corporation boards, and, of course, running federal bureaucracies, or universities.  Rigidnikal enough to dominate third-raters, and hold unimaginatively to a course that has proved effective in the past, and rally others at their level, along with the masses, against non-conformity, which will include a country’s culturateurs.  Such hyporigidniks are the great defenders of mediocrity.  And here’s where this entry becomes on-topic for a blog called “Poeticks,” for among the great defenders of mediocrity are the people selecting prize- and grants-winners in poetry, and which contemporaries’ poetry should be taught, published and made the subject of widely-circulated critical essays or books.

A level below the managerial hyporigidniks are the marmly hyporigidniks.  Only slightly above-average in charactration, or basal mental energy, below average in accommodance, the engine of flexibility, imagination, creativity, but with possibly slightly above average accelerance, or the ability to raise their mental energy when appropriate.  So, not in managerial hyporigidniks’ league, but able to construct rigidniplexeses about trivialities like table manners, spelling, etc., and lord it over milyoops.  And, in poetry, repeat the opinions of the Establishment.

Managerial hyporigidniks, I should have said, are higher in charactration than lesser hyporigidniks.  Indeed, each level of rigidniks has more charactration, and less accommodance–and smaller but more life-consuming rigidniplexes.  The lowest-level hyporigidniks have average charactration and accommodance, and variable but never inordinately high accelerance.   Peasant hyporigidniks, I call them: they form rigidniplexes that are little more than habits sensible for their position in life, and aren’t so much locked into them as too unimaginative to try anything else.

In the past, I’ve often hypothesized a kind of “pararigidniplex”–a rigidniplex formed by freewenders, who are the sanest, most intelligent people.   I now have a new name for it: “wendrijniplex.”  It’s like any other rigidniplex except for its origin, which is not caused by a person’s chronically having too much charactration and too little accommodance, but by a freewender’s having in a single instance, too much charactration and too little accommodance, his enthusiasm for a discovery of his over-riding his critical sense, and his continued pleasure in the rigidniplex it brings into being, being too great for him to break ties with it.  So it blights his intellectual existence every bit as unfortunately as a rigidnik’s rigidniplex blights his.

To be thorough, I will remind my readers (including myself) that everyone forms knowleplexes, which are mental constructs each of which provides an inter-related understanding of some fairly large subject like biology, for a layman, or the biology of mammals, or of one species of mammals, for a biologist.  A rational (although not necessarily valid) knowleplex is a “verosoplex.”  Offhand, I would say there are two kinds of irrational knowleplexes: rigidniplexes and–another new term coming up–“ignosoplex,” or a knowleplex which is basically too incoherent to be classified as either rational or irrational.  It’s the result of ignorance.  We all have many of them, each concerning a field we are “ignosophers” about–not completely ignorant of, but not sufficiently knowledgeable about to be able to form a verosoplex–or any kind of working rigidniplex.

I’m well aware that most readers will find the above the product of an ignosopher.  It isn’t.  It’s just a pop-psychology–level very rough draft of one small knowleplex the among many making up my knowleplex of temperament, which in turn is a small knowleplex among the many making up my theory of intelligence, which is just a small portion of my theory of epistemology, which is a not-small portion of my theory of the human psychology.  Or so I keep telling myself.

Entry 218 — Evolution of Intelligence, Part 4

Saturday, September 11th, 2010

Sensors are  at first sensitive to only one stimulus.  If the sensitivity helped its cell, it would be retained by the species; if not it would be not be retained.  Eventually, sensors would become potentially sensitive to more and more stimuli, to hurry the process of finding effective sensitivities.  Sensors always sensitive to a wide vairety of stimuli would not be effective until they were able to limit their sensitivity to the first stimulus they are exposed to.  This would also keep the cell up-to-date–no longer would they automatically have sensitivities to other species that had become extinct or to matter in an enivronment no longer present.

Okay, now comes the detachment of such sensors before being sensitized to given stimuli.  They might not be able to admit neuro-signals then, in which case they would be innocuous accidental superfluous intruders that could well persist–until they became sensitive to neuro-signals.  At that point, they would become “sensor-sensors.”

Once able to become active, they would emit neuro-signals that would turn on effectors, sometimes, beneficially, sometimes not, sometimes neither.  Once an inhibitor joined one of them to make a proto-retroceptual reflex, their cell could inhibit them from activating effectors they should not.

To go back to my earlier remarks: “Another step in the evolution of superior intelligence will be the advent of inhibitors and stimulators–and we know inhibition and stimulation have major roles in the nervous system.  An inhibitor is device which prevents any effector it is connected to from acting in the same manner that a sensor causes the activation of any effector it is connected to.  Like everything else, it would pop up by chance but persist when it happened to be connected to a prey-odor sensor, say, and inhibited an away-from effector.  Ergo, the alphazoa blessed with such an inhibitor would not flee a cell whose predator color it had an avoidance reflex for if the cell had a prey odor, but appropriately flee a cell that had the color of a predator but no prey odor.

