If you prefer the following comment of mine to Sadhguru, read on, ye sadly-misguided Westerner of only 5 of the twelve levels of consciousness attained by the enlightened wise men of the East–hey, where are the girl swamis?!

And yet my thought is a billion to the 73rd power times more valuable than any dna molecule, and it doesn’t even have to have its best sneakers on. 

THOUGHT

(In my last post to Karl before I wrote the following, I said that to be able to discuss what Sadhguru said, we first had to define what thought was.  That’s because there are many different definitions of it, not to mention whatever swamis like Sadhguru takes the place of definition.  So I tried to work out my definition, for the tenth or twentieth time.)

For me, “thought” is what dominates our consciousness when we are analyzing some portion of existence.  It is not what is continually passing through our consciousness, which is extremely variable.  I’m sure I gave the latter some name once, but can’t remember it.  No matter: I just came up with one I don’t think can be bettered, and I’m sure is not the name I had for it earlier: consciation (CON shee A shuhn).  To be precise about it, in my psychology, consciation is the series of brain-states I call “instacons,” for “instants of consciousness,” which are the smallest choronological units of awareness.  Each instacon consists of all the brain-cells in the cerebrum that I call master-cells (m-cells) that are active (and perhaps some cells active elsewhere in the nervous system).

According to my theory, thought is what we call various combinations of active m-cells located in parts of the cerebrum I call “the reducticeptual awareness” and the “scienceptual awareness.”  The former provides the verbal elements of thought which are almost always present, and mathematical and other conceptual material, the latter logic based on cause and effect.  Much else, such as visual data under analysis, will also be present.

I have only now begun to consider what other kinds of consciation exist.  “Aesthesciation” might be one—which would occur when the dominant active-cells are in the auditory or sagaceptual or visual or some similar awareness, or combinations of these, and the evaluceptual awareness.  There would also be various kinds of  “percepciation”—visual or auditory m-cells again being dominant, but non-aesthetically.  The visual-consciation one might be concentrating on to find one’s way through a jungle, say.

How about “sociosciation,” the consciation having to do with people, or the usually scorned “egosciation,” of focus on one’s self?

The brain’s attention center determines which of the several consciations dominates at any given time.

Is there, I suddenly wonder, a “superstisciation?”  A consciation identical to normal thought but without the participation of active scienceptual m-cells?

* * *

My idea of thought may be malarky, but–unlike Sadhguru’s–it is falsifiable.  Once neurophysiologists have sensitive enough equipment, they will be able to determine if my awarenesses, or something like them–and their m-cells, exist.  More important, they will be able to find what happens in the brain when a person believe himself to be thinking of something, which will either invalidate or validate the main brunt of my theory

Oh, one thing more.  In my piece about thought, I did not define consciousness.  For me it it is not part of the brain, but something undefinable outside the brain and wholly different from it, being the one immaterial thing I believe in.  (All theories begin with dogma, or axioms; the fact that I am aware of a consciousness within me is one of my theory’s.)

A person’s consciousness interacts with his brain to allow the conversion of active m-cells into whatever it is that the consciousness can experience.  This consciousness is, in fact, the person, passively experiencing the life of the being whose brain it is interacting with.  It is irrelevant so far as understanding the workings of the brain are concerned.  Since those workings result in everything the consciousness experiences, which it by axiomatic definition does, I need only describe what the brain does, and claim the conversion I do.  It is unfalsifiable.  That we are somehow conscious of data brought to us by the nervous system is a fact, though: a blindfolded person will not experience a visual object in front of him, for example; take the blindfold off his eyes and he will.

That I am conscious is a fact for me, but not for anyone else.

Hey, I feel this is one of my more interesting entries.  I hope some of you agree!  I hope to work on my idea of a superstisciation.  It doesn’t seem a joke to me.  Take ghosts.  I was just reading about some allegedly haunted house in which ghosts were throwing objects such as books around.  If you have a reasonably effective scienceptual awareness, you will apply cause and effect logic to the idea of a ghost that can throw a book.  How, since ghosts are immaterial?  Or: why can’t we see or otherwise perceive a ghost, especially with the sense of touch, if it has enough materiality to grasp a book?  How can a ghost see material photons without material rods and cones?  Etc.

Sure, they just do.

.

