Entry 1662 — More on Prac- & Cerebra-ceptuality « POETICKS

Entry 1662 — More on Prac- & Cerebra-ceptuality

Questions in the Night: Big words only make it into the cerebrasipience zone?  Algebra and higher math goes to cerebraceptual awareness only?  Only strongly activated anthroceptual data gets in the cerebraceptual awareness?  High charactration required for use of cerebraceptual awareness?

Later I remembered enough of my model of the brain to begin making a little sense (I hope).  First off, I remembered how many awarenesses it contains, from the main ones like the reducticeptual (or conceptual) awareness through lesser ones like the matheceptual (or mathematics) sub-awareness down to even smaller ones I have not yet gotten down to but know are there.  Each basically contains little but master-cells (m-cells), associative-cells (a-cells) and a mnemoduct.  It is the activation of m-cells that gives us our experience of existence in the form of knowlecules, those being a sort of understood datum: “horse,” for instance, or “hoof” or “mammal,” depending on the context.  Each active m-cell contributes a knowicle to the experience—i.e., a unit of knowledge, perhaps a syllable or something much smaller.  They are activated either by sensory-cells reacting to stimuli in the outer or inner environment, or to memories of previously experienced knowlicles stored in their associated mnemoduct.

The a-cells are what count for this new cerebral set-up of mine, for they connect to m-cells in lower-order awarenesses unlinked to sensory-cells.  This allows me to hypothesize an entire cerebraceptual awareness with sub-awarenesses in touch through a-cells with many or all the awarenesses making up the practiceptual awareness.  Hence, the possibility that the latter sends only certain, potentially-“higher” to the cerebraceptual awareness.  Meanwhile, the cerebraceptual awareness may have sensory-cells in the practiceptual awareness (I’m really brainstorming here, so may not be making sense) that are aware of data beyond the competence of the practiceptual awareness—perhaps relationships in the latter’s knowlecules.  Hence, some m-cells in the cerebraceptual awareness will be activated by what is going on in the practiceptual awareness—and cause one to experience some new kind of knowledge.

To try feebly to give an example: a cerebraceptual sensory-cell in the practiceptual awareness’s matheceptual awareness might perceive some knowlecule as algebraic, tag it as such and activate an m-cell in the cerebraceptual awareness that causes us to experience something the practiceptual awareness could not have: “a3,” say.  But probably not.

The point is, that the cerebraceptual awareness could easily share only some data with the practiceptual awareness, and be sensitive to data the practiceptual awareness can’t be—except maybe in some roundabout way due to an exceptionally good popular science book for laymen.

In any case, I now believe that the brain’s attention center is important.  It’s where the brain determines where one’s attention should be focused.  I now think it could allow this new cerebral organization of mine by sensing when some awareness in the practiceptual awareness has been stymied by something requiring verosophical attention, and in effect shuts down the practiceptual awareness and turns on the cerebraceptual awareness.

Or a poet experiences something in his practiceptual awareness that becomes in effect a problem for him to solve as a poem.  He has fragments of thoughts that strike him as material for a poem but they bewilder him enough to cause his brain to flip his attention (assuming nothing important is happening in this day-to-day, that always over-rides cerebraceptual needs, although the two awarenesses may struggle).  Eventually he will be able to control his attention—more easily by simply by (1) reducing his day-to-day as much as possible, and (2) working his way into a frustrated mental state that will flip him into his cerebraceptual awareness.

Meanwhile, his cerebellum may help out by going automatic, thus leaving his practiceptual awareness with nothing to do, which will shut it down.  (Until something environmental alerts it powerfully enough—a loud sound, for instance.)  I think of Wordsworth’s turning his practiceptual awareness over to his cerebellum by taking long walks that the cerebellum tended to while he was (mostly) composing away in his cerebraceptual awareness.

Random thoughts: that much of the anthroceptual awareness is blocked from the cerebraceptual awareness.  It is in the latter that a person becomes impersonal, and the people in his life become objects.

Superior minds are those able to stay in their cerebraceptual awarenesses the longest.  This will require the ability to raise one’s cerebral energy and maintain a high level of it—although dropping it when appropriate.
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One Response to “Entry 1662 — More on Prac- & Cerebra-ceptuality”

  1. Ed Baker says:

    from that par-graph that be:gins w/: “The point is,”
    you pin-it-all on this Donkey Mind.

    It’s like, as Larry Eigner says/said/wrote: “we’re all windows” ?

    where “opening” and “closing” is also ( as you posit) a duality…
    or, what do the Intelligent Academics call “it”…. a “dichotomy”

    not only doe “the people in his life become objects” but
    he also…. be:comes [ material } to use ?

    the problem, if it is a problem, is that dropping even dropping
    is not so easy…. or to drop even “good” habits ain’t either ?

    well: enough about you. Let’s talk about me. and/ or the Reader/Viewer as
    the Voyeur that he is…. that any poem or painting needs him to co:mplete

    ?

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Intelligence « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Intelligence’ Category

Entry 1688 — Traits of Genius, First Revision

Saturday, January 10th, 2015

Here’s a shortened (improved but still in-progress, with hopes for feedback) version of idea of the characteristics of genius:

The Objective Hallmarks of Genius or: the traits you can recognize a possible genius by (and I now believe he will have them all, although some may not be instantly identifiable)

1. Gross tendency to emotional ups and downs, sometimes psychotically extreme as with Theodore Roethke.  (Note: most of the characteristics on this list have been pointed out by many others, and I doubt it any is original.  While in this parenthesis, let me add that this is my first list so with surely be incomplete, perhaps severely so.)

2. A need for Great Achievements–like Keats’s declared hope of being among the English poets when he died—and an inability not to strive to the utmost for them.

3. Sufficient fundamental (innate) self-confidence to go one’s own way regardless of what others say—which must make one a (natural) non-conformist since no one who is true to himself will be more than partially like anyone else.  (Note: a natural non-conformist is one who is naturally different from others rather than one who has to work to be different from others; evidence of this will be the many ways a natural non-conformist conforms, without its bothering him.

4. Sufficient lack of self-confidence to forever fear failure, coupled with an insane final immunity to it that keeps one from giving up.

5. Reasonably high output as an artist and/or verosopher–due to determination and persistance.  (Needless to say, I’m assuming in advance that I have the hallmarks of genius, so basically listing what I believe to be my own characteristics–but I’ll leave out bald-headedness.  And unbelievable potent wittiness.)
6. Unusual curiosity, varied and intensive.

7. Extreme perfectionism, but only about what’s centrally important: sloppy about details.  I always remember Ezra Pound’s saying about chess grandmasters: they will look for the best move, then, having found it, look for a better.

Someone with all these will be at least a ?enius–but not necessarily a genius.

It seems to me there must be more hallmarks of genius, but I can’t bring any to mind just now.

I took the last two from the National Enquirer list.  There were two others there I left off my list but find worth commenting on:

        HONESTY. Geniuses are frank, forthright and honest. Take the responsibility for things that go wrong. Be willing to admit, ‘I goofed’, and learn from your mistakes.

My Comment: That’s me, but I have no idea whether other ?eniuses tend to be frank, etc.

ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE. Geniuses are able to effectively get their ideas across to others. Take every opportunity to explain your ideas to others.

My Comment: This would be one of the characteristics of a genius mentality, I would guess.  I tend to think it must be the hardest thing for a ?enius to achieve.  A subject worth an essay.  The geniuses most easily getting appropriate recognition before they are dead are those specializing in something where colleagues are in some sense clustered and on the same page–physicists, for example.  Their vocation needs to have been recognized as significantly a superior one, as physics is, poetry not, for a genius to be recognized as such in his lifetime.  Perhaps the greatest geniuses are those who succeed not just in getting personal recognition but for getting, or playing an important role in getting, recognition for their vocation.  (In my case, recognition for what I call “Otherstream Poetry.”)

The Two Not-Yet Substantiatable Essential (Innate) Components of Genius

1. Extremely superior general cerebreffectiveness (i.e., general intelligence that takes in all the varied kinds of intelligence that exist, few of them measured by IQ tests, such as skill with people, musical ability, and general creativity)

2. At least one extremely superior major kind of cultural talent –e.g., musical creativity or mathematical deftness.

All the Objective Hallmarks of Genius will automatically result from a person’s having the two essential components of genius.  Hence, “all” one needs to be a genius are the two components just mentioned.

Revised Footnote from Yesterday: No matter how often I notice how ardently those advocating some point of view so frequently seem to need to denounce all views on the subject involved but their own as wholly invalid rather than merely incompletely convincing, or the like, it almost always makes me shake my head.  I can’t claim I’m never guilty of it, but . . .

New word: “nincomplootly”

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Entry 1686 — Some Thoughts on ?enius

Friday, January 9th, 2015

None of my three or four faithful readers will be surprised that I have a rather large need to believe I am a genius–a genuine one, not an IQ or MacArthur genius.  The only thing perhaps unusual, for a serious, meta-professional artist or verosopher like me, is that I admit my need.  By “meta-professional artist or verosopher,” I mean someone whose main reason for his activities as either is to produce something of significant cultural value.  Unlike Samuel Johnson, at least if we go by his famous saying about only fools writing for anything but money.  Sam is one of my cultural heroes however much I disagree with him about possibly more things than I agree with him about.  Of course, one reason for that is that money is much less meaningful in our incredibly affluent country than it was in his.  True poverty was hard for a great many people to avoid in his, near-impossible to suffer in ours.

I think false modesty is so battered into people like me that, for most of us, it is no longer false.  There is also the (innate) need to fit in in spite of being different.  Like many ?eniuses, I do downplay my aptitudes (like the one that made schoolwork mostly easy for me).  I also somewhat exaggerate my many ineptitudes such as the way it grab hold of conclusions prematurely, or my slowness to understand (which, most of the time, I contend, is a virtue due to realizing how much more there is to be understood than most others).  What helps me most is that I’m actually pretty normal in most respects, and that’s genuine.  I tend to think of myself as a television that has one channel no other television has that picks up telecasts from some weird planet in another galaxy . .  but only once or twice a year.  (Other ?eniuses are the same kind of television, each of which picks up telecasts from a different weird planet.)

I’ve now used my newest coinage, “?enius,” enough to indicate it’s not a typo.  That’s because, as is the case, I suspect, with many blessed/cursed with the kind of brain I have, I have enough self-confidence to be sure I’m either a genius or not far off from being one, but not to declare myself one.  In fact, I truly don’t know whether I am one or not.  What I am, therefore, is a ?enius.

I would not be surprised if even the most ratified culturateur–Murray Gell-Mann, for instance–

Hey, I just did a quick search of the Internet for Murray to check for about the twentieth time whether or not he spelled his last name with a hyphen and found an entry at this Roman Catholic Blog that is one of the best blog entries I’ve ever come across–in spite of its having been written by someone who considers those not accepting the existence of God as a given to be intellectually vacuous, and their arguments on par with those of holocaust-deniers (which, he implies, are wholly worthless although some I’ve found to be pretty good, just not good enough to unconvince me that it is beyond reasonable doubt that a great many Jews were deliberately killed by the Nazis[1]).

Back to what I was saying: I would not be surprised if even Nobelist Murray Gell-Mann sometimes fears he’s not very smart, after all.  Maybe not.  More likely he is like Newton feeling like a small boy at the beach finding interesting pebbles or shells . . . but still aware at some level that only he was noticing them.

The situation is different for ?eniuses like me who, even in old age, are near-completely unrecognized.  One would have to be close to insane to be sure the whole world, just about, was wrong about you.  Nonetheless, I keep thinking and writing about genius and related topics, my own underlying aim always being, to some degree or other, to find a way to get around the evidence against me.

Not today, unless in just having revealed my invention (so far as I know) of the world’s first English word for day-to-day use that includes a typographical mark as one of its letters (Cummings and others have made words like it, but not for use outside the poems they are in) is my subtle argument for my being a genius.  I guess I am never not trying to prove  I’m a genius whenever I create a serious work of art or write a serious text.  In this entry I’m mainly considering what someone you might reasonably characterize as “brilliant” of “gifted,” but not accept as a genius.

My latest thought is minor but taxonomically valuable: it is that a genuine genius has two characteristics: the temperament of a genius and the mentality of a genius.  This thought occurred to me when (as so often) thinking about myself–in particular about what I could claim for myself as one striving to achieve genius.  I feel certain that I do have the temperament of a genius; what is unknown is if I also have the mentality of a genius.

All I can say about the latter is it’s very much higher than even a superior human mentality, and that it’s far more than ability to score high on IQ tests or get high grades in school.  I lean toward believing it is probably high-superiority in only one kind of art or verosophy, maybe two, not some kind of all-around superiority.  In any case, I don’t feel capable of pinning it down objectively.

I do feel the temperament of a genius can be objectively defined.  I contend it consists of some high proportion of the following characteristics, each overt and easy to identify:

1. Gross tendency to emotional ups and downs, sometimes psychotically extreme as with Theodore Roethke.  (Note: most of the characteristics on this list have been pointed out by many others, and I doubt it any is original.  While in this parenthesis, let me add that this is my first list so with surely be incomplete, perhaps severely so.)

2. A need for Great Achievements–like Keats’s declared hope of being among the English poets when he died.

3. A disregard for the opinions of others–i.e., non-conformity.

4. Reasonably high output as an artist and/or verosopher–due to determination and persistance.  (Needless to say, I’m assuming in advance that I have the temperament of a genius, so basically listing my own characteristics–but I’ll leave out bald-headedness.  And unbelievable potent wittiness.)

5. Extreme self-reliance–a variation on #3 because it importantly includes going one’s own way regardless of what others say.

Yikes, I see I don’t need to make a list–the National Enquirer beat me to it by some 35 years:

    1. DRIVE. Geniuses have a strong desire to work hard and long. They’re willing to give all they’ve got to a project. Develop your drive by focusing on your future success, and keep going.  Sure: my #4 is the necessary result and provides objective evidence of this.
    2. COURAGE. It takes courage to do things others consider impossible. Stop worrying about what people will think if you’re different.  See my #5.
    3. DEVOTION TO GOALS. Geniuses know what they want and go after it. Get control of your life and schedule. Have something specific to accomplish each day.  Only sometimes true.  My #4 again will be the result for someone with the temperament of genius.
    4. KNOWLEDGE. Geniuses continually accumulate information. Never go to sleep at night without having learned at least one new thing each day. Read. And question people who know.  Everybody continually accumulates knowledge.  A ?enius becomes a genius in part by applying what he accumulates better than others due to his genius mentality.
    5. HONESTY. Geniuses are frank, forthright and honest. Take the responsibility for things that go wrong. Be willing to admit, ‘I goofed’, and learn from your mistakes.  That’s me, but I have no idea whether other ?eniuses tend to be frank, etc.
    6. OPTIMISM. Geniuses never doubt they will succeed. Deliberately focus your mind on something good coming up.  Again, see my #4.
    7. ABILITY TO JUDGE. Try to understand the facts of a situation before you judge. Evaluate things on an opened minded, unprejudiced basis and be willing to change your mind.  My mentality of genius would include this; it’s just the truism, be intelligent.
    8. ENTHUSIASM. Geniuses are so excited about what they are doing, it encourages others to cooperate with them. Really believe that things will turn out well. Don’t hold back.  Maybe, but I tend to see being a loner in your field as more likely a characteristic of a genius temperament.
    9. WILLINGNESS TO TAKE CHANCES. Overcome your fear of failure. You won’t be afraid to take chances once you realize you can learn from your mistakes.  #4.
    10. DYNAMIC ENERGY. Don’t sit on your butt waiting for something good to happen. Be determined to make it happen.  #4.
    11. ENTERPRISE. Geniuses are opportunity seekers. Be willing to take on jobs others won’t touch. Never be afraid to try the unknown.  #4 and #5.
    12. PERSUASION. Geniuses know how to motivate people to help them get ahead. You’ll find it easy to be persuasive if you believe in what you’re doing.  I suspect ?eniuses are too advanced to be persuasive, and not involved in collective enterprises.
    13. OUTGOINGNESS. I’ve found geniuses able to make friends easily and be easy on their friends. Be a ‘booster’ not somebody who puts others down. That attitude will win you many valuable friends.  No.  Although this fits me more than it doesn’t.  Many ?eniuses are ingoing.  All ?eniuses must be ingoing at times, extremely ingoing, I would say. 
    14. ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE. Geniuses are able to effectively get their ideas across to others. Take every opportunity to explain your ideas to others.  This would be one of the characteristics of a genius mentality, I would guess.  I tend to think it must be the hardest thing for a ?enius to achieve.  A subject worth an essay.  The geniuses most easily getting appropriate recognition before they are dead are those specializing in something where colleagues are in some sense clustered and on the same page–physicists, for example.  Their VOCATION needs to have been recognized as significantly a superior one, as physics is, poetry not. 
    15. PATIENCE. Be patient with others most of the time, but always be impatient with your self. Expect far more of yourself than others. #2
    16. PERCEPTION. Geniuses have their mental radar working full time. Think more of others’ needs and wants than you do of your own.  BS.
    17. PERFECTIONISM. Geniuses cannot tolerate mediocrity, particularly in themselves. Never be easily satisfied with your self. Always strive to do better.  I think I would put having high standards for oneself on my list although that would follow from #2, having a need to be great.
    18. SENSE OF HUMOR. Be willing to laugh at your own expense. Don’t take offense when the joke is on you.  I feel I pretty decidedly have this, but don’t see what it has to do with genius.
    19. VERSATILITY. The more things you learn to accomplish, the more confidence you will develop. Don’t shy away from new endeavors.  I’ll have to think about this.  My initial thought is how one should balance improved understanding of one thing versus having many understandings.  But having a genius mentality will automatically cause you to absorb a great many things not obviously related and use many of them (as well as know which ones to scrap).
    20. ADAPTABILITY. Being flexible enables you to adapt to changing circumstances readily. Resist doing things the same old way. Be willing to consider new options.  Have superior accommodance, the most important characteristic of a genius mentality.
    21. CURIOSITY. An inquisitive, curious mind will help you seek out new information. Don’t be afraid to admit you don’t know it all. Always ask questions about things you don’t understand.  I’m sure extreme curiosity, inability to be satisfied with one-step answers, or even ten-step answers, is an important part of the genius mentality.
    22. INDIVIDUALISM. Do things the way you think they should be done, without fearing somebody’s disapproval.  This is on my list.
    23. IDEALISM. Keep your feet on the ground – but have your head in the clouds. Strive to achieve great things, not just for yourself, but for the better of mankind.  Do great things, by your definition.
    24. IMAGINATION. Geniuses know how to think in new combinations, see things from a different perspective, than anyone else. Unclutter your mental environment to develop this type of imagination. Give yourself time each day to daydream, to fantasize, to drift into a dreamy inner life the way you did as a child.  Again, be born with a superior accommodance.

