Jack Foley « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Jack Foley’ Category

Entry 385 — My Most-Used Coinage

Monday, February 21st, 2011

On 2/21/2011 3:21 AM, Jake Berry wrote:

Bob,    Hope this finds you well. I'm working on an essay and I'd like to  use your term 'otherstream', but I want to quote your definition  of the word directly. I haven't been able to find it on the internet  and I have no idea where it might be among all my books and papers.  So how would you define it?    Best,  Jake  

Terrific hearing from you, Jake–although it makes me feel guilty by reminding me of what a horrible correspondent I’ve been for going on ten years or more.  So many people I haven’t kept in touch with but should have!  Although I do keep up with you on the Internet.

Ah, the old days when I was one of the Kings of the  . . . Otherstream because I owned my own Xerox!  I’ve had some ungood years since then.  2010 was possibly the worst year I’ve had in thirty years.  But this year, so far, is going pretty well, although right now I’m in my null zone again.

Maybe not–your e.mail has me at least partway out of it.  Great to know someone still likes my coinage, and it was fun doing my own search for it on the Internet.  I found an article about Dale Jensen and his wife, Judy Wells, in which the term was used, followed by a comment by Jack Foley (good ol’ Jack) declaring that Andrew Joron had not coined “otherstream,” Bob Grumman had!

Somewhere else some guy took credit for coining it in 1996. My guess is that I first used it around 1985, so it has just has its 25th anniversary.  If I, indeed, was the first to use it.  Who knows if I did or not.  I don’t care.  I mean, it’d be nice to know for sure some word that more than a few people use was my word, but I’m really not that big about getting credit.  I want money, not credit!

Oh, I also found out there are various businesses calling themselves “otherstream” this or that, including, I think, a broadcast network.

So, a definition.  I’ve defined it in different although similar ways.  I think I would say that “otherstream” is my adjective for kinds works of art the great majority of arts academics, well-known critics, commercial publishers and commercial magazine editors know little more than the names of, if that.  A brief definition: art that’s now taught in college classes.  For me, it means approximately but only approximately the opposite of “mainstream.”  What it’s the exact opposite of is “knownstream.”  That’s because some art is knownstream, like certain kinds of very formal verse–the sestina, say, is well-known to most literature professors but is not what you’d call a kind of mainstream poetry.  I don’t think cowboy poems are considered mainstream, either, or though fairly popular.  I used it mainly for visual poetry, sound poetry and language poetry when I began using it, but some language poetry has become mainstream.

Hope this helps.  Thanks for wanting to use the word, which I think is a useful one.  And for inspiring me to write what I have here, which I can now use for today’s entry in my blog!  Make sure to link me to your essay when it’s online, or send it to me if it’s printed–with the hundred dollar royalty fee I charge for the use of any of my coinages.  (You can use “knownstream,” also mine, for half-price.)

all best, Bob

Entry 88 — MATO2, Chapter 1.10

Thursday, January 28th, 2010

During the next two  days I got a copy in the mail of the introductory essay Richard Kostelanetz wanted me to critique, the manuscript of a poetry collection John Bennett my press was going to publish, and letters from Jake Berry and Jack Foley.  Richard’s essay was is fairly good but I saw a number of things I counted wrong with it;.  As for John’s manuscript, it seemed fine–one poem in particular, whose main image was a car wash, I especially liked.  I wrote a short letter of full acceptance to John and a card acknowledging receipt, and suggesting he delete much of one section of his essay, to Richard.

Jack’s letter was friendly but he quickly.got on me for under-representing females and blacks (and Asiatics) in of Manywhere.  In my reply I tried to skirt the issue.  I didn’t pugnaciously tell him that my purpose was accuracy, not making the world better for members of victim-groups.  Hence, I wrote about the four canonical poets, all male, whom I admired enough to put explicitly into the sonnet my book was partly about,  and the fifth, also male, to whom the sonnet strongly alluded.  Except for a few short passages about Shakespeare and a mention or two of contemporary linguexpressive poets like Wilbur, my book is about an area of literature few women have done anything of importance in, and no blacks that I knew of at the time I wrote it.  The late Bill Keith is still the only significant black American in visual poetry I know about,  Larry Tomoyasu the only Asian American.   I don’t know whether I knew him when I wrote the first volume of my series.  I don’t believe I mentioned him in it.

The ever-amiable Jake was fully positive about my book.

Entry 414 — A New Term « POETICKS

Entry 414 — A New Term

I have a new term to announce: “knowlecular mind-flow.”  I’m only announcing it because I have nothing else to write about here, and I’m trying again to do a daily entry.  Although that will probably stop for a week or more fairly soon as I am seeing my hip doctor tomorrow to schedule hip replacement surgery.  I figure if it doesn’t help me, I won’t be worse off than I now am (except if I become permanently, painfully crippled, which I deem highly unlikely).  I won’t be worse off since I feel I’m at the point where my bad hip just barely keeps me from enjoying walking, running and tennis, so if the operation puts me a mile further from enjoying those things, so what.  It’s like the difference between losing in the finals  at Wimbledon 6-7, 6-7, 7-6, 7-6, 100-98, and losing in the first round, 6-0, 6-0, 6-0.

By mind-flow, by the way, I mean everything one is conscious of at a given moment.  “Thinking” means too many different things, particularly (and mainly) unvoiced words.  “Mentation” is better but tends, I think, to exclude feelings.  The best thing about “mind-flow,” modified by “knowlecular,” is that I can define it.  I need it right now for my discussion of rigidnikry in my Shakespeare authorship book.

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Old Age « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Old Age’ Category

Entry 1220 — Old Age, Part 3

Saturday, September 21st, 2013

Now to my thesis that we oldsters can no long fit knowleplexes larger than a certain not-very-large size into our brains—because of the size and complexity of the structures we’ve already erected in them.  I have a simple analogy to explain it: one’s understanding of existence as a little city in the cerebrum that one’s brain has spent its lifetime building.  Everything in it is basically as permanent as city buildings; repairs are made, unmendable damage occurs, but basically, little changes.  Eventually, there is no longer any place to erect anything new of significant size.  I suppose one could demolish some old building to make room, but I think that would be more difficult than destroying a city building is.

At some point, one starts to have trouble figuring out where to put new data.  A consideration is keeping track of important old understandings.  Result: a more and more great disinclination to read anything with new data in it.

I’ve scratched the surface of my ideas on this–without sating them too carefully.  Old age making me too tired to?  Old age making it hard for me to find the words and ideas I need?  Both?

One thing I particular delayed me: my wanting to use my terms for various kinds of data.  I was sure I had tree terms, but could not remember the third, and find any list tat had it.  The two that are, right now, second-nature enough for me not easily to forget (although I have always been able to forget just about anything) “knowlecule” or word-sized datum like “hoof” or “horse”; and “knowleplex” or complex specialty like zoology–the discipline, not the word for it.  Both knowlecules and knowleplexes come in various sizes.  In many cases, it’s not easy to say which a given datum is.  Many, too, are both: the game of baseball, for instance, is a knowlecule for a doctor specializing in sports injuries; but a knowleplex for a baseball manager.

I’d been wondering about my third conage for several days.  It finally occurred to me a little while ago (it’s a little after four as I write this, in case anyone cares–as a scholar in the next century plotting my creative cycles may): “knowlexpanse” or a significantly large field like biology.  I think somewhere I coined a word for world-view, too, and lost it.  Or maybe accepted “world-view” as good enough.