Eventually, effectors would evolve capable of causing two actions, or a sensor similarly capable.  Hence, an effector connected to a sensor sensitive to prey odor might both inhibit withdrawel from a cell with a predator’s color and cause advance toward a cell with the odor of prey.  Or a sensor sensitive to prey odor connect to two effectors, one inhibiting withddrawel, one causing advance.

“So, life will now have achieved the ability to choose between advancing or withdrawing in the direction of a gray cell, and be on its way toward more complex actions.  It will still be a very primitive computer, but with something like intelligence, anyway.”  The alphazoan could now, in effect, remember encountering a certain stimulus, what resulted, and whether or not the outcome was beneficial.

Something else is likely to have happened: various effectors sensitive to all neuro-signals from endo-sensors becoming constantly manufactured while inhibited ones are destroyed.   This would allow the cell constantly to find effective new ways to deal with existence.  Only effective reflexes consisting of endo-sensors and effectors would keep alive, and the latter would become more sophisticated in what signals they accepted, for they’d be able to accept lots of difference signals so long as what action they contributed to was pleasurable.  Stimulators would increase this.

The number of sensor-sensors would increase, as well.  The truest form of memory would occur once one sensor-sensor conected to another.   You would then have a memory of, say, stimulus A followed by a memory of stimulus B.  If cellular activity (call it activity C) as sensor-sensor B becomes active is positive, then when stimulus A again leads to sensor A’s activation, Sensor A would activate sensor B–even it no stimulus B was then present.  AB would then, through memory, try to cause activity C and possibly succeed.

More complex arrangements would then have to evolve.  Memory-holders, as I will now call sensor-sensors, would become sensitive to much, then all, “information” transmitted during an “instacon,” or unit of consciousness  They would retain the “information” until having some threshold amount needed for activation–which might come to be variable, dependent of what’s going on in the cell as a whole.  Longer strands of connected memory-holders would come into being.  Effectors would gain variable amounts of neuro-signals, often from more than one memory-cell (and no long directly from a sensor), and need a certain minimal amount to become active.  At some point, too, multi-cellular organisms would evolve or have evolved, relatively soon devoting whole cells to carry out the functions I’ve been giving to organelles.

Consequently, my next step in modeling the evolution of intelligence is going to concern the development of the mnemoducts my theory hypothesizes, as the central organs of memory, and intelligence.  I am taking a break from the project now, however, because of other projects higher on my present list of priorities.

Entry 214 — The Evolution of Intelligence, Part 3

Tuesday, September 7th, 2010

Here’s a revision of what I’ve been fumbling with concerning the evolution of intelligence with some additions:

An explanation of intelligence, starting with its evolution, if by intelligence we mean “choice of behavior” as opposed to random activity.

Let’s begin with the first living cell, a protozoan.  It moves randomly through water.  Eventually it accidentally acquires a sensitivity to light, let’s say, although it could be salt density or temperature, it doesn’t matter.  So, it has the prototype of a nervous system, a single sensor sensitive to light.  The next consequential accident will be its evolving a component–an organelle–that makes it move in some direction as opposed to being moved by environmental forces.  Call it an “effector.”  It may evolve this before it evolves a sensor, it doesn’t matter, What matters is that eventually many protoazoa will have non-functioning but not seriously biologically disadvantageous nervous-systems. They’ll have the potential to be superior (that is, they will have taken a step toward us), so I will call them “alphzoa.”

The first key accident leading to intelligence will be an alphazoan’s forming a linkage from its light-sensor to its effector, allowing the former to activate the latter.  As I see it, the linkage will not be the equivalent of a wire, but will result from two hypothesized attributes of organelles, at least the sensors and effectors I’m speaking of.  First claim: that when a sensor is exposed to whatever it is in the exo-environment that activates it, it carries out some kind of chemical reaction that creates molecules that leave it to flow haphazardly through the cell’s cytoplasm.  This will likely have no particular effect on the cell, so will be ignored by natural selection.

Second claim, an effector will react to the presence of the molecule the sensor transmits by absorbing it.  Eventually. it will absorb a molecule that partakes in a chemical reaction that leads to the effect for which the effector is responsible.  Ergo, a micro-relex is born.  If the action the reflex leads to is a biologically advantageous reaction to the presence of the stimulus activating the sensor involved, natural selection will keep it.  If, as probably the case, the reaction is neither good or bad, it may or may not be kept long enough for nature to find some use for it.  If the reaction is disadvantageous, cells possessing the reflex will die out.

Let me further propose that the organelles I’m speaking of have the equivalent of cell membranes, and call the molecules transmitted neuro-transmitters, which is what they in effect are.  So, if an effector causes movement toward light, and light is beneficial–as perhaps a source of energy–alpazoa with this capacity will soon become dominant.  Alphazoa which light causes to move away from light will die out.  Or perhaps evolve differently, finding something in darkness that makes up for lack of light–concealment from prey, maybe.  In any case, a functional, useful nervous system will have come into being, or what I’d call simple reflexive intelligence.

