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Entry 1639 — Choice of Ethotactic, Part 4

Saturday, November 22nd, 2014

What I’ve said so far suggests a question to me: can something a person does with no ethical intentions be ethotactical?  For instance, say I am with a friend I know to be much more poor than I and we  come upon an apple tree in a public forest with one apple on it, and I pick it and eat it, not thinking of my friend.  Or, for a more colorful example, say I have been taught that Irishmen are subhuman creatures without the ability to feel pain, and that hunting them will be good practice in the use of firearms that one may one day need to fight off aliens from outer space.  So I shoot a few Irishmen between the eyes, inflicting pain on them without realizing it, and even perhaps killing one or two of them.  Have I behaved immorally?

According to my theory of knowlecular psychology, no.  That’s because an ethotactic, or the choice of a moral or immoral action, can only be the result of some anthroceptual decision based on living in harmony with a known social code.

I think I would go so far as to say that my killing an Irishmen or two in such a case is not immoral even according to most people’s standards.  Many would protest, but because it would seem that I would be excusing a Nazi taught to consider Jews sub-human for gassing them.  I would excuse the Nazi, but only morally.  For me, he would be not immoral, but homicidally stupid—and therefore deserving to be reprimanded!  Sorry.  I have a weakness for black humor.  What I believe is that such a person should be prevented from continuing to gas Jews by being executed—unless one truly believes some kind of re-education can make him accept Jews as human, and he is compelled to repay society for his social stupidity by spending the rest of his life shining the shoes of Jews for free or something.

Ultimately, I believe all reprehensible acts are acts of stupidity, and that what kind of stupidity is involved—moral stupidity or some other kind of stupidity—is irrelevant.  Society should be maximally protected from the person acting reprehensibly (and protected from his genes, for I believe criminals [real criminals], and that’s who I’m talking about, should not be allowed to breed).  Of course, I realize I’m making a complex subject seem much more cut&dry than it is.  Just ideas to counteract simple-minded bad/good anti-continuumism and the insensitivity of certain sentimentalists to Evil.

About evil I will say that all definitions of it are necessarily subjective, but that it does exist, and can be defined sociobjectively.  Sociobjectivity is a view of an idea that is held by such a large majority of the members of a society and which has an objective neurophysiological basis as to be close enough to true objectivity as to be taken as such.  Take the evil of killing an innocent child.  Almost everyone would disapprove of that, and (I believe) almost all of us are instinctively repelled by the deed, and—in fact—would instinctively try to prevent a child, innocent or not, from being killed.

Not that our instinct to use reason would necessarily not be involved.  If effective, it might tell us that our standing in society will go up if we stop someone from murdering a child.  Although our instinct to advance statoosnikally would be part of that.  Actually, I think in most cases, protecting the child would be reflexive whereas our explanation would be taken care of mostly by our reasoning.

To be honest, if I were dominated by reason, I would never risk my life, even as the old man I now am, for some child, because what I believe I may contribute to World Culture is almost sure to be more than what the child will, however long he lives.  The problem with that, of course, is that my ability to reason may be defective, in which case, my not saving a child at the risk of losing my own life would be stupid integrity–that is, acting according to my code that I should protect my own life at all costs because of its great value to the world.  I claim that following that code would be absolutely valid if I were another . . . Nietzsche, without his breakdown.

Needless to say, the idea that Evil is what some deity has said it to be is absurd; various deities have universally defined certain acts as evil because the men who invented them were instinctively against those acts.  Other non-universal acts, like saying something contemptuous about some deity, have also been said to have been ordained Evil by a deity invented by men not because their inventors were instinctively against such acts but because the definition of Evil helped them gain power or destroy other tribes, or simply because of some personal dislike—of a priest once clawed by a cat that made him claim his main god had defined cats as evil, for example.

I do think that reasoning should dominate every moral choice one makes, but it can’t overcome one’s instincts, all of which are ultimately moral, for a given person.  We can only argue about whose individual morals would work best for the society we want to live in, and perhaps use reason to show that giving in to a society’s chosen code will be better for each individual in the long run, the long run excluding some never-seen Heaven or anything like it.

Which brings to mind the question of whether or not it is moral to lie to the masses and tell them some God will do horrible things to them if they don’t accept a society’s code.  I realize that there are those who don’t believe that our species naturally, due to our genes, divides into different social classes–three of them, roughly speaking:  masters, slaves, and . . . cerebreans.  They’re nuts.

I divide ethics into the study of socioethotactics and the study of egoethotactics . . . I think.  There are two major problems: formulation of a maximally fair and biologically advantageous set of socioethotactics by a society, and an individuals’ reconciling his inevitably conflicting set of egoethotactics with his society’s socioethotactics.

More on this eventually, if I think I can say anything at all interesting about it.

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Note: on the day I made my first entry here about ethotactics, 36 people checked up on me at my Wikipedia entry; rarely do more than 4 people visit it on a day, and none since the first month it was up have anywhere near that many done so.  Were they fans of Jonah Goldberg, whose article I was commenting on?  The visits after that have been few, for or five in a day at most.

Last, and definitely least, here’s this SURVEY again:

Please, Dear Reader, I implore thee: when you have read as much of this entry as you feel like reading, let me know whether you have found it worth reading in full or not by clicking “YES” or “NO” below. You would help me a great deal, and might even get me to make my entries more reader-friendly. (And for the love of Jayzuz, please don’t try to spare my feelings by politely declining to click the NO although you think the entry Vile Beyond Imagination. Oh, some of you may need to know that I am not asking you whether you agree with me or not!)

YES

NO

Note: I will be repeating this request in some of my entries to come. Feel free to click one of my buttons each time I do, but please don’t click either more than once a day.

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Entry 1636 — Back to Goldberg

Wednesday, November 19th, 2014

Okay, back to my response to an essay by Jonah Goldberg.  I was writing about the effect of ethotactical intelligence on ethotactical duration but also the width of said duration.  An “ethotactic” is a person’s moral choice of action in a given situation.  I ended my writing for that day with the following:

“Obviously, the situation will have a lot to do with the length of a person’s ethotactical durations, there seldom being little point in trying for a long one regarding what to do morally about a piece of candy one has been offered.  Short-term moral behavior will not depend much on ethotactical intelligence.  That means day-to-day behavior will generally be intelligent enough (and considered acceptable enough) although not based on long ethotactical durations or particularly high ethotactical intelligence.

“Now for a scattering of points, because I don’t see right off how to present a better organized response to Goldberg’s essay.  First is his suggestion that too many people, especially young people, believe that “if it feels right, do it!’ by which he means all they think is necessary to make an ethotactical decision is passion.  Goldberg amplifies this when he quotes a character in the movie, Legally Blonde, as follows: “On our very first day at Harvard, a very wise professor quoted Aristotle; ‘The law is reason free from passion.’  Well, no offense to Aristotle, but in my three years at Harvard, I have come to find that passion is a key ingredient to the study and practice of law—and of life.’”

“Well, I would agree with Goldberg that the character is an airhead  . . .” I stopped there, cutting the paragraphs above from the text because I thought it had come to a good stopping point before them.  When I came back to them just now, three days later, and wrote the paragraph beginning this entry, to set the scene, I was immediately unsure what I was talking about.    There’s a person’s plain choice of action.  How is it different from his moral choice of action?

Okay, a person’s choice of action depends on a vote from each of his active awarenesses at the time.  These votes will probably never be equal.  How much weight the vote of a given awareness will have will depend on the person and on the situation.  And now I suspect I’m constructing a different theory or set of ideas than I was describing in part one of this cluster-dementia of an intellectual exploration.