I’m stopping now–as I seldom would have with so little written forty, or even just twenty, years ago.

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Entry 1219 — Old Age, Part 2

Friday, September 20th, 2013

When I reached my intellectual prime is near-impossible to pin down, but my favorite guess—mainly, I suspect, because it’s a standardly Interesting Number, is the age of fifty.  One thing that makes the choice near-impossible is how to compare one’s breakthrough understanding of his subject (or, in my case, one of them) with his later, very gradual efforts to make that understanding full, coherent, and—perhaps most important, and definitely most difficult—accessible to others.

I came up with the basis, still unchanged except superficially, of my knowlecular psychology at the age of 26 and don’t feel I’ve yet made it full, coherent and accessible, although I’ve had many breakthroughs that (in my view, valuably) expanded it, and continuously simplified and clarified it—while simultaneously, alas, complicating and muddying it.

My peak as a poet is much easier to identify, although I’m uncertain of the exact dates involved.1

My major breakthrough into long division poetry (after a minor breakthrough into mathematical poetry twenty years or so previous that I didn’t go anywhere with for fifteen years or more) happened when I was around fifty-five; my much less consequential breakthrough into my Poem poems occurred at about the same time.  Two definite peaks that all that nothing that followed reached although I am sure some of the poems I later made were my best till then.  I contend that making one’s best poem does not require more or even as much, intelligence, talent, or whatever, as making one’s first successful poem that is significantly and valuably different from all the other poems one has composed.  In fact, coming up with a bad poem may require more skill than making a very good one if the bad one is new in a wonderfully exploitable way.2

In short, I think I peaked as a poet at the age of 55, then held my own pretty much until recently, when I’ve become substantially less productive than I’d been between 55 and 70.  I don’t think the level of my poems has dropped, just the number of them.  An interesting possibility is that I may still compose the visiopoetic epic I’ve wanted someday to.  What kind of peak would it be?  It would probably be my major work as a poet.  I’m pretty sure it would include several poems I already consider major—for me.  But the intelligence and/or related abilities I’d need to bring it off would not need to be at the high level they once were, or even all that close to it.

I realize that I’ve not done much work on my psychology since I turned 70 or 71, either.  I want to pull it together into a unified whole the same way I hope to pull together my poetry into a unified epic.  Again, it would not take what its discovery and later additions and improvements did.

I don’t know of any thinker or artist who did anything after turning 70 or so that greatly changed the over-all value of his work as a whole.  Picasso, for instance, turning out hundreds of works, some of them as fine as anything he’d previously done, but meaning he’d made 654 masterpieces instead of only 611: so what?  We don’t really need them, happy as we should be to have them.  (For one thing, others are carrying on from where he left off—something true of all the other great artists, and thinkers who went on to do valuable work after 70.)

In every other way, people over 70 are nothing like they were at 35 or even 55.  For most jobs, a businessman would be stupid to hire someone that old instead of a much younger person.  Affirmative action will no doubt soon force him to.  As a matter of fact, I think there have been several cases of elderly farts successfully suing businesses that fired them.

Odd, the idea I had that sparked this discussion I almost left the discussion without mentioning.  It concerns the inability of elderly farts to acquire data significantly new to them.  In simplest terms, it concerns how these people stop reading complex books.  I was thinking of myself, of how it’s been, what, twenty years, since I read the equivalent of an undergraduate textbook on anything?!  My thesis, which I hope to get to tomorrow, is that we oldsters can no long fit knowleplexes larger than a certain not-very-large size into our brains—because of the size and complexity of the structures we’ve already erected in them.

* * *

1 I believe my diary has the particulars, or most of them, but I’m certainly not going to research it right now

 2 As Gertrude Stein’s specimens of prose (evocature, a sub-category of prose, is what I call the kind of literature they are) in Tender Buttons have been for many, albeit not her (although I would call a few of them more successful than not).

Egalapsychosis: the insane belief that no one is inferior in any way to anyone else.  A mental dysfunctionality common to American liberals.

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Entry 1218 — My Ageism

Thursday, September 19th, 2013

About the only good thing about being as old as I am is that it gives me a group to be politically incorrect about because I’m in it.  The group, of course, is . . . senior citizens.  I contend that anyone who thinks senior citizens are not inferior to those younger than they is out of his mind.  I do believe that an elderly fart–someone over fifty-five (plus or minus anywhere from one to ten years)–should have one advantage over his juniors, including himself when younger: his experience.  He will exploit it more slowly than he once was able to, but possibly get more out of it–or at least something valuably new out of it.

* * *

I’m afraid that’s all for now.  I had a meeting of my local writers’ group to go to and when I got back, I was shot.

Note: I had this one done on time but forgot to make it pubic.

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Entry 1217 — Old Age

Wednesday, September 18th, 2013

After typing the beginning of a short essay on my ageism, I found out I had suddenly gotten a day behind here.  So I needed to do two entries.  I decided the one for yesterday would be brief, and about old age since I’d already put it in that category.  Ergo, my opinion about being old: it stinks.  More about it in my entry for today.

As for the 18th of September, I did get something done on it: my latest Scientific American blog entry, although it won’t posted until Saturday, or maybe late Friday night.  I also worked on multiplication poems for dogs, one for my dentist and one for a local writer-friend.  I had silly ideas for a while that I could make money selling personalized copies of the thing, but soon realized there was no chance of that–although I hope to try it.

Okay, now to try to get today’s entry done, in spite of being already all worn out.

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Entry 276 — The Irratioplex « POETICKS

Entry 276 — The Irratioplex

Another day in the null zone for me, perhaps because I’m going without the pain pills I’ve been on for my bad hip as an experiment.  I played tennis this morning without any more of the slight hip pain I’ve been having with the pain pills.  That was nice but since I got home from that and a little marketing (for socks and new sneakers), I I’ve been feeling blah.  A nap didn’t help.

Meanwhile, I’m been feeling bitter about my reputation as a defender of Shakespeare.  SHAKSPER, an Internet discussion group I’m in, has for several days been discussing the proper reaction to a movie coming out called Anonymous, in which the Earl of Oxford is depicted as Shakespeare–and as Queen Elizabeth’s son–and Southampton is depicted as Oxford and Elizabeth’s son.  I think it may destroy Oxfordianism the way the preposterous codes found in Shakespeare’s plays “proving” Bacon wrote them pretty much destroyed Baconism.

What irks me is that several who comment at SHAKSPER mentioned James Shapiro’s recent book on the authorship question, and books and articles on it by others, but not my book.  No doubt I’m biased, but I consider my book the best refutation of anti-Stratfordianism in print, and the only one that presents a serious theory of what makes people become anti-Stratfordianism–whether valid or not.  Yet the Shakespeare establishment, and their little followers at the two authorship sites I participate in don’t mention me, or respond to my posts to SHAKSPER.  Maybe they don’t want it known that our side has a crank like me on it.   A crank, morover, who calls anti-Stratfordians “psitchotics.”

Nonetheless, my attempt to understand what causes reasonably intelligent people to become psitchotics where Shakespeare is concerned, and–more important–find a way to express my finding entertainingly and coherently, continues, with a minor development today, the new term “irratioplex.”  This I pronounce ehr RAH shuh plehks.  Do I misspell it?  Possibly, but “irratiplex” doesn’t do it for me.

