Consciousness « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Consciousness’ Category

Entry 1689 — Musings on Thought

Sunday, January 11th, 2015

I’ve been . . . discussing philosophy, you might say, with Karl Kempton the past day or two.  He and I have been at it about his brand of Eastern spiritualism versus my brand of Western materialism for twenty or more years.  Needless to say, neither of us has budged from his position.  Right now we are at it about what the swami below said.

Thought is the most surface element of intelligence. What happens in one DNA molecule is a billion times more complex than your thought. Sadhguru
For more wisdom from Sadhguru, click this: Sadhguru.

If you prefer the following comment of mine to Sadhguru, read on, ye sadly-misguided Westerner of only 5 of the twelve levels of consciousness attained by the enlightened wise men of the East–hey, where are the girl swamis?!

And yet my thought is a billion to the 73rd power times more valuable than any dna molecule, and it doesn’t even have to have its best sneakers on. 

THOUGHT

(In my last post to Karl before I wrote the following, I said that to be able to discuss what Sadhguru said, we first had to define what thought was.  That’s because there are many different definitions of it, not to mention whatever swamis like Sadhguru takes the place of definition.  So I tried to work out my definition, for the tenth or twentieth time.)

For me, “thought” is what dominates our consciousness when we are analyzing some portion of existence.  It is not what is continually passing through our consciousness, which is extremely variable.  I’m sure I gave the latter some name once, but can’t remember it.  No matter: I just came up with one I don’t think can be bettered, and I’m sure is not the name I had for it earlier: consciation (CON shee A shuhn).  To be precise about it, in my psychology, consciation is the series of brain-states I call “instacons,” for “instants of consciousness,” which are the smallest choronological units of awareness.  Each instacon consists of all the brain-cells in the cerebrum that I call master-cells (m-cells) that are active (and perhaps some cells active elsewhere in the nervous system).

According to my theory, thought is what we call various combinations of active m-cells located in parts of the cerebrum I call “the reducticeptual awareness” and the “scienceptual awareness.”  The former provides the verbal elements of thought which are almost always present, and mathematical and other conceptual material, the latter logic based on cause and effect.  Much else, such as visual data under analysis, will also be present.

I have only now begun to consider what other kinds of consciation exist.  “Aesthesciation” might be one—which would occur when the dominant active-cells are in the auditory or sagaceptual or visual or some similar awareness, or combinations of these, and the evaluceptual awareness.  There would also be various kinds of  “percepciation”—visual or auditory m-cells again being dominant, but non-aesthetically.  The visual-consciation one might be concentrating on to find one’s way through a jungle, say.

How about “sociosciation,” the consciation having to do with people, or the usually scorned “egosciation,” of focus on one’s self?

The brain’s attention center determines which of the several consciations dominates at any given time.

Is there, I suddenly wonder, a “superstisciation?”  A consciation identical to normal thought but without the participation of active scienceptual m-cells?

* * *

My idea of thought may be malarky, but–unlike Sadhguru’s–it is falsifiable.  Once neurophysiologists have sensitive enough equipment, they will be able to determine if my awarenesses, or something like them–and their m-cells, exist.  More important, they will be able to find what happens in the brain when a person believe himself to be thinking of something, which will either invalidate or validate the main brunt of my theory

Oh, one thing more.  In my piece about thought, I did not define consciousness.  For me it it is not part of the brain, but something undefinable outside the brain and wholly different from it, being the one immaterial thing I believe in.  (All theories begin with dogma, or axioms; the fact that I am aware of a consciousness within me is one of my theory’s.)

A person’s consciousness interacts with his brain to allow the conversion of active m-cells into whatever it is that the consciousness can experience.  This consciousness is, in fact, the person, passively experiencing the life of the being whose brain it is interacting with.  It is irrelevant so far as understanding the workings of the brain are concerned.  Since those workings result in everything the consciousness experiences, which it by axiomatic definition does, I need only describe what the brain does, and claim the conversion I do.  It is unfalsifiable.  That we are somehow conscious of data brought to us by the nervous system is a fact, though: a blindfolded person will not experience a visual object in front of him, for example; take the blindfold off his eyes and he will.