L. Ron Hubbard thought this worthy of re-circulation.  It’s not bad for The National Enquirer, but basically a guide for socio-economic go-getters, not my kind of geniuses.

The list is here, by the way. It’s followed by a lot of interesting comments.

I now need a break from this topic. I hope tomorrow to be able to have an updated list here.

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[1] No matter how often I notice the need of those advocating some point of view to denounce all opposing views as wholly invalid (or is it a–possibly innate–defect that makes it difficult for them to avoid binary thinking?), it almost always makes me shake me head.  I can’t claim I’m never guilty of it, but . . .

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Entry 1668 — Additions & Blither

Sunday, December 21st, 2014

First an addition to my taxonomy of awarenesses: I’ve decided to give what I was temporarily calling the “X-ceptual Awareness” one of the names I previously considered, then junked, “the Magniceptual Awareness.”  My problem with it was that it was too similar to “the Supraceptual Awareness,” the name I had given to my system’s over-all awareness.  I made that problem go away by simply changing “Supraceptual Awareness” to “Cerebral Awareness.”  Pretty clever, wot?  It makes sense since both the Practiceptual Awareness and the Magniceptual Awareness are in, or mostly in, the cerebrum.  And I’m comfortable with the idea of a Sub-Cerebral Awareness located in the cerebellum and other parts of the brain, as well as various places in the secondary nervous system.

Next, a Noun cement that I hope will will cause those of you feeling guilty about getting all this blog’s incredible brilliance for free to express your gratitude with money–to someone on food stamps (due to his actual economic situation, not lies about it, although I did not report the $200 I made as a writer last year in my 2013 request to continue on the dole, nor will I report the $350! I made as a writer this year on my upcoming request).  You can do this by sending me $5 or more for an autographed numbered copy of a limited edition of 4 More Poem Poems.  It just came off the press.  Only 8 copies printed, each with a different cover from the others–in fact, I have just decided to paste a unique original visual image on each cover.  (Note: I really think $20 would be reasonable for anyone who is paying that or more for a subscription to any poetry-related magazine whatever.)  I claim that no one who likes Joycean foolery with the language and surrealism will find at least one of the poems delightful.  And there iz not one (1) but two (2) dreadfully wicked attacks in the collection on our country’s poetry gate-keepers–but only in passing!  Remember, Posterity will really be angry with you for not sending me any money!

To take advantage of this Fabulous Offer, send check & your name&address to:

Bob Grumman
1708 Hayworth Road
Port Charlotte FL 33952

Sorry for the begging, folks.  I’m really not badly off: I still have credit cards that will allow me to borrow over ten thousand dollar before I max them.  I just used on of the cards for $1500, in fact–to have some company try to get the data in an external drive of mine that went bad about a year ago, and has the only copies of a few of my poems, and a lot of my only copies of others’ poems including four or five of Guy Beining’s the originals of which are lost.  But I thought it’d be fun to play marketeer for a little while.  And at least I didn’t bold-face the above.

* * *

Okay, now to what seems to me an interesting question I just wondered into (note: it’s near impossible now for me not to qualify every opinion of mine in some way like this) while discussing Karl Kempton’s current central project, an exhaustively researched history of visual poetry from pre-history on: what poem should be considered the world’s first major full-scale visual poem?  Very subjective, I fear, because of the difficulty in defining both a full-scale poem (for me, to put it simply, it would be a poem that’d be mediocre or worse if not for what it does visually) and a major poem.

I have no idea what poem is but don’t think any of Mallarme’s was because not depending on the visual for anything truly central to them.  Nor Apollinaire’s, which seem primitive to me, although I’d have to look at them again to be sure.  Such a poem would have to have a highly significant and original visual metaphor at its core to get the prize, in my opinion.  Nothing before the twentieth century that I know about does.  I think I’d aware the prize to something by Cummings (although I’m not sure what, and he may not have composed what I’d call a full-scale visual poem); if not Cummings, then Grominger’s “silence,” but not with confidence because I don’t know what other superior visual poems came before it.

Here’s a related question I didn’t send Karl: what poet could be said to have been the world’s first serious, dedicated, lyrovisual poets, by which I mean poet who concentrated a fairly substantial portion of his thoughts and energy to lyrovisual poetry–as opposed to Lewis Carroll who (1) was not a lyrical visual poet and (2) wrote light visual poems (which were nonetheless an important contribution to poetry, or Mallarme or Herbert, neither of whom composed more than a few poems that could be called visual–or, from my standpoint, made primary visual poems, or poems whose visual content was at least as important aesthetically as its verbal content.

I’m not even sure Cummings would qualify for consideration since he did not compose all that many poems I’d call primary visual poems.  I’d have to go through my volume of his complete poetry to be sure of this, though.  So, we have a preliminary question: what poets devoted a fairly substantial portion of his thoughts and energy to lyrovisual poems.  My impression is that Kenneth Patchen was one of them.  I think Apollinaire probably was, too.  Most of the concrete poets seem to have been. I know I’ll annoy a number of you with my next pronouncement: it is that fewer and fewer people calling themselves visual poets devote much, or any, time to the composition of visual poems, preferring to make textual designs (and mostly doing extremely well at it).

Now another addition, this to my thoughts about urceptual personae:

It occurred to me that I made no attempt in yesterday’s entry to indicate the biological advantage of having . . . ursonae, so I’ll try to do that now.  I’ll need to go into some detail about the way an urceptual persona is created.  For an example, I’ll use the urnemy (no, I’m just foolin’ around: I won’t make that my new name for “the urceptual enemy”).  When a baby first sees its father, it will automatically be thrust into its socioceptual awareness[1] where its urceptual persona recognition mechanism is.  This mechanism will activate the baby’s urceptual other—due to such stimuli as the father’s face and arms.  The father will be unfamiliar to it (probably, although he may have experienced enough of him while in the womb for him to be familiar; or perhaps any face will be familiar enough not to cause the baby pain, or even to cause it pleasure; assume here, though, that the father is unfamiliar to the baby, maybe because he has a beard and is first encountered while he is sneezing or farting).  Since the unfamiliar causes pain according to my theory, and pain caused by another person has to be one of the stimuli causing the activation of a person’s urceptual enemy, the baby’s urceptual enemy will become active.

The baby will withdraw as much as possible from its enemy, the father, because urceptual personae automatically activate appropriate certain reflexive behavior.  This is value #1 of an urceptual persona.

At this point, I am going to drop the urceptual enemy for not being as good a choice as an example as I first thought.  I’ll go instead to the urceptual father.  In the scenario I began, the father will almost certainly not continue to activate the baby’s urceptual enemy for long, if he even does so when the baby first encounters him.  The baby’s mother will probably be with the father and say something like, “Here’s your daddy, Flugwick (or whatever the kid’s name is),” in a momvoice, accompanied by a mom smile, and many another mo0mfeature, so neutralize the father’s unfamiliarity.  And the father will smile and say something in a gentle voice and perhaps, tickle the kid under the chin—certainly something likely to seem pleasant to the kid.  In short, little Flugwick’s urceptual persona recognition mechanism will soon activate its urceptual father (I now think a baby will recognize the first male it encounters as its father—but be able to correct the error before long—rather than as a friend; if my hypothesis turns out valid, it will be easy to determine exactly what happens.

Be that as it may, eventually the baby will (in normal circumstance) automatically perceive its father as both a certain shape with a certain voice and smell—and as its urceptual father.  The activation of the latter will help it more quickly react to the father appropriately.  It will learn from its social environment—mainly its family—the details of appropriate reactions not instinctive like its smile will be until it learns enough to control it.

That an urceptual persona will double the ability of the real person it is attached to cause reactions is it second extremely important biological value.  For one thing, this will make people more important than almost anything else to a person, which would obviously help a species survive.

What might be as important to a person as people?  Here’s where my superspeculative nature takes over from my speculative nature.  The goals a person shoots for may become as important to a person as others, or even himself  Beauty, for an artist.  As I’ve already tried to demonstrate, an artist will almost surely be motivated to some small or large degree to create an object of beauty to gain others’ approval.  But simply to create something of beauty for its own sake can very well be his main motive, or even his only motive.  I’m back to the magniceptual awareness where one might go to concentrate on beauty free of interpersonal concerns.  Where I increase my speculativeness is in thinking puberty may open a person’s magniceptual awareness—give him doors into it, or significantly increase his doors into it.  I strongly suspect a male’s magniceptual awareness is significantly large than a female’s.  Just as a female’s anthroceptual awareness is much larger than a male’s. Of course, feminists will take this to be an insult to women, but I don’t see it as that.  Well, as a male, I have to think of what I am as superior to females, but nonetheless trying to be objective about it, there’s no reason to say that interpersonal matters require less talent than impersonal matters.

The joke is that all this will be moot when asexual computers take over the world, reproducing like protocytes—with ecstasy.  But who knows, they may be us.
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[1] According to Me, among everyone’s ten major awarenesses[2] (so far) is an anthroceptual awareness, which consists of two sub-awarenesses, the egoceptual awareness which is where a person experiences himself as an individual, and the socioceptual awareness, where he experiences himself as a member of his society.  Each of these is one of the “intelligences,” in Howard Gardner’s writings on the subject.

[2] A major awareness is an awareness just under one of the primary awarenesses on my taxonomical chart of the awarenesses.

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Entry 1665 — Additions to Yesterday’s Entry

Thursday, December 18th, 2014

Note: in yesterday’s entry, I opposed entities that are “real,” because capable of being sensorily perceived, to “imaginary” ones that cannot be perceived.  I should have used “communicatively perceived” in place of just “perceived,” or whatever term I used for that.  That’s because some believers in Eastern x-ceptualities, believe themselves actually perceiving gods and the like whom others cannot.  I say that if I see a tree, and say the tree is real and get almost any sane person to look at it and agree with me that it is, I have identified a communicably perceivable entity whereas if an Eastern mystic says he went somewhere in his mind, or some like place, and talked with his god, his god is only perceptible to him, if he cannot take me where I can also meet him; the god is not communicably perceivable.

This goes back to the two realities idea of mine.  I’m not sure what nutto names I gave them, but they are the personal reality and the collective reality, and–for me–the only one the means anything is the collective reality: reality is what I and others agree it is.  I think my personal reality is almost the collective’s.  The important differences are no questions not yet genuinely decided by the collective: for instance, the value of my cultural contributions.  I suspect there will never be a fair way to determine that but the collective’s current answer would have to be”who knows.”

As I think more on it, it seems to me there might be two collective realities: the one with a city called New York separated by an ocean called the Atlantic from a city called London, and we go into our x-ceptual awareness to consider.  There most questions are a good deal less than 95% decided by the collective, and I think it fair not to consider something to be part of the collective reality (“objective reality” is or should be my name for this unless 95% of the clearly sane say it is.  It is insane, though, to reject something proposed as real because it hasn’t gotten enough votes; one must accept it as not sufficiently demonstrated only.

Maybe I’m saying objective reality is what we deal with in a practiceptual awareness, while insufficiently-demonstrated reality makes up most of what we deal with in our higher awareness.  From another slant, objective reality consists of entities; non-practiceptual possible reality consists of the inter-relationships of entities.

I’ve thought more about what to call x-ceptuality.  “Sapienceptuality” may be my best attempt, but it’s not right.  “Aristoceptuality” gets it almost exactly, but only if we put aside the fact that most aristocrats are not very bright.  And Aristotle, my favorite philosopher, had little to do with the arts.  Another miss: “Magnaceptual,” out because too similar to “Supraceptual,” which I want to keep for my ruling awareness.

I thought of following Siggy in using the names of gods which would have given me “Apolloceptual.”  But what god’s name could I use for “practiceptual,” assuming I could give up that name, which seems near ideal for what I want it to mean.  Also, Apollo seems to me to represent only part of where goes on in the “second” awareness.

“Significeptual?”  I like it but fear it’s too much of a slur on the practical.   I thought of “culturaceptual” because the practiceptual awareness has to do with survival and comfort, the other awareness with what I think of as culture.  But “culture” is a contaminated word.

“Abracaceptual?”  A good one, but no.

Fie on it.  I’m quitting for now.
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Entry 1664 — Back to Important Stuff

Wednesday, December 17th, 2014

Today I”m back to my little third- or fourth-level theory of Intelligence.  Here are my latest thoughts on it:

(1)  I’m tentatively changing some terms: “pracsipience” to “practiceptual intelligence,” and “pracsipiceptual,” or whatever term I had for the awareness involved, to “practiceptual”; “cerebrasipience” to . . . I’m not sure.  I want “x-ceptual intelligence.”  Weird: may that’s it: “xceptual intelligence.”  Too cute?  My first thought was was “metapracticeptual intelligence.”  I love the German “hohen,” for “high,” but am not so sure “hohenceptual” would work.  It’s exactly right in meaning conveyed, but . . . I think I’ll leave the matter hanging for now.

Note to Marton: I’m claiming scholar’s use for my use of the ellipsis, so will not be sending you a royalty for use of it.

(2) Could the x-ceptual awareness be the first home of theology?  I distinguish “theology: from “religion.”  At the moment, I think of religion as the practiceptual worship of gods, and belief in various superstitions.  Theology is an attempt to work up a philosophy (or, better, metaphysics) of religion—to explain Jehovah, for instance.  Theology, in working almost entirely with abstract (really, imaginary) entities would seem surely to be a kind of practiceptual undergoing—“metaverosophy,” verosophy dealing rationally with entities one can perceive, metaverosophy dealing with all entities we are capable of thinking of, real and imaginary.

Digression: is there a difference between the imagined and any other kind of unreal entity?  I tend to think not, but the closer an imaginary entity is to something real, the more plausible it becomes: God as a man who is hiding rather than beyond human perception is about as plausible as an imaginary entity can be, it seems to me.  Or as a computer.

I can go along with the idea of the non-practiceptual awareness being caused, in part or wholly, by the need for a theology.  The need for meta-arithmetic would likely be a greater cause, however.

(3) Might the non-practiceptual awareness be a place to escape perceptual overload for many?  For our girl Emily, for sure.  But for me, too.  Which makes me think how my present ideas could make a psychotherapy book, and be useful: how to use your x-ceptual awareness to save your mind!  Or show it as a kind of East Indian practice—which it is, to a degree.

That makes me wonder if I need to divide my x-ceptual awareness in two, one division involved only with . . . reality, the other with both reality, since it’s impossible fully to escape it, and the imaginary.  Maybe call the first simply “Western x-ceptuality,” and the second “Eastern x-ceptuality,” each name being a derogatory epithet to a good number of people.

(4) The relationship of music to my new two awarenesses of the first rank is an interesting problem.  Music is both highly abstract and highly concrete.  The dance would be practiceptual: choreography above it.

I find I need a term for our over-all system of awarenesses.  Perhaps, “supraceptual awareness?” That which contains the practiceptual awareness and its sibling, with portions of (so far) ten major awareness shared or separately under those two?  One of the ten is the one I call the “compreceptual awareness”; so far I haven’t worked out a good definition of it but provisionally consider it always active, and the repository of a general overall picture of everything a person is experiencing during a given instacon, both his perception of the inner and outer environments, and his retroception of past experience.  The supraceptual awareness, whoever, is just a name: it has nothing in it except . . . all the other awareness and sub-awarenesses.

Back to the dance.  It must be the most practiceptual of the arts since it requires a continuing sense of what one’s muscles are doing.  But the abstract patterning that choreographical creativity becomes involved with would require the higher awareness.  Similarly music ascends out of simple practiceptual art into higher art as patterning takes over from simple instinctual love of basic sounds and rhythms.  I think its ascent is faster than dance’s.

(5) I find this scheme of two awarenesses of the first rank (under the supraceptual awareness) to support much of my musings on verosophy and the arts versus survival, and all the other practiceptual activities I’ve previously listed, who knows where.  Not surprisingly, it confirms many of my cultural prejudices such as my belief that visimagery (visual art) only became an art with the advent of non-representational painting, before that being a craft, albeit sometimes becoming more in the hands of its most gifted practitioners.  I see only non-representational visimagery as post-practiceptual.  Color and shape, of course, remain for it as important as sounds and rhythms are in music, but patterns, within compositions and intercompositionally (the way paintings and sculptures interact with other paintings and sculpture, and musical compositions interact with other musical compositions—by the artist involved himself, or by other artists, become much more important.

(6) Maybe “systeceptual awareness” may be a good term for the higher awareness, some relatively complex system (importantly) underlying everything that goes on in it.  The trouble is that some practiceptual activities are systematic, albeit only tactically so.  So, maybe “stratisysteceptual?”  Just kiddink.  I guess I now have two entities to name.