And irratioplex is an irrational knowleplex.  There are several.  Two of them are the rigidniplex and the enthusiaplex.  I now maintain that all anti-Stratfordians are afflicted with one or the other of these two irratioplexes.  The new term allows me to couple them as victims of irratioplexes, then show how they differ from one another by virtue of their (slightly) different irratioplexes.  The rigidniks’ irratioplex is forced on them by their innate psychology; the enthusiasts’ (who are frrewenders) acquire their irratioplexes during fits of enthiuiasm, making them quickly too strong thereafter to resist.  Both irratioplexes act the same once active. both nearly impossible for their victims’ to resist.

My new strategy for the description of wacks is to concentrate on irratioplexes in general, proceed to  rigidniplexes and enthusiaplexes in general, then to how the latter two specifically enslave their victims to anti-Stratfordianism.

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Wackagandism « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Wackagandism’ Category

Entry 1304 — Wow, Two More Coinages!

Thursday, December 19th, 2013

“Propagandfication” and “Othereststream Poetry.”

The first is from the following post I just sent off to a site where I’m arguing against wacks who believe Shakespeare was an imposter and had called a post by one of them full of sludge, whereupon he questioned the appropriateness of my use of the term:

As a verosopher, I consider sludge by authorship wacks to be groundless assertions and badly-supported arguments that have been refuted hundreds of times by the sane.  Among them are such assertions as one you favor: “No one wrote a eulogy to Shakespeare after he died until 1623.”  The Water poet did.  Basse almost certainly did.  Maybe one or two others.  Read David Kathman’s essay on this at his and Terry Ross’s site.  I quote much of what he says in it in my book.

But even if we did not have the Water poet’s poem, or any other poem to Shakespeare until 1623, the assertion would be what I call a propagandification, which is a statement which some propagandist presents as true although we lack sufficient data to determine whether it is genuinely true or not.  If we had no poems dedicated to Shakespeare until 1623, a scholar of integrity would NOT say, “No one wrote a eulogy to Shakespeare after he died until 1623,” he would say, “No poem dedicated to Shakespeare after he died until 1623 has survived.”  If not an authorship wack, he would add that there is no reason to expect that any would, or even that any would necessarily have been written, although he would guess that some were but were withheld for publication in the First Folio.  He would certainly not consider the lack of poems to mean much beside all the evidence there IS for Shakespeare.  Absence of evidence can be useful when the identity of an author is obscure due to scarcity of data, but a monument, a collection of plays with the author’s name and picture in it, and known associates of his confirming his identity, forty or so books from when he was alive with his name on the title-page, mentions of him as a writer by a number of writers of his time, and much else is not scarcity of evidence.

The second occurred to me this morning when I was contemplating how “otherstream poetry” has lost the meaning I gave it–because so many use it for poetry I consider standard, like simple neo-Ashberianism.
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Entry 1199 — Wackagandism

Saturday, August 31st, 2013

My latest coinage means “the propagandistic techniques of cranks, kooks and others advancing totally insane theories of verosophy such as the idea that someone other than William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon wrote the works attributed to him.”  It came to me while thinking about the contributions of Oxfordian Steve Steinberg to the thread here about the Oxfordian movie, Anonymous.  In reply to a post of mine trying for the third or fourth time to explain an argument against a contention of his, he told me that in order to explain something, I had to know something.  Here’s what I wrote back:

* * *

Good one, Steve, but somewhat off the mark.  Nonetheless, it’s gotten me to try to explain something to you again.  What I’m going to try to explain to you is how bad your tendency almost always to dodge problems with your position makes you look.  No, I realize that first I must explain to you that you DO this, for I fear I believe you don’t realize you do.  I will use this short back&forth of ours to do so.

First off, I describe a problem I have with your position: your contention that Shakespeare of Stratford would not have been exposed to a more or less standard curriculum is wrong.  You called the presumption that English schools of the time had any kind of standard curriculum a “myth” (debasing one of the world’s most precious terms by misusing it as a synonym for “error,” and implied synonym for “lie” the way so many propagandists moronically do).

At this point, you derided me for claiming that Latin, a single scholastic subject, could mean “curriculum,” or collection of subjects.  Or so I interpreted you to be doing.  You ignored the full context of my post which, I feel, should have made my point clear.  In any case, you made no attempt to figure out what my point was, if you truly failed to understand it, nor ask me what it was.  You EVADED the problem I had tried to bring to your attention.

2. Still, maybe I WAS (Italics intended) unclear.   If I was, my next post should have helped you, although it was sarcastically put.  Here is where your nature as a propagandistic evader of problems to your case came fully to the fore: as I probably not fully accurately recall, you continued not to understand my point; more important, you spread the conversation all over the place, a standardly propagandistic ploy of anti-Stratfordians (and probably unconscious) to draw one’s opponents into irrelevancies, and away from whatever point they are advancing, which you can’t deal effectively with.

3. I restated my point.  Your response to this was simply to tell me I don’t know anything–which, by the way, is another standardly propagandistic ploy of anti-Stratfordians: insulting one’s opponent maximally, consciously or unconsciously aware that making someone angry is a good way to distract him from his central intention.

Okay, now to give you an easy chance to show that you can respond to a description of something that may be wrong with your case without doing what I have claimed you do habitually: I will re-state as clearly as I can what’s wrong with your idea about what Shakespeare would have learned at his grammar school.  All you have to do is say what you disagree with in my statement and why–AND avoid telling me what a jerk Baldwin was (and I am), et cetera.  You must avoid the temptation otherwise to tackle about my characterization of you above, too.  In other words, I want you to demonstrate that you can argue unevasively, not just say you can.  But if you actually attend focusedly to my point, I will be glad to discuss my characterization of the way you operate in a different thread.

Good one, Steve, but somewhat off the mark.  Nonetheless, it’s gotten me to try to explain something to you again.  What I’m going to try to explain to you is how bad your tendency almost always to dodge problems with your position makes you look.  No, I realize that first I must explain to you that you DO this, for I fear I believe you don’t realize you do.  I will use this short back&forth of ours to do so.

First off, I describe a problem I have with your position: your contention that Shakespeare of Stratford would not have been exposed to a more or less standard curriculum is wrong.  You called the presumption that English schools of the time had any kind of standard curriculum a “myth” (debasing one of the world’s most precious terms by misusing it as a synonym for “error,” and implied synonym for “lie” the way so many propagandists moronically do).

At this point, you derided me for claiming that Latin, a single scholastic subject, could mean “curriculum,” or collection of subjects.  Or so I interpreted you to be doing.  You ignored the full context of my post which, I feel, should have made my point clear.  In any case, you made no attempt to figure out what my point was, if you truly failed to understand it, nor ask me what it was.  You EVADED the problem I had tried to bring to your attention.

2. Still, maybe I WAS (Italics intended) unclear.   If I was, my next post should have helped you, although it was sarcastically put.  Here is where your nature as a propagandistic evader of problems to your case came fully to the fore: as I probably not fully accurately recall, you continued not to understand my point; more important, you spread the conversation all over the place, a standardly propagandistic ploy of anti-Stratfordians (and probably unconscious) to draw one’s opponents into irrelevancies, and away from whatever point they are advancing, which you can’t deal effectively with.

3. I restated my point.  Your response to this was simply to tell me I don’t know anything–which, by the way, is another standardly propagandistic ploy of anti-Stratfordians: insulting one’s opponent maximally, consciously or unconsciously aware that making someone angry is a good way to distract him from his central intention.