I should probably re-start but I’m too lazy too.  It is also possible that I’ve got an idea begun that may lead somewhere worthwhile.  Question: what awareness provides the ethical portion of a person’s choice of action?  Immediate answer: the evaluceptual awareness, because it is the awareness that determines on the basis of past experience what path is most likely to maximize the pleasure-to-pain ratio.  This answer is wrong.

The moral content of the evaluceptual awareness’s choice will be determined all or mostly in the anthroceptual awareness, because it will try to make one act properly in order to satisfy one or more social instincts like the need to conform, the empathic need not to cause pain . . . there must be others but I can’t think of them now.  The instinct not to cause pain probably has many sub-instincts under it: like the need not to boast (because it may make others feel smaller) . . .

I wonder if there’s an egoceptual instinct to be honest in appraising oneself.  No one else need see that you dishonestly rate yourself a better poet than some Nobel Prize Winner, so it’s not a socioceptual instinct, if it exists.  I think it may exist because it would be advantageous for preventing unrealistic behavior.  But would it be moral?  And what about the embarrassment of missing five lay-ups in a row in your backyard where no one can see you.  You have immorally failed to live up to your own expectations just as missing one layup in a game would be immorally failing to live up to your group’s expectations.  If doing what you’re supposed to in a team effort hasn’t to do with morality, what does it have to do with?

My problem is to intelligently describe a person’s choice of action, which I now see is a matter of describing the many choices it is a combination of—basically the votes of various awarenesses (and sub-awarenesses) I’ve already mentioned.  Too much work for me now, so I’m outta here.  I hope I return to this matter, for my own sake.  (It would be immoral for me to deprive the world of my further thoughts about it.)  Not sure I will.

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Entry 1633 — Moral Integrity

Sunday, November 16th, 2014

Jonah Goldberg is one of my favorite writers.  I consider him funny enough to steal material from, and agree with (most of) his political outlook.  Often, though, I find myself partially disagreeing with some position of his.  At the moment, I’m disagreeing with portions of his latest essay in National Review, “Empty Integrity.”  Goldberg believes the world is opting for a kind of “integrity” that Irish philosopher David Thunder categorizes as “purely formal accounts of integrity (which) essentially demand internal consistency within the form or structure of an agent’s desires, actions, beliefs, and evaluations.”  Opposed to this is a kind of integrity, Thunder describes as “fully substantive accounts.”  The difference between the two is that a person with the first kind acts in accordance with ethical principles designed to maximize his pleasure-to-pain ratio whereas a person with the second kind “desires to do what is morally good in all of his decisions,” according, again, to Thunder.

Goldberg implies that the first kind of integrity, which—because he associates it with the philosophy of Nietzsche, one of my idols—I will hereafter term Nietzschean Integrity, is “empty.”  It isn’t.  What he is really bothered by, first, is that a person possessing it does not “apply reason to nature and our consciences in order to discover what is moral” but simply does what “feels right.”  This is wrong for Goldberg because it ultimately means understanding integrity “only as a firm commitment to one’s own principles—because one’s own principles are the only legitimate principles. The god of a person’s morality is thus not Jehovah but the person.”

Nietzschean Integrity is “empty” only inasmuch as there is no imaginary being running it.  It seems to me that a truly empty integrity would be one that was devoid of rules to follow.  That is not the case with Nietzschean Integrity.  What makes it empty for Goldberg is merely his dislike of its rules . . .  No, what is wrong with it for him is not its rules but the rules he believes it will be based on if some entity outside it is not their source.  Actually there is no reason a person with Nietzschean Integrity might not “apply reason to nature and (his) conscience in order to discover what is moral” and, as a result become firmly committed to absolutely standard good old George Washington principles—because they lead him to rules of morality that “feel right” to him.

Ultimately, we all must follow the internal moral rules that feel right regardless of where they come from.  Everything we do, we do because it feels right.  Reason may tell someone that if he sticks his hand in a fire, he will experience pain, but he will accept what it tells him because it feels right.  To give just one example of why you should accept my generality that should suffice to clinch my case—which, I suppose, reduces the question to one of simple semantics.

In any case, the real problem for Goldberg (and me) is what I have some up with the brilliant name for of “Stupid Integrity.”   And here I bumble into boilerplate I feel bad about repeating but, I fear, is all I have to say about the topic.  I claim that one necessarily tries always to maximize his P2P (i.e., his “pleasure-to-pain ratio”), as he at the time believes—I should say, “guesses”—it to be for a length of time dependent on his . . . anthreffec- tiveness, or effectiveness as a human being, which includes but is quite a bit more than his “cerebreffectiveness,” which includes what those less picky about such matters than I would call “intelligence” but is significantly more than.  To make it easier to plow through what I will go on to say, though, I will replace “anthreffectiveness” with “intelligence.”

The stupider a person is, the shorter the period of time I’m speaking of will be.  Since my greatest defect as a thinker is a need to name just about everything I discuss, I am now going to call this period of time the “ethotactical duration.”  It’s a term I’ve come up with on the spot, so probably won’t last long.  It’s how long ahead a person plans (in effect, since usually the “planning” will be nothing like formal planning, and won’t even involve what most people think of as thought)—or, to put it more simply, it’s how long a person will take to decide, based on his (conscious or unconscious) moral code, what he will next do.  (A “behavratactical duration” is how far ahead a person plans before initiating any behavior.)

Note to Goldberg: please tell your couch that I am not purposely trying to distract my readers from my essentially empty ideas by overloading them with terminology, and that—while I do feel he’s almost as good an influence on my as he is on you, I’d prefer that he not bother me until I’ve finished saying what I want to say here.  I should add that if he wants me to continue referring to him in the future, thus improving his chances of immortality by at least 0.62%, he needs to try harder to be my friend.)

To be fastidious to a nauseating extreme, I must say that by “how long ahead a person thinks before making an ethotactical decision about what he will do next,” I actually mean “how long ahead the wide variety of facts, feelings, and who-knows-what-else a person will (in effect) consult before making an ethotactical decision regarding what he will next do.

Now then, while the length of a person’s ethotactical duration has a great deal to do with the intelligence of his moral acts, the width and depth of his moral decisions (i.e., their intelligence) will have significantly more to do with it.  Does he just consider the taste of a piece of candy he has been offered, or also its effect on his health and/or its effect on his reputation, and/or its effect on a child with him if you don’t offer it to him and the effect of that on you, and/or its effect on his mood and the effect of that on the poem he is composing . . . and the effect of that on what the world thinks of him in the year 2222?

As you can see, ethotactical intelligence will effect ethotactical duration but also the width of said duration.  In the case just described, if the person is concerned only with the taste of the candy bar and the immediate effect of his giving it versus not giving it to the child, he will only be concerned with a duration approximately equal to the time it takes him to eat the candy, or the same length of time (let’s assume) that he will enjoy the child’s enjoyment of the candy if he gives it to the child, or feel guilty about not giving it the child if he eats it but the width of the duration will be greater than it would have been had he only considered how the candy would taste.

(My thanks to Goldberg’s couch for not telling me how clumsily I just expressed myself.)