Eventually some sensor will evolve that is sensitive to the color, say, of one of the alphazoan’s prey and links with an effector causing the alphzoa to move toward the prey, a “toward-effector.”  Ditto, a reflex with an “away-from effector” attached to a sensor sensitive to the color or some other characteristic of some kind of predator on the alphazoan.  Not a technical advance, but certainly a big jump in improving the alphazoa’s biological fitness.

By this time, something of central importance had to have happened, or become ready to happen: the evolution of sensors sensitive to pain and pleasure.  For that to happen, “endo-sensors” (sensors sensitive to external stimuli) would have to have broken free of the cell membrane to become potential “intra-sensors.”  And somehow become sensitive to something of vital importance, a chemical due to damage to the cell membrane, say–probably excessive water (a biochemist would know).  Or maybe the organelle might have become sensitive to pieces of the membrane with which it would never have come into contact unless the membrane were damaged.  If the intra-sensor were attached to an away-from effector, natural selection would select it because of its value in helping its cell get away from whatever had damaged is membrane.

Before or after the evolution of pain-organelles, similar organelles connected to toward-effectors would become sensitive to some by-product, say, of a successful hunt–something eaten but not digested, that would cause  the cell to pursue whatever it had gotten a good taste of, with a feeling of pleasure.

Metaphysical question: why would such a sensation of pleasure be pleasurable?  That puzzles me.  The answer is not because it would motivate the cell to do something to keep the pleasure occurring.  Nothing can motivate a cell.  If it evolves a way to move toward a certain beneficial stimulus, it will do so, whether it feels pleasure or not.  My only guess to account for this is that in the eogotmic universe (or ultimate universe behind all existence), construction (such as the combining of materials to make a membrane) pleasurable, destruction (i.e., fragmentation) is painful, and that construction/destruction here reflects construction/destruction there.   Hence, any living organism will feel pleasure when it is reasonably well-organized, pain when going to pieces (and nothing one way or the other when in between the two states), and its state of organization will reflect its egotomic state of organization.

Another step in the evolution of superior intelligence will be the advent of inhibitors and stimulators–and we know inhibition and stimulation have major roles in the nervous system.  An inhibitor is device which prevents any effector it is connected to from acting in the same manner that a sensor causes the activation of any effector it is connected to.  Like everything else, it would pop up by chance but persist when it happened to be connected to a prey-odor sensor, say, and inhibited an away-from effector.  Ergo, the alphazoa blessed with such an inhibitor would not flee a cell whose predator color it had an avoidance reflex for if the cell had a prey odor, but appropriately flee a cell that had the color of a predator but no prey odor.  Eventually, effectors would evolve capable of causing two actions, or a sensor similarly capable.  Hence, an effector connected to a sesnor sensitive to prey odor might both inhibit withdrawel from a cell with a predator’s color and cause advance toward a cell with the odor of prey.  Or a sensor sensitive to prey odor connect to two effects, one inhibiting withddrawel, one causing advance.

So, life will now have achieved the ability to choose between advancing or withdrawing in the direction of a gray cell, and be on its way toward more complex actions.  It will still be a very primitive computer, but with something like intelligence, anyway.

Entry 209 — More on Maximuteurs

Thursday, September 2nd, 2010

I continue continuingly to feel like I need a nap: when I lie down, I close my eyes and at once feel near to sleep–but rarely sleep.  Although, I seem now always to get six hours or more at night.  Can’t figure it out.  But It makes it hard for me to concentrate, or want to do anything like write a daily entry here, which I’m forcing myself to do to keep myself from falling entirely to sloth.

I’m not sleepy when on the tennis court.  This morning, I played three sets of doubles (2 wins).  I was reasonably energetic, and running better, albeit nowhere near as well as I feel I ought to.  When I got home, I didn’t start limping, as I generally do after tennis.  So my leg may be getting better.  I quickly got sleepy, though.

Okay, to provide slightly less trivial content to this, back to the maximuteur, specifically to the what makes a failed maximuteur.

1. Not knowing enough, including the fact that one doesn’t know enough.  The result for the failed verosopher is a faulty premise, for the failed artist, lack of originality.

2. Illogic that will doom even a maximuteur with a valid premise or full understanding of an art.

3. Lack of talent for self-criticism.

4. Lack of marketing skills.

I think 1. may well apply to me as a theoretical psychologist, but none of the others–at least to any significant degree.  I’ve done almost nothing to market my theory, but I’ve published enough to make it available, and had a weird enough life, enough of it documented, to eventually get someone to pay attention to it.  I consider it very likely invalid, but almost certainly of value.