Okay, now to give you an easy chance to show that you can respond to a description of something that may be wrong with your case without doing what I have claimed you do habitually: I will re-state as clearly as I can what’s wrong with your idea about what Shakespeare would have learned at his grammar school.  All you have to do is say what you disagree with in my statement and why–AND avoid telling me what a jerk Baldwin was (and I am), et cetera.  You must avoid the temptation otherwise to tackle about my characterization of you above, too.  In other words, I want you to demonstrate that you can argue unevasively, not just say you can.  But if you actually attend focusedly to my point, I will be glad to discuss my characterization of the way you operate in a different thread.

* * *

I then added a second post in which I warned that “I now have a new plan: using quotations from this enormous thread as the basis of a monograph on what I’m tentatively calling ‘Wackagandistic Techniques.’ So be careful what you type. If I actually go through with this, and I only get seriously involved in about two percent of the projects I tell people I’m going to, and finish less than one percent of those, I will post it and make changes to misquotations–or accurate quotations of passages their authors didn’t mean. In other words, I’ll try to be fair, though never not nasty.”

I chose to quote my first post because I think it pretty good–although way off-topic for this blog.  Beware: I will no doubt be using this blog for more matter concerned with wackagandism.  I find that there’s nothing I enjoy more than writing about mental dysfunctionality.  What I write has to be valuable: either because it’s insightful or because it epitomizes mental dysfunctionality.

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Entry 445 — Vaudevillic Poetry « POETICKS

Entry 445 — Vaudevillic Poetry

I’ve coined another term, “Vaudevillic Poetry,” for what I’ve been calling “Jump-Cut Poetry.”  This is a somewhat derogatory term inspired by my bias against short-attention span art, the kind of art that presents discontinuous acts.  It reminds me of why I never much liked television variety shows like Ed Sullivan’s when young, and have rarely looked forward to visits to museums.  Lots of fun stuff but within an hour I start getting a headache.  I’m too much of a convergent thinker, I guess.

Lately I’ve decided that the “language poetry” now gaining Official Recognition is really not much different from Ashbery’s vaudevillic poetry, so really is not extending what the academy recognizes as poetry of value.  Ergo, Wilshberia remains the only part of the contemporary American poetry continuum the Poetry Establishment has any really knowledge of.

Additional note: I’m renaming “Sprungrammatical Poetry” “Grammar-Centered Poetry.”  Accessibility and all that.  So: in my taxonomy, there are two kinds of Language poetry: grammar-centered and infraverbal.  I’m thinking, too, that there are two kinds of vaudevillic poetry: phrase-length and sentence-length.  “Jumbled-Text” may be a third–one beyond Wilshberia.  But possibly beyond what I conceive as poetry, as well–i.e., hyperhermetic or Steinian, if you consider her short texts poems (although I feel I get some of them).

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Ethics « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Ethics’ Category

Entry 1639 — Choice of Ethotactic, Part 4

Saturday, November 22nd, 2014

What I’ve said so far suggests a question to me: can something a person does with no ethical intentions be ethotactical?  For instance, say I am with a friend I know to be much more poor than I and we  come upon an apple tree in a public forest with one apple on it, and I pick it and eat it, not thinking of my friend.  Or, for a more colorful example, say I have been taught that Irishmen are subhuman creatures without the ability to feel pain, and that hunting them will be good practice in the use of firearms that one may one day need to fight off aliens from outer space.  So I shoot a few Irishmen between the eyes, inflicting pain on them without realizing it, and even perhaps killing one or two of them.  Have I behaved immorally?

According to my theory of knowlecular psychology, no.  That’s because an ethotactic, or the choice of a moral or immoral action, can only be the result of some anthroceptual decision based on living in harmony with a known social code.

I think I would go so far as to say that my killing an Irishmen or two in such a case is not immoral even according to most people’s standards.  Many would protest, but because it would seem that I would be excusing a Nazi taught to consider Jews sub-human for gassing them.  I would excuse the Nazi, but only morally.  For me, he would be not immoral, but homicidally stupid—and therefore deserving to be reprimanded!  Sorry.  I have a weakness for black humor.  What I believe is that such a person should be prevented from continuing to gas Jews by being executed—unless one truly believes some kind of re-education can make him accept Jews as human, and he is compelled to repay society for his social stupidity by spending the rest of his life shining the shoes of Jews for free or something.

Ultimately, I believe all reprehensible acts are acts of stupidity, and that what kind of stupidity is involved—moral stupidity or some other kind of stupidity—is irrelevant.  Society should be maximally protected from the person acting reprehensibly (and protected from his genes, for I believe criminals [real criminals], and that’s who I’m talking about, should not be allowed to breed).  Of course, I realize I’m making a complex subject seem much more cut&dry than it is.  Just ideas to counteract simple-minded bad/good anti-continuumism and the insensitivity of certain sentimentalists to Evil.

About evil I will say that all definitions of it are necessarily subjective, but that it does exist, and can be defined sociobjectively.  Sociobjectivity is a view of an idea that is held by such a large majority of the members of a society and which has an objective neurophysiological basis as to be close enough to true objectivity as to be taken as such.  Take the evil of killing an innocent child.  Almost everyone would disapprove of that, and (I believe) almost all of us are instinctively repelled by the deed, and—in fact—would instinctively try to prevent a child, innocent or not, from being killed.

Not that our instinct to use reason would necessarily not be involved.  If effective, it might tell us that our standing in society will go up if we stop someone from murdering a child.  Although our instinct to advance statoosnikally would be part of that.  Actually, I think in most cases, protecting the child would be reflexive whereas our explanation would be taken care of mostly by our reasoning.

To be honest, if I were dominated by reason, I would never risk my life, even as the old man I now am, for some child, because what I believe I may contribute to World Culture is almost sure to be more than what the child will, however long he lives.  The problem with that, of course, is that my ability to reason may be defective, in which case, my not saving a child at the risk of losing my own life would be stupid integrity–that is, acting according to my code that I should protect my own life at all costs because of its great value to the world.  I claim that following that code would be absolutely valid if I were another . . . Nietzsche, without his breakdown.

Needless to say, the idea that Evil is what some deity has said it to be is absurd; various deities have universally defined certain acts as evil because the men who invented them were instinctively against those acts.  Other non-universal acts, like saying something contemptuous about some deity, have also been said to have been ordained Evil by a deity invented by men not because their inventors were instinctively against such acts but because the definition of Evil helped them gain power or destroy other tribes, or simply because of some personal dislike—of a priest once clawed by a cat that made him claim his main god had defined cats as evil, for example.

I do think that reasoning should dominate every moral choice one makes, but it can’t overcome one’s instincts, all of which are ultimately moral, for a given person.  We can only argue about whose individual morals would work best for the society we want to live in, and perhaps use reason to show that giving in to a society’s chosen code will be better for each individual in the long run, the long run excluding some never-seen Heaven or anything like it.

Which brings to mind the question of whether or not it is moral to lie to the masses and tell them some God will do horrible things to them if they don’t accept a society’s code.  I realize that there are those who don’t believe that our species naturally, due to our genes, divides into different social classes–three of them, roughly speaking:  masters, slaves, and . . . cerebreans.  They’re nuts.