TO BE CONTINUED (alas)

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Conceptual Poetry « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Conceptual Poetry’ Category

Entry 1285 — The Conceptaphor

Saturday, November 30th, 2013

Those familiar with my poetics coinages will know about my use of “phor” as a suffix for “variety of equaphor,” “equaphor” itself being one of them–and meaning, basically, “analogy presented as an identity,” the metaphor being the classic example.  Hence, my latest means “conceptual metaphor.  And example is the dividend shed I use in my long division poems as a metaphor equating the poem it’s in to a mathematical machine, or–perhaps more exactly–equating  what happens to the dividend as an inevitable, absolutely valid, concrete process.  Similarly, a log division poem’s long division paraphernalia is a metaphor for the poem as a whole, equating it to a mathematical process.  The idea is to generate connotations counter to the sensual denotations and connotations the rest of the poem’s elements are generating. . . .  It’s hard to explain, but I know what I’m doing!

I figure I need the term now for three different pieces I’m writing: my next post-SciAm entry, a review of an anthology of mathematics-related poetry, and an essay on the value of such poetry.  In the meantime, I’m still working on a definition of conceptual poetry.  I may now have it: poetry making central use of a conceptaphor.  Or: poetry whose central aesthetic effect is due more to one or more conceptaphors than to anything else.  Conceptual Poem: poem built around a conceptaphor, or conceptaphorical cluster.  (I never get anything right the first time.  Well, rarely.)

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Entry 952 — Pronouncements & Blither, Part 13

Friday, December 14th, 2012

First of all, something I posted at Argotist Online: “Here’s a good discussion point: why are poets so unwilling to discuss poetry on the Internet? Do they discuss it in some length elsewhere? Perhaps they do like talking about it, but not where what they say will become part of a permanent record?”

Another: ““Is it possible for someone whose poetry is at the level of Pound’s or Yeats’s to publish his poetry anywhere more than a few will see it? Or have it intelligently reviewed in a publication reaching more than a hundred readers?”

Next, a corrected version of something I said in my last entry: “A poem is good in proportion to the ratio of the (unified) largeness of the beauty it evokes for its best engagents to the size of the poem.”

Finally, a work from Marton Koppany’s latest collection, Addenda–which I’m not yet ready to say anything about except that it’s terrific:

Addenda, by the way, is as certainly a major collection of poetry by a living author as any other collection I’ve seen in the past forty years.

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Entry 948 — Pronouncements & Blither, Part 9

Monday, December 10th, 2012

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Back at New-Poetry someone advanced a silly poem as the equal of the Sondheim.  At the same time a few shrugged off my case for the value of the latter as entirely subjective and thus of no importance.  Others made comments I considered equally inane.  So, yesterday evening, I responded with:
Would any of you who have been contributed to this thread (or only read portions of it) be willing (be brave enough) to carry out the following experiment:
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(1) Select two poems, one you consider significantly better than the other;

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(2) Support your view with references to what is explicitly in each poem, bad and good (in your opinion)?

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Second challenge to those unwilling to do this because it would be meaninglessly subjective: be honest enough to go on record with the view that all poems are equally good.

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I’ve already half-done this with a very flawed quick reaction to the Sondheim poem indicating why I consider it at least not bad. (I now consider it a superior poem, having found more virtues in it by thinking of it more focusedly as a conceptual poem.) I will now say why—objectively, because supported by what’s objectively in or not in each of the two poems as opposed to anything that may be subjectively in them like sincerity.) I will now compare it with the other poem posted:

PHOTOSYNTHESIS
by Banana Jones
You have a head,
mountain goats eat fudge,
I spread toe jelly on my wrist,
Concrete angel,
You ain’t got nothing on me,
Oh right…
Babies come from vagina’s.
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Sondheim inserts (_) into his poem, as I’m now sure it is, in accordance with a logical plan—i.e., after every word or phrase in order that a person doing the task of reading it will be able to check off each read bit of the poem. This slows the read (a virtue in the opinion of most I’m fairly sure) and also almost forces a reader to pay more than normal attention to each bit, and think about the task of reading. The poem explicitly tells the reader to take extra pains while he’s reading, so the claim that pressure to pay more than normal attention to one’s journey through the text seems to me objectively true. I feel I could support most of my reactions to the poem similarly, but am not up to doing that right now. My aim now is simply to compare this one thing the Sondheim text objectively does I believe any reasonable person would agree to what seems to me an absence of any thing like it.
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The Jones poem does nothing according to any logic I can see. It jump-cuts from one clause-length narrative to another entirely unconnected to it in any meaningful sense (I say with a fair confidence that I am here being objective in the reasonable sense that (verbal) meaninglessness can be objectively defined as words arranged in such a way as to confuse a large majority of readers or listeners, and no defense of their meaningfulness will change any but a very few minds about that).
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The Sondheim contains one fresh element, or perhaps can be said to carry out a fresh design; and every poem needs something fresh–objectively. If we start with the dogma that a poem needs to move one, and know objectively from a study of the effects of poetry on human beings that a poem that does absolutely nothing new will rarely move anyone, even those who claim to like some such poem.
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The Jones poem is not fresh—because although its particular images are wildly different from the images in conventional poems—they lack all coherence and therefore result in chaos—objectively result in it, I say, using the same argument I previously used—and chaos is never fresh however different its elements, one chaos being perceived by the sane as just about entirely the same as any other chaos. I think this observation important (and especially like it because it just occurred to me as I was writing this): the Sondheim is not chaos (although possibly not cohering here and there.
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I think I could find some virtues in the Jones poem if I tried, but I’m sure they wouldn’t equal the virtues in the Sondheim I’ve already written about in this thread, and I’ve found more since then. I claim they are objectively superior to any virtues in the Jones I’m now intuitively aware of, but that’s admittedly just an assertion, but one made because I’m not up to a full dissertation on the two poems—here.
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Frankly, I think that I’ve shown beyond reasonable doubt that the Sondheim is the better of the two poems. Which makes me think maybe my challenge would have been that someone show why they are equal. Or of what value any discussion of the merits of any poem is if we agree in advance than nobody’s opinion means anything. 
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Entry 947 — Pronouncements & Blither, Part 8

Sunday, December 9th, 2012

Two days ago I posted what follows to a thread at New-Poetry concererning experimentality in which the poem discussed was inserted:

I threw the commentary following the text below (which is by Alan Sondheim) in one writing, and left it as is without checking it to try for an authentic initial response—although it’s not quite initial as I have skimmed the poem two or three times before writing about it.—Bob

when (_) you (_) read (_) this (_)

when (_) you (_) read (_) this (_) if (_) you (_) read (_)
this (_) please (_) do (_) check (_) where (_) you (_) do
(_) check (_) so (_) you (_) will (_) track (_) your (_)
reading (_) where (_) you (_) check (_) in (_) the (_)
midst (_) of (_) parentheses (_) in (_) the (_) midst (_)
of (_) bodies (_) you (_) will (_) check. (_) and (_) two
(_) you (_) will (_) know (_) you (_) have (_) then (_)
read (_) and (_) will (_) have (_) been (_) read (_) by
(_) the (_) checks (_) both (_) useful (_) and (_) against
(_) all (_) interference (_) which (_) you (_) might (_)
now. (_) three (_) you (_) will (_) check (_) here (_) and
(_) then (_) here (_) and (_) you (_) will (_) fill (_) in
(_) checks (_) and (_) blanks (_) and (_) you (_) will.
(_) four (_) and (_) fecund (_) and (_) cornucopia (_) and
(_) the (_) great (_) fullness (_) of (_) life (_) and (_)
desire (_) will (_) result (_) with (_) all (_) words (_)
checked (_) that (_) you (_) have (_) read (_) them (_)
and (_) you (_) have (_) been (_) there. (_) and (_) you
(_) will (_) have (_) read (_) them. (_) five (_) and (_)
you (_) will (_) have (_) been (_) there, (_) you (_) can
(_) check, (_) you (_) will (_) have (_) been (_) there.
(_) (_)


To avoid getting into whether this work by Alan Sondheim is a poem or not, I will refer to it simply as a “text.” The speaker of the text expects us to read it. He wants you to do something as you do, put checks in the parentheses. You will already be disconcerted by the strange appearance of the text. Every effective aesthetic experience begins with a “hunh,” however small and usually too short-lasting to be noticed, which turns into pleasure when one gets one’s bearings. Sometimes the hunh lasts a long time. One may never get one’s bearings, in which case the text, or whatever it is, has failed one as a work of art—at that point. But one sincerely wishing to understand the text may finally get his bearings, with help if not on his own, if he persists.