I don’t think any of the reasons for failure apply to me as a poet.  Again, my marketing attempts have not been very good, but my poetry has been published and a few times discussed by others.  I can’t believe that I won’t get so much as a footnote in literary histories of my time.

Entry 207 — A Day in the Life of a Verosopher

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010

Random thoughts today because I want to get this entry out of the way and work on my dissertation on the evolution of intelligence, or try to do so, since I’m still not out of my null zone, unless I’m slightly out but having trouble keeping from falling back into it.

First, two new Grummanisms: “utilinguist” and “alphasemanticry.”  The first is my antonym for a previous coinage of mine, “nullinguist,” for linguist out to make language useless; ergo, a utilinguist is a linguist out to make language useful.  By trying to prevent “poetry” from meaning no more than “anything somebody thinks suggests language concerns” instead meaning, to begin with,  “something constructed of words,” before getting much more detailed, for example.

“Alphasemanticry” is my word for what”poetry” should mean if the nullinguists win: “highest use of language.”  From whence, “Visual Alphasemanticry” for a combination of graphics and words yielding significant aesthetic pleasure that is simultaneously verbal and visual.”

I popped off today against one of Frost’s “dark” poems, or maybe it is a passage from one of them:  “. . . A man can’t speak of his own child that’s dead”–the kind academics bring up to show Frost was Important, after all.   “Wow,” I said, “Wow, he confronts death!  He must be major! ”  I then added, “Frost is in my top ten all-time best poets in English that I’ve read but not for his Learic Poems.”

James Finnegan then corrected me, stating (I believe) that the poem didn’t confront death but showed its effects.   I replied, “Okay, a poem about the effect of death on two people.   What I would call a wisdom poem.  I’m biased against them.  I like poems that enlarge my world, not ones that repeat sentiment about what’s wrong with it, or difficult about it.  Frost knew a lot about reg’lar folks, but I never learned anything from him about them that I didn’t already know.  In other words, I’m also somewhat biased against people-centered poems.  But mostly, I don’t go to poems to learn, I go to them for pleasure.”

I would add that I’m an elitist, believing with Aristotle that the hero of a tragedy needs to be of great consequence, although I disagree with him that political leaders are that, and I would add that narrative literature of any kind requires either a hero or an anti-hero (like Falstaff) of great consequence.

I’m not big on poems of consolation, either.

I find that when I have to make too trips on my bike in a day, it zaps me.  I don’t get physically tired, I just even less feel like doing anything productive than usual.  Today was such a day.  A little while ago i got home from a trip to my very nice dentist, who cemented a crown of mine that had come out (after 24 years) back in for no charge, and a stop-off at a CVS drugstore to buy $15 worth of stuff and get $4 off.  I actually bought $18 worth of stuff, a gallon of milk and goodies, including a can of cashews, cookies, candy, crackers . . .  Living it up.  Oh, I did buy cereal with dried berries in it, too.

My other trip was to the tennis courts where I played two sets, my side winning both–because of my partners.  I’m not terrific at my best, and have been hobbled by my hip problem for over a year.  It may be getting slightly better, though–today I ran after balls a few times instead of hopped-along after them.  I’m still hoping I’ll get enough better to put in at least one season playing my best.  Eventually, I’m sure I’ll need a hip replacement but there’s a chance I won’t have to immediately.

I’ve continued my piece on the evolution of intelligence, but not done anything on it today.  now fairly confident I have a plausible model of the most primitive form of memory, and its advance from a cell’s remembering that event x followed action a and proved worth making happen again to a cell’s remember a chain of actions and the result.  That’s all that our memory does, but it’s a good deal more sophi- sticated.  I think I can show how primitive memory evolved to become what my theory says it now, but won’t know until I write it all down.  (It’s amazing how trying to write down a theory for the first time exposes its shortcomings.)  If I can present a plausible description of my theory’s memory, it will be a good endorsement of it.  No, what is much more true is that if I am not able to come up with a plausible description, it will indicate that my theory is probably invalid.

Entry 205 — Evolution of Intelligence, Part 2

Sunday, August 29th, 2010

At this stage of the evolution of intelligence a lot of minor advances would be made: multiplication of reflexes, the addition of sensors sensitive to the absence of a stimulus, the combining of more sensors and effectors so, perhaps, a purple cell with white dots and smell B and a long flagellum will be pursued if the temperature of the water is over eighty degrees but not if it is under.

By this time, something of central importance had to have happened, or be ready to happen: the evolution of sensors sensitive to pain and pleasure. For that to happen, “endo-sensors” (sensors sensitive to external stimuli) would have to have broken free of the cell membrane to become potential “intra-sensors.” And somehow become sensitive to a chemical due to damage to the cell mem- brane–probably excessive water (a biochemist would know). Or maybe the infra-cell might become sensitive to pieces of the membrane which it would never have contact with unless the membrane were damaged. If the intra-sensor were attached to an away-from effector, natural selection would select it because of its value in helping its cell get away from whatever had damaged is membrane.