I divide ethics into the study of socioethotactics and the study of egoethotactics . . . I think.  There are two major problems: formulation of a maximally fair and biologically advantageous set of socioethotactics by a society, and an individuals’ reconciling his inevitably conflicting set of egoethotactics with his society’s socioethotactics.

More on this eventually, if I think I can say anything at all interesting about it.

* * *

Note: on the day I made my first entry here about ethotactics, 36 people checked up on me at my Wikipedia entry; rarely do more than 4 people visit it on a day, and none since the first month it was up have anywhere near that many done so.  Were they fans of Jonah Goldberg, whose article I was commenting on?  The visits after that have been few, for or five in a day at most.

Last, and definitely least, here’s this SURVEY again:

Please, Dear Reader, I implore thee: when you have read as much of this entry as you feel like reading, let me know whether you have found it worth reading in full or not by clicking “YES” or “NO” below. You would help me a great deal, and might even get me to make my entries more reader-friendly. (And for the love of Jayzuz, please don’t try to spare my feelings by politely declining to click the NO although you think the entry Vile Beyond Imagination. Oh, some of you may need to know that I am not asking you whether you agree with me or not!)

YES

NO

Note: I will be repeating this request in some of my entries to come. Feel free to click one of my buttons each time I do, but please don’t click either more than once a day.

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Entry 1638 — Choice of Ethotactic, Part 3

Friday, November 21st, 2014

A Note to the Fore:

Please, Dear Reader, I implore thee: when you have read as much of this entry as you feel like reading, let me know whether you have found it worth reading in full or not by clicking “YES” or “NO” below.  You would help me a great deal, and might even get me to make my entries more reader-friendly.  (And for the love of Jayzuz, please don’t try to spare my feelings by politely declining to click the NO although you think the entry Vile Beyond Imagination.  Oh, some of you may need to know that I am not asking you whether you agree with me or not!)

YES

NO

Note: I will be repeating this request in some of my entries to come.  Feel free to click one of my buttons each time I do, but please don’t click either more than once a day.

* * *

A new start.  What I think I think now is that an ethotactic is any choice of action that is made fully or to a great extent on the basis of anthreval- uceptual input.  Do I need to say more?  Surely that clarifies the subject satisfactorily?  (I’m exercising my wit here because I’m scared that if I go on, I’ll horribly bungle the amplification what I’ve just said requires.  But my verboceptual awareness—along perhaps with some part of my scienceptual awareness—has convinced my socioceptual awareness, that I have a verosophical moral duty to expose my full thinking on this in spite of how bad my egoceptual awareness, trying to stop me, will feel about my exposing the lameness of my brain.  More exactly, my evaluceptual awareness, which right now I think has offices in each of the rest of the cerebrum’s awarenesses as well as a brain area all to itself where it collects the votes pro and con about all the choices available to the behavraceptual awareness, where a final choice of action will generate the action the person involved takes.

You know, I truly do not know whether I’m making sense at all.  I’m fairly sure that I have a good idea what I’m saying, but am also certain that I am over-simplifying what I think is occurring.  Which may not be.  Not that it matters, since I don’t think I can make any headway toward a reasonably intelligent rough description doing anything other than taking a series of very simple steps of description.

Note: it is at this point that I thought of constructing the YES/NO buttons above.

Okay, what happens in slightly more detail is that (1) a person experiences instacon A (i.e., “instant of consciousness A”), or the contents thereof, which I probably have a name for but can’t now recall.  (2) Instacon A activates a number of possible actions out of the awarenesses participating in it.  Let us say, for instance, that it contains data depicting an ant on his kitchen counter that activate cells in his visioceptual awareness (a sub-awareness of his protoceptual or fundaceptual awareness [whose name I haven’t permanently chosen], data activating cells representing “me, innocently going about my daily business, in the egoceptual sub-awareness of my anthroceptual awareness (I’m going into detail to try to keep things straight for myself), data activating cells in the socioceptual sub-awareness of my anthroceptual awareness representing “enemy deleteriously approaching my food,” data activating cells representing the word, “ant,” in the verboceptual sub-awareness of the linguiceptual sub-awareness of my reducticeptual awareness, and maybe data activating cells causing a barely perceptible reaction to fear of the sting of a fire ant.

All these active cells will send attempt to activate behavraceptual cells capable of causing appropriate behavioral responses like moving a hand that’s near the ant, carefully sliding a piece of paper under the ant and removing it from the house without injuring it, splotting the damned thing, or singing a song about “Aunt Delores,” if I knew one.  Meanwhile, instacon A would probably have continuing sequences of information in it with nothing to do with the ant—something to do with why I’d come into the kitchen, for instance.  Behavraceptual cells responsible for various appropriate behavioral responses (or behavioral responses that seem appropriate to me) would activate those responses.

In effect, they would vote for the action begun, or continued—make that actions, because we generally carry out more than one action during each instacon.  Each activated cell or cell-group would try to send energy to the muscles or glands responsible for carrying out its desire.  But much of that energy would be blocked by the greater energy another cell or cell-groups responsible for a behavior in conflict with the behavior the first cell or group was trying to cause.  In other words, a lot of votes would be cast, and the evaluceptual awareness, where they were being cast, would determine which candidates receiving votes would win, and succeed in causing action.  If any.  For I may take no action, no cell or cell-group’s transmission being strong enough to cause me to do anything.I suspect that in this case, the word, “ant,” would make me say to myself, “Damned ants.”  This would be an ethotactical response based on my perception of the ant as an intruder, and—possibly—my empathy for the robotic damned thing.  Perhaps my laziness would be a factor, too.  Would it have any ethical component?  I think not.  I think I would have a musclaceptual reaction of “don’t squash, too much work” that would be purely, amorally, protoceptual—i.e., having to do with my desire not to exert myself, nothing else.

Which suggests a question to me: can something a person does with no ethical intentions be ethotactical?

TO BE CONTINUED

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Entry 1636 — Back to Goldberg

Wednesday, November 19th, 2014

Okay, back to my response to an essay by Jonah Goldberg.  I was writing about the effect of ethotactical intelligence on ethotactical duration but also the width of said duration.  An “ethotactic” is a person’s moral choice of action in a given situation.  I ended my writing for that day with the following:

“Obviously, the situation will have a lot to do with the length of a person’s ethotactical durations, there seldom being little point in trying for a long one regarding what to do morally about a piece of candy one has been offered.  Short-term moral behavior will not depend much on ethotactical intelligence.  That means day-to-day behavior will generally be intelligent enough (and considered acceptable enough) although not based on long ethotactical durations or particularly high ethotactical intelligence.

“Now for a scattering of points, because I don’t see right off how to present a better organized response to Goldberg’s essay.  First is his suggestion that too many people, especially young people, believe that “if it feels right, do it!’ by which he means all they think is necessary to make an ethotactical decision is passion.  Goldberg amplifies this when he quotes a character in the movie, Legally Blonde, as follows: “On our very first day at Harvard, a very wise professor quoted Aristotle; ‘The law is reason free from passion.’  Well, no offense to Aristotle, but in my three years at Harvard, I have come to find that passion is a key ingredient to the study and practice of law—and of life.’”

“Well, I would agree with Goldberg that the character is an airhead  . . .” I stopped there, cutting the paragraphs above from the text because I thought it had come to a good stopping point before them.  When I came back to them just now, three days later, and wrote the paragraph beginning this entry, to set the scene, I was immediately unsure what I was talking about.    There’s a person’s plain choice of action.  How is it different from his moral choice of action?