That I am conscious is a fact for me, but not for anyone else.

Hey, I feel this is one of my more interesting entries.  I hope some of you agree!  I hope to work on my idea of a superstisciation.  It doesn’t seem a joke to me.  Take ghosts.  I was just reading about some allegedly haunted house in which ghosts were throwing objects such as books around.  If you have a reasonably effective scienceptual awareness, you will apply cause and effect logic to the idea of a ghost that can throw a book.  How, since ghosts are immaterial?  Or: why can’t we see or otherwise perceive a ghost, especially with the sense of touch, if it has enough materiality to grasp a book?  How can a ghost see material photons without material rods and cones?  Etc.

Sure, they just do.

.

AmazingCounters.com

Entry 498 — Jaynes’s Theory of Consciousness

Saturday, September 10th, 2011

The other day I began reading one of the many books I have lying around the house which I haven’t read.  This one is a history of psychology.  It seems readable, but the author believes in Julian Jaynes’s theory that human beings did not have consciousnesses until some 2500 years or so ago.  Jaynes was led to it by his finding that the characters of Homer and other authors back then seemed never to use “I,” instead claiming their ideas and commands were those of gods.   Ditto, in fact, all their thoughts!  I can’t say that I’m an expert on Jaynes.  I tried to read his book on his theory long ago but tired quickly of it.  I probably don’t have a great grasp of his theory, but I’m close enough to an accurate gist of it to know it’s hooey.

As far as I’m concerned, Homer and other early poets gave Big Ideas and Big Commandments to the gods because of their importance.  Also because of the way sudden shimmering impulses (like an idea for a poem, or painting, or song) seem to come from nowhere–hence, from a muse.  Also because leaders of the time, who were often priests, found it easier to get people to obey them (and reward them) if they said they were assistants to some extremely powerful god–as they may well have believed they were.   In some cases, the great men of the time were psychotic, and truly heard vlices inside them that must have been goods since they knew that they were not themselves.

I can’t read Homer or anyone else not English-speaking in the language of their poems, and haven’t read too many works of the ancients that attempted extreme accuracy–or didn’t, for that matter.  But I suspect that the ancients probably rarely quoted their characters making ordinary remarks, and maybe never quoted them saying something like, “I prefer roast lamb to roast pig.”  I can’t believe they ever had a character say that the god of his belly preferred one to the other.  I think they, like us, took it for granted that their ordinary words came from their ordinary selves.  They may have called the source of their thoughts “nous,” of the like, but that was just another word for “soul,” or “something that allows us to be aware of existence and is not ordinary matter, but is us.”  The me within. 

A complicating factor would have been dreams.  Where do they come from?  But I think they thought dreams were simply an entrance into some land elsewhere than here.  That goods lived there, gods sometimes no doubt appearing in the dreams. would have made sense to them.   So gods could very well have communicated with them.  Still, they would have had, it seems to me, have felt themselves as that with which the gods communicated.

There’s also the sense at times that an arm, say, is an arm, at other times, “me.”  “My arm it the table” versus “I hurt myself.” 

I know I’m fumbly here.  Not saying much, and not being too coherent.  But I’m trying to be daily with my blogs for a while.  So I won’t delete what I’ve said, nor stop.

The main thing I want to say is that Jaynes could not have been right if he thought (as I think he did) that human beings evolved a few thousand years ago from beings with no sense of self (or “consciousness”) to self-conscious.  Basically it just strikes me as ridiculous.  Above the assertional level, I find it much more plausible to believe it took our early users of the written language to write about subtleties of psychology like self-consciousness a while than to believe in a sudden biological jump into what I would claim is an urceptual Self from–what?

Well, for one thing, an innate grammar without a first person singular or plural.  If without any innate grammar, then a grammar painfully developed without and “I/we.”  Plus, I just can’t conceive of any kind of awareness, and I think every living thing must have an awareness, that doesn’t identify itself with . . .  well, itself. 

This has been one of my goofier entries.  I’m glad to be on record about Jaynes, though.  Maybe someday my thoughts about his theory will come together better for me.