As happened with “The Wasteland” for many, and—I’m sure—with poems of Stevens’s. Can it happen with the text above? It did quickly for me because I have a lot of experience with poems like it. It’s hard to say why, but I’ll try, because I don’t think any poem genuinely any good if it can’t eventually be explained.

If one actually reads it and at least imagines himself making checks, one will enter a kind of mood I don’t have a name for (yet). A mood based on exploring ideas, and/or carrying out an analysis. Here, what reading is—metaphorically related, it seems to me (and this is a first draft of my understanding of the text), to ones over-all experience of going through life.

Think of the text as one’s life, which you are being asked fully to examine. So, the text is at least a joke on those (like me) who may spend too much time evaluating everything they do. On the other hand, it may be straight didacticism about the value of attending to every detail of one’s life

Perhaps it’s only a text that the strongly analytical can enjoy. Those with a strong reducticeptual awareness, as I call it. The joy of working one’s way to the solution of a challenging math problem.

It poses a question for me, how does one really know that he has “been there?” Have you ever stopped long enough in your life to make a check mark—which will mean that you took time to better your experience of wherever you stopped.

I don’t yet know what is meant by having “been read by all checks, and I wonder if “now” is a typo for “know.” One should not expect complete clarity from a poem, and certainly not at once.

It becomes lyrical at the end, at least for me, climaxing in the joy I now find to be the sense of fulfillment when you look over something important you’ve done and realize from the memories you formed (like boxes checked) that you have truly been somewhere. As, when the text works for you, it becomes at the end, once you come sufficiently to terms with it, a there you have fully been at/in.

Okay, this is disorganized and possibly not too coherent in places. But it shows how a mind with a little of the necessary background and a willingness to wade into something not immediately nice can form some kind of appreciation of the text by giving it a chance, and express that appreciation however poorly, which seems to me proof that the text is not worthless.

In any case, I consider it well worth returning to, and likely to lead me to greater appreciation of it.

Last thought because I just had it: line 22 is absolutely terrific.

I haven’t had time since to fix it, but eventually will, expanding on it at the same time–at length, I hope.  Fascinating poem.  I have decided, by the way, to give it its own class, “conceptual poetry,” although it is an infraverbal poem, and probably a visual one, as well.

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Entry 1199 — Wackagandism « POETICKS

Entry 1199 — Wackagandism

My latest coinage means “the propagandistic techniques of cranks, kooks and others advancing totally insane theories of verosophy such as the idea that someone other than William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon wrote the works attributed to him.”  It came to me while thinking about the contributions of Oxfordian Steve Steinberg to the thread here about the Oxfordian movie, Anonymous.  In reply to a post of mine trying for the third or fourth time to explain an argument against a contention of his, he told me that in order to explain something, I had to know something.  Here’s what I wrote back:

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Good one, Steve, but somewhat off the mark.  Nonetheless, it’s gotten me to try to explain something to you again.  What I’m going to try to explain to you is how bad your tendency almost always to dodge problems with your position makes you look.  No, I realize that first I must explain to you that you DO this, for I fear I believe you don’t realize you do.  I will use this short back&forth of ours to do so.

First off, I describe a problem I have with your position: your contention that Shakespeare of Stratford would not have been exposed to a more or less standard curriculum is wrong.  You called the presumption that English schools of the time had any kind of standard curriculum a “myth” (debasing one of the world’s most precious terms by misusing it as a synonym for “error,” and implied synonym for “lie” the way so many propagandists moronically do).

At this point, you derided me for claiming that Latin, a single scholastic subject, could mean “curriculum,” or collection of subjects.  Or so I interpreted you to be doing.  You ignored the full context of my post which, I feel, should have made my point clear.  In any case, you made no attempt to figure out what my point was, if you truly failed to understand it, nor ask me what it was.  You EVADED the problem I had tried to bring to your attention.

2. Still, maybe I WAS (Italics intended) unclear.   If I was, my next post should have helped you, although it was sarcastically put.  Here is where your nature as a propagandistic evader of problems to your case came fully to the fore: as I probably not fully accurately recall, you continued not to understand my point; more important, you spread the conversation all over the place, a standardly propagandistic ploy of anti-Stratfordians (and probably unconscious) to draw one’s opponents into irrelevancies, and away from whatever point they are advancing, which you can’t deal effectively with.

3. I restated my point.  Your response to this was simply to tell me I don’t know anything–which, by the way, is another standardly propagandistic ploy of anti-Stratfordians: insulting one’s opponent maximally, consciously or unconsciously aware that making someone angry is a good way to distract him from his central intention.

Okay, now to give you an easy chance to show that you can respond to a description of something that may be wrong with your case without doing what I have claimed you do habitually: I will re-state as clearly as I can what’s wrong with your idea about what Shakespeare would have learned at his grammar school.  All you have to do is say what you disagree with in my statement and why–AND avoid telling me what a jerk Baldwin was (and I am), et cetera.  You must avoid the temptation otherwise to tackle about my characterization of you above, too.  In other words, I want you to demonstrate that you can argue unevasively, not just say you can.  But if you actually attend focusedly to my point, I will be glad to discuss my characterization of the way you operate in a different thread.

Good one, Steve, but somewhat off the mark.  Nonetheless, it’s gotten me to try to explain something to you again.  What I’m going to try to explain to you is how bad your tendency almost always to dodge problems with your position makes you look.  No, I realize that first I must explain to you that you DO this, for I fear I believe you don’t realize you do.  I will use this short back&forth of ours to do so.

First off, I describe a problem I have with your position: your contention that Shakespeare of Stratford would not have been exposed to a more or less standard curriculum is wrong.  You called the presumption that English schools of the time had any kind of standard curriculum a “myth” (debasing one of the world’s most precious terms by misusing it as a synonym for “error,” and implied synonym for “lie” the way so many propagandists moronically do).

At this point, you derided me for claiming that Latin, a single scholastic subject, could mean “curriculum,” or collection of subjects.  Or so I interpreted you to be doing.  You ignored the full context of my post which, I feel, should have made my point clear.  In any case, you made no attempt to figure out what my point was, if you truly failed to understand it, nor ask me what it was.  You EVADED the problem I had tried to bring to your attention.

2. Still, maybe I WAS (Italics intended) unclear.   If I was, my next post should have helped you, although it was sarcastically put.  Here is where your nature as a propagandistic evader of problems to your case came fully to the fore: as I probably not fully accurately recall, you continued not to understand my point; more important, you spread the conversation all over the place, a standardly propagandistic ploy of anti-Stratfordians (and probably unconscious) to draw one’s opponents into irrelevancies, and away from whatever point they are advancing, which you can’t deal effectively with.

3. I restated my point.  Your response to this was simply to tell me I don’t know anything–which, by the way, is another standardly propagandistic ploy of anti-Stratfordians: insulting one’s opponent maximally, consciously or unconsciously aware that making someone angry is a good way to distract him from his central intention.