Okay, a person’s choice of action depends on a vote from each of his active awarenesses at the time.  These votes will probably never be equal.  How much weight the vote of a given awareness will have will depend on the person and on the situation.  And now I suspect I’m constructing a different theory or set of ideas than I was describing in part one of this cluster-dementia of an intellectual exploration.

I should probably re-start but I’m too lazy too.  It is also possible that I’ve got an idea begun that may lead somewhere worthwhile.  Question: what awareness provides the ethical portion of a person’s choice of action?  Immediate answer: the evaluceptual awareness, because it is the awareness that determines on the basis of past experience what path is most likely to maximize the pleasure-to-pain ratio.  This answer is wrong.

The moral content of the evaluceptual awareness’s choice will be determined all or mostly in the anthroceptual awareness, because it will try to make one act properly in order to satisfy one or more social instincts like the need to conform, the empathic need not to cause pain . . . there must be others but I can’t think of them now.  The instinct not to cause pain probably has many sub-instincts under it: like the need not to boast (because it may make others feel smaller) . . .

I wonder if there’s an egoceptual instinct to be honest in appraising oneself.  No one else need see that you dishonestly rate yourself a better poet than some Nobel Prize Winner, so it’s not a socioceptual instinct, if it exists.  I think it may exist because it would be advantageous for preventing unrealistic behavior.  But would it be moral?  And what about the embarrassment of missing five lay-ups in a row in your backyard where no one can see you.  You have immorally failed to live up to your own expectations just as missing one layup in a game would be immorally failing to live up to your group’s expectations.  If doing what you’re supposed to in a team effort hasn’t to do with morality, what does it have to do with?

My problem is to intelligently describe a person’s choice of action, which I now see is a matter of describing the many choices it is a combination of—basically the votes of various awarenesses (and sub-awarenesses) I’ve already mentioned.  Too much work for me now, so I’m outta here.  I hope I return to this matter, for my own sake.  (It would be immoral for me to deprive the world of my further thoughts about it.)  Not sure I will.

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Entry 1633 — Moral Integrity

Sunday, November 16th, 2014

Jonah Goldberg is one of my favorite writers.  I consider him funny enough to steal material from, and agree with (most of) his political outlook.  Often, though, I find myself partially disagreeing with some position of his.  At the moment, I’m disagreeing with portions of his latest essay in National Review, “Empty Integrity.”  Goldberg believes the world is opting for a kind of “integrity” that Irish philosopher David Thunder categorizes as “purely formal accounts of integrity (which) essentially demand internal consistency within the form or structure of an agent’s desires, actions, beliefs, and evaluations.”  Opposed to this is a kind of integrity, Thunder describes as “fully substantive accounts.”  The difference between the two is that a person with the first kind acts in accordance with ethical principles designed to maximize his pleasure-to-pain ratio whereas a person with the second kind “desires to do what is morally good in all of his decisions,” according, again, to Thunder.

Goldberg implies that the first kind of integrity, which—because he associates it with the philosophy of Nietzsche, one of my idols—I will hereafter term Nietzschean Integrity, is “empty.”  It isn’t.  What he is really bothered by, first, is that a person possessing it does not “apply reason to nature and our consciences in order to discover what is moral” but simply does what “feels right.”  This is wrong for Goldberg because it ultimately means understanding integrity “only as a firm commitment to one’s own principles—because one’s own principles are the only legitimate principles. The god of a person’s morality is thus not Jehovah but the person.”

Nietzschean Integrity is “empty” only inasmuch as there is no imaginary being running it.  It seems to me that a truly empty integrity would be one that was devoid of rules to follow.  That is not the case with Nietzschean Integrity.  What makes it empty for Goldberg is merely his dislike of its rules . . .  No, what is wrong with it for him is not its rules but the rules he believes it will be based on if some entity outside it is not their source.  Actually there is no reason a person with Nietzschean Integrity might not “apply reason to nature and (his) conscience in order to discover what is moral” and, as a result become firmly committed to absolutely standard good old George Washington principles—because they lead him to rules of morality that “feel right” to him.

Ultimately, we all must follow the internal moral rules that feel right regardless of where they come from.  Everything we do, we do because it feels right.  Reason may tell someone that if he sticks his hand in a fire, he will experience pain, but he will accept what it tells him because it feels right.  To give just one example of why you should accept my generality that should suffice to clinch my case—which, I suppose, reduces the question to one of simple semantics.

In any case, the real problem for Goldberg (and me) is what I have some up with the brilliant name for of “Stupid Integrity.”   And here I bumble into boilerplate I feel bad about repeating but, I fear, is all I have to say about the topic.  I claim that one necessarily tries always to maximize his P2P (i.e., his “pleasure-to-pain ratio”), as he at the time believes—I should say, “guesses”—it to be for a length of time dependent on his . . . anthreffec- tiveness, or effectiveness as a human being, which includes but is quite a bit more than his “cerebreffectiveness,” which includes what those less picky about such matters than I would call “intelligence” but is significantly more than.  To make it easier to plow through what I will go on to say, though, I will replace “anthreffectiveness” with “intelligence.”

The stupider a person is, the shorter the period of time I’m speaking of will be.  Since my greatest defect as a thinker is a need to name just about everything I discuss, I am now going to call this period of time the “ethotactical duration.”  It’s a term I’ve come up with on the spot, so probably won’t last long.  It’s how long ahead a person plans (in effect, since usually the “planning” will be nothing like formal planning, and won’t even involve what most people think of as thought)—or, to put it more simply, it’s how long a person will take to decide, based on his (conscious or unconscious) moral code, what he will next do.  (A “behavratactical duration” is how far ahead a person plans before initiating any behavior.)

Note to Goldberg: please tell your couch that I am not purposely trying to distract my readers from my essentially empty ideas by overloading them with terminology, and that—while I do feel he’s almost as good an influence on my as he is on you, I’d prefer that he not bother me until I’ve finished saying what I want to say here.  I should add that if he wants me to continue referring to him in the future, thus improving his chances of immortality by at least 0.62%, he needs to try harder to be my friend.)

To be fastidious to a nauseating extreme, I must say that by “how long ahead a person thinks before making an ethotactical decision about what he will do next,” I actually mean “how long ahead the wide variety of facts, feelings, and who-knows-what-else a person will (in effect) consult before making an ethotactical decision regarding what he will next do.

Now then, while the length of a person’s ethotactical duration has a great deal to do with the intelligence of his moral acts, the width and depth of his moral decisions (i.e., their intelligence) will have significantly more to do with it.  Does he just consider the taste of a piece of candy he has been offered, or also its effect on his health and/or its effect on his reputation, and/or its effect on a child with him if you don’t offer it to him and the effect of that on you, and/or its effect on his mood and the effect of that on the poem he is composing . . . and the effect of that on what the world thinks of him in the year 2222?

As you can see, ethotactical intelligence will effect ethotactical duration but also the width of said duration.  In the case just described, if the person is concerned only with the taste of the candy bar and the immediate effect of his giving it versus not giving it to the child, he will only be concerned with a duration approximately equal to the time it takes him to eat the candy, or the same length of time (let’s assume) that he will enjoy the child’s enjoyment of the candy if he gives it to the child, or feel guilty about not giving it the child if he eats it but the width of the duration will be greater than it would have been had he only considered how the candy would taste.