 

Consciation « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Consciation’ Category

Entry 1689 — Musings on Thought

Sunday, January 11th, 2015

I’ve been . . . discussing philosophy, you might say, with Karl Kempton the past day or two.  He and I have been at it about his brand of Eastern spiritualism versus my brand of Western materialism for twenty or more years.  Needless to say, neither of us has budged from his position.  Right now we are at it about what the swami below said.

Thought is the most surface element of intelligence. What happens in one DNA molecule is a billion times more complex than your thought. Sadhguru
For more wisdom from Sadhguru, click this: Sadhguru.

If you prefer the following comment of mine to Sadhguru, read on, ye sadly-misguided Westerner of only 5 of the twelve levels of consciousness attained by the enlightened wise men of the East–hey, where are the girl swamis?!

And yet my thought is a billion to the 73rd power times more valuable than any dna molecule, and it doesn’t even have to have its best sneakers on. 

THOUGHT

(In my last post to Karl before I wrote the following, I said that to be able to discuss what Sadhguru said, we first had to define what thought was.  That’s because there are many different definitions of it, not to mention whatever swamis like Sadhguru takes the place of definition.  So I tried to work out my definition, for the tenth or twentieth time.)

For me, “thought” is what dominates our consciousness when we are analyzing some portion of existence.  It is not what is continually passing through our consciousness, which is extremely variable.  I’m sure I gave the latter some name once, but can’t remember it.  No matter: I just came up with one I don’t think can be bettered, and I’m sure is not the name I had for it earlier: consciation (CON shee A shuhn).  To be precise about it, in my psychology, consciation is the series of brain-states I call “instacons,” for “instants of consciousness,” which are the smallest choronological units of awareness.  Each instacon consists of all the brain-cells in the cerebrum that I call master-cells (m-cells) that are active (and perhaps some cells active elsewhere in the nervous system).

According to my theory, thought is what we call various combinations of active m-cells located in parts of the cerebrum I call “the reducticeptual awareness” and the “scienceptual awareness.”  The former provides the verbal elements of thought which are almost always present, and mathematical and other conceptual material, the latter logic based on cause and effect.  Much else, such as visual data under analysis, will also be present.

I have only now begun to consider what other kinds of consciation exist.  “Aesthesciation” might be one—which would occur when the dominant active-cells are in the auditory or sagaceptual or visual or some similar awareness, or combinations of these, and the evaluceptual awareness.  There would also be various kinds of  “percepciation”—visual or auditory m-cells again being dominant, but non-aesthetically.  The visual-consciation one might be concentrating on to find one’s way through a jungle, say.

How about “sociosciation,” the consciation having to do with people, or the usually scorned “egosciation,” of focus on one’s self?

The brain’s attention center determines which of the several consciations dominates at any given time.

Is there, I suddenly wonder, a “superstisciation?”  A consciation identical to normal thought but without the participation of active scienceptual m-cells?

* * *

My idea of thought may be malarky, but–unlike Sadhguru’s–it is falsifiable.  Once neurophysiologists have sensitive enough equipment, they will be able to determine if my awarenesses, or something like them–and their m-cells, exist.  More important, they will be able to find what happens in the brain when a person believe himself to be thinking of something, which will either invalidate or validate the main brunt of my theory

Oh, one thing more.  In my piece about thought, I did not define consciousness.  For me it it is not part of the brain, but something undefinable outside the brain and wholly different from it, being the one immaterial thing I believe in.  (All theories begin with dogma, or axioms; the fact that I am aware of a consciousness within me is one of my theory’s.)

A person’s consciousness interacts with his brain to allow the conversion of active m-cells into whatever it is that the consciousness can experience.  This consciousness is, in fact, the person, passively experiencing the life of the being whose brain it is interacting with.  It is irrelevant so far as understanding the workings of the brain are concerned.  Since those workings result in everything the consciousness experiences, which it by axiomatic definition does, I need only describe what the brain does, and claim the conversion I do.  It is unfalsifiable.  That we are somehow conscious of data brought to us by the nervous system is a fact, though: a blindfolded person will not experience a visual object in front of him, for example; take the blindfold off his eyes and he will.

That I am conscious is a fact for me, but not for anyone else.