Okay, now to give you an easy chance to show that you can respond to a description of something that may be wrong with your case without doing what I have claimed you do habitually: I will re-state as clearly as I can what’s wrong with your idea about what Shakespeare would have learned at his grammar school.  All you have to do is say what you disagree with in my statement and why–AND avoid telling me what a jerk Baldwin was (and I am), et cetera.  You must avoid the temptation otherwise to tackle about my characterization of you above, too.  In other words, I want you to demonstrate that you can argue unevasively, not just say you can.  But if you actually attend focusedly to my point, I will be glad to discuss my characterization of the way you operate in a different thread.

* * *

I then added a second post in which I warned that “I now have a new plan: using quotations from this enormous thread as the basis of a monograph on what I’m tentatively calling ‘Wackagandistic Techniques.’ So be careful what you type. If I actually go through with this, and I only get seriously involved in about two percent of the projects I tell people I’m going to, and finish less than one percent of those, I will post it and make changes to misquotations–or accurate quotations of passages their authors didn’t mean. In other words, I’ll try to be fair, though never not nasty.”

I chose to quote my first post because I think it pretty good–although way off-topic for this blog.  Beware: I will no doubt be using this blog for more matter concerned with wackagandism.  I find that there’s nothing I enjoy more than writing about mental dysfunctionality.  What I write has to be valuable: either because it’s insightful or because it epitomizes mental dysfunctionality.

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Anthropology « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Anthropology’ Category

Entry 1386 — Coinebreation

Saturday, March 1st, 2014

The result of my latest fit of koi NEE bree AY shuhn

I am retiring one of my coinages: “Triumphancy.”  I like it but the expression of “triumph” as the central goal of narrative poetry is sufficient.  I’m not sure about “kinhood.”  It’s a good word that I’ll keep.  What I’m not sure of is whether it works as well as some other word may as what anthrocentric poetry seeks mainly to express.

Passing note: nothing screws up a style like a desire to be thorough.  Of course, nothing brings stylistic brilliance to a peak more than thoroughness elegantly captured.  (I’m forever parenthetically excusing my style . . . as now.  Stupid, this need to make my readers aware that I’m wonderfully self-aware/self-critical.)

“Kinfusion”: joyful recognition of being one with some other person regarding something of consequence, like who you want to win the super bowl.  Wrong.  It would be the state of being one with some other person.  What about “kincognition?”  Ridiculous word, but I may use it.

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Entry 1385 — Triumphancy

Friday, February 28th, 2014

Just a few random thoughts for this entry, my second of the day after finding out I was one day behind in entries and having had trouble enough doing the one for yesterday, although once I got going, I kept going.  (Warning: some of the material is politically-incorrect.)

Triumphancy, is much more a male goal than a female one.  Women, much more often than men, can be heard saying, “It’s only a game,” and they mean it.  Men say the same thing fairly often, but non-wimps don’t really mean it.  Men have always been the ones going off on quests.  It goes back to the sexual division of labor that Nature gave our species, and most other species, one result of which, for us, was making males responsible for hunting, females responsible for gathering–and hunting is a much more questlike activity than gathering.  But geographical exploration became primarily a male activity, too, the physique, temperament and kind of mental abilities that make males better hunters than females making them better for exploration, too.

In addition, and this seems always overlooked by feminists, wimps and academic anthropologists, males are much more biologically expendable than females, so it makes biological sense to fit them for much more risk than females, and make them desire the challenge of danger to a much greater extent.  Males are much more physically courageous/foolhardy than females.  Genetically.  (Yes, there are exceptions, Nature never obliterating exceptions, and they are interesting but in a brief discussion not worth consideration.)  Females have other equally valuable characteristics–such as a superior self-preservation instinct.  And a stronger instinctive desire for kinhood, or at least a different desire for it than males’.

Here’s a test of that psychologists could carry out: gather some short stories emphasizing a character’s thoughts and feelings but hardly going anywhere narratively (some of Henry James’s, for instance) and the same number of “action stories”–stories high on plot but low on characterization.  Then have fifty female and fifty male college students read them and rank them from most pleasurable to least pleasurable.  I’m sure male and female ratings will be opposite each other.

One problem: action stories generally have male protagonists so it might be hard to make half of one’s selection of them concerning female protagonists; it would be easy, I think, to split the character studies into two equal groups according to sex of protagonist.  Unfortunately, there are many other problems because of the many variables involved, like quality of writing, amount of violence, seepage of interesting characterization into action stories, and good plotting into character studies.  But the rough idea makes sense.  Probably just a study of who buys what kind of reading matter could decide the matter.

One thing seems clear to me: there’s no way one could claim that either of the two kinds of stories is superior to the others–although I suspect English professors would vote for character studies–which I would say proved my point in spite of the sex of the professors.  I suppose it would be too difficult to categorize the greatest literary works, though, to settle the matter, most of them being complex mixtures of characterization and plot.

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Urceptuality « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Urceptuality’ Category

Entry 1674 — The Sun & My First House

Saturday, December 27th, 2014

For the past two days or so I have been feeling like I am on the verge of really getting started on a Major Work beginning with an in-depth survey of my theory of awarenesses.  I couldn’t figure out why until I thought of the transitting sun.  That’s what the sun is called when one is considering its location in one horoscope: right now the Sun is at 6 degrees Capricorn in the sky, which puts it just in my horoscope’s first house, which begins at around 3 degrees Capricorn.  This house, as you might guess, has to do with beginnings!

It’s all rot, but fun.  And I have to admit, when my life is suddenly doing something good that my horoscope says it should be doing, it encourages me, however many more times I’ve compared what my horoscope said my life should be doing with what my life was doing and found no similarity at all between the two.  I think it’s because nothing in my life is ever encouraging.  Okay, exaggeration.  What’s more true is that the few things in my life that have been encouraging resulted in nothing but disappointment: get the gig at the Scientific American website, for instance.  To be maximally accurate, I should say that the stars are no worse at predicting good things for me than real life is, and not as depressing when their predictions are full of hooey, because I don’t really believe in them.

On the other hand, anything encouraging is good for me, if I can even half believe in it for a few minutes because I think people like me may have an urceptual optimist in us that is sensitive to any sign of encouragement, and able to minimize all that our internal pessimist tries to warn us about.

Note: you have just had a front eye on the birth of the urceptual optimist and urceptual pessimist: neither existed until I began writing the paragraph above.  They make sense to me, particularly the urceptual optimist.  How else explain the insanity that keeps people like me going no matter how unarguably quickly the unreachability of our goals is increasing?

Hey, I also have three new terms for you: “magni-cerebrevalu-ceptual,”  “practi-cerebrevaluceptual,” and “reflexevaluaceptual.” I’ll save my discussion of these till tomorrow.

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Entry 1201 — The Obversopher « POETICKS

Entry 1201 — The Obversopher

Yesterday I came up with another new word, “obversopher,” for “opposite of versosopher.”  A propagandist is an obversopher who wants his understanding of some belief system to triumph whether true or not.  An obtusopher is an obversopher who wants his understanding of some belief system to triumph in spite of its invalidity because he truly fails to realize it is invalid.  A verosophers wants the truth to triumph regardless of whether it validates some belief system of his or not.

I’m confused about the book I thought I was going to write about propagandism.  The above is part of my flounder to find a Unifying Principle for it.