I can’t remember any more of my ideas, but know there were scores, all terrific.  So this entry is about done.  I may have gone about as far as I can with this topic: four entries and a little under three thousand words.  Not much, and it includes a lot of digressions like this.  It may be a good very rough start to the full presentation of my knowlecular psychology I’ve always hoped to compose.

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Entry 1662 — More on Prac- & Cerebra-ceptuality

Monday, December 15th, 2014

Questions in the Night: Big words only make it into the cerebrasipience zone?  Algebra and higher math goes to cerebraceptual awareness only?  Only strongly activated anthroceptual data gets in the cerebraceptual awareness?  High charactration required for use of cerebraceptual awareness?

Later I remembered enough of my model of the brain to begin making a little sense (I hope).  First off, I remembered how many awarenesses it contains, from the main ones like the reducticeptual (or conceptual) awareness through lesser ones like the matheceptual (or mathematics) sub-awareness down to even smaller ones I have not yet gotten down to but know are there.  Each basically contains little but master-cells (m-cells), associative-cells (a-cells) and a mnemoduct.  It is the activation of m-cells that gives us our experience of existence in the form of knowlecules, those being a sort of understood datum: “horse,” for instance, or “hoof” or “mammal,” depending on the context.  Each active m-cell contributes a knowicle to the experience—i.e., a unit of knowledge, perhaps a syllable or something much smaller.  They are activated either by sensory-cells reacting to stimuli in the outer or inner environment, or to memories of previously experienced knowlicles stored in their associated mnemoduct.

The a-cells are what count for this new cerebral set-up of mine, for they connect to m-cells in lower-order awarenesses unlinked to sensory-cells.  This allows me to hypothesize an entire cerebraceptual awareness with sub-awarenesses in touch through a-cells with many or all the awarenesses making up the practiceptual awareness.  Hence, the possibility that the latter sends only certain, potentially-“higher” to the cerebraceptual awareness.  Meanwhile, the cerebraceptual awareness may have sensory-cells in the practiceptual awareness (I’m really brainstorming here, so may not be making sense) that are aware of data beyond the competence of the practiceptual awareness—perhaps relationships in the latter’s knowlecules.  Hence, some m-cells in the cerebraceptual awareness will be activated by what is going on in the practiceptual awareness—and cause one to experience some new kind of knowledge.

To try feebly to give an example: a cerebraceptual sensory-cell in the practiceptual awareness’s matheceptual awareness might perceive some knowlecule as algebraic, tag it as such and activate an m-cell in the cerebraceptual awareness that causes us to experience something the practiceptual awareness could not have: “a3,” say.  But probably not.

The point is, that the cerebraceptual awareness could easily share only some data with the practiceptual awareness, and be sensitive to data the practiceptual awareness can’t be—except maybe in some roundabout way due to an exceptionally good popular science book for laymen.

In any case, I now believe that the brain’s attention center is important.  It’s where the brain determines where one’s attention should be focused.  I now think it could allow this new cerebral organization of mine by sensing when some awareness in the practiceptual awareness has been stymied by something requiring verosophical attention, and in effect shuts down the practiceptual awareness and turns on the cerebraceptual awareness.

Or a poet experiences something in his practiceptual awareness that becomes in effect a problem for him to solve as a poem.  He has fragments of thoughts that strike him as material for a poem but they bewilder him enough to cause his brain to flip his attention (assuming nothing important is happening in this day-to-day, that always over-rides cerebraceptual needs, although the two awarenesses may struggle).  Eventually he will be able to control his attention—more easily by simply by (1) reducing his day-to-day as much as possible, and (2) working his way into a frustrated mental state that will flip him into his cerebraceptual awareness.

Meanwhile, his cerebellum may help out by going automatic, thus leaving his practiceptual awareness with nothing to do, which will shut it down.  (Until something environmental alerts it powerfully enough—a loud sound, for instance.)  I think of Wordsworth’s turning his practiceptual awareness over to his cerebellum by taking long walks that the cerebellum tended to while he was (mostly) composing away in his cerebraceptual awareness.

Random thoughts: that much of the anthroceptual awareness is blocked from the cerebraceptual awareness.  It is in the latter that a person becomes impersonal, and the people in his life become objects.

Superior minds are those able to stay in their cerebraceptual awarenesses the longest.  This will require the ability to raise one’s cerebral energy and maintain a high level of it—although dropping it when appropriate.
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Entry 1661 — Fuzzilier Re: Pracsipience, Etc.

Sunday, December 14th, 2014

The first thought here in a continuation of my thinking about day-to-day-thinking I was annoyed into by another lawyer’s making a bundle out of the increasingly complete abandonment by our country of any belief in self-responsibility: a kid got killed by a negligent driver; for lawyers, though, the responsibility in such a case is only that of the individual who directly caused a death if he is the one with the most money who can be sued.  Hence, in this case, the party sued (successfully, for over a million) was the church owning the parking lot (because some bushes got in the driver’s view and there’s no reason that should have made him slow down and be extra cautious: those owning any kind of property most make sure it is 100% safe).

That made me think about the pracsipience of the lawyers involved.  Is it greater than other people’s?  I decided it wasn’t.  They are probably in the 60% of the people I believe are quite intelligent in day-to-day living.  But they have a special talent for swindling.  Similarly I believe that doctors are no more pracsipient than the rest of us, but they have a talent for their vocation (which I admire, as I do not admire the vocation of some, but definitely not all, lawyers).

On second thought, I’m not sure doctors have any special talent so much as they have concentrated some of their pracsipience into becoming doctors.  As everyone concentrates a certain portion of his pracsipience.  Perhaps a talent is such a concentration of pracsi-pience?  (Am I unfuzzying rather than the reverse as I certainly was in my mind when I began this entry?)

On third thought, it seems to me that concentrations of pracsipience are different from a talent.  The lawyer suing the church had a talent for swindling whereas my doctor has a concentration of pracsipience in the field of medicine.  Of course, many doctors also have talents related to doctoring, as well.  The normal academic is all concentrated pracsipiences, or must pretend to be if he is going to make a living in academia.

I forgot about my 10% of those whose pracsipience is a level above the 60%’s: perhaps it’s superior because of those with it are better at concentrating their otherwise normal pracsipience than others.  In any case, those who succeed at what most people consider the higher professions like law and medicine are no doubt mostly in the 10% of people of superior pracsipience.

To be reasonably effective in the day-to-day, one needs to have the ability to concentrate one’s pracsipience in some vocation, so it’s part of pracsipience–at all levels.

 I’m pretty sure I haven’t said all I want to on this topic but right now I’ve zeroed out.  I’m afraid I’ll be saying more on it tomorrow.  Sorry.

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Entry 1660 — “Pracsipience”

Saturday, December 13th, 2014

I’ve been thinking about a new way of thinking about anthreffec-tiveness, or an individual’s over-all intelligence.  It’s new for me, but I suspect it may be close to most person’s idea of it.  Anyway, it’s just a different way of sorting them for me.  But I’m wondering if it may have a neurophysiological basis in the existence of a cerebral basement.  I like the idea so will stick a “Pracsipiceptual Awareness” into my model of the cerebrum that is be responsible for all of an individual’s “pracsipience,” or practical, day-to-day cerebreffectiveness (“cerebreffectiveness,” remember, being my word for exclusively cerebral anthreffectiveness, which is an individual’s entire effectiveness).

Frankly, I haven’t figured out how it would work.  Its mission would be to guiding an individual to maximally effective choices in his day-to-day tactical activities.  Making a living, keeping house, marketing, bringing up children, etc.  Not writing poetry or music, and designing bridges, etc.  Not, that is, strategic cerebreffectiveness, although a person using his pracsipience will often also being using his . . . cerebracip-ience, or what he needs from his mental equipment to go beyond day-to-day living into the arts, verosophy or the other higher human activities, if there are any (right now my mind’s a blank about them).

I now have divided the cerebrum into two sections: the pracsipiceptual awareness and the cerebrasipiceptual awareness.  I think of them as one under the other like the cerebellum under the cerebrum, but suspect each is all over the place.  My need now is to find a way for only certain “day-to-day date,” whatever that might be, to get into the pracsipiceptual awareness, and higher data into the cerebrasipiceptual awareness.  With the former passing on anything that might be useful to the higher awareness to it?

The only thing so far clear to me is that all the awarenesses would be involved with both these two new awarenesses.  I must think more on it.

My first interest, though, is in sorting an individual’s intelligences or competences in his pracsipience . . . and the minor and major talents  i believe just about everyone has, like the ability to sing or play bridge well on up to the ability to make large-scale scientific discoveries or novels that his cerebrasipiceptual awareness oversees.  All I’m saying to this point is that each individual has a pracsipience and talents, which I think is a standard way of looking at a person’s mental equipment: intelligence, and talents.  Although the word, “intelligence,” is used (in my view) confusingly too often to mean only ability at academics or the like.

My guess is that a good 60% of us are pracsipient, or effective in our day-to-day lives.  Another 20% are just adequately effective in our daily lives, most of them about as pracsipient as most people except for some condition that keeps them always or occasionally . . .  stupid: alcoholism, for instance, or rigidnikry (i.e., what I call a theoretical mental dysfunction that makes a person excessively inflexible of mind and cerebraffectively flawed in a number of other related ways) or poor eyesight, etc. . . . or, interesting, excessive cerebrasipience!

A further guess of mine is that only 10% of us (not me!) are an order of magnitude more pracsipient than the average 60%, and another 10% an order of magnitude (or more, in the case of the truly mentally handicapped) less pracsipient than the just adequately pracsipient.

What I’m doing, it seems to me, is explaining to myself the fact that I find almost every one to be “intelligent” (every bit as “intelligent” as I), 80%, in fact, if I count the 20% whose basically effective pracsipience is flawed).  I’m also trying to explain the not too common people I know or have known who seem to me gifted in . . . simply, living (but never, so far as I know, having the highest kind of cerebrasipience, genius).  but not too many.  Finally, I’m hypothesizing that I am right in assuming that what I call pracsipience does not really vary much.  Except for those with extreme inborn defects, or who have suffered horrendous damage to the wrong organs, we’re all about as much the same in this characteristic as we are in . . . the ability to eat.  Exaggeration–to give my drift.

Now, genius is the one talent that very few have, if you define it to mean something as special as I do.  One in a million?  Perhaps, although that would mean the USA has over 300 geniuses in it, and my sense is that we have quite a bit less: my friends–ME, needless to say–and what?  maybe fourteen or fifteen others.  Seriousfully, 300 may be right.  But just a few would be have a genius an order of magnitude greater than the best of the others.  The only American genius I’m even sorta sure is one, is Murray Gell-Mann; but I don’t understand advance theoretical physics or–and this is important–am not an expert in its history; therefore, I can’t evaluate the importance or originality (this latter being what I need to be an expert in the history of recent physics to determine) of what he’s done.  All I can say is that he is definitely a minor genius, at least–a “minor genius” as opposed to a major one being most of thus in my genius class.

I feel certain intuitively that America has a few Beethovens although I’m not sure who they are.  Nobody in America since Pollock  doing visimagery (i.e., visual art) exclusively is for me a Pollock–but my opinion is next to worthless because I don’t know very much about what’s going on in either art–and the media certainly isn’t any help.

To finish up, the one firm belief I’m considering holding until new data invalidates it is that most everyone is intelligent and talented, which means they have both pracsipience and cerbrasipience (although, as I didn’t mention, some vary a lot in number of talents as well as quality of one or more talents), but very few have a talent I would call genius, and almost none a talent I would call major genius.

It occurs to me that intelligence may be my favorite subject to pronounce and blither about, I guess because the world I grew up in seemed to me to make more of it than of anything else.  Ultimately it has to be–by my definition, which is “that which accounts for a person’s full lifetime effectiveness as a human being.”  But the “intelligence” made so much of by the world in general is only a small part of that.

In any case, no doubt whatever intelligence is, I have a need to know it well so I can rate myself.  But I also think I have simply been drawn to its study out of an innate proclivity to understand myself and others.  That’s impossible without getting significantly into a study of whatever intelligence is.

I hope to say more about the loose ends in what I’ve said here.  I hope also, as I always do, that a few people will read this with interest.  I’d love to get feedback, but don’t expect any.
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Entry 1609 — The Volume of the Intellect

Thursday, October 23rd, 2014

While thinking about getting back to my essay on formal education, I got to thinking about the difficulty of measuring the value of any kind of education.  That led me back to old ideas of mine concerning the volume of one’s intellect.  My thought is that an objective measurement of one’s intelligence would be very difficult, but a way that might help to make it in theory would consider one’s over-all understanding of existence as an object with three dimensions.  If so, one could simply measure it.  The larger the volume, the greater the intelligence it was the result of.

What I would begin with is a map of God’s understanding of existence–assuming existence is the same for him as it is for us.  I would divide it into several general understandings.  (1) understanding of the physical world–physics and, basically, all the other sciences . . .  I’m brainstorming . . . while trying out of another null zone of mine to jam something, anything, into this space so I will remain true to my vow of posting a blog entry every day.  Anyway, I’m interrupting myself almost immediately because an understanding of the physical world requires (a) visual knowledge, (b) verbal knowledge, (c) mathematical knowledge.  God will know what’s in the world, all of it.  Knowledge.  But that’s not enough for understanding.  Understanding means knowing how everything relates to everything else.

To begin again: An understanding of existence consists of (1) an understanding of the physical world which depends on one’s ability to reason mathematically, verbally and spatially–but that ability is not part of the intellect, only the understanding, if any, that it provides.   One builds an understanding of existence using math, words, and visualization.  This understanding thus has a measurable volume.  This might be called intellectual understanding as opposed to emotional understandings like music, visimagery and literature.  There’s also psychological understanding–how large one’s social life is–to put is simplistically: how many friends one has,  how long one has known them, and–most important–how deeply one’s relationship is to each of them.  But the complexity of the over-all group one is ultimately part of counts, too.

These are notes toward notes.  My goal is to show that basically the size of one’s intellect depends on how many subjects one is significantly involved with, and how deeply one is involved with each.  I know what I’m talking about,but am too tired to show it.

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Entry 1449 — IQ Tests

Saturday, May 10th, 2014

About all I was able to write today was the following for my essay on intelligence, which suddenly looks like it’s going nowhere:

The many defects of IQ tests

1. The abilities they measure are important in too few of the understandings intelligence should be a means to, dealing for the most part only with numbers, words and spatial relationships—not music, colors, physical movements, people. . . .

2. The abilities they measure are short-term; for example, the ability to solve arithmetic problems quickly as opposed to the ability to solve a problem in higher mathematics that might take weeks, months or years to solve

3. The abilities they measure are simple: knowing what words mean, for instance, as opposed to being able to use them in a sentence

4. They don’t measure creativity, which is much more important than what they do measure, or even could measure if they measured all they should, for the highest intellectual accomplishments. Indeed, in certain ways, they do measure it–negatively, marking creative solutions wrong that may be better than the one considered correct.

5. The answers to their questions are not necessarily the only good ones, and are sometimes not the best.

6. They do not necessarily test a person under the best conditions for that person. Fear of failure, for instance, could make a testee miss many questions he’d have no trouble with if a friend pretended he needed help answering them, for instance.

7. They are biased in favor of grinds—that is, they can be studied for, which means those taking them seriously enough can outdo others brighter than they without similar motivation.

8. They are egalitarianized—that is, they are written in accordance with the assumption that, for instance, males and females should be equally good at them instead of making each test of a subject like mathematics made to see how effective the person taking it is in that subject without consideration of what group outdoes another, or is outdone.

9. They may measure ability at tests rather than ability in the subjects involved.

10. The ones given to children fail to take into account different rates of maturation: one child may take longer to reach full intellectual maturation than another. The tests should not be age-related. Hence, someone tested at the age of fourteen, for instance, should do a lot better than he did when tests as an eight-year-old.

IQ tests give a very rough approximation of what I guess they are intended to find: a person’s likelihood of academic success. That’s because such success is based on the ability to take tests, superficial knowledge (e.g., a large vocabulary competently but trivially used versus a smaller vocabulary creatively used), an absence of creativity, academic motivation (which I hold to be different from intellectual motivation—a form of opportunism, it is: become proficient at that which pays regardless of whether or not it helps you in the search for truth), promptness.

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Sociobiology « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Sociobiology’ Category

Entry 802 — Intelligence, Biology and the Establishment

Tuesday, July 17th, 2012

Every time I write about the way biology works against a society’s best minds, do it differently.  But I keep trying to get it right.  My latest thinking posits three kinds of intelligence, Vocational Effectiveness Intelligence, Vocational Magnitude Intelligence and Creative Intelligence, all of them genetically-determined.  These are all general intelligences.  Vocational Effectiveness is approximately what IQ tests measure: the capacity to solve common problems quickly and well.  Vocational Magnitude Intelligence might be a synonym for ambition.  The higher one’s VMQ is, the larger the contribution to your culture you will try to make.  A Ninth Symphony for a composer, say, rather than a sitcom’s theme.  As for Creative Intelligence, it’s just what its name indicates, one’s ability to be innovative.    Note that I don’t say “effectively” creative.  One needs good Vocational Effectiveness Intelligence to be that.  Add good Vocational Magnitude Intelligence to those two and you get Beethoven’s symphonies and Wagner’s operas. Subtract Vocational Magnitude from it and you may get Richard Rodgers’ musicals.  A person whose VMQ and VEQ are both high, but whose CQ is average or lower, will be someone like most US presidents, or most Forbes 500 CEOs–efficient at doing what others have done before them.