Eventually similar intra-sensors connected to toward effectors would become sensitive to some by-product, say, of a successful hunt–something eaten but not digested, that would cause the cell to pursue whatever it had gotten a good taste of. I’m now going to name all such components of a cell that carry out functions like those of the sensors and effector “infra-cells” to make discussion easier. Let me add the clarification that the connections between sensors and effectors may begin as physical channels but will soon almost surely come to be made by precursors of neuro-transmitters: i.e., a sensor with “connect” to its effector by a distinctive chemical that only the effector recognizes and is activated by.  The cell’s cytoplasm will act as a primitive synapse.

Various other “neurophysiological” improvements should soon also occur. One would be an intra-sensor’s gaining the ability to activate a toward effector when it senses pleasure but activate an away-from effector when it senses pain. The accident resulting in such an infra-cell would not be too unlikely, it seems to me: simply the fusion of two cells, one sensitive to pain and connected to an away-from effector, the other sensitive to pleasure and connected to a toward effector. Obviously an evolutionary improvement.

It also seems likely to me that intra-sensors would evolve sensitive to the activation of effectors. They would connect to other infra- cells carrying out reactions to, say, a successful capture of prey: a toward effector becomes active due to signals from a sensor sensitive to a certain kind of prey, in which case the outcome should be dinner, so a sensor sensitive to the effector’s activation which is connected to some infra-cell responsible for emitting digestive juices or the like, would be an advantage.

Certain other infra-cells should evolve to allow the step up to memory, but right now I can’t figure out what they might be, so will stop here, for now.

Entry 202 — Back to Gladwell’s 10,000 Hours

Thursday, August 26th, 2010

Certain cranks are questioning the possibility that Shakespeare wrote the works attributed to him on the grounds that he could not have gotten the 10,000 hours of practice at his craft Malcolm Gladwell says every genius needs.  What I want to know is, if Shakespeare had his ten thousand hours when he wrote the Henry VI trilogy, where does it show?  There are serious scholars out there who think Heminges and Condell were lying when they said he wrote them.  Many mainstream critics won’t accept that he wrote certain scenes in them.

I claim that any reasonably intelligent non-genius actor of the time could have used the historians of the time, as Shakespeare did, to have written them.  Add, perhaps, a cleverness with language that some 14-year-olds have.  The only way his histories improved after the trilogy was in the author’s becoming better with words, through practice, of course, but only what he would have gotten from contin- uing to write plays (and doctor plays and–most important–THINK about plays), and getting interested enough in a few of his stereotypical characters to archetize them as he did Falstaff.

It seems to me that the requirements for being a playwright are (1) a simple exposure to plays to teach one what they are; (2) the general knowledge of the world that everyone automatically gets simply by living; (3) the facility with the language that everyone gets automa- tically from simply using them all one’s life.  The rank one as a playwight will depend entirely on his inborn ability to use language, and his inborn ability to empathize with others, and himself.  Of course, the more plays he writes, the better playwright he’ll be, but I’m speaking of people who have chosen to make playwriting their vocation (because they were designed to do something of the sort).

I speak out of a life devoted to writing and having read biographies of dozens of writers.  I would never be able to agree that I’m wrong on this.

Entry 479 — The Believing Brain « POETICKS

Entry 479 — The Believing Brain

What follows as a review for Amazon I just wrote.

I bought a copy of Michael Shermer’s The Believing Brain in hopes that it would help me improve my own theory of how people come to believe in nonsense. As a rival of his in the field, I was also curious as to how his theory of that compared with mine. It doesn’t. I would love to be able to spend several thousand words to say why, but this is just an Amazon review, so I will have to be brief and superficial.

The main difference between his theory and mine is that his doesn’t go very deeply into brain structure. We find out from him what parts of the brain are involved with the patterns he hypothesizes we all form in our attempts to make sense of the world, and discusses dopamine, which scientists have long held to be active in Skinnerian reinforcement. It seems to Shermer to contribute much to some persons’ being more likely to find patterns in noise than others’. Which is clearly akin to seeing conspirational patterns where there are none. That, alas, is as far as
he goes.

Compare that to my theory, and you’ll see the problem. My theory involves not just a few different areas of the bain and neuro-transmitters, but what the areas contain, to wit: collection of brain-cells whose activation is experienced as an understanding of some fairly significant aspect of reality, say the biology of housecats, or of the human eye, or of all mammals. I show in detail how one (entirely hypothetical) element oversees the organization of the connections made between each of the brain-cells, and how endocrines (like dopamine) reinforce or weaken these connections–due to other elements’ judgement of their effectiveness (which has to do, basically, with their ability to keep a person’s ratio of pleasure to pain as high as possible).