I need a list of propagandistic techniques and of examples of obtusophical irrationality.  I probably should list everything that could possibly be on either list then get them appropriately organized.  Wishlexia.  Varieties of distraction.  Use of logical fallacies.  Cherry-Picking.  Insults.  Decontextualization.

Nothing more today.  Earlier an important external hard drive crashed and I lost two hours taking it to Staples to have it looked at.  My data may be retrievable, but I won’t find out for at least another six hours.  I was worried that I’d lost many good graphic images.  The drive had been for back-ups, but I’d begun using it as my only storage place for a lot of stuff–because I feared a computer crash, not an external drive crash.  Very stupid.  But lucky, for most of the data on the drive was (as I finally remembered after not finding it anywhere on any of my computers) from another external drive of mine, and most everything else recent was on a flash drive that I use to take things from my main computer to the one I use for my blog.  But now a thunderstorm is giving me trouble.  It zapped a half hour of work a few minutes ago.  So I want to get this posted right now.

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Evocature « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Evocature’ Category

Entry 959 — Lyrico- & Cognitopoetic Evocature

Friday, December 21st, 2012

 

I have two new coinages for you today: alert the New York Times!  I guess I owe the pair to the essay by Marjorie Perloff and some of the responses to it in The Boston Review.  They got me thinking about what Perloff calls “conceptual poetry,” but which, in most cases I know of, is—by my definition of poetry, conceptual prose.  So, were they conceptual prose poems, in which case I would call them conceptual evocature, “evocature” being my name for prose whose aims are those of conventional poetry, a focus on images, psychological relationships, scenes (but not stories) or mixtures of two or all of these to evoke deep feelings.

That meant I had to find a name for conventional evocature, the prose poems everyone is familiar with.  At first I tried “intellectual evocature” for conceptual “poems,” “sub-intellectual evocature” for the other kind.  I was completely against the negativity of this, truly believing that neither sort of text was inferior to the other (or to what I considered poetry), but I found it extremely hard to come up with a better term.

My Roget was no help: the only antonym it gave for “intellect” was “insanity.”  Eventually, I settle on “lyrical,” a term I’ve long used for what most people in the field would agree is “lyrical poetry”—poetry whose focus is on images (especially metaphorically-employed), psychological relationships, etc., and no longer, it seems to me, on its melody, however primary that can be in some of our greatest poetry.  Result: a kind of prose concerned with feelings one can ascend to by solving a difficult mathematical problem or seeing suddenly the way two atoms work together chemically or how to win a knight in a game of chess called “intellectual evocature”; and a kind of prose concerned with feelings generated by the daffodils Wordsworth once wrote of or a love gained or lost or a red wheel/ barrow called “lyrical evocature.”

That prose that is both intellectual and lyrical should go without saying.  I believe that any such mixture will almost always be more one than the other, thus adhering to its definition as more lyrical than intellectual if called lyrical, and the reverse if called intellectual.  That none will ever be able to identify some specimens of mixed evocature as one or the other does not invalidate the definition since no definition that does not fail at its borders in some trivial way is possible.

My two terms did not remain permanent, though.  Before I’d used them without thinking when first writing about the two kinds of evocature, I’d already coined “lyricopoetic” and “cognitopoetic.”  Once I realized I’d put them aside, I was upset.  What a shame to have to give up such clever coinages!  Their replacements seemed better, though: unpretentious and fitting.

But I didn’t stick with them.  What changed my mind, besides my parental pride, was first the coldness of “intellectual” compared with “cognitopoetic.”  Not that the latter glowed with warmth, but “poetic” did seem to me significantly to counter the coldness of “cognito.”  I quickly realized, too, that it was a much more specifically appropriate adjective than “intellectual”—because of  that “poetic.”  It was clearly a good thing for a reader to think “poetry” when told of a kind of literary work called “evocature.”  The adjective would work much better, too, when applied to some art other than conceptual prose.  For instance, an asemic “poem” described as “cognitopoetic” should quickly turn an engagent’s thoughts to language (as the work itself, which might contain no words, might not); the same work called “intellectual” would be nowhere near as helpful in that way.  Ergo, I’m going with my coinages.  Not that anyone but I will use either set.

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Entry 363 — Evocature

Sunday, January 30th, 2011

Ron Silliman’s Ketjak is discussed, and quoted, in an interesting review quoted by Barrett Watten in an entry to his blog here.  I mention it now because of two thoughts that crossed my mind when I read the three paragraphs of Ketjak quoted near the beginning of the review: one is that it was not a language poem, as Barry Schwabsky, the author, claimed, nor is it even a poem.  It is not a language poem because it employs no linguipoetic devices–no devices, that is, based on syntax, orthography or inflection.  It is not a poem because it has no flow-breaks, only jump-cuts, which I do feel qualify as flow-breaks.  The work, assuming it continues to be prose, is what I call evocature, a variety of literary prose.

But it’s supposed to be among the break-through texts of the language poetry movement.  Am I panning it by saying it does neither language nor poetry?  No.  I am merely improving the way it should be taken, which is as a break-through text of what has become language prose.

Of course, hardly anyone will accept that Silliman’s text is not a language poem.  But considering it a poem makes it extremely difficult to distinguish poetry from prose, which I think important to do.  It also makes the task almost wholly dependent of subjective choices.  Using my definition, one can distinguish a poem from prose easily by counting the objectively discernable flow-breaks in it.  Disregarding my definition, one can only tell the two apart (it seems to me) by counting how many elements a given text has that poetry has long be believed to have more of than prose such as figurative language, melodation (alliteration, rhyme, meter, etc.), fresh diction, density, lineation, formal shape  (such as the fourteen lines a sonnet has), and much else.  One must also subjectively evaluate the aesthetic importance of these since no text will have them all, and what everyone would agree is a poem may have only one element of poetry but have it too powerfully not to qualify as a poem whereas a piece of political prose might have a great deal of trite flowery language to qualify quantitatively as a poem, but not qualitatively.  For communication’s sake, it thus makes much more sense to me to prefer my clear definition of poetry to any other one.

As for nullinguistically eschewing any definition, at all, or one that can be applied to anything, it is my simply claim that that is simply to ignore the search for truth.  That is something I, for one, can’t do.

I quite like the excerpt of Ketjak, by the way.  I don’t know enough about what’s been called language poetry to know for sure how historically important it is, but I suspect it has not been greatly over-esteemed.

Difference Between the Sexes « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Difference Between the Sexes’ Category

Entry 1676 — Mars Rules My Moon

Monday, December 29th, 2014

The planet Mars is interfering with my normal reticence, pushing me to throw away the last shred of my pretense of being a Nice Person by finally revealing that I believe men and women are significantly different from one another.  The transiting moon is contributing to the problem because it has entered the house where my natal moon, and that house is ruled by Aries, the sign of Mars!  Meanwhile, Uranus is currently in Aries, too, and (energizingly) trine to my natal sun.  Uranus is my ruling planet, and basically in charge of craziness, which is what it’s mainly energizing in the present case.  So add it to the mix.  As for Mars, it is conjunct to (with?) my natal sun, which is why it’s having such a great effect on me.  Nothing, I fear can now save me.  I must now continue with my follow-up to what I mentioned toward the end of my letter to William Voegeli.

What I believe was standard educated thought for at least a century before I was born and possibly until 1960.  Somewhere along the way the feminist movement ordained that it was invalid, and that was it.  I’m sure many males, and perhaps a few females, still believed it, but we kept our mouths shut.  Let me be as honest as I can (an Aquarian defect): as an unfortunately close-to-100% male (tall, thin, bald-headed, heterosexual and much else I won’t get into): I not only consider men to be vastly superior to women but consider that a healthy point-of-view (and expect healthy women to believe women to be vastly superior to men).  But I’m intelligent enough to see that men and women have to put up with each other.  Needless to say, my innate sex drive makes that unavoidable for me personally, although not nearly as much now as it did earlier.