To a good extent the double-high-VQs, as I call them, run most establishments, including the Contemporary Poetry Establishment, fighting for the double-high-VQs in the field with high enough CQs to be superior poets, but not high enough CQs to be otherstream poets. A few poets high in both CQ and VEQ but low in VMQ may break into certification, but only the triple-High-Qs in poetry most clever at concealing genius, or most incredibly lucky, will–less than a century after their births.

Biology is the reason for this.  Societies need double-High-VQs to fare well–by forming establishments that oversee the repetition at their most complex of those behaviors that have brought their society to where it is, and defending them.  High-VEQs and VMQs make up the establishments lower ranks.   High-CQs are valuable for enlivening things–providing slightly unconventional interior decoration for the standard architecture that result from the double-high-VQs’ leadership. Triple-Qs are  guarded against because if allowed, they could very well cause damage in one or more of the following ways–(1) propel their society too far in some significant field that not enough others could keep up with them well enough to exploit the resulting advances, so the field would be reduced to chaos, which would harmfully jar related fields and possible spread worrisomely far through a society’s entire culture; (2) simply burden many fields with more new knowledge than anyone can handle–including the triple-High-Qs themselves (each of whom could handle  his own field’s otherstream but not ten other fields’ otherstreams); (3) successful triple-High-Qs happening to have opposite world-views could lead to the most damaging of possible wars; (4) the advances wrought by triple-High-Qs might use up too many resources too quickly; (5) the success of even one triple-high-Q in a field would make the leaders of that field’s Establishment feel tenth-rate by comparison (inappropriately, because–ultimately–a society needs them as much as it needs its triple-High-Qs); (6) if Triple-High-Qs were rewarded on the basis of their achievements, they would flourish and tend to have more children than they do now, which would greatly increase the harm they did.

As should be obvious, I’m mostly just throwing together arguments against allowing Triple-High-Qs to become rich and famous.  I hope that my main point is nonetheless clear: A society’s second-best must defend it from its best . . . for enough time for the society to get where the best have gotten two or three generations before (which really isn’t that far, although it will seem so to those struggling merely to keep up with the society’s natural slow advance, and all healthy societies will advance, in spite of their Establishments).  Ways will  be found to keep the Triple-High-Qs from suicide (most of the time) becauwse while their discoveries and inventions must be defended against, the defense must eventually fail for the society involved to avoid stagnation and death.

first draft warning, first draft-warning, first-draft warning

I felt like I was writing mush at times while working on the above, but I didn’t slow down, wanting to get as many of my thoughts in as possible; I ad hocced many terms, like the various Qs, as needed.  I think what I’ve written is interesting but when greatly improved, and fit into my over-all view of cultural history and/or the psychology of cultural achievement or whatever, may well bother more than one Establishment enough for them to send a primary jeerer to attack it. I’m too beat now to start fixing it, or even to look at it.

Urp.

Note: it’s quite possible that biology forces even Triple-High-Qs to try to defend their society against them.

Oh, one last thing: the CQ depends (entirely) on accommodance, the cerebral mechanism I’ve mentioned here before; the VEQ has (most) to do with accelerance, another of my hypothetical brain mechanisms; VMQ depends (most) on charactration, or the cerebrum’s basal metabolism, the third mechanism of general intelligence I have posited for many years.  These all have to do with the body’s use of energy, so should be no more implausible than the body’s (mostly glandular) mechanisms’ role in physical activity.

Personal, possibly related, note: my attempt to get a museum interested in my mathematical poetry work seems to have failed to get even a thank you, not interested, letter; my earlier attempt to involve Charles Murray in a correspondence the kind of thing I write about above seems to have failed, too–no response; but I wrote him in care of The New Criterion, so some cretin there may have thought it not important enough to pass on to Murray, or may have simply lost it as things get lost in busy companies.  Let’s see, I also have a letter-to-the-editor of Free Inquiry I haven’t heard back about; it still could appear in the next issue, not yet out, though–or the one after it.  I do sympathize with the kind of people I send such material to, for cranks can be a nuisance and they can’t know for sure that if I’m a crank, I’m not the kind who makes a nuisance of himself.  I give up quickly.  I think my final attempt to be accepted through the servants’ entrance to an Establishment is a summary of my theory of general intelligence that I made as an Internet comment to a peer-review-level text at a Scientific American site that I haven’t had the gumption to put into final form and post.  So it goes.  But the activities of The Argotist against the poetry establishment in which I’ve become a main participant seem to be having some small effect. . . .

One last note: I’m involved, as I almost always am, in a round of the Computer strategy game, Civilization.  It’s not the undumbest pastime I can think of, but it should certainly seem less important to me than my psychological theorizing or my poetry.  I can’t swear it doesn’t, though.

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J. P. Guilford « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘J. P. Guilford’ Category

Entry 1372 — My Psychology & Guilford’s

Saturday, February 15th, 2014

Today I’ll try to make sense about Guilford’s theory of intelligence versus mine.

Guilford’s Structure of Intellect

According to Guilford’s Structure of Intellect (SI) theory (1955), an individual’s performance on intelligence tests can be traced back to the underlying mental abilities or factors of intelligence. SI theory comprises up to 150 different intellectual abilities organized along three dimensions—Operations, Content, and Products.

My theory of cerebreffectiveness, which is more or less what Guilford’s “intellect” is, also posits numerous different intellectual abilities along with what might be called three dimensions: my charactration (unless I changed its name),  accommodance and accelerance.  Are they much like Guilford’s operations, content and products?  One way they definitely are not is that my three have a single mechanism over them which I consider the g factor (which he considered his theory to reject, although I don’t think it does).

It is a mechanism I call the “cerebrexecutive” which is responsible for supervising the interaction of the three cerebral dimensions responsible for all we think and do.  To describe the process simply, the cerebrexecutive oversees the flow of cerebral energy; that determines the way the three . . . “subcerebrexecutives” interact, which in turn determines which master-cells will be activated to produce the thoughts and behavior of the individual involved at that time.  Said master-cells contribute to many operations, perhaps the same ones  Guilford hypothesized, or ones similar to them.  They are the final determinants of cerebreffectiveness.

Note: I hope to get a decent name for my three operations.  Maybe “cerebreffectors.”  Or “cerebranisms.”

Eventually, I hope to provide detailed examples of thinking and behavior that will make all this much more clear than I suspect my previous paragraph does.

Operations dimension

SI includes six operations or general intellectual processes:

  1. Cognition – The ability to understand, comprehend, discover, and become aware of information.
  2. Memory recording – The ability to encode information.
  3. Memory retention – The ability to recall information.
  4. Divergent production – The ability to generate multiple solutions to a problem; creativity.
  5. Convergent production – The ability to deduce a single solution to a problem; rule-following or problem-solving.
  6. Evaluation – The ability to judge whether or not information is accurate, consistent, or valid.

Interesting.  It seems to me my theory treats cognition, memory recording and memory retention as a single process.  For me, sensory-cells are activated by stimuli in both the external and internal environments and, in turn activate master-cells (m-cells) in the cerebrum.  This activation the individual involved experiences as perceptual information.   At the same time, certain master-cells are activated whose activation the individual experiences as “retroceptual” information (or memories).  In other words, the individual becomes aware of a given moment’s information both from the immediate environments and recalled while data is recorded.

Note: I have no explanation for the individual’s consciousness of perceived and remember data.  That the individual exists with a consciousness that acts as I describe is the ground premise of my theory.  All I can say about it is that it exists.  (If it doesn’t exist, then I call what it does do as existing.)

At the same time that the individual becomes aware of what he perceives and remembers, he automatically forms a preliminary understanding, comprehension, discovery, idea, etc., of it.  Example: When little Willie sees a black cat, his nervous system activates m-cells whose activation he understands to mean “black cat.”  His nervous system also activates m-cells whose state he understands as “Max,” the name the actual cat reminds him is its.  We could call the three fused processes “cognition,” it seems to me.  Large forms of cognition, of course, occur; they simply take longer to do so, and include chains of moments rather than a single one.  Little Willie, watching his cat, connects it to the cockroach he saw scampering across the floor a moment ago (I’m drawing on my sad experience as an impoverished super-genius here–please send me some money) and may form an enlarged understanding of the situation.

Guilford’s other three operations are more complex.  Divergent production is what happens, according to my theory, when the cerebrexecutive puts the accommodance mechanism in charge of things.  What that does I will describe elsewhere.  Here, it suffices to say, it is the brain’s way of being creative.  (It causes the brain to become disorganized enough to form the novel linkages of data that creativity requires, to put it most simply.)

As for convergent production, that occurs, according to my theory, when the cerebrexecutive puts the charactration mechanism in charge (or, more exactly, leaves it in charge since it’s the cerebrum’s default boss).  This causes the narrowed concentration needed to follow a possible solution to a problem to its conclusion.  Accelerance will generally participate in both operations.  In divergence, it helps the brain pull quickly pull in a potential solution once recognized.  In convergence it strengthens and narrows the focus to defeat distraction until the solution is arrived at.

As for “evaluation,” I consider that a part of both divergent and convergent thinking.  If one’s cerebrexecutive is a good one, it will bring accelerance and accommodance into play in such a way as judge each attempted solution to a problem.

In short, it seems to me, that my theory contains all the operations Guilford’s does, although with much different mechanisms responsible for them–and, I suspect, with their nature, interactions and effects much more deeply worked out.

Content dimension

SI includes four broad areas of information to which the human intellect applies the six operations:

  1. Figural – Concrete, real world information, tangible objects — things in the environment. It includes visual: information perceived through seeing; auditory: information perceived through hearing; and kinesthetic: information perceived through one’s own physical actions.
  2. Symbolic – Information perceived as symbols or signs that stand for something else, e.g., Arabic numerals, the letters of an alphabet, or musical and scientific notations.
  3. Semantic – Concerned with verbal meaning and ideas. Generally considered to be abstract in nature.
  4. Behavioral – Information perceived as acts of people. (This dimension was not fully researched in Guilford’s project, remains theoretical, and is generally not included in the final model that he proposed for describing human intelligence.)

Guilford’s  “content” translates readily into my theory of awarenesses.  His “figural” is the same as the content of my fundaceptual awareness, which is where all our fundamental perceptions of our inner and outer environments are recorded as they occur or are remembered.  His “symbolic” content is the content of my reducticeptual awareness.  His semantic content is in this awareness, too–in the verboceptual subawareness of the reducticeptual awareness–since it is also symbolic.  It is, in fact, a dominant region of that awareness.  Guilford’s behavioral dimension is not researched at all in my project but is definitely part of it.  But it supplies the content of an awareness with much else in it, the anthroceptual awareness, which has to do with all human acts, our own as well as those of others, and the acts of all living creatures as well (and supernatural ones, too!)

My theory also has a behavraceptual awareness, but its function is to carry out our own behavior.  Like all the awarenesses, it interacts with other awarenesses, so contributes to the anthroceptual awareness to possibly help it do some of the things one’s behavioral dimension does.  My theory covers many more kinds of content than Guilford’s does, for it has, at last count, ten major awarenesses, most of them with many sub-awarenesses.  These I will introduce later.

Product dimension

As the name suggests, this dimension contains results of applying particular operations to specific contents. The SI model includes six products, in increasing complexity:

  1. Units – Single items of knowledge.
  2. Classes – Sets of units sharing common attributes.
  3. Relations – Units linked as opposites or in associations, sequences, or analogies.
  4. Systems – Multiple relations interrelated to comprise structures or networks.
  5. Transformations – Changes, perspectives, conversions, or mutations to knowledge.
  6. Implications – Predictions, inferences, consequences, or anticipations of knowledge.

Therefore, according to Guilford there are 5 x 3 x 6 = 90 intellectual abilities or factors (his research only confirmed about three behavioral abilities, so it is generally not included in the model). Each ability stands for a particular operation in a particular content area and results in a specific product, such as Comprehension of Figural Units or Evaluation of Semantic Implications.

I’m not entirely sure just how parallel my theory is to Guilford’s idea of products.  His units suggest my knowlecules, or units of data concerning one stimulus or stimulus cluster the individual takes as a unified whole (or not, depending on the context–e.g., a horse is such a unified whole, but so is a horse’s mane, or a herd of horses.  His classes are like what I call “knowleplexes”–for data more complicated than single units, like the entire field of zoology.  I consider his other products as simply different combinations of knowlecules.

I believe my theory contains elements his does not.  I’m thinking of mechanisms for determining cerebral pain and pleasure, which contribute greatly to cerebreffectiveness.  It’s what tags thoughts as errors or acts of a Grumman.  I mean, of genius.  Also the etiologiplex (or whatever I’m calling it) which is responsible for apprehending a thing’s cause or effect and recording it, which is obviously important cerebreffectively.  Ah, and there are many instincts in my theory such as fear of snakes, recognition of human faces, vicarious sympathy, etc., that could be considered products like Guilford’s.  A set of innate personae like Jung’s, too.

Guilford’s original model was composed of 120 components (when the behavioral component is included) because he had not separated Figural Content into separate Auditory and Visual contents, nor had he separated Memory into Memory Recording and Memory Retention. When he separated Figural into Auditory and Visual contents, his model increased to 5 x 5 x 6 = 150 categories. When Guilford separated the Memory functions, his model finally increased to 180 factors.

I suspect if I carried out the same calculation with my equivalents of Guilford’s operations, content and products, I’d get a lot more categories than 150.  I think I’d have at least one more set of factors, too–at the tail end of each sequence when muscles or glands turn a cerebreffect (i.e., the final result of a cerebrexecutive command) into an action (which isn’t always the case because many sequences end in thoughts or feeling only).  At this tail end, purely physical abilities convert the cerebreffective portion of the sequence into anthreffectiveness, the success of which can be due in great part to the effectiveness of the muscles’ or glands’ contribution.  But here my concern is only with Guilford’s idea of intelligence, or intellectual ability, and mine of cerebreffectiveness.

Criticism

Various researchers have criticized the statistical techniques used by Guilford. According to Jensen (1998), Guilford’s contention that a g-factor was untenable was influenced by his observation that cognitive tests of U.S. Air Force personnel did not show correlations significantly different from zero. According to one reanalysis, this resulted from artifacts and methodological errors. Applying more robust methodologies, the correlations in Guilford’s data sets are positive.  In another reanalysis, randomly generated models were found to be as well supported as Guilford’s own theory.

My criticism is merely that Guilford never had a chance to discuss his theory with me.  I think mine does what he was trying to do.  I doubt the application of statistics to his theory or competitors of it have much chance of being of value.  Too many variables concerned.

I’m pleased I got into Guilford.  His theory suggests to me that I’m not that much of a crank.  No doubt I’m finding it more like mine than it really is.  Still, I didn’t feel like I was straining too much to reveal the possible similarities I did.  Another plus of my adventure is that I think I learned a little more about what I’m doing.  Best of all, I had fun!  Zah-goo!

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Entry 1664 — Back to Important Stuff « POETICKS

Entry 1664 — Back to Important Stuff

Today I”m back to my little third- or fourth-level theory of Intelligence.  Here are my latest thoughts on it:

(1)  I’m tentatively changing some terms: “pracsipience” to “practiceptual intelligence,” and “pracsipiceptual,” or whatever term I had for the awareness involved, to “practiceptual”; “cerebrasipience” to . . . I’m not sure.  I want “x-ceptual intelligence.”  Weird: may that’s it: “xceptual intelligence.”  Too cute?  My first thought was was “metapracticeptual intelligence.”  I love the German “hohen,” for “high,” but am not so sure “hohenceptual” would work.  It’s exactly right in meaning conveyed, but . . . I think I’ll leave the matter hanging for now.

Note to Marton: I’m claiming scholar’s use for my use of the ellipsis, so will not be sending you a royalty for use of it.

(2) Could the x-ceptual awareness be the first home of theology?  I distinguish “theology: from “religion.”  At the moment, I think of religion as the practiceptual worship of gods, and belief in various superstitions.  Theology is an attempt to work up a philosophy (or, better, metaphysics) of religion—to explain Jehovah, for instance.  Theology, in working almost entirely with abstract (really, imaginary) entities would seem surely to be a kind of practiceptual undergoing—“metaverosophy,” verosophy dealing rationally with entities one can perceive, metaverosophy dealing with all entities we are capable of thinking of, real and imaginary.

Digression: is there a difference between the imagined and any other kind of unreal entity?  I tend to think not, but the closer an imaginary entity is to something real, the more plausible it becomes: God as a man who is hiding rather than beyond human perception is about as plausible as an imaginary entity can be, it seems to me.  Or as a computer.

I can go along with the idea of the non-practiceptual awareness being caused, in part or wholly, by the need for a theology.  The need for meta-arithmetic would likely be a greater cause, however.

(3) Might the non-practiceptual awareness be a place to escape perceptual overload for many?  For our girl Emily, for sure.  But for me, too.  Which makes me think how my present ideas could make a psychotherapy book, and be useful: how to use your x-ceptual awareness to save your mind!  Or show it as a kind of East Indian practice—which it is, to a degree.

That makes me wonder if I need to divide my x-ceptual awareness in two, one division involved only with . . . reality, the other with both reality, since it’s impossible fully to escape it, and the imaginary.  Maybe call the first simply “Western x-ceptuality,” and the second “Eastern x-ceptuality,” each name being a derogatory epithet to a good number of people.

(4) The relationship of music to my new two awarenesses of the first rank is an interesting problem.  Music is both highly abstract and highly concrete.  The dance would be practiceptual: choreography above it.