I also show what happens when the person involved encounters new information, in particular new information that contradicts the person’s understanding. I posit that people have different temperaments that have a great deal to do with how sensitive they are to contradictions–
how susceptible to confirmation bias. I show in detail why, neurophysiologically, one temperament will make a person gullible, another resistant to unhappy facts, and another . . . scientific. That is, I show what I think happens to individ ual cells as a result of a
person’s temperament that determines how believing his mind is.

Shermer doesn’t begin to do anything like this, preferring references to trivial psychological experiments having to do with things like whether people engaged in a game will notice a gorilla who walks nonchalantly through their play area or not. Interesting anecdotes, and not entirely
irrelevant, just not of much help to someone like me. My ideas may make far less sense than his, but my attempt is far more worth making than his.

I also feel that Shermer jumps around too much. He sometimes seems more intent on arguing for some outlook of his–on religion or politics, mainly–than on providing an in-depth portrait of a believing brain.

Among my other problems with him is his assertion that you can’t prove a negative. No doubt I’m missing something, but surely if I prove I’m a human being, I prove I’m not a chimpanzee.

He loses me, too, when he claims that a person’s consciousness is just a bunch of brain-cells firing. Nowhere does he seem to realize that consciousness, the inexplicable Me inside all of us (it seems to me although I have no way of knowing whether or not any consciousness but
mine exists), is something wholly different from matter. How it can simply arise when some creature’s nervous system becomes complex enough somehow to form it seems to me as absurd as the idea that a universe can simply arise when some deity’s nervous system becomes complex enough to form it.

I have a question for Shermer, and those as committed to his idea of consciousnesses as he: if I use a blackjack to knock you unconscious, how can you tell whether I’ve rendered your consciousness effectually dead, or merely rendered it empty by blocking its access to data, as
well as its access to wherever it is that memories are formed? My wonder in this area goes alarmingly further, to the belief that I can’t feel certain a stone lacks consciousness.

Despite all my criticisms, I would certainly not call Shermer’s book worthless. He’s a clear writer, and more clear a thinker than many are on the subject his book is about, which is not an easy one. I’d call The Believing Brain superior (and mostly entertaining) journalism. It’s just not serious science. (But there aren’t that many scientists doing what I’d call serious science.)

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3 Responses to “Entry 479 — The Believing Brain”

  1. Ed Baker says:

    your “cup of tea” will be Rita Carter’s MAPPING THE MIND”
    U.C. Press, 1999

    inside flap says: “In this book -the first visual guide to the brain – Rita Carter draws on the latest imaging techniques to give extraordinary and accessible insights into how the brain works.”

    the mechanics of the brain and she does not confuse “brain” with “mind”

    the cover is really ‘cool’
    a bit simplistic but what visuals aren’t

    am sure a visual of this cover is on the net…

  2. Ed Baker says:

    here is cover image:

    http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/512GM4XNV0L._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-sticker-arrow-click,TopRight,35,-76_AA300_SH20_OU01_.jpg

    now to check out (her) ”
    Parietal/sensory cortex margin: doppel-gangers – a special version of oneself – may be the result of disturbance to this area.”

    … and other many other “triggered by memories/hallucinations/fragments and traumatic events replayed in the amygdala, so that I can bring with them their full cargo of both sensory and emotional associations.”

    which is, sort-of almost a direct quote from her book page 128

  3. Bob Grumman says:

    Nice cover, Ed, and the book sounds like one I’d like, and one I ought to get. Thanks for telling me about it.

    –Bob

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Sonnet « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Sonnet’ Category

Entry 1294 — A Break from Difficult Art

Monday, December 9th, 2013

Today it’s back two centuries to Wordsworth’s “Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey,” when he speaks of having felt

A presence that disturbs me with the joy  Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime  Of something far more deeply interfused,  Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,  And the round ocean and the living air,  And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:  A motion and a spirit, that impels  All thinking things, all objects of all thought,  And rolls through all things.

And this from his sonnet about the beauteous evening:

The gentleness of heaven broods o'er the Sea;  Listen! the mighty Being is awake,  And doth make with his eternal motion  A sound like thunder--everlastingly.

In these two poems, Wordsworth, it seems to me, connects to what I am calling the Urceptual Under-Presence, although his conception of it differs from mine in important respects, and is much more vague than mine is–or perhaps I should say as I hope mine will be.  This Under-Presence is what I think many identify as God.  I think of it as something evolution gave us to cope with the vast meaninglessness of the universe–a personification of it we carry around in our heads it as a comprehensible being, false but soothing.  But it is also a powerful–and valid–metaphor.
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Entry 1758 — My New Blogs « POETICKS

Entry 1758 — My New Blogs

Today’s blog entry is at my Knowlecular Psychology Blog.  Make that was at my Knowlecular Psychologt Blog.  As soon as I posted the entry, I realized my new set-up is not likely to work because Pages are not Blogs, they will just go on and on as single pages until, it’s my guess, they reach a limit.  I could set up three new real blogs but they’d be too much trouble to operate.  So, I’m now shutting down my pseudo-blogs, and poeticks.com will go back to the being the dithered mess it’s been for the past several years.  Beginning with what I had in my Knowlecular Psychology Blog for today:

Here beginneth my knowlecular psychology blog.