I believe men and women are innately psychologically different from one another in a way that increases both their need for each other and the friction between them.  Men give life meaning; women make it livable.  To lunge beyond the minor infamies of popular men-as-Martians, women-as-Venusians books.  Back to what I said about a focus on aspiration and a focus on compassion.

Also: men are oaks in winter, needing the foliage that women are more or less as much as women need the structuring mean can provide them.

Men lead, women follow. Margaret Thatcher was a rare exception, an effective leader, there being about as many effective female leaders as there are superior male leaders, but only a hundredth as many effective female leaders as effective male leaders.  Another effective female leader was anthropologist Margaret Mead.  I don’t think much of her standard anthropological views (what makes effective leaders is their ability to think standardly better than most others, and avoid thinking unstandardly, and sometimes standard views make sense), but I think her right when she concluded that while male and female roles varied from one society to another, males always took the roles that society considered its most important ones (as I’m pretty sure it was her, but I’ve never called myself an effective scholar [believe my ideas, not my data]).  I therefore more than half-think political positions are rapidly losing status in our society now that women are taking them over, and that college degrees have almost most entirely lost status with superior males now that females are proving much better at getting them than all but a few males.

As you may have noticed, I’m into my note-scattering mode now, writing thoughts as they occur without trying (much) for any kind of logical presentation.  I’ll try to make connections between notes when I can, though.  Like the connection of what I’m about to get into back to my honesty about myself.  I said I healthily consider my sex superior to . . . my sister’s.  I bring her into this because something she said to me as a little girl (around ten when I was eleven and the two of us were on the wonderful roof of our wonderful childhood house where no one could see us because of the M-shape of the roof we’d climbed down into where its two sides came to a point).  I don’t remember how we got into it but we were arguing about who was better, boys or girls.  I was winning because my sister couldn’t deny that men were physically superior to women, and in our family even my mother (who graduated from high school at the age of 15) agreed men were smarter than women (although, oddly, I thought my mother much smarter than my father until puberty when I realized that he, though slower by quite a bit than she, was deeper).

I had no reply to what she next said: “Only girls can have babies.”  Later I learned of something called “division of labor,” than feminists seem not to believe in.  But it caused me as the asexual objective being that I am to about an equal degree that I am a male to come to understand that sexes as equal but different–however much the male in me scoffs at the idea.

That reproduction is maximally complex in human beings is central to the division of labor between the sexes.  Women have a womb, and it is not some minor organ they have and men don’t.  For one thing, it must require energy for maintenance that must reduce a female’s energy for other things like boxing and writing symphonies.  It more substantially affects the amount of energy a pregnant female has for various activities.

Meanwhile, the male has no womb holding him back.  One major, rarely-mentioned side-effect of his womblessness, however, is how biologically-expendable it makes him, something I immediately recognized when at the age of 32 I learned about copulation.  (Slight exaggeration in hopes that the wittiness of it will keep any female or girly-boy friend of mine who is reading this from being too mad at me.)  Males are close to biologically irrelevant when it comes to reproduction, because one male can keep a village of a hundred nubile females and no males but him doubling in population yearly, and in eleven or twelve years, more than doubling whereas one nubile female in a village of a hundred healthy young men and no females but him will need help from daughters to ever double the population of her village.

This being the case, why wouldn’t Mother Nature make males courageous, sometimes excessively so, and females timid?  Why shouldn’t they hunt and fight other tribes while females gathered vegetables and fruit, and fled from another tribe’s warriors?  In short, why shouldn’t reproductively barely-relevant males be risk-takers–intellectually, eventually, as much as physically–like me, now, I try to convince myself, never having been much of a physical risk-taker, although I believe I would have been had I needed to because of a confrontation between a scared me and a German Shepherd who bit me (actually, just nipped me in the heel), which turned me instantly into a beserker whose scream of rage as I whirled around to face the dog made the it run away.

Of course, women can take on maleness when necessary, Mother Nature realizing there will be times when males are too scarce to fill all the male roles needing filling; but they won’t be as good males as natural males, nor able to keep it up for very long (generally).  Men can make adequate mommies, too, but not usually for a long time.

Women are much better verbally than men . . . practiceptually, which is all that the the verbal portion of IQ tests test (incompletely).  Orally, particularly, due to the female vocal cords–and superior flexibility of mind (which is also a female defect that makes them more suggestible than men–in the long term).

Culturally, women’s main value is their female point-of-view; that is, they can add much to any art or verosophy that no male can, even a maximally feminine one–just as males can supply much that no female can.

After skimming what I’ve so far written, I see that I’ve left out how Mother Nature has used common sense to make those who bear children have a much stronger mothering-instinct than those who may not be present at a child’s birth.  Indeed, it seems obvious to me that women are the timid sex not only to protect themselves, but to protect the children they bear.  And a good reason they are more empathetic than men is to be able to forge closer bonds than men to their children and be able to react faster to their needs, which they feel within to a greater degree than man.

At the same time, this gives men a freedom from domestic responsibilities, to be emotionally as well as physically better able to put aside their families (especially when young and thus more male than they will be) that allows them to go on quests.

I just remembered one other big difference between men and women.  I discovered its importance thirty or forty years ago but this will be the first time in print I’ve mentioned it.  I can’t believe geneticists are not aware of it, but can’t recall ever reading a discussion of it.  It’s the fact that the y-chromosome, which only men have, is so much smaller than the x-chromosome it joins to form the genotype of the potential human being.[1]  Unless I’m mistaken, the difference in size between the two means that many genes in the x-chromosome have no gene from the y-chromosome to fuse with; therefore variation is substantially increased: there’s no gene from the y-chromosome to neutralize or modify a freak gene from the x-chromosome as there would be in a fertilized ovum destined to become a female.

One of my speculations, by the way, is that our species and probably others have a mutation mechanism that intentionally causes genetic mutations, and that its target is the an individual’s sex chromosome–perhaps, in fact, an ovum’s sex chromosome.  Hence, such a mechanism would increase the possibility of genetic variation.

Be that as it may, this greater male genetic variation would explain why more IQ geniuses as well as more of those of severely reduced mental-capacity are male than female, an empirical fact, I believe.  It seems also a fact that males are much more susceptible to genetic defects and to a lesser degree since they are rarer, genetic blessings.

All this would go along with my theory of the biological expendability of males: mother Nature doesn’t mind if a bunch of males are born severely defective, so she can risk them to test new genes on.  I further speculate that she keeps a woman’s mutation mechanism dormant until a woman is in her thirties, thus seeing to it that a woman’s first children are “normal” and only taking a chance of failed experiments on late-born children, children, in other words probably “extra.”  I particularly like the idea as one such late-born who in his own view must have all kinds of genetic mutations in his XY chromosome.  But my impression is that a fair number of superior culturateurs had older mothers.  And it is a fact that the late-born are more likely to be defective than those to young mothers.

* * *

[1] Sorry, right-to-lifers, but fetuses are not human beings for me, although I’d prefer they live as much as I prefer tadpoles to live (which I do) though much less than I want living cats to stay alive.

* * *

My intention today was to get all my evil thoughts about the differences between men and women down, to get them out of the way.  But there are quite a few more, and details to be recorded, and I’m tiring.  To bring this entry past the 2,000-word mark, though,  I’ll mention where differences between the sexes get most interesting.   Those of temperament are the most obvious: men lean toward being rigidniks, women milyoops (though most are a healthy balance between them.