I find I need a term for our over-all system of awarenesses.  Perhaps, “supraceptual awareness?” That which contains the practiceptual awareness and its sibling, with portions of (so far) ten major awareness shared or separately under those two?  One of the ten is the one I call the “compreceptual awareness”; so far I haven’t worked out a good definition of it but provisionally consider it always active, and the repository of a general overall picture of everything a person is experiencing during a given instacon, both his perception of the inner and outer environments, and his retroception of past experience.  The supraceptual awareness, whoever, is just a name: it has nothing in it except . . . all the other awareness and sub-awarenesses.

Back to the dance.  It must be the most practiceptual of the arts since it requires a continuing sense of what one’s muscles are doing.  But the abstract patterning that choreographical creativity becomes involved with would require the higher awareness.  Similarly music ascends out of simple practiceptual art into higher art as patterning takes over from simple instinctual love of basic sounds and rhythms.  I think its ascent is faster than dance’s.

(5) I find this scheme of two awarenesses of the first rank (under the supraceptual awareness) to support much of my musings on verosophy and the arts versus survival, and all the other practiceptual activities I’ve previously listed, who knows where.  Not surprisingly, it confirms many of my cultural prejudices such as my belief that visimagery (visual art) only became an art with the advent of non-representational painting, before that being a craft, albeit sometimes becoming more in the hands of its most gifted practitioners.  I see only non-representational visimagery as post-practiceptual.  Color and shape, of course, remain for it as important as sounds and rhythms are in music, but patterns, within compositions and intercompositionally (the way paintings and sculptures interact with other paintings and sculpture, and musical compositions interact with other musical compositions—by the artist involved himself, or by other artists, become much more important.

(6) Maybe “systeceptual awareness” may be a good term for the higher awareness, some relatively complex system (importantly) underlying everything that goes on in it.  The trouble is that some practiceptual activities are systematic, albeit only tactically so.  So, maybe “stratisysteceptual?”  Just kiddink.  I guess I now have two entities to name.

I can’t remember any more of my ideas, but know there were scores, all terrific.  So this entry is about done.  I may have gone about as far as I can with this topic: four entries and a little under three thousand words.  Not much, and it includes a lot of digressions like this.  It may be a good very rough start to the full presentation of my knowlecular psychology I’ve always hoped to compose.

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Old Age « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Old Age’ Category

Entry 1220 — Old Age, Part 3

Saturday, September 21st, 2013

Now to my thesis that we oldsters can no long fit knowleplexes larger than a certain not-very-large size into our brains—because of the size and complexity of the structures we’ve already erected in them.  I have a simple analogy to explain it: one’s understanding of existence as a little city in the cerebrum that one’s brain has spent its lifetime building.  Everything in it is basically as permanent as city buildings; repairs are made, unmendable damage occurs, but basically, little changes.  Eventually, there is no longer any place to erect anything new of significant size.  I suppose one could demolish some old building to make room, but I think that would be more difficult than destroying a city building is.

At some point, one starts to have trouble figuring out where to put new data.  A consideration is keeping track of important old understandings.  Result: a more and more great disinclination to read anything with new data in it.

I’ve scratched the surface of my ideas on this–without sating them too carefully.  Old age making me too tired to?  Old age making it hard for me to find the words and ideas I need?  Both?

One thing I particular delayed me: my wanting to use my terms for various kinds of data.  I was sure I had tree terms, but could not remember the third, and find any list tat had it.  The two that are, right now, second-nature enough for me not easily to forget (although I have always been able to forget just about anything) “knowlecule” or word-sized datum like “hoof” or “horse”; and “knowleplex” or complex specialty like zoology–the discipline, not the word for it.  Both knowlecules and knowleplexes come in various sizes.  In many cases, it’s not easy to say which a given datum is.  Many, too, are both: the game of baseball, for instance, is a knowlecule for a doctor specializing in sports injuries; but a knowleplex for a baseball manager.

I’d been wondering about my third conage for several days.  It finally occurred to me a little while ago (it’s a little after four as I write this, in case anyone cares–as a scholar in the next century plotting my creative cycles may): “knowlexpanse” or a significantly large field like biology.  I think somewhere I coined a word for world-view, too, and lost it.  Or maybe accepted “world-view” as good enough.

I’m stopping now–as I seldom would have with so little written forty, or even just twenty, years ago.

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Entry 1219 — Old Age, Part 2

Friday, September 20th, 2013

When I reached my intellectual prime is near-impossible to pin down, but my favorite guess—mainly, I suspect, because it’s a standardly Interesting Number, is the age of fifty.  One thing that makes the choice near-impossible is how to compare one’s breakthrough understanding of his subject (or, in my case, one of them) with his later, very gradual efforts to make that understanding full, coherent, and—perhaps most important, and definitely most difficult—accessible to others.

I came up with the basis, still unchanged except superficially, of my knowlecular psychology at the age of 26 and don’t feel I’ve yet made it full, coherent and accessible, although I’ve had many breakthroughs that (in my view, valuably) expanded it, and continuously simplified and clarified it—while simultaneously, alas, complicating and muddying it.

My peak as a poet is much easier to identify, although I’m uncertain of the exact dates involved.1

My major breakthrough into long division poetry (after a minor breakthrough into mathematical poetry twenty years or so previous that I didn’t go anywhere with for fifteen years or more) happened when I was around fifty-five; my much less consequential breakthrough into my Poem poems occurred at about the same time.  Two definite peaks that all that nothing that followed reached although I am sure some of the poems I later made were my best till then.  I contend that making one’s best poem does not require more or even as much, intelligence, talent, or whatever, as making one’s first successful poem that is significantly and valuably different from all the other poems one has composed.  In fact, coming up with a bad poem may require more skill than making a very good one if the bad one is new in a wonderfully exploitable way.2

In short, I think I peaked as a poet at the age of 55, then held my own pretty much until recently, when I’ve become substantially less productive than I’d been between 55 and 70.  I don’t think the level of my poems has dropped, just the number of them.  An interesting possibility is that I may still compose the visiopoetic epic I’ve wanted someday to.  What kind of peak would it be?  It would probably be my major work as a poet.  I’m pretty sure it would include several poems I already consider major—for me.  But the intelligence and/or related abilities I’d need to bring it off would not need to be at the high level they once were, or even all that close to it.

I realize that I’ve not done much work on my psychology since I turned 70 or 71, either.  I want to pull it together into a unified whole the same way I hope to pull together my poetry into a unified epic.  Again, it would not take what its discovery and later additions and improvements did.

I don’t know of any thinker or artist who did anything after turning 70 or so that greatly changed the over-all value of his work as a whole.  Picasso, for instance, turning out hundreds of works, some of them as fine as anything he’d previously done, but meaning he’d made 654 masterpieces instead of only 611: so what?  We don’t really need them, happy as we should be to have them.  (For one thing, others are carrying on from where he left off—something true of all the other great artists, and thinkers who went on to do valuable work after 70.)

In every other way, people over 70 are nothing like they were at 35 or even 55.  For most jobs, a businessman would be stupid to hire someone that old instead of a much younger person.  Affirmative action will no doubt soon force him to.  As a matter of fact, I think there have been several cases of elderly farts successfully suing businesses that fired them.

Odd, the idea I had that sparked this discussion I almost left the discussion without mentioning.  It concerns the inability of elderly farts to acquire data significantly new to them.  In simplest terms, it concerns how these people stop reading complex books.  I was thinking of myself, of how it’s been, what, twenty years, since I read the equivalent of an undergraduate textbook on anything?!  My thesis, which I hope to get to tomorrow, is that we oldsters can no long fit knowleplexes larger than a certain not-very-large size into our brains—because of the size and complexity of the structures we’ve already erected in them.

* * *

1 I believe my diary has the particulars, or most of them, but I’m certainly not going to research it right now

 2 As Gertrude Stein’s specimens of prose (evocature, a sub-category of prose, is what I call the kind of literature they are) in Tender Buttons have been for many, albeit not her (although I would call a few of them more successful than not).

Egalapsychosis: the insane belief that no one is inferior in any way to anyone else.  A mental dysfunctionality common to American liberals.

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Entry 1218 — My Ageism

Thursday, September 19th, 2013

About the only good thing about being as old as I am is that it gives me a group to be politically incorrect about because I’m in it.  The group, of course, is . . . senior citizens.  I contend that anyone who thinks senior citizens are not inferior to those younger than they is out of his mind.  I do believe that an elderly fart–someone over fifty-five (plus or minus anywhere from one to ten years)–should have one advantage over his juniors, including himself when younger: his experience.  He will exploit it more slowly than he once was able to, but possibly get more out of it–or at least something valuably new out of it.

* * *

I’m afraid that’s all for now.  I had a meeting of my local writers’ group to go to and when I got back, I was shot.

Note: I had this one done on time but forgot to make it pubic.

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Entry 1217 — Old Age

Wednesday, September 18th, 2013

After typing the beginning of a short essay on my ageism, I found out I had suddenly gotten a day behind here.  So I needed to do two entries.  I decided the one for yesterday would be brief, and about old age since I’d already put it in that category.  Ergo, my opinion about being old: it stinks.  More about it in my entry for today.

As for the 18th of September, I did get something done on it: my latest Scientific American blog entry, although it won’t posted until Saturday, or maybe late Friday night.  I also worked on multiplication poems for dogs, one for my dentist and one for a local writer-friend.  I had silly ideas for a while that I could make money selling personalized copies of the thing, but soon realized there was no chance of that–although I hope to try it.

Okay, now to try to get today’s entry done, in spite of being already all worn out.

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Entry 1660 — “Pracsipience” « POETICKS

Entry 1660 — “Pracsipience”

I’ve been thinking about a new way of thinking about anthreffec-tiveness, or an individual’s over-all intelligence.  It’s new for me, but I suspect it may be close to most person’s idea of it.  Anyway, it’s just a different way of sorting them for me.  But I’m wondering if it may have a neurophysiological basis in the existence of a cerebral basement.  I like the idea so will stick a “Pracsipiceptual Awareness” into my model of the cerebrum that is be responsible for all of an individual’s “pracsipience,” or practical, day-to-day cerebreffectiveness (“cerebreffectiveness,” remember, being my word for exclusively cerebral anthreffectiveness, which is an individual’s entire effectiveness).

Frankly, I haven’t figured out how it would work.  Its mission would be to guiding an individual to maximally effective choices in his day-to-day tactical activities.  Making a living, keeping house, marketing, bringing up children, etc.  Not writing poetry or music, and designing bridges, etc.  Not, that is, strategic cerebreffectiveness, although a person using his pracsipience will often also being using his . . . cerebracip-ience, or what he needs from his mental equipment to go beyond day-to-day living into the arts, verosophy or the other higher human activities, if there are any (right now my mind’s a blank about them).

I now have divided the cerebrum into two sections: the pracsipiceptual awareness and the cerebrasipiceptual awareness.  I think of them as one under the other like the cerebellum under the cerebrum, but suspect each is all over the place.  My need now is to find a way for only certain “day-to-day date,” whatever that might be, to get into the pracsipiceptual awareness, and higher data into the cerebrasipiceptual awareness.  With the former passing on anything that might be useful to the higher awareness to it?

The only thing so far clear to me is that all the awarenesses would be involved with both these two new awarenesses.  I must think more on it.

My first interest, though, is in sorting an individual’s intelligences or competences in his pracsipience . . . and the minor and major talents  i believe just about everyone has, like the ability to sing or play bridge well on up to the ability to make large-scale scientific discoveries or novels that his cerebrasipiceptual awareness oversees.  All I’m saying to this point is that each individual has a pracsipience and talents, which I think is a standard way of looking at a person’s mental equipment: intelligence, and talents.  Although the word, “intelligence,” is used (in my view) confusingly too often to mean only ability at academics or the like.

My guess is that a good 60% of us are pracsipient, or effective in our day-to-day lives.  Another 20% are just adequately effective in our daily lives, most of them about as pracsipient as most people except for some condition that keeps them always or occasionally . . .  stupid: alcoholism, for instance, or rigidnikry (i.e., what I call a theoretical mental dysfunction that makes a person excessively inflexible of mind and cerebraffectively flawed in a number of other related ways) or poor eyesight, etc. . . . or, interesting, excessive cerebrasipience!

A further guess of mine is that only 10% of us (not me!) are an order of magnitude more pracsipient than the average 60%, and another 10% an order of magnitude (or more, in the case of the truly mentally handicapped) less pracsipient than the just adequately pracsipient.

What I’m doing, it seems to me, is explaining to myself the fact that I find almost every one to be “intelligent” (every bit as “intelligent” as I), 80%, in fact, if I count the 20% whose basically effective pracsipience is flawed).  I’m also trying to explain the not too common people I know or have known who seem to me gifted in . . . simply, living (but never, so far as I know, having the highest kind of cerebrasipience, genius).  but not too many.  Finally, I’m hypothesizing that I am right in assuming that what I call pracsipience does not really vary much.  Except for those with extreme inborn defects, or who have suffered horrendous damage to the wrong organs, we’re all about as much the same in this characteristic as we are in . . . the ability to eat.  Exaggeration–to give my drift.

Now, genius is the one talent that very few have, if you define it to mean something as special as I do.  One in a million?  Perhaps, although that would mean the USA has over 300 geniuses in it, and my sense is that we have quite a bit less: my friends–ME, needless to say–and what?  maybe fourteen or fifteen others.  Seriousfully, 300 may be right.  But just a few would be have a genius an order of magnitude greater than the best of the others.  The only American genius I’m even sorta sure is one, is Murray Gell-Mann; but I don’t understand advance theoretical physics or–and this is important–am not an expert in its history; therefore, I can’t evaluate the importance or originality (this latter being what I need to be an expert in the history of recent physics to determine) of what he’s done.  All I can say is that he is definitely a minor genius, at least–a “minor genius” as opposed to a major one being most of thus in my genius class.

I feel certain intuitively that America has a few Beethovens although I’m not sure who they are.  Nobody in America since Pollock  doing visimagery (i.e., visual art) exclusively is for me a Pollock–but my opinion is next to worthless because I don’t know very much about what’s going on in either art–and the media certainly isn’t any help.

To finish up, the one firm belief I’m considering holding until new data invalidates it is that most everyone is intelligent and talented, which means they have both pracsipience and cerbrasipience (although, as I didn’t mention, some vary a lot in number of talents as well as quality of one or more talents), but very few have a talent I would call genius, and almost none a talent I would call major genius.

It occurs to me that intelligence may be my favorite subject to pronounce and blither about, I guess because the world I grew up in seemed to me to make more of it than of anything else.  Ultimately it has to be–by my definition, which is “that which accounts for a person’s full lifetime effectiveness as a human being.”  But the “intelligence” made so much of by the world in general is only a small part of that.

In any case, no doubt whatever intelligence is, I have a need to know it well so I can rate myself.  But I also think I have simply been drawn to its study out of an innate proclivity to understand myself and others.  That’s impossible without getting significantly into a study of whatever intelligence is.

I hope to say more about the loose ends in what I’ve said here.  I hope also, as I always do, that a few people will read this with interest.  I’d love to get feedback, but don’t expect any.
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theoretical psychology « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘theoretical psychology’ Category

Entry 1389 — “Cerebrogovernance”

Tuesday, March 4th, 2014

Yeah, another coinage, this one finishing off my full definition of the “G-factor” (or, in my psychology, general cerebreffectiveness component–or full-scale intelligence as opposed to what most credentialed psychologists consider it) as a combination of four cerebral mechanisms: charactration, accommodance, accelerance and–now–cerebrogovernance.  Mechanism in charge of basal cerebral energy level; mechanism in charge of reducing cerebral energy level; mechanism in charge of increasing cerebral energy; and supervisory mechanism in charge of directing cerebral energy (which is effectually the same as directing attention) to and from various awarenesses (or areas of the cerebrum such as the auditory or verbal awarenesses–e.g., the cerebrogovernance might turn off all the awarenesses of a person silently reading except his verbal awaresness and verbal/visual and verbal auditory association areas, then switch him out of all three to his auditory awareness if someone suddenly screams his name).

I think of cerebrogovernance as “little g” and all four cerebreffective mechanisms “big G.”  All the major awarenesses are “big S’s” (for big specific “intelligences”), and their many sub-awarenesses (e.g., the reducticeptual awareness’s matheceptual and linguaceptual sub-awarenesses) are “little s’s.”

I’m gearing up for a Major little essay on my theory of cerebreffective- ness.  But, first I have to finish the first blog entry to the continuation of my Scientific American blog.  I’ve almost finished it, honest, but I keep finding spots to repair, delete or expand, and seem to be avoid what I believe is the thing’s final section (where I went off on a tangent about tragedy, then realized what I had to say about it was too confuse to try to add to my entry).

Meanwhile, I had my cystoscopy.  It went very well, but my problem turned out to be due to a bladder stone the doctor couldn’t removed for some reason so I’ll have to go back next Monday for, I guess, a similar procedure to remove it.  Will find out more Thursday.  Meanwhile, I’ll have to endure another week of sometimes painful difficulty urinating.  Right now I’m in a good mood, though–even though I’m not on hydrocodone.

Speaking of that, I just read in the paper that I’m a hydrocodone-abuser because I sometimes take “just to feel better”–instead, apparently, for a headache back-ache or the like that other pain remedies don’t do much for, which is what my hydrocodone was prescribed for.  It’s so stupid.  A person semi-incapacitated because of a headache should be given a pill but a person unable to do anything that will give his life meaning because he’s in the kind of null zone I get into at times should not be given a pill–unless, I gather, worse off than I am.

My doctor can no longer prescribe the dosage of Hydrocodone he used to, so my latest prescription from him is for half the dosage.  A little silly, since it only means I have to take two pills instead of one to get the effect one was giving me.  I’m going to see how the half-dosage works, though.  I suspect I don’t really need any dosage; I think I only need the caffeine pills.  But who knows, I may end up seeing a shrink to get genuine anti-depressive pills, legitimately.