Hey, I feel this is one of my more interesting entries.  I hope some of you agree!  I hope to work on my idea of a superstisciation.  It doesn’t seem a joke to me.  Take ghosts.  I was just reading about some allegedly haunted house in which ghosts were throwing objects such as books around.  If you have a reasonably effective scienceptual awareness, you will apply cause and effect logic to the idea of a ghost that can throw a book.  How, since ghosts are immaterial?  Or: why can’t we see or otherwise perceive a ghost, especially with the sense of touch, if it has enough materiality to grasp a book?  How can a ghost see material photons without material rods and cones?  Etc.

Sure, they just do.

.

AmazingCounters.com

Entry 498 — Jaynes’s Theory of Consciousness « POETICKS

Entry 498 — Jaynes’s Theory of Consciousness

The other day I began reading one of the many books I have lying around the house which I haven’t read.  This one is a history of psychology.  It seems readable, but the author believes in Julian Jaynes’s theory that human beings did not have consciousnesses until some 2500 years or so ago.  Jaynes was led to it by his finding that the characters of Homer and other authors back then seemed never to use “I,” instead claiming their ideas and commands were those of gods.   Ditto, in fact, all their thoughts!  I can’t say that I’m an expert on Jaynes.  I tried to read his book on his theory long ago but tired quickly of it.  I probably don’t have a great grasp of his theory, but I’m close enough to an accurate gist of it to know it’s hooey.

As far as I’m concerned, Homer and other early poets gave Big Ideas and Big Commandments to the gods because of their importance.  Also because of the way sudden shimmering impulses (like an idea for a poem, or painting, or song) seem to come from nowhere–hence, from a muse.  Also because leaders of the time, who were often priests, found it easier to get people to obey them (and reward them) if they said they were assistants to some extremely powerful god–as they may well have believed they were.   In some cases, the great men of the time were psychotic, and truly heard vlices inside them that must have been goods since they knew that they were not themselves.

I can’t read Homer or anyone else not English-speaking in the language of their poems, and haven’t read too many works of the ancients that attempted extreme accuracy–or didn’t, for that matter.  But I suspect that the ancients probably rarely quoted their characters making ordinary remarks, and maybe never quoted them saying something like, “I prefer roast lamb to roast pig.”  I can’t believe they ever had a character say that the god of his belly preferred one to the other.  I think they, like us, took it for granted that their ordinary words came from their ordinary selves.  They may have called the source of their thoughts “nous,” of the like, but that was just another word for “soul,” or “something that allows us to be aware of existence and is not ordinary matter, but is us.”  The me within. 

A complicating factor would have been dreams.  Where do they come from?  But I think they thought dreams were simply an entrance into some land elsewhere than here.  That goods lived there, gods sometimes no doubt appearing in the dreams. would have made sense to them.   So gods could very well have communicated with them.  Still, they would have had, it seems to me, have felt themselves as that with which the gods communicated.

There’s also the sense at times that an arm, say, is an arm, at other times, “me.”  “My arm it the table” versus “I hurt myself.” 

I know I’m fumbly here.  Not saying much, and not being too coherent.  But I’m trying to be daily with my blogs for a while.  So I won’t delete what I’ve said, nor stop.

The main thing I want to say is that Jaynes could not have been right if he thought (as I think he did) that human beings evolved a few thousand years ago from beings with no sense of self (or “consciousness”) to self-conscious.  Basically it just strikes me as ridiculous.  Above the assertional level, I find it much more plausible to believe it took our early users of the written language to write about subtleties of psychology like self-consciousness a while than to believe in a sudden biological jump into what I would claim is an urceptual Self from–what?

Well, for one thing, an innate grammar without a first person singular or plural.  If without any innate grammar, then a grammar painfully developed without and “I/we.”  Plus, I just can’t conceive of any kind of awareness, and I think every living thing must have an awareness, that doesn’t identify itself with . . .  well, itself. 

This has been one of my goofier entries.  I’m glad to be on record about Jaynes, though.  Maybe someday my thoughts about his theory will come together better for me.

 

One Response to “Entry 498 — Jaynes’s Theory of Consciousness”

  1. karl kempton says:

    why read beyond stupid statement consciousness began 2500 years ago!? maybe he thinks the world is only 6000 years old.

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