Otherwise, the main ones are in . . . I can’t remember my name for it: the “cerebrawareness?”  All the awarenesses in the cerebrum taken together I mean.  That would be a good term for it.  Anyway, I contend that the cerebrawarelity of females is substantially different from the males.  Females have a more developed anthroceptual awareness than men, for instance.  I’ll get back to this sometime, but I think it less important than other things I want to discuss (although right now I can’t think what they might be).

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Entry 1200 — On Obtusophy and Propagandism « POETICKS

Entry 1200 — On Obtusophy and Propagandism

This from Steve Steinberg at the Anonymous thread:

I “got” what you said exactly Bob. You’re referring to Oxfordian/anti-Stratfordian arguments as “propaganda” and “wack-text” is the closest thing to actual propaganda I’ve encountered in the Shakespeare authorship debate. So is your penchant for making up “ology” words by which to describe us as mentally unsound. That’s okay. I’m cool with it. It’s cute and charming in a way. But, if there is anyone in the SAQ debate who is a ‘propagandist’ it is you!

What follows is what I made of three responses (here with the above because I’m in my null zone again, in spite of having taken what I call my “zoom-dose”: two APCs and a hydrocodrone tablet:

So far, Steve, you’ve done nothing to indicate you understand my simple point except say that you have. I feel that if you had, you would have made some attempt to refute it.

Moreover, you clearly are ignorant of what propaganda is. For one thing, it is NOT name-calling. As I told Ranny, it is AMONG OTHER THINGS, name-calling as a SUBSTITUTE for responsible argumentation. I just about always supply responsible argumentation, so am NOT a propagandist.

But thanks for mislabeling me, for it reminds me that I neglected something important in any discussion like this: definition of argument-establishing terminology. In this case, the main argument-establishing term is “propaganda.” I will now go to my word-processor to work up my preliminary definition of this. I extremely doubt that you could define it, but you’re welcome to try.

Note, the thought has crossed my mind that you may not be a propagandist but seem like on due to your being what I term a “obtusophist”–one not intellectually qualified to participate effectively in verosophical discussions.

Here’s my definition of propagandism (so far–I know it’s more complex than I suggest):

Propagandism (by which I mean the use of propaganda): the promotion of a belief through the excessive use of appeals to emotion and/or invalid argumentation and/or misrepresentations of effective arguments against the belief being promoted, and/or simple distraction–with a minimum of fact-based logical argumentation for the belief or engagement with fact-based logical arguments against the belief.

I say that you have dealt propagandistically with my fully-argued point about Shakespeare’s exposure to a curriculum–because you have failed to engage it, and used distraction against it (bringing up irrelevancies).  Being propagandistic once or twice does not make you a propagandist.  In fact, I think you are an obtusophist.  Someone who comes up with interesting thoughts he can’t effectively defend, and lacks a coherent serious theory.

Note: my description of you as an obtusophist is not an argument against your beliefs, so not propaganda, just a side-opinion.

Later note for here but not the thread: nullosophers, who are those opposing the search for truth, are inevitably propagandists because intentionally confusing whatever the issue is.  Obtusophers act like propagandists but unintentionally.  They sincerely believe they are on the road to some Grand Elucidation of an Important Subject.  Verosophers sometimes operate like propagandists–by smearing opponents, for instance–but not to win an argument but for the joy of smearing a moron.

“Verosophy,” you may need to be reminded, is derived from the Latin for “true” and the Greek for “wisdom”–or “knowledge.”  Hence, a verosopher is a seeker of truth.  This is a required term in English because English lacks a word for philosophers, scientists, historians . . . mathematicians?  My zoom-dose may be taking effect belatedly, for  a flow of thought is beginning to raise me out of the null zone.  I’ve just thought an old small thought about whether or not mathematics is a science.  I say that because it is not if science is considered a quest to understand material reality (like metaphysics is a quest to understand everything else, if there is anything else–and there is: my consciousness, for one thing; maybe yours, too, although I suspect not.  Mathematics, to get back to that, is a quest to understand itself only.  That it’s splendidly useful in science is beside the point.  (Side-thought: for tomorrow’s essay, students, tell me if mathematics is too important in science, not important enough, or employed just the right amount.  It’s greatly over-used in psychology, I think.)

Okay, we need the term, “verosophy” (or some better term if anyone can come up with one), to cover all the forms of serious truth-seeking, to wit: science, philosophy, mathematics, history. . . .  Step back, I feel another coinage gurgling up: “sociodominancy.”  I think I have some other word for that but it would probably take me a couple of hours to find it, so the heck with it.  Sociodominancy is the art or science of winning ascendancy over others, with sub-categories of politics and . . . war, I guess (I want a spiffier word like “havocry”).  Would chess and bridge be sub-categories of war?  Economics I’d make a sub-category of the science of psychology, ditto political science.  What about geographical exploration?  No.  Geography is a science, exploration a means of gaining truths about it the way looking through a telescope is a means of gaining astronomical truths.

Technology is a sister of science as is art.

Now I have a great urge to see my list of human activities–but I’m so damnable disorganized, I can’t find the list nor where to go that it might be.

* * * I just found one item on the list: “utilitry.”  That would include technology.  Failed to find any more.

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Sexism « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Sexism’ Category

Entry 1456 — Small Rant Against Euphemophilia

Saturday, May 17th, 2014

Bambi’s mother told him that if he couldn’t say something nice, he should say nothing, at all.  That was sixty or seventy years ago.  The thought is outdated now.  The American ruling class, and their publicity department (the American media), would say, “If you can’t think something nice, turn yourself in (to a reputable professional, of course) for counseling.  This is stupid in too many different ways for me to unfume enough to deal with it without revealing myself as every possible kind of black-hearted sub-human.  But I’ll point out one major way it is stupid, anyway: that once we can only tell others that they are wonderful (for fear of ostracism or legal punishment), there are bound to be people with unusually big hearts who will start telling others they are super-wonderful, and before you know it, the quickest-witted hyper-offendables will take action against those who have called them wonderful–i.e., inferior to the super-wonderful.

These kinds of thoughts I should just reserve for my private diary, but I gotta put something here daily!  I also feel obligated to other members of posterity here already to show them they aren’t alone.  Yes, weird that I would think of myself acting as a member of future generations by expressing views of of generations dead when I was born.

I should shut up but I have so little instinct for self-preservation, I can’t.  So I have to tell you I consider euphemophilia a synonym for what I just found out is “misandry,” hatred of men.  Interesting that you never hear of anyone accused of that. “Misandry” is crummy sounding so I’m going to use “mistestostergy” instead.  And now I really must yank myself outta here . . . except, alas, to make one more archaically self-deluded remark: I do not consider myself even close to being a misogynist.  But, remember, I don’t consider myself close to being homophobic, either, although I don’t think homosexuals should call their variety of marriage “marriage.”  And I refuse to call them “gays.”

really gotta yank myself outta here.  Will it help if I say I don’t respect our president’s intelligence, but don’t respect it less than I respect the previous president’s?

No one’s ever said I had a death-wish, but maybe I have.  (Some have suggested I seem to seek failure, which may be true although, frankly, I don’t believe it is.)  Okay–I go!

Note: I did go.  I’m back now only to say I just named “sexism” as on of the categories this entry belongs in.  I’m curious if that will draw visitors.  Why I would want it to would be a question for my shrink if I weren’t too benighted to believe in shrinks.

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