Of course, the thing that most disgusts me is that I’m not allowed to buy the pills from anyone who wants to sell them to me without a prescription, and take them as I see fit, on the grounds that I should make all final decisions about my body.  Which, of course, could include my decision to put one of my doctors in charge of my thyroid gland, for instance, as I’ve done.

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Entry 1176 — Natural and Learned Concepts

Thursday, August 8th, 2013

A few days ago while discussing conceptual poetry, which seems to be attracting a lot of attention amongst poetry people, I got mired in confusion: I realized I didn’t know what I was taking about.  This morning  (no, yesterday morning since I’m writing this a day in advance) I suddenly felt I did, so wrote the following to New-Poetry:

I think I’ve solved my question about what Grumman was trying to put into words.  It is that there are two kinds of concepts, those we perceive “naturally” the way we perceive the color red, and those we learn, which are more complex and ordinarily the only mental objects considered to be concepts (so far as I know).  I realized this while thinking about numbers.  The number one is a natural concept, I claim, because–I claim–one perceives a thing’s “oneness”  the same way one perceives a thing’s redness.  Thinking about it further, I decided that what we experience (due to a simple innate brain counting mechanism) is “absence of duplication.”  The mechanism consists of a storage chamber holding everything a person has seen (I’m considering the visual only for simplicity’s sake) over the past minute or so; and matching chamber with a slot for the object being tested for “oneness” and a slot into which each of the things in the storage chamber are inserted.  The matching chamber has a second compartment where one image overlaps the other and differences and samenesses are counted and a percentage arrived at that indicates match or non-match.

If nothing matches, the object being tested gets a one.  One match gives it a two.  Beyond that, who knows, but I’m sure four or five matches give the object a many.  Words labeling each of these, like “one,” “alone,” “unique,” “twin,” etc.  Larger numbers are learned.  Five dots gets a many from the counting mechanism–but eventually is learned as a hand of fingers or the like, which is reduced to the word, “five.”

I believe more complex mathematical mechanisms may have evolved, but haven’t thought any out.  I can’t believe I’m saying anything very wrong or new.  But I work from introversion almost entirely–being too lazy for research and related work.

So, to get to POETRY, I suppose it doesn’t matter whether a conceptual poem’s concept/s is/are natural or learned.  But I think all concepts are natural at the core.

Boy, I wish I were 25–and able to focus on ONE area of investigation the way Darwin did!  This would be a good such area to spend a life on.

Note: in knowlecular psychology, natural concepts are termed “urceptual concepts.”
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Entry 711 — A Visit With Paul Crowley

Tuesday, April 10th, 2012

For anyone coming here who doesn’t realize I’m a lunatic, I thought I’d give you a look at my latest post to HLAS.  In it I argue about what intelligence is with Paul Crowley.  No, what I’m now trying to do is get him to agree that such a thing exists.  I believe you will find him unbelievably out of it.  I often believe him to be a computer program designed to see how rational people interact with the completely irrational.  Or perhaps just for the fun of seeing me make a fool of myself trying to refute someone too dense to be refuted.  In any case, I believe my participation in discussions with Paul Crowley (which have been going on for around fifteen years) are near-proof that I am a lunatic.  But there is method in my madness, heheheheheh.  I am the foremost explorer of irrationality in the world, you see!  I’m not out to defeat this boob, but to spark manifestations of every conceivable insanity out of him so that I may list them as a lepidopterist collects butterflies for display!

On Apr 9, 11:48 am, Paul Crowley wrote:

> n 07/04/2012 00:09, Bob Grumman wrote:

> > And if you really think no one discusses intelligence,
> > and who is intelligent, who not, and what precisely it
> > is, and so forth, you’re–why, you’re Paul Crowley.

> The world is much more than the acquaintances
> of Bob Grumman. No one, outside of those born
> in the 20th century in a modern western scientistic
> culture discusses ‘intelligence’ in a manner that
> is remotely similar. To all other societies and
> cultures, the concept is either quite alien or
> utterly strange.

> >>> Is there a necessity to postulate an entity that allows
> >>> us to see–which I would call “sight?”
> >> Certainly not. People and other creatures see.
> >> That is enough.

> > Where did the word, “sight,” come from? (Truly,
> > you’re at your finest here, Paul–I’m sure I’ve never
> > tried to answer such incredibly stupid opinions
> > before.)

> It is convenient, in the English language (and
> in some other languages), to sometimes use
> abstract nouns. I’d advise you not to let that
> fact fool you into believing that such things
> have a real existence — but you are already
> hopelessly lost in a world of fantasy.

> > Ophthamologists should not be concerned with
> > some entity that allows people to see?

> There is no such entity.

What are the eyes?

> >> There is nothing to define. There is nothing
> >> that can be defined. It’s classic case of the
> >> Emperor’s new clothes.

> > Right. There is no such thing as intelligence
> > because there is no such thing as intelligence.

> Sorry, but pointing at the nakedness of the
> Emperor is enough to demonstrate that he
> has no clothes. It’s up to those claiming that
> he really has clothes to demonstrate that fact.
> For example, they could put him on a
> weighing scales and show that he weighed
> more with them on than with some off.
> You can’t off course. The clothing (i.e. here
> ‘intelligence’) exists because you want it to
> exist, so it must exist. You can’t imagine a
> world without it, but you have no conception
> as to how you’d prove or disprove its
> existence.

[note: amazing how much cranks love the dead metaphor of the emperor’s new clothes.]

> >>> And now I’m to what I thought I’d write about just
> >>> now: how we should tackle what I want to tackle,
> >>> which is to determine if each of us possesses a
> >>> mechanism I would call “intelligence” that allows
> >>> us effectively to interact with the environment–
> >>> biologically, I mean: i.e., in such a way as to
> >>> keep us alive and comfortable.

> >> No one in the real world asks such a question.
> >> It’s entirely fake.

[note: one of the most comic of Paul’s traits is his inability to avoid using “no one” and “entirely” and the like every chance he gets. If really pushed on the practice, he will call me too literal-minded to accept that he “really” means “the probability against anyone’s acting in such a way is astronomical,” of the like. But it’s clear he truly means what he says. As a rigidnik, he can’t accept not being 100% on the right side of any significant question.]

> > Yet I have reference books that define the term, and
> > books about it.

> If you had any historical perspective you would
> know that throughout history nearly all libraries
> consisted of books that were nearly all
> worthless junk. Those of the 20th century
> must be by far the worst in this respect, with
> Pssyycholistic and other pseudo-scientific
> ‘works’ being manifestly mindless junk from
> the moment they were published.

“Nearly all worthless junk.” Absolutely incredibly obtuse statement. Since I have something called intelligence, I know that to the contrary no book ever created was worthless junk. Many books about intelligence seem to me not to have very effectively advanced the search for truth regarding it, but the possibility that any of them was discussing something non-existent is ludicrous. But I’ll keep playing this insane game you have me in, the goal of which is to nail you in a contradiction no sane person can deny–although you will.

Here’s a starting question:  What did Shake-speare have that I do not have that was responsible for his creation of plays vastly superior to the ones I’ve written?

> >> You are talking about a nothing.

> > I am speaking of a physical mechanism humans
> > have that allow for problem solving.

> Nope. You are missing every point that can
> be missed. As an analogy, let’s say you
> are explaining to some young person how
> important the New York Times was in the
> 20th century, and what it was like. But, at best
> — and you are even a long way from that — you
> would be saying what kind of ink was used for
> its printing, and where they got the paper.

> >> There is no entity which “allows us to solve
> >> problems”. We either solve them or we don’t.
> >> We either walk or we don’t.

> > Ah, so my legs have nothing to do with my ability to
> > walk?

> How do you come to this conclusion?
> You need a lot of things to be able to walk,
> and working legs are one of them. Being
> able to balance is another. Having a fair
> amount of practice around the ages of one
> or two is another. Having nerve connections
> in the lower spine is another. And so on
> and on

So anything that’s complicated does not exist? What happens to allow a car to move is complicated: does it therefore not have the ability to move?

> Possessing an entity called ‘walking ability’
> does not figure in mind (or the books) of any
> physiotherapist or doctor or other specialist
> in the field. It would only be imagined by some
> specialist in Pssyychologostical bull-shit.

Wouldn’t a physiotherapist investigate certain physical mechanisms and not others? Would he give a person having trouble walking a color discrimination test?

> >> We either eat or
> >> we don’t. You can talk about whole ranges
> >> of pre-conditions that “allow us” to eat, or
> >> walk, or solve problems; for example, being
> >> fit and healthy helps. But none of these pre-
> >> conditions have some over-riding power.
> >> [..]

> > All you’re saying is that intelligence is a mechanism
> > has many constituents.

> NO, I am not. I am saying it is far less useful
> an idea than ‘walking ability’ would be to a
> paediatrician or a doctor in a hospital for foot
> or leg amputees.

I had a bad hip, Paul. It was operated on last June. After the operation I could walk, but not well. All the doctors and nurses and therapists I was involved in were concerned with my ABILITY TO WALK, not with whether it was there or not there as  a lunatic like you apparently would, but whether or not I had an EFFECTIVE ABILITY TO WALK. Certain muscles needed exercise for me to fully to recover THE ABILITY TO WALK. I soon had that ability again, but not a reasonably good ABILITY TO RUN, which they next worked on, and that is nearly back, as well.

> >> There is NO ability. Giving a name to a nothing
> >> and then defining it is (I fully agree) the raison

> >> d’etre of Pssyychologism.

> > Can a normal person solve some problems? If so,
> > what does he possess that allows him to do that?
> > Nothing?

> Take a relatively simple concept like ‘walking’

I can walk because I have legs and a brain that directs those legs.

> or ‘left-handedness’, and ask the same kind
> of question. You will (hopefully) then see that
> such a question is absurd or close to absurd,
> and that it has no reasonable answer.  THEN
> you might realise that to imagine you have a
> meaningful question as regards ‘intelligence’
> is only to fool yourself.

As far as I can make out, you are claiming that there is no such thing as an ability. Or that abilities exist but nothing physical causes them to be manifested.

> >> Not the supernatural. We are what we see we
> >> are. There is no point in trying to pretend that
> >> we are explicable in terms of electrical signals
> >> or whatever. You could say that today’s New
> >> York Times is just a combination of paper and
> >> ink. But to reduce it to ‘paper and ink’ misses
> >> its entire nature, and to respond in the wrong
> >> dimension. You are (somehow) thinking you can
> >> do something similar with human beings and
> >> their brains — reduce them all to bio-electrical
> >> bits and signals. You are simply missing the
> >> point.

Block the bio-electrical bits and signals to the cerebrum and the person involved will have no ability to solve problems. Doesn’t that tell you something, Paul?

> > If it is not bio-electrical bits and signals, and not
> > supernatural, what is it?

> It’s the hopeless inapplicability of your
> reductionist approach to anything human.

Seriously, Paul, have you had a relapse? You seem at least one order
of magnitude more insane than ever before.

–Bob

Few people visit HLAS nowadays, for Paul and I dominate it and there are few who are willing to wade through our exchanges.  I think they are very funny, some of my inept attempts against Paul being close to as funny as his almost-always bizarre irrationalities.  The very few who have commented on Paul or I lump us together.  No one yet has ventured to take sides in this particular thread (or the two or three other threads the discussion has also been going on in).  So I would appreciate it if someone would be good enough to reassure me that it is not absurd to believe that human beings possess a mechanism it makes sense to call intelligence that, among other things, allows them to solve problems (or try to).  I’m curious, too, if anyone finds Paul as hilarious as I do.  Sometimes I think there may be less that a thousand people in the whole world who love the ravings of nuts as much as I.  And, as I’ve said more than once, I empathize with nuts, knowing full well that I may be one myself.  Although I am convinced I am leagues less a nut than Paul Crowley is.  (I’ve tried to find out who he is in the real world and gotten nowhere, by the way; he refuses to disclose anything at all about himself–amusingly, I find it hard not to disclose everything about myself.)

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Entry 232 — New Knowlecular Terminology!!!

Saturday, September 25th, 2010

After so many near-worthless entries, at last a really really exciting one!  A very lame school marm type at HLAS, one of my Shakespeare Authorship “Question” sites, got me thinking about rigidniplexes.  They are fixational systems rigidniks form that are the basis of the authorship theories of the most dedicated and rigidly doctrinaire anti-Stratfordians.  One of their main functions is defending the rigidnik against non-conformity.   I had always thought of them as necessarily irrational.

But it seemed to me  the school marm, Mark Houlsby (which may be a pseudonym), has one,   because of  the way he constantly gets after people for rude remarks, going off-topic, and disregard of what he thinks is grammatical correctness, as well as any view he disagrees with, which are mostly non-conformist views.   Yet Houlsby is not an anti-Stratfordian nor does he  seem any more irrational than every normal person is, just set in his narrow ways.  So, I decided there are two basic kinds of rigidniplexes, “hyperrigidniplexes” and “hyporigidniplexes,” the first being highly irrational, the second not particularly irrational.

Actually, I’ve always believed in more than one kind of rigidniplex, but I hadn’t come up with names for them I liked, and my definitions of them were vague.    Now I think I’ll call the most rigidnikal of rigidniplexes, the ones suffered by genuine psychotics, “ultrarigidniplexes.”  Such rigidniplexes are either not “sensibly” irrational, the way hyperrigidniplexes are, or are based on unreality rather than the irrational, although they are no doubt irrational as well.  For instance, an ultrarigidnik may believe unreal aliens from another dimension are after him whereas a mere hyperrigidnik will only believe, say, that no one whose parents are illiterate can become a great writer, which is idiotic but but is merely a misinterpretation of reality, wholly irrational, but not drawing on pure fantasy.

There are probably two levels of hyporigidniks–no, make that three.  Managerial hyporigidniks are the most successful rigidniks, common in the officer corps of the military, and on corporation boards, and, of course, running federal bureaucracies, or universities.  Rigidnikal enough to dominate third-raters, and hold unimaginatively to a course that has proved effective in the past, and rally others at their level, along with the masses, against non-conformity, which will include a country’s culturateurs.  Such hyporigidniks are the great defenders of mediocrity.  And here’s where this entry becomes on-topic for a blog called “Poeticks,” for among the great defenders of mediocrity are the people selecting prize- and grants-winners in poetry, and which contemporaries’ poetry should be taught, published and made the subject of widely-circulated critical essays or books.

A level below the managerial hyporigidniks are the marmly hyporigidniks.  Only slightly above-average in charactration, or basal mental energy, below average in accommodance, the engine of flexibility, imagination, creativity, but with possibly slightly above average accelerance, or the ability to raise their mental energy when appropriate.  So, not in managerial hyporigidniks’ league, but able to construct rigidniplexeses about trivialities like table manners, spelling, etc., and lord it over milyoops.  And, in poetry, repeat the opinions of the Establishment.

Managerial hyporigidniks, I should have said, are higher in charactration than lesser hyporigidniks.  Indeed, each level of rigidniks has more charactration, and less accommodance–and smaller but more life-consuming rigidniplexes.  The lowest-level hyporigidniks have average charactration and accommodance, and variable but never inordinately high accelerance.   Peasant hyporigidniks, I call them: they form rigidniplexes that are little more than habits sensible for their position in life, and aren’t so much locked into them as too unimaginative to try anything else.

In the past, I’ve often hypothesized a kind of “pararigidniplex”–a rigidniplex formed by freewenders, who are the sanest, most intelligent people.   I now have a new name for it: “wendrijniplex.”  It’s like any other rigidniplex except for its origin, which is not caused by a person’s chronically having too much charactration and too little accommodance, but by a freewender’s having in a single instance, too much charactration and too little accommodance, his enthusiasm for a discovery of his over-riding his critical sense, and his continued pleasure in the rigidniplex it brings into being, being too great for him to break ties with it.  So it blights his intellectual existence every bit as unfortunately as a rigidnik’s rigidniplex blights his.

To be thorough, I will remind my readers (including myself) that everyone forms knowleplexes, which are mental constructs each of which provides an inter-related understanding of some fairly large subject like biology, for a layman, or the biology of mammals, or of one species of mammals, for a biologist.  A rational (although not necessarily valid) knowleplex is a “verosoplex.”  Offhand, I would say there are two kinds of irrational knowleplexes: rigidniplexes and–another new term coming up–“ignosoplex,” or a knowleplex which is basically too incoherent to be classified as either rational or irrational.  It’s the result of ignorance.  We all have many of them, each concerning a field we are “ignosophers” about–not completely ignorant of, but not sufficiently knowledgeable about to be able to form a verosoplex–or any kind of working rigidniplex.

I’m well aware that most readers will find the above the product of an ignosopher.  It isn’t.  It’s just a pop-psychology–level very rough draft of one small knowleplex the among many making up my knowleplex of temperament, which in turn is a small knowleplex among the many making up my theory of intelligence, which is just a small portion of my theory of epistemology, which is a not-small portion of my theory of the human psychology.  Or so I keep telling myself.

Entry 218 — Evolution of Intelligence, Part 4

Saturday, September 11th, 2010

Sensors are  at first sensitive to only one stimulus.  If the sensitivity helped its cell, it would be retained by the species; if not it would be not be retained.  Eventually, sensors would become potentially sensitive to more and more stimuli, to hurry the process of finding effective sensitivities.  Sensors always sensitive to a wide vairety of stimuli would not be effective until they were able to limit their sensitivity to the first stimulus they are exposed to.  This would also keep the cell up-to-date–no longer would they automatically have sensitivities to other species that had become extinct or to matter in an enivronment no longer present.