This has been up for a day or so and has had three visitors!  I wasn’t sure anyone was interested in my totally uncertified theory.  Anyway, I think the three of you, even though you may all just be students of abnormal psychology.  (Actually, I think you’re all academics stealing ideas from me.  No problem.  Although I would like getting credit for them, I’ve gone too long without any recognition for even one of them to be able any longer to care much.)

Entry 1 — Plexed and Unplexed Data

This won’t be much of an entry, just some notes from another bedtime trickle of ideas.  Two nights ago, I think.  It is just a return to the presentation of my theory of accommodance.  I’d been thinking of it as retroceptual data versus perceptual data, or a person’s memory versus the external stimuli he’s encountering.  It’s not an easy dichotomy, though, because it’s really strong memories versus perceptual data and random memories.  So I split the data involved into assimilated versus unassimilated data, or fragmentary versus unified, or unconsolidated versus consolidated.  Later I got more rigorous: there are, I now posit, plexed and unplexed data, or data consolidated into a knowleplex and “free” data, mostly coming in from a person’s external or internal environment but sometimes containing retrocepts (bits of memory) that have not yet been consolidated into a knowleplex.

I had a second thought: that some plexed data could come from the environment.  This would occur when a person encountered a complex of stimuli that quickly activated some knowleplex he had and accompanied it.  Ergo, there were two kinds of plexed data: retroceptual and perceptual; there were two kinds of unplexed data, too: retroceptual and perceptual.   I think of perceptual plexed data as “preplexed,”

* * *

Maybe when I’m not in my null zone, where I am now, I’ll come up with a better idea for improving my blog.

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AmazingCounters.com

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Entry 559 — My Self-Image « POETICKS

Entry 559 — My Self-Image

I think the main thing that keeps me from being Completely Obnoxious is my sincere sense of humor about myself.  Depending on my mood, I think I’m the greatest super-genius ever, a joke (well, make that the Greatest Joke Ever, since I never quite escape megalomania), or the Most Contemptible Failure Ever.  Actually, when I’m in the kind of mood I’m in now in (10 November, around noon)–after my first dose of APCs in over two weeks (because my head felt too blitzed for me to get anywhere with my Shakespeare chapter) *, I tend simultaneously to believe I’m terrific and a colossal joke.   

*Gad, how good it made me feel to close my parenthetical expression as soon as I’d finished typing it!  How rarely I do.

My self-image intrigues me, not only because it’s mine.  It is important to me, perhaps more important to me than most people’s self-images are to them.  (A few of them may not even have one!)  True, when I take off into a project, small of huge, the project consumes my every thought.  But my self-image is usually instrumental in igniting my take-off.  I usually (I think–I really haven’t thought that much about this before) need to feel that I’m a hero with a grand quest ahead of me.  Even when merely shelving scattered books, for–behold–I am then preparing the field for the greater project to follow, whatever it is.  This has a lot to do, I suddenly see, with why I hate jobs like brushing my teeth or shaving in spite of how little time they steal: they seem to me to have nothing to do with anything of importance.  Such jobs are what we have slaves for, or should have them for!!!!  (Oops, gotta watch that elitism of mine.  Know, I implore you, that the slaves I have in mind are of all the human skin-shades.) 

On the other hand, while I often wished I could get out of it when I used to run three or more miles daily four or five times a week, each run was a mini-quest, with a time to shoot for–as well as exercise to make me fit for greater quests.  Shopping wasn’t quite the same but even it had a bit of questness to it.  And the pleasure the food or drink would give me could make up for its not being much, if anything, of a quest.  It occurs to me that normal men dislike shopping for clothes because clothes lack the pleasure, for them, of food and drink, and we have no instinct for capturing clothing.  

Those of you familiar with my theory of psychology will have realized that I’ve been speaking of what I call the sagaceptual awareness.  That’s one’s innate system of brain-cells and interconnections that causes one, when it is active, to feel oneself to be the hero of some archetypal saga–chasing one’s Venus, for instance; starting one’s ascent of Parnassus; going out on the tennis court to compete for first place in the Charlotte County B-3 over-55 men’s league . . .  This awareness becomes active much more easily for me than for others, it seems to me.  Once enheroed in it, I stop thinking of myself as a hero, from that point on it being sufficient for me to be the hero in whatever saga I’ve become a part of.  But I become aware of my self-image in flashes.  More often, the glory, or the equivalent thereof, that I will win, breaks through my concentration on the task at hand.