(My thanks to Goldberg’s couch for not telling me how clumsily I just expressed myself.)

TO BE CONTINUED (alas)

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Entry 1519 — Thoughts on Morality, Continued

Saturday, July 26th, 2014

When writing about morality yesterday, I puttered on after finishing the part I post in yesterday’s blog entry.  That resulted in this:

When I first had my little cluster of ideas, I thought I could describe how what I consider the central innate human drive, the pleasure-to-pain ratio maximization (P2P) drive, leads to a person’s internalized morality (also innate).  Further reflection on this was what put me in my null zone.  What follows are fragments from the system I thought I could come up with.

To begin with, the P2P drive, as its name, indicates, compels a person to try to maximize his pleasure (or minimize his pain). The “try” is important for he won’t necessarily know what will lead to a maximum pleasure and/or minimum pain.  Hence, his attempt may result in the opposite of what he wants.

By maximum pleasure, by the way, I mean anything that causes happiness or diminishes pain, not just wine, women and song, or the like.  It is most important to note, too, that I am speaking of a person’s lifetime of pleasure.  Hence, heavy, unpleasant physical exercising, or piano-practice, or studying–because of the pleasure the person believes his sacrifices will lead to.  The same reasoning holds for minimum pain.

I feel pretty much out of ideas about my subject now–the ones I had didn’t last very long.  But I going to try now to add a few thoughts about the innate mechanisms I think most of us have that influence our moral behavior.  “Ethiplexes,” I think I’ll call them for now.

Two are the empathy instinct and need for social approbation drive that I’ve already mentioned.  It occurred to me that a sub-instinct of the empathy instinct might be the maternal drive, narrowly defined here as a human need to nurture and protect children, infants in particular, and much more developed in most women than in men.  But it is definitely present in most men–which is why there is so much more grief when a homicidal lunatic’s victims are children rather than adults.  I think it may well be the basis of the nanny-state western nations have turned into.  It has something to do with the perception of losers as infants by those with strong maternal drives.

I’m not sure how to discuss this without mortally offending just about everybody.  I’ll just add that evidence in support of my contention is the way exploration of space halted once we got to the moon, with almost no complaints.  Which reminds me of another drive that is too morally influential in my opinion: the species-preservation drive.  It seems like the more people we have in the world, the more horrifying events like the Challenger disaster seem.  I suppose the media is part of that.

The social approbation drive is also a conformity drive; an offshoot may be the drive to make others conform, the totalitarian drive.  “Do what you’re told” is a leading moral tenet.  Because utter conformity wouldn’t work for a species, I believe a few of us have an anti-authoritarian drive.  Perhaps most boys (and many fewer girls) have one that weakens as they age.

Yes, I’m really dragging today.  Not thinking clearly or deeply.  I was hoping I’d get going but it doesn’t look like I will today.  Maybe tomorrow.

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Entry 1441 — Can a Stone Feel Pain?

Friday, May 2nd, 2014

Whether or not a stone can feel pain is key question in philosophy although few would recognize as such.  I keep coming back to it.  The unreflective answer is, “Of course not.”  The insane answer is, “Certainly.”  The correct answer is, “We have no way of knowing, probably ever.”  You see, we only know a stone would have no way of telling us it was in pain, if it ever were.  Moreover, even if it did, how could we know it to be in pain rather than signalling that something hit it–without being conscious of pain, as such?  It may even experience it as pleasure.

What difference does it make?  Well, if one is a liberal suffering from empathophilia, or excessive need to express empathy, one–recognizing that a stone could feel–would forbid one from kicking one.  Of course, to those of us not so afflicted, it makes no difference.  We recognize that we can mistreat a stone because a stone is not us.  And can’t fight back.

There–another dumb entry because I take my vow of a blog entry a day seriously.  My computer would be in deep pain if I didn’t, not to mention the Internet.  How about someone reading this?  Well, I didn’t force him too.  Besides, he’s not me.  (Note: this last was a joke. My theory of ethics holds that other human beings, and many other creatures, are in most contexts, as almost-us as members of our family. Unless we iz psychopaths.)

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Entry 307 — Columpetry? « POETICKS

Entry 307 — Columpetry?

Some lists of best poetry collections published in 2010 have been posted recently at New-Poetry.  Needless to say, I was contemptuous of the selections.  I wrote a variation of what I always write about such rankings:  “My first thought is that even if these lists were compiled by critics with a knowledge of the full range of poetry being composed nowadays, they are premature.  The year has not ended yet.  My second, much more intelligent thought, is that the lists that ought to be compiled should be of the best collections of poetry published in 2000.  A minor third thought is that if the latter lists were said to be of 2010 collections, few would realize it from the poems in them (assuming topical references were deleted).

Remembering my coinage, “magnipetry,” it crossed my mind that these lists were not of the best collection of that, but of . . . “medipetry” (mee DIH peh tree).  No, I thought, some of the collections on some of the lists are superior however short of magnipetry they are.  What they are is . . .  I needed a term for good but unadventurous poetry.  If I got it, it next occurred to me, I’d need one for adventurous poetry, for not all adventuours poetry is magnipetry, nor all magnipetry adventurous.  Hence, “Columpetry” for poetry to finds new worlds.  But which is disqualified by its “lump.”

So I gave up.  But not permanently, I hope.

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Taxonomy « POETICKS

Archive for the ‘Taxonomy’ Category

Entry 1057A — Anumric Mathematics

Friday, March 29th, 2013

As a think, one of my mottoes is definitely, first thought, wrong thought.   The other day I changed one of my wrong thoughts–well, not all wrong, but wrong enough to change; and it wasn’t a thought, it was one of my coinages.  I’d introduced the mathematics equivalent, I thought, of “asemic writing,” calling it “anumeric mathematics.”  But a day or two ago, I realized that “anumeric” is not the equivalent of “asemic” but of  “asemantic.”  The equaivalent of “asemic” would be “anumric!”  One excellent result of this chance, which I now officially make, is that there’s no reason an anumric mathematical work can’t have numbers in it, so long as they are doing nothing numric, by which I can now say I mean, doing no more than possibly signifying a quantity.  In the latter case, they would be acting numerically if minimally–but not numricly.  That’s important!  So, everybody, correct your notes.

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Entry 469 — A Personal Problem

Sunday, July 17th, 2011

 

My standard arguments against the application of the term, “visual poetry,” to works without words, or without words that contribute significantly to their central aesthetic meaning have long been: (1) expanding the coverage of the term to just about any conceivable somebody or other wants to call a visual poem–which, of course, renders it worthless as a tool of description; and (2) it breaks with the practice of several thousand years of considering poetry a literary art, and therefore requiring words; why change a meaning so drastically that’s worked so well for so long?  With regard to (2) let me add that, yes, the meaning of “poetry” was expanded to included free verse, and just about all such terms need to be at least a little flexible, but free verse poems continued to use the majority of devices that metrical verse did, and remained a literary art (and as such, I claim, continued to achieve its most important effects in the verbal area of the human brain, not elsewhere in the brain, and certainly not elsewhere in the brain and not in the verbal area of the brain).