Okay, now comes the detachment of such sensors before being sensitized to given stimuli.  They might not be able to admit neuro-signals then, in which case they would be innocuous accidental superfluous intruders that could well persist–until they became sensitive to neuro-signals.  At that point, they would become “sensor-sensors.”

Once able to become active, they would emit neuro-signals that would turn on effectors, sometimes, beneficially, sometimes not, sometimes neither.  Once an inhibitor joined one of them to make a proto-retroceptual reflex, their cell could inhibit them from activating effectors they should not.

To go back to my earlier remarks: “Another step in the evolution of superior intelligence will be the advent of inhibitors and stimulators–and we know inhibition and stimulation have major roles in the nervous system.  An inhibitor is device which prevents any effector it is connected to from acting in the same manner that a sensor causes the activation of any effector it is connected to.  Like everything else, it would pop up by chance but persist when it happened to be connected to a prey-odor sensor, say, and inhibited an away-from effector.  Ergo, the alphazoa blessed with such an inhibitor would not flee a cell whose predator color it had an avoidance reflex for if the cell had a prey odor, but appropriately flee a cell that had the color of a predator but no prey odor.

Eventually, effectors would evolve capable of causing two actions, or a sensor similarly capable.  Hence, an effector connected to a sensor sensitive to prey odor might both inhibit withdrawel from a cell with a predator’s color and cause advance toward a cell with the odor of prey.  Or a sensor sensitive to prey odor connect to two effectors, one inhibiting withddrawel, one causing advance.

“So, life will now have achieved the ability to choose between advancing or withdrawing in the direction of a gray cell, and be on its way toward more complex actions.  It will still be a very primitive computer, but with something like intelligence, anyway.”  The alphazoan could now, in effect, remember encountering a certain stimulus, what resulted, and whether or not the outcome was beneficial.

Something else is likely to have happened: various effectors sensitive to all neuro-signals from endo-sensors becoming constantly manufactured while inhibited ones are destroyed.   This would allow the cell constantly to find effective new ways to deal with existence.  Only effective reflexes consisting of endo-sensors and effectors would keep alive, and the latter would become more sophisticated in what signals they accepted, for they’d be able to accept lots of difference signals so long as what action they contributed to was pleasurable.  Stimulators would increase this.

The number of sensor-sensors would increase, as well.  The truest form of memory would occur once one sensor-sensor conected to another.   You would then have a memory of, say, stimulus A followed by a memory of stimulus B.  If cellular activity (call it activity C) as sensor-sensor B becomes active is positive, then when stimulus A again leads to sensor A’s activation, Sensor A would activate sensor B–even it no stimulus B was then present.  AB would then, through memory, try to cause activity C and possibly succeed.

More complex arrangements would then have to evolve.  Memory-holders, as I will now call sensor-sensors, would become sensitive to much, then all, “information” transmitted during an “instacon,” or unit of consciousness  They would retain the “information” until having some threshold amount needed for activation–which might come to be variable, dependent of what’s going on in the cell as a whole.  Longer strands of connected memory-holders would come into being.  Effectors would gain variable amounts of neuro-signals, often from more than one memory-cell (and no long directly from a sensor), and need a certain minimal amount to become active.  At some point, too, multi-cellular organisms would evolve or have evolved, relatively soon devoting whole cells to carry out the functions I’ve been giving to organelles.

Consequently, my next step in modeling the evolution of intelligence is going to concern the development of the mnemoducts my theory hypothesizes, as the central organs of memory, and intelligence.  I am taking a break from the project now, however, because of other projects higher on my present list of priorities.

Entry 214 — The Evolution of Intelligence, Part 3

Tuesday, September 7th, 2010

Here’s a revision of what I’ve been fumbling with concerning the evolution of intelligence with some additions:

An explanation of intelligence, starting with its evolution, if by intelligence we mean “choice of behavior” as opposed to random activity.

Let’s begin with the first living cell, a protozoan.  It moves randomly through water.  Eventually it accidentally acquires a sensitivity to light, let’s say, although it could be salt density or temperature, it doesn’t matter.  So, it has the prototype of a nervous system, a single sensor sensitive to light.  The next consequential accident will be its evolving a component–an organelle–that makes it move in some direction as opposed to being moved by environmental forces.  Call it an “effector.”  It may evolve this before it evolves a sensor, it doesn’t matter, What matters is that eventually many protoazoa will have non-functioning but not seriously biologically disadvantageous nervous-systems. They’ll have the potential to be superior (that is, they will have taken a step toward us), so I will call them “alphzoa.”

The first key accident leading to intelligence will be an alphazoan’s forming a linkage from its light-sensor to its effector, allowing the former to activate the latter.  As I see it, the linkage will not be the equivalent of a wire, but will result from two hypothesized attributes of organelles, at least the sensors and effectors I’m speaking of.  First claim: that when a sensor is exposed to whatever it is in the exo-environment that activates it, it carries out some kind of chemical reaction that creates molecules that leave it to flow haphazardly through the cell’s cytoplasm.  This will likely have no particular effect on the cell, so will be ignored by natural selection.

Second claim, an effector will react to the presence of the molecule the sensor transmits by absorbing it.  Eventually. it will absorb a molecule that partakes in a chemical reaction that leads to the effect for which the effector is responsible.  Ergo, a micro-relex is born.  If the action the reflex leads to is a biologically advantageous reaction to the presence of the stimulus activating the sensor involved, natural selection will keep it.  If, as probably the case, the reaction is neither good or bad, it may or may not be kept long enough for nature to find some use for it.  If the reaction is disadvantageous, cells possessing the reflex will die out.

Let me further propose that the organelles I’m speaking of have the equivalent of cell membranes, and call the molecules transmitted neuro-transmitters, which is what they in effect are.  So, if an effector causes movement toward light, and light is beneficial–as perhaps a source of energy–alpazoa with this capacity will soon become dominant.  Alphazoa which light causes to move away from light will die out.  Or perhaps evolve differently, finding something in darkness that makes up for lack of light–concealment from prey, maybe.  In any case, a functional, useful nervous system will have come into being, or what I’d call simple reflexive intelligence.

Eventually some sensor will evolve that is sensitive to the color, say, of one of the alphazoan’s prey and links with an effector causing the alphzoa to move toward the prey, a “toward-effector.”  Ditto, a reflex with an “away-from effector” attached to a sensor sensitive to the color or some other characteristic of some kind of predator on the alphazoan.  Not a technical advance, but certainly a big jump in improving the alphazoa’s biological fitness.

By this time, something of central importance had to have happened, or become ready to happen: the evolution of sensors sensitive to pain and pleasure.  For that to happen, “endo-sensors” (sensors sensitive to external stimuli) would have to have broken free of the cell membrane to become potential “intra-sensors.”  And somehow become sensitive to something of vital importance, a chemical due to damage to the cell membrane, say–probably excessive water (a biochemist would know).  Or maybe the organelle might have become sensitive to pieces of the membrane with which it would never have come into contact unless the membrane were damaged.  If the intra-sensor were attached to an away-from effector, natural selection would select it because of its value in helping its cell get away from whatever had damaged is membrane.

Before or after the evolution of pain-organelles, similar organelles connected to toward-effectors would become sensitive to some by-product, say, of a successful hunt–something eaten but not digested, that would cause  the cell to pursue whatever it had gotten a good taste of, with a feeling of pleasure.

Metaphysical question: why would such a sensation of pleasure be pleasurable?  That puzzles me.  The answer is not because it would motivate the cell to do something to keep the pleasure occurring.  Nothing can motivate a cell.  If it evolves a way to move toward a certain beneficial stimulus, it will do so, whether it feels pleasure or not.  My only guess to account for this is that in the eogotmic universe (or ultimate universe behind all existence), construction (such as the combining of materials to make a membrane) pleasurable, destruction (i.e., fragmentation) is painful, and that construction/destruction here reflects construction/destruction there.   Hence, any living organism will feel pleasure when it is reasonably well-organized, pain when going to pieces (and nothing one way or the other when in between the two states), and its state of organization will reflect its egotomic state of organization.

Another step in the evolution of superior intelligence will be the advent of inhibitors and stimulators–and we know inhibition and stimulation have major roles in the nervous system.  An inhibitor is device which prevents any effector it is connected to from acting in the same manner that a sensor causes the activation of any effector it is connected to.  Like everything else, it would pop up by chance but persist when it happened to be connected to a prey-odor sensor, say, and inhibited an away-from effector.  Ergo, the alphazoa blessed with such an inhibitor would not flee a cell whose predator color it had an avoidance reflex for if the cell had a prey odor, but appropriately flee a cell that had the color of a predator but no prey odor.  Eventually, effectors would evolve capable of causing two actions, or a sensor similarly capable.  Hence, an effector connected to a sesnor sensitive to prey odor might both inhibit withdrawel from a cell with a predator’s color and cause advance toward a cell with the odor of prey.  Or a sensor sensitive to prey odor connect to two effects, one inhibiting withddrawel, one causing advance.

So, life will now have achieved the ability to choose between advancing or withdrawing in the direction of a gray cell, and be on its way toward more complex actions.  It will still be a very primitive computer, but with something like intelligence, anyway.

Entry 209 — More on Maximuteurs

Thursday, September 2nd, 2010

I continue continuingly to feel like I need a nap: when I lie down, I close my eyes and at once feel near to sleep–but rarely sleep.  Although, I seem now always to get six hours or more at night.  Can’t figure it out.  But It makes it hard for me to concentrate, or want to do anything like write a daily entry here, which I’m forcing myself to do to keep myself from falling entirely to sloth.

I’m not sleepy when on the tennis court.  This morning, I played three sets of doubles (2 wins).  I was reasonably energetic, and running better, albeit nowhere near as well as I feel I ought to.  When I got home, I didn’t start limping, as I generally do after tennis.  So my leg may be getting better.  I quickly got sleepy, though.

Okay, to provide slightly less trivial content to this, back to the maximuteur, specifically to the what makes a failed maximuteur.

1. Not knowing enough, including the fact that one doesn’t know enough.  The result for the failed verosopher is a faulty premise, for the failed artist, lack of originality.

2. Illogic that will doom even a maximuteur with a valid premise or full understanding of an art.

3. Lack of talent for self-criticism.

4. Lack of marketing skills.

I think 1. may well apply to me as a theoretical psychologist, but none of the others–at least to any significant degree.  I’ve done almost nothing to market my theory, but I’ve published enough to make it available, and had a weird enough life, enough of it documented, to eventually get someone to pay attention to it.  I consider it very likely invalid, but almost certainly of value.

I don’t think any of the reasons for failure apply to me as a poet.  Again, my marketing attempts have not been very good, but my poetry has been published and a few times discussed by others.  I can’t believe that I won’t get so much as a footnote in literary histories of my time.

Entry 207 — A Day in the Life of a Verosopher

Tuesday, August 31st, 2010

Random thoughts today because I want to get this entry out of the way and work on my dissertation on the evolution of intelligence, or try to do so, since I’m still not out of my null zone, unless I’m slightly out but having trouble keeping from falling back into it.

First, two new Grummanisms: “utilinguist” and “alphasemanticry.”  The first is my antonym for a previous coinage of mine, “nullinguist,” for linguist out to make language useless; ergo, a utilinguist is a linguist out to make language useful.  By trying to prevent “poetry” from meaning no more than “anything somebody thinks suggests language concerns” instead meaning, to begin with,  “something constructed of words,” before getting much more detailed, for example.

“Alphasemanticry” is my word for what”poetry” should mean if the nullinguists win: “highest use of language.”  From whence, “Visual Alphasemanticry” for a combination of graphics and words yielding significant aesthetic pleasure that is simultaneously verbal and visual.”

I popped off today against one of Frost’s “dark” poems, or maybe it is a passage from one of them:  “. . . A man can’t speak of his own child that’s dead”–the kind academics bring up to show Frost was Important, after all.   “Wow,” I said, “Wow, he confronts death!  He must be major! ”  I then added, “Frost is in my top ten all-time best poets in English that I’ve read but not for his Learic Poems.”

James Finnegan then corrected me, stating (I believe) that the poem didn’t confront death but showed its effects.   I replied, “Okay, a poem about the effect of death on two people.   What I would call a wisdom poem.  I’m biased against them.  I like poems that enlarge my world, not ones that repeat sentiment about what’s wrong with it, or difficult about it.  Frost knew a lot about reg’lar folks, but I never learned anything from him about them that I didn’t already know.  In other words, I’m also somewhat biased against people-centered poems.  But mostly, I don’t go to poems to learn, I go to them for pleasure.”

I would add that I’m an elitist, believing with Aristotle that the hero of a tragedy needs to be of great consequence, although I disagree with him that political leaders are that, and I would add that narrative literature of any kind requires either a hero or an anti-hero (like Falstaff) of great consequence.

I’m not big on poems of consolation, either.

I find that when I have to make too trips on my bike in a day, it zaps me.  I don’t get physically tired, I just even less feel like doing anything productive than usual.  Today was such a day.  A little while ago i got home from a trip to my very nice dentist, who cemented a crown of mine that had come out (after 24 years) back in for no charge, and a stop-off at a CVS drugstore to buy $15 worth of stuff and get $4 off.  I actually bought $18 worth of stuff, a gallon of milk and goodies, including a can of cashews, cookies, candy, crackers . . .  Living it up.  Oh, I did buy cereal with dried berries in it, too.

My other trip was to the tennis courts where I played two sets, my side winning both–because of my partners.  I’m not terrific at my best, and have been hobbled by my hip problem for over a year.  It may be getting slightly better, though–today I ran after balls a few times instead of hopped-along after them.  I’m still hoping I’ll get enough better to put in at least one season playing my best.  Eventually, I’m sure I’ll need a hip replacement but there’s a chance I won’t have to immediately.

I’ve continued my piece on the evolution of intelligence, but not done anything on it today.  now fairly confident I have a plausible model of the most primitive form of memory, and its advance from a cell’s remembering that event x followed action a and proved worth making happen again to a cell’s remember a chain of actions and the result.  That’s all that our memory does, but it’s a good deal more sophi- sticated.  I think I can show how primitive memory evolved to become what my theory says it now, but won’t know until I write it all down.  (It’s amazing how trying to write down a theory for the first time exposes its shortcomings.)  If I can present a plausible description of my theory’s memory, it will be a good endorsement of it.  No, what is much more true is that if I am not able to come up with a plausible description, it will indicate that my theory is probably invalid.

Entry 205 — Evolution of Intelligence, Part 2

Sunday, August 29th, 2010

At this stage of the evolution of intelligence a lot of minor advances would be made: multiplication of reflexes, the addition of sensors sensitive to the absence of a stimulus, the combining of more sensors and effectors so, perhaps, a purple cell with white dots and smell B and a long flagellum will be pursued if the temperature of the water is over eighty degrees but not if it is under.

By this time, something of central importance had to have happened, or be ready to happen: the evolution of sensors sensitive to pain and pleasure. For that to happen, “endo-sensors” (sensors sensitive to external stimuli) would have to have broken free of the cell membrane to become potential “intra-sensors.” And somehow become sensitive to a chemical due to damage to the cell mem- brane–probably excessive water (a biochemist would know). Or maybe the infra-cell might become sensitive to pieces of the membrane which it would never have contact with unless the membrane were damaged. If the intra-sensor were attached to an away-from effector, natural selection would select it because of its value in helping its cell get away from whatever had damaged is membrane.

Eventually similar intra-sensors connected to toward effectors would become sensitive to some by-product, say, of a successful hunt–something eaten but not digested, that would cause the cell to pursue whatever it had gotten a good taste of. I’m now going to name all such components of a cell that carry out functions like those of the sensors and effector “infra-cells” to make discussion easier. Let me add the clarification that the connections between sensors and effectors may begin as physical channels but will soon almost surely come to be made by precursors of neuro-transmitters: i.e., a sensor with “connect” to its effector by a distinctive chemical that only the effector recognizes and is activated by.  The cell’s cytoplasm will act as a primitive synapse.

Various other “neurophysiological” improvements should soon also occur. One would be an intra-sensor’s gaining the ability to activate a toward effector when it senses pleasure but activate an away-from effector when it senses pain. The accident resulting in such an infra-cell would not be too unlikely, it seems to me: simply the fusion of two cells, one sensitive to pain and connected to an away-from effector, the other sensitive to pleasure and connected to a toward effector. Obviously an evolutionary improvement.

It also seems likely to me that intra-sensors would evolve sensitive to the activation of effectors. They would connect to other infra- cells carrying out reactions to, say, a successful capture of prey: a toward effector becomes active due to signals from a sensor sensitive to a certain kind of prey, in which case the outcome should be dinner, so a sensor sensitive to the effector’s activation which is connected to some infra-cell responsible for emitting digestive juices or the like, would be an advantage.

Certain other infra-cells should evolve to allow the step up to memory, but right now I can’t figure out what they might be, so will stop here, for now.

Entry 202 — Back to Gladwell’s 10,000 Hours

Thursday, August 26th, 2010

Certain cranks are questioning the possibility that Shakespeare wrote the works attributed to him on the grounds that he could not have gotten the 10,000 hours of practice at his craft Malcolm Gladwell says every genius needs.  What I want to know is, if Shakespeare had his ten thousand hours when he wrote the Henry VI trilogy, where does it show?  There are serious scholars out there who think Heminges and Condell were lying when they said he wrote them.  Many mainstream critics won’t accept that he wrote certain scenes in them.

I claim that any reasonably intelligent non-genius actor of the time could have used the historians of the time, as Shakespeare did, to have written them.  Add, perhaps, a cleverness with language that some 14-year-olds have.  The only way his histories improved after the trilogy was in the author’s becoming better with words, through practice, of course, but only what he would have gotten from contin- uing to write plays (and doctor plays and–most important–THINK about plays), and getting interested enough in a few of his stereotypical characters to archetize them as he did Falstaff.