My impression is that the sagaceptual awareness is stronger for the greatest achievers than for others, and that most of them have no shyness about indicating it–Keats, for instance, writing somewhere (in a letter, I believe) that he wanted to be remembered “among the English Poets,” or something close to that.  Unconcealed ambition.  Others don’t want to be caught being proud.  It may be that our age is particularly harsh on those who want to rise above others.  Even I have worked out ways around that, which I actually believe in (intellectually, at any rate): for instance, I have said that followers are as necessary as leaders; an effective leader is just another necessary component of the greatness (however defined) that can only be achieved by a group of people, which includes effective followers (and their effect cats and dogs).  Actually, this is unarguable true, but I have to admit that I tend not finally to believe anyone counts but me. . . .

I  believe that existence simple is, it has no meaning.  But for biological reasons, we have to act as though it does have some meaning–which in the final analysis comes always down to the triumphant attainment of a sagaceptual goal.  Meaning is the finding of meaning. 

One last thought before I leave this for an attempt to continue my Shakespeare chapter (into Greatness): that there is a role in the sagaceptual awareness for each of us to take, that of the spectator.  This allows us to root for ourselves, something too few others generally seem willing to do.  The best because they are busy rooting for themselves; the non-best because they’re too dumb to recognized our worthiness of cheers.  Until we’re safely dead, of course.

Whee.

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Entry 238 — The Evaluceptual Awareness « POETICKS

Entry 238 — The Evaluceptual Awareness

The following is a very rough, very brief account of cerebral pain and pleasure.  There are also pre-cerebral pain and pleasure.  Although they have a small role to play in over-all aesthetic pleasure and pain, it is too small to be worth (probably confusing) discussion here.  I plan to make my account part of my book concerning the taxonomy of poetry.

The Evaluceptual Awareness

The evaluceptual awareness is where a brain evaluates its experience.  In my theory there are two evaluceptual responses possible (in the cerebrum, at any rate, which is nearly all this book is concerned with): knowlecular frustration and knowlecular resolution, which I will hereafter be referring to as, simply, frustration and resolution. The former results whenever a knowlecule receiving k-units (cerebral energy) fails to become immediately active as a memory.

Resolution, on the other hand, results from any knowlecule’s getting k-units to a knowlecule that becomes immediately active, even if its k-units weren’t responsible for its activation (as would be the case if it sent too few k-units to a knowlecule to activate it immediately but k-units from elsewhere, or perceptual stimulation, were enough to do that). An evaluception-cell is associated with every m-cell. It is sensitive to how many k-units any k-route transmitts to the m-cell it isassociated with during a given instacon, and whether or not the m-cell becomes immediately active.

If the m-cell does become active, the evaluceptual-cell causes the enhancement of each k-route that sent it k-units to in proportion to the number of k-unitseach route sent. If the m-cell does not become active, the  evaluceptual-cell causes the inhibition of each k-route that sent it k-units in proportion to the number of k-units each route sent. That is, if resolution occurs at the site of one m-cell, the k-routes contributing to it are rewarded with enhancement; if frustration comes about there, the contributing k-routes are penalized with inhibition. An enhanced k-route will thereafter multiply whatever k-units it transmits to the degee that it is enhanced; the reverse is true for an inhibited k-route, which will divide any k-units given it to transmit.  It’s quite simple, as shown below.

M-cell X, activated, transmits k-units of cerebral energy to m-cells A and B via route X87, which will diverge into two routes, X87A and X87B.  The broken lines ending in little rectangles from the Evaluceptual Center read the amount of energy A and B receive and report the amount the the Center.  Let’s say A then becomes active.  The line from the Center to A ending in an inverted v will tell the Center that, whereupon the Center will use its Stimulator to enhance route X87A.  That will mean that the next time X is activated, it will favor its X87B route.

If at the same time B fails to become active, the reverse will happen.  X87B will be inhibited, and X, when next active, will reduce the amount of energy it transmits to B.

Meanwhile, all evaluceptual-cells active during a given instacon (smallest chronological unit of consciousness) will transmit the strength of the frustration or resolution at their m-cells to the Evaluceptual Center.  The latter will give the instacon its evaluceptual rating, or final evaluceptual coloring. A surplus of frustration will cause a feeling of pain, a surplus of resolution pleasure. If a moment’s frustration and resolution are equal (or nearly so), then the moment will be evaluceptually neutral, and cause neither pain nor pleasure.

The way frustration and resolution work makes biological sense, for it means that events (or thoughts) that are unexpected, events (or thoughts) not forecast, will cause pain, and those that are expected will cause pleasure. The predicted should be pleasurable because one has dealt with it before and, apparently, found it to be safe–or, at any rate, survived it. The unpredicted, however, may be dangerous, so ought to seem painful. The neurophysiological results (according to my theory) of frustration and resolution build on this logic.  They are, to put it simply, avoidance of anything that causes pain to the degree that it is painful (until it becomes familiar enough not to cause pain), wariness of anything that causes neither pain nor pleasure, and attraction to anything that causes pleasure to the degree that is does that.

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