If you prefer the following comment of mine to Sadhguru, read on, ye sadly-misguided Westerner of only 5 of the twelve levels of consciousness attained by the enlightened wise men of the East–hey, where are the girl swamis?!

And yet my thought is a billion to the 73rd power times more valuable than any dna molecule, and it doesn’t even have to have its best sneakers on. 

THOUGHT

(In my last post to Karl before I wrote the following, I said that to be able to discuss what Sadhguru said, we first had to define what thought was.  That’s because there are many different definitions of it, not to mention whatever swamis like Sadhguru takes the place of definition.  So I tried to work out my definition, for the tenth or twentieth time.)

For me, “thought” is what dominates our consciousness when we are analyzing some portion of existence.  It is not what is continually passing through our consciousness, which is extremely variable.  I’m sure I gave the latter some name once, but can’t remember it.  No matter: I just came up with one I don’t think can be bettered, and I’m sure is not the name I had for it earlier: consciation (CON shee A shuhn).  To be precise about it, in my psychology, consciation is the series of brain-states I call “instacons,” for “instants of consciousness,” which are the smallest choronological units of awareness.  Each instacon consists of all the brain-cells in the cerebrum that I call master-cells (m-cells) that are active (and perhaps some cells active elsewhere in the nervous system).

According to my theory, thought is what we call various combinations of active m-cells located in parts of the cerebrum I call “the reducticeptual awareness” and the “scienceptual awareness.”  The former provides the verbal elements of thought which are almost always present, and mathematical and other conceptual material, the latter logic based on cause and effect.  Much else, such as visual data under analysis, will also be present.

I have only now begun to consider what other kinds of consciation exist.  “Aesthesciation” might be one—which would occur when the dominant active-cells are in the auditory or sagaceptual or visual or some similar awareness, or combinations of these, and the evaluceptual awareness.  There would also be various kinds of  “percepciation”—visual or auditory m-cells again being dominant, but non-aesthetically.  The visual-consciation one might be concentrating on to find one’s way through a jungle, say.

How about “sociosciation,” the consciation having to do with people, or the usually scorned “egosciation,” of focus on one’s self?

The brain’s attention center determines which of the several consciations dominates at any given time.

Is there, I suddenly wonder, a “superstisciation?”  A consciation identical to normal thought but without the participation of active scienceptual m-cells?

* * *

My idea of thought may be malarky, but–unlike Sadhguru’s–it is falsifiable.  Once neurophysiologists have sensitive enough equipment, they will be able to determine if my awarenesses, or something like them–and their m-cells, exist.  More important, they will be able to find what happens in the brain when a person believe himself to be thinking of something, which will either invalidate or validate the main brunt of my theory

Oh, one thing more.  In my piece about thought, I did not define consciousness.  For me it it is not part of the brain, but something undefinable outside the brain and wholly different from it, being the one immaterial thing I believe in.  (All theories begin with dogma, or axioms; the fact that I am aware of a consciousness within me is one of my theory’s.)

A person’s consciousness interacts with his brain to allow the conversion of active m-cells into whatever it is that the consciousness can experience.  This consciousness is, in fact, the person, passively experiencing the life of the being whose brain it is interacting with.  It is irrelevant so far as understanding the workings of the brain are concerned.  Since those workings result in everything the consciousness experiences, which it by axiomatic definition does, I need only describe what the brain does, and claim the conversion I do.  It is unfalsifiable.  That we are somehow conscious of data brought to us by the nervous system is a fact, though: a blindfolded person will not experience a visual object in front of him, for example; take the blindfold off his eyes and he will.

That I am conscious is a fact for me, but not for anyone else.

Hey, I feel this is one of my more interesting entries.  I hope some of you agree!  I hope to work on my idea of a superstisciation.  It doesn’t seem a joke to me.  Take ghosts.  I was just reading about some allegedly haunted house in which ghosts were throwing objects such as books around.  If you have a reasonably effective scienceptual awareness, you will apply cause and effect logic to the idea of a ghost that can throw a book.  How, since ghosts are immaterial?  Or: why can’t we see or otherwise perceive a ghost, especially with the sense of touch, if it has enough materiality to grasp a book?  How can a ghost see material photons without material rods and cones?  Etc.

Sure, they just do.

.