It seems to me that the requirements for being a playwright are (1) a simple exposure to plays to teach one what they are; (2) the general knowledge of the world that everyone automatically gets simply by living; (3) the facility with the language that everyone gets automa- tically from simply using them all one’s life.  The rank one as a playwight will depend entirely on his inborn ability to use language, and his inborn ability to empathize with others, and himself.  Of course, the more plays he writes, the better playwright he’ll be, but I’m speaking of people who have chosen to make playwriting their vocation (because they were designed to do something of the sort).

I speak out of a life devoted to writing and having read biographies of dozens of writers.  I would never be able to agree that I’m wrong on this.

Entry 1661 — Fuzzilier Re: Pracsipience, Etc. « POETICKS

Entry 1661 — Fuzzilier Re: Pracsipience, Etc.

The first thought here in a continuation of my thinking about day-to-day-thinking I was annoyed into by another lawyer’s making a bundle out of the increasingly complete abandonment by our country of any belief in self-responsibility: a kid got killed by a negligent driver; for lawyers, though, the responsibility in such a case is only that of the individual who directly caused a death if he is the one with the most money who can be sued.  Hence, in this case, the party sued (successfully, for over a million) was the church owning the parking lot (because some bushes got in the driver’s view and there’s no reason that should have made him slow down and be extra cautious: those owning any kind of property most make sure it is 100% safe).

That made me think about the pracsipience of the lawyers involved.  Is it greater than other people’s?  I decided it wasn’t.  They are probably in the 60% of the people I believe are quite intelligent in day-to-day living.  But they have a special talent for swindling.  Similarly I believe that doctors are no more pracsipient than the rest of us, but they have a talent for their vocation (which I admire, as I do not admire the vocation of some, but definitely not all, lawyers).

On second thought, I’m not sure doctors have any special talent so much as they have concentrated some of their pracsipience into becoming doctors.  As everyone concentrates a certain portion of his pracsipience.  Perhaps a talent is such a concentration of pracsi-pience?  (Am I unfuzzying rather than the reverse as I certainly was in my mind when I began this entry?)

On third thought, it seems to me that concentrations of pracsipience are different from a talent.  The lawyer suing the church had a talent for swindling whereas my doctor has a concentration of pracsipience in the field of medicine.  Of course, many doctors also have talents related to doctoring, as well.  The normal academic is all concentrated pracsipiences, or must pretend to be if he is going to make a living in academia.

I forgot about my 10% of those whose pracsipience is a level above the 60%’s: perhaps it’s superior because of those with it are better at concentrating their otherwise normal pracsipience than others.  In any case, those who succeed at what most people consider the higher professions like law and medicine are no doubt mostly in the 10% of people of superior pracsipience.

To be reasonably effective in the day-to-day, one needs to have the ability to concentrate one’s pracsipience in some vocation, so it’s part of pracsipience–at all levels.

 I’m pretty sure I haven’t said all I want to on this topic but right now I’ve zeroed out.  I’m afraid I’ll be saying more on it tomorrow.  Sorry.

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Genius « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Genius’ Category

Entry 1688 — Traits of Genius, First Revision

Saturday, January 10th, 2015

Here’s a shortened (improved but still in-progress, with hopes for feedback) version of idea of the characteristics of genius:

The Objective Hallmarks of Genius or: the traits you can recognize a possible genius by (and I now believe he will have them all, although some may not be instantly identifiable)

1. Gross tendency to emotional ups and downs, sometimes psychotically extreme as with Theodore Roethke.  (Note: most of the characteristics on this list have been pointed out by many others, and I doubt it any is original.  While in this parenthesis, let me add that this is my first list so with surely be incomplete, perhaps severely so.)

2. A need for Great Achievements–like Keats’s declared hope of being among the English poets when he died—and an inability not to strive to the utmost for them.

3. Sufficient fundamental (innate) self-confidence to go one’s own way regardless of what others say—which must make one a (natural) non-conformist since no one who is true to himself will be more than partially like anyone else.  (Note: a natural non-conformist is one who is naturally different from others rather than one who has to work to be different from others; evidence of this will be the many ways a natural non-conformist conforms, without its bothering him.

4. Sufficient lack of self-confidence to forever fear failure, coupled with an insane final immunity to it that keeps one from giving up.

5. Reasonably high output as an artist and/or verosopher–due to determination and persistance.  (Needless to say, I’m assuming in advance that I have the hallmarks of genius, so basically listing what I believe to be my own characteristics–but I’ll leave out bald-headedness.  And unbelievable potent wittiness.)
6. Unusual curiosity, varied and intensive.

7. Extreme perfectionism, but only about what’s centrally important: sloppy about details.  I always remember Ezra Pound’s saying about chess grandmasters: they will look for the best move, then, having found it, look for a better.

Someone with all these will be at least a ?enius–but not necessarily a genius.

It seems to me there must be more hallmarks of genius, but I can’t bring any to mind just now.

I took the last two from the National Enquirer list.  There were two others there I left off my list but find worth commenting on:

        HONESTY. Geniuses are frank, forthright and honest. Take the responsibility for things that go wrong. Be willing to admit, ‘I goofed’, and learn from your mistakes.

My Comment: That’s me, but I have no idea whether other ?eniuses tend to be frank, etc.

ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE. Geniuses are able to effectively get their ideas across to others. Take every opportunity to explain your ideas to others.

My Comment: This would be one of the characteristics of a genius mentality, I would guess.  I tend to think it must be the hardest thing for a ?enius to achieve.  A subject worth an essay.  The geniuses most easily getting appropriate recognition before they are dead are those specializing in something where colleagues are in some sense clustered and on the same page–physicists, for example.  Their vocation needs to have been recognized as significantly a superior one, as physics is, poetry not, for a genius to be recognized as such in his lifetime.  Perhaps the greatest geniuses are those who succeed not just in getting personal recognition but for getting, or playing an important role in getting, recognition for their vocation.  (In my case, recognition for what I call “Otherstream Poetry.”)

The Two Not-Yet Substantiatable Essential (Innate) Components of Genius

1. Extremely superior general cerebreffectiveness (i.e., general intelligence that takes in all the varied kinds of intelligence that exist, few of them measured by IQ tests, such as skill with people, musical ability, and general creativity)

2. At least one extremely superior major kind of cultural talent –e.g., musical creativity or mathematical deftness.

All the Objective Hallmarks of Genius will automatically result from a person’s having the two essential components of genius.  Hence, “all” one needs to be a genius are the two components just mentioned.

Revised Footnote from Yesterday: No matter how often I notice how ardently those advocating some point of view so frequently seem to need to denounce all views on the subject involved but their own as wholly invalid rather than merely incompletely convincing, or the like, it almost always makes me shake my head.  I can’t claim I’m never guilty of it, but . . .

New word: “nincomplootly”

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Entry 1686 — Some Thoughts on ?enius

Friday, January 9th, 2015

None of my three or four faithful readers will be surprised that I have a rather large need to believe I am a genius–a genuine one, not an IQ or MacArthur genius.  The only thing perhaps unusual, for a serious, meta-professional artist or verosopher like me, is that I admit my need.  By “meta-professional artist or verosopher,” I mean someone whose main reason for his activities as either is to produce something of significant cultural value.  Unlike Samuel Johnson, at least if we go by his famous saying about only fools writing for anything but money.  Sam is one of my cultural heroes however much I disagree with him about possibly more things than I agree with him about.  Of course, one reason for that is that money is much less meaningful in our incredibly affluent country than it was in his.  True poverty was hard for a great many people to avoid in his, near-impossible to suffer in ours.

I think false modesty is so battered into people like me that, for most of us, it is no longer false.  There is also the (innate) need to fit in in spite of being different.  Like many ?eniuses, I do downplay my aptitudes (like the one that made schoolwork mostly easy for me).  I also somewhat exaggerate my many ineptitudes such as the way it grab hold of conclusions prematurely, or my slowness to understand (which, most of the time, I contend, is a virtue due to realizing how much more there is to be understood than most others).  What helps me most is that I’m actually pretty normal in most respects, and that’s genuine.  I tend to think of myself as a television that has one channel no other television has that picks up telecasts from some weird planet in another galaxy . .  but only once or twice a year.  (Other ?eniuses are the same kind of television, each of which picks up telecasts from a different weird planet.)

I’ve now used my newest coinage, “?enius,” enough to indicate it’s not a typo.  That’s because, as is the case, I suspect, with many blessed/cursed with the kind of brain I have, I have enough self-confidence to be sure I’m either a genius or not far off from being one, but not to declare myself one.  In fact, I truly don’t know whether I am one or not.  What I am, therefore, is a ?enius.

I would not be surprised if even the most ratified culturateur–Murray Gell-Mann, for instance–

Hey, I just did a quick search of the Internet for Murray to check for about the twentieth time whether or not he spelled his last name with a hyphen and found an entry at this Roman Catholic Blog that is one of the best blog entries I’ve ever come across–in spite of its having been written by someone who considers those not accepting the existence of God as a given to be intellectually vacuous, and their arguments on par with those of holocaust-deniers (which, he implies, are wholly worthless although some I’ve found to be pretty good, just not good enough to unconvince me that it is beyond reasonable doubt that a great many Jews were deliberately killed by the Nazis[1]).

Back to what I was saying: I would not be surprised if even Nobelist Murray Gell-Mann sometimes fears he’s not very smart, after all.  Maybe not.  More likely he is like Newton feeling like a small boy at the beach finding interesting pebbles or shells . . . but still aware at some level that only he was noticing them.

The situation is different for ?eniuses like me who, even in old age, are near-completely unrecognized.  One would have to be close to insane to be sure the whole world, just about, was wrong about you.  Nonetheless, I keep thinking and writing about genius and related topics, my own underlying aim always being, to some degree or other, to find a way to get around the evidence against me.

Not today, unless in just having revealed my invention (so far as I know) of the world’s first English word for day-to-day use that includes a typographical mark as one of its letters (Cummings and others have made words like it, but not for use outside the poems they are in) is my subtle argument for my being a genius.  I guess I am never not trying to prove  I’m a genius whenever I create a serious work of art or write a serious text.  In this entry I’m mainly considering what someone you might reasonably characterize as “brilliant” of “gifted,” but not accept as a genius.

My latest thought is minor but taxonomically valuable: it is that a genuine genius has two characteristics: the temperament of a genius and the mentality of a genius.  This thought occurred to me when (as so often) thinking about myself–in particular about what I could claim for myself as one striving to achieve genius.  I feel certain that I do have the temperament of a genius; what is unknown is if I also have the mentality of a genius.

All I can say about the latter is it’s very much higher than even a superior human mentality, and that it’s far more than ability to score high on IQ tests or get high grades in school.  I lean toward believing it is probably high-superiority in only one kind of art or verosophy, maybe two, not some kind of all-around superiority.  In any case, I don’t feel capable of pinning it down objectively.

I do feel the temperament of a genius can be objectively defined.  I contend it consists of some high proportion of the following characteristics, each overt and easy to identify:

1. Gross tendency to emotional ups and downs, sometimes psychotically extreme as with Theodore Roethke.  (Note: most of the characteristics on this list have been pointed out by many others, and I doubt it any is original.  While in this parenthesis, let me add that this is my first list so with surely be incomplete, perhaps severely so.)

2. A need for Great Achievements–like Keats’s declared hope of being among the English poets when he died.

3. A disregard for the opinions of others–i.e., non-conformity.

4. Reasonably high output as an artist and/or verosopher–due to determination and persistance.  (Needless to say, I’m assuming in advance that I have the temperament of a genius, so basically listing my own characteristics–but I’ll leave out bald-headedness.  And unbelievable potent wittiness.)

5. Extreme self-reliance–a variation on #3 because it importantly includes going one’s own way regardless of what others say.

Yikes, I see I don’t need to make a list–the National Enquirer beat me to it by some 35 years:

    1. DRIVE. Geniuses have a strong desire to work hard and long. They’re willing to give all they’ve got to a project. Develop your drive by focusing on your future success, and keep going.  Sure: my #4 is the necessary result and provides objective evidence of this.
    2. COURAGE. It takes courage to do things others consider impossible. Stop worrying about what people will think if you’re different.  See my #5.
    3. DEVOTION TO GOALS. Geniuses know what they want and go after it. Get control of your life and schedule. Have something specific to accomplish each day.  Only sometimes true.  My #4 again will be the result for someone with the temperament of genius.
    4. KNOWLEDGE. Geniuses continually accumulate information. Never go to sleep at night without having learned at least one new thing each day. Read. And question people who know.  Everybody continually accumulates knowledge.  A ?enius becomes a genius in part by applying what he accumulates better than others due to his genius mentality.
    5. HONESTY. Geniuses are frank, forthright and honest. Take the responsibility for things that go wrong. Be willing to admit, ‘I goofed’, and learn from your mistakes.  That’s me, but I have no idea whether other ?eniuses tend to be frank, etc.
    6. OPTIMISM. Geniuses never doubt they will succeed. Deliberately focus your mind on something good coming up.  Again, see my #4.
    7. ABILITY TO JUDGE. Try to understand the facts of a situation before you judge. Evaluate things on an opened minded, unprejudiced basis and be willing to change your mind.  My mentality of genius would include this; it’s just the truism, be intelligent.
    8. ENTHUSIASM. Geniuses are so excited about what they are doing, it encourages others to cooperate with them. Really believe that things will turn out well. Don’t hold back.  Maybe, but I tend to see being a loner in your field as more likely a characteristic of a genius temperament.
    9. WILLINGNESS TO TAKE CHANCES. Overcome your fear of failure. You won’t be afraid to take chances once you realize you can learn from your mistakes.  #4.
    10. DYNAMIC ENERGY. Don’t sit on your butt waiting for something good to happen. Be determined to make it happen.  #4.
    11. ENTERPRISE. Geniuses are opportunity seekers. Be willing to take on jobs others won’t touch. Never be afraid to try the unknown.  #4 and #5.
    12. PERSUASION. Geniuses know how to motivate people to help them get ahead. You’ll find it easy to be persuasive if you believe in what you’re doing.  I suspect ?eniuses are too advanced to be persuasive, and not involved in collective enterprises.
    13. OUTGOINGNESS. I’ve found geniuses able to make friends easily and be easy on their friends. Be a ‘booster’ not somebody who puts others down. That attitude will win you many valuable friends.  No.  Although this fits me more than it doesn’t.  Many ?eniuses are ingoing.  All ?eniuses must be ingoing at times, extremely ingoing, I would say. 
    14. ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE. Geniuses are able to effectively get their ideas across to others. Take every opportunity to explain your ideas to others.  This would be one of the characteristics of a genius mentality, I would guess.  I tend to think it must be the hardest thing for a ?enius to achieve.  A subject worth an essay.  The geniuses most easily getting appropriate recognition before they are dead are those specializing in something where colleagues are in some sense clustered and on the same page–physicists, for example.  Their VOCATION needs to have been recognized as significantly a superior one, as physics is, poetry not. 
    15. PATIENCE. Be patient with others most of the time, but always be impatient with your self. Expect far more of yourself than others. #2
    16. PERCEPTION. Geniuses have their mental radar working full time. Think more of others’ needs and wants than you do of your own.  BS.
    17. PERFECTIONISM. Geniuses cannot tolerate mediocrity, particularly in themselves. Never be easily satisfied with your self. Always strive to do better.  I think I would put having high standards for oneself on my list although that would follow from #2, having a need to be great.
    18. SENSE OF HUMOR. Be willing to laugh at your own expense. Don’t take offense when the joke is on you.  I feel I pretty decidedly have this, but don’t see what it has to do with genius.
    19. VERSATILITY. The more things you learn to accomplish, the more confidence you will develop. Don’t shy away from new endeavors.  I’ll have to think about this.  My initial thought is how one should balance improved understanding of one thing versus having many understandings.  But having a genius mentality will automatically cause you to absorb a great many things not obviously related and use many of them (as well as know which ones to scrap).
    20. ADAPTABILITY. Being flexible enables you to adapt to changing circumstances readily. Resist doing things the same old way. Be willing to consider new options.  Have superior accommodance, the most important characteristic of a genius mentality.
    21. CURIOSITY. An inquisitive, curious mind will help you seek out new information. Don’t be afraid to admit you don’t know it all. Always ask questions about things you don’t understand.  I’m sure extreme curiosity, inability to be satisfied with one-step answers, or even ten-step answers, is an important part of the genius mentality.
    22. INDIVIDUALISM. Do things the way you think they should be done, without fearing somebody’s disapproval.  This is on my list.
    23. IDEALISM. Keep your feet on the ground – but have your head in the clouds. Strive to achieve great things, not just for yourself, but for the better of mankind.  Do great things, by your definition.
    24. IMAGINATION. Geniuses know how to think in new combinations, see things from a different perspective, than anyone else. Unclutter your mental environment to develop this type of imagination. Give yourself time each day to daydream, to fantasize, to drift into a dreamy inner life the way you did as a child.  Again, be born with a superior accommodance.

L. Ron Hubbard thought this worthy of re-circulation.  It’s not bad for The National Enquirer, but basically a guide for socio-economic go-getters, not my kind of geniuses.

The list is here, by the way. It’s followed by a lot of interesting comments.

I now need a break from this topic. I hope tomorrow to be able to have an updated list here.

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[1] No matter how often I notice the need of those advocating some point of view to denounce all opposing views as wholly invalid (or is it a–possibly innate–defect that makes it difficult for them to avoid binary thinking?), it almost always makes me shake me head.  I can’t claim I’m never guilty of it, but . . .

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