I have a third problem with what I consider the misuse of the term, though–a personal one.  It is that as people encounter works like many of those in the new (excellent) collection at Illuminated Script: 30 Years of Visual Poetry & Intermedia that are called “visual poems” although they are without aesthetically significant words or even textual elements and are thus conditioned not to expect anything called a visual poem to be verbally meaningful. Ergo, unless I call my combinations of words and graphics “visual poems containing significant words,” those encountering them will take them as perhaps pleasant designs but not trouble to work out what they much more importantly are due to their words. In short, my own works will suffer because of the way others mislabel theirs.

True, few will care about my works even after alerted to the fact that the words in them are not just graphically-designed into them.  Still . . .

Entry 399 — Christian Jurgensen Thomsen

Monday, March 7th, 2011

What follows is an excerpt from Geoffrey Bibby’s The Testimony of the Spade, 1956.  It’s here as testimony in support of my view of the importance of taxonomy.  Thomsen, who was unfamiliar to me until earlier this morning, is credited by most scholars of originating the division of prehistory in the stone, bronze and iron ages.  A simple feat of taxonomy but hugely important for raising artifact collection out of empirical scatter into systematic study–i.e., provided what was needed to the science of archaeology out of it, and thus a means to significant understanding of prehistory.

Entry 354 — A Few Further Thoughts on Taxonomization

Friday, January 21st, 2011

First, another thought about taxonomy: an effective taxonomy will have lacuna that its structure makes readily fillable.  The Periodic Table of Elements is a prime example.

And an anecdote in support of the high value of taxonomization.  It concerns one of my many small possible discoveries while working on my knowlecular psychology.  It was that despite the standard view of certified psychologists, there is no such thing as “short-term memory,” there is only “memory.”  In other words, we don’t store recent events in one section of the brain for some short period than release the unimportant ones, and shift the important ones to another section of the brain devoted to long-term memories.  I always had trouble with this because I could see no way of evaluating short-term memories–how, for instance, could the brain pick out some memory that might be crucially important ten years down the road however irrelevant at the moment?  Where taxonomization came in was that I was at the same time driven to make my taxonomy as compact as possible.  Limit the number of classifications.  That’s a prime goal of any taxonomist.  So I worked to eliminate the short-term memory and long-term-memory as subcategories of “memory.”  It was many years before I found a very simple, elegant solution–a way the brain could tag all incoming data in such a way that one’s faculty of remembering would tend to choose recent events before older events (of equal contextual attractiveness–i.e., if you just met someone named Mary and your wife is named Mary, the name Mary will probably still more likely bring up a memory of your wife than of the new Mary you’ve met, but if your wife’s name is Judy, than the name will bring up a memory of the new Mary faster than it will bring up some other acquaintance of yours who has that name, to put it very simply).

I claim that taxonomization significantly helped me to my breakthrough this time, and many other times.  If my psychology proves invalid that may seem a so what, but I also claim that taxonomization is similarly helpful to successful theorists.

I think the reason I’m such an advocate for taxonomy is my work throughout the years to construct a full-scale psychology.  Reflecting on it, I realize that what I’ve mostly done has been taxonomization–defining items and systematically classifying them.  Such informal taxonomization is essential for any serious full understanding of a versosophy (any verosoplex, that is), including ones more respected than mine.  I’ve read about some of the research that’s been done in this area, by the way, and don’t find any of it to contradict my theory; in fact, the researchers seem to me empiricists without little idea of what they’re doing.  They’re certainly not concerned with a big picture.

When I have more pep, I hope to be a little more specific about how I’ve worked out my theory, beginning with the universe, the activity of the brain, which I divide into perception, retroception (memory) and behavior.

Entry 352 — More on the Value of Taxonomy

Wednesday, January 19th, 2011

The more I think about it, the more I feel like superciliously saying that Truth is one of the two primary values in life beyond survival, and therefore of the highest value for itself alone, and that a taxonomy is the basis of every significant form of Truth, so of the highest value for itself alone.  It is an understanding the value of which can only be appreciated by those able to perceive the full size, if not fully understand a form of verosophy and follow its taxonomical base into “ever-smaller mysteries, and ever-vaster interconnections.”

But I contend that a taxonomy also has valuable utilitarian uses.  A cardinal one is its use for helping people understand  a given poem.  To demonstrate that, let’s take an untitled language poem with no author’s name that someone not knowing anything about such a thing encounters, and for some obscure reason doesn’t dismiss it as nonsense but wants to understand it.  Let’s assume it has some normal words in it.  If he knows about my taxonomy, he can go to it and figure out from it that the object he has is 1. material and therefore matter, 2. part of life because printed as a human artifact, 3. part of human life because a human artifact, 4. m0re than likely something resulting from mentascendancy, 5. a form of art since it certainly isn’t a form of versosophy–nor recognizable as religious though he may have to investigate that further, by perhaps taking it to a minister of some kind, 6. literature since it certainly is neither persuasive or utilitarian (although it may take him a while to reach that conclusion), and 7. poetry, because not having the set right margin that prose has.

It is obviously 8. linguexclusive and 9. not songmode, so plaintext poetry, and 10. not  orthological, so xenexpressive (the class I have now, thanks to Geof, replaced xenological and language poetry with).  Under xenexpressive, he’ll find language poetry with jump-cut poetry and surrealistic poetry, neither of which fit, so he’ll identify it as 11. language poetry.  He should be able to tell which main kind of language poem it is–let’s say, 12. sprungrammatical.  In the full taxonomy I hope one day to put together, he’ll be able to determine what kind of sprungrammatical poem it is–one to three levels down.  Now, with a name, he’ll be able to study anthologies of such poems and read articles about them.  Then he can dismiss them as nonsense with a clear conscience!

What is his alternative?  I can’t think of any–assuming he’s alone–i.e., has no educated friends to help him–except to consult a typology, or list of poetries–after somehow deducing that the text is a form of poetry.  He must then read the description of every kind of poetry until coming on one that seems to be of his text.  A long j0b, and even then he’ll not have learned anything about what such poems are like and unlike.

A taxonomy can work in the opposite direction, too.  Let’s say our subject finds a text labeled a language poem and finds it interesting, but puzzling in part.  He looks it up in a reference book and finds a fair but finally unsatisfying vague definition of it.  If in a typological reference book, he’ll have nowhere else to go.  Of course, few if any references are entirely typological; most of their definitions will mention what general kind of poetry a specific poem is.  He might find, for instance, that his language poem is “postmodern,” and read about that, which may help a bit.  But if he learns what it is taxonomically, he’ll soon be able to learn more about its xenexpressive qualities, and its plaintext qualities, and so forth  And see why it is not surrealistic but illuminatingly somewhat like surrealistic poetry.  Etc.

Entry 351 — Debating Huth on Taxonomy

Tuesday, January 18th, 2011

Shortly after he got my booklet, A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry, Geof Huth wrote an excellent review of it at his blog, here. It is also a critique, which I will not respond to in detail.

Bob Grumman has released a new book, really a chapbook, entitled A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry, and it combines the two halves of Bob’s intellect into one. The first of these is an interest in clear thinking, in making distinctions even if only for distinction’s sake, an interest in definition and categorization. And the second is its opposite, though it is the second that Bob rarely sees. The second is a tendency to simplify distinctions by setting rules that are not in evidence in the facts, a tendency to muddle things a bit, to wander.

And I love both these halves of Bob, even though, or probably because, they both can annoy me and enchant me, because their annoyance is often a possibility for illumination and because their enchantments lead me terribly astray. These two halves of Bob are the two halves of his visual poetry as well. He creates some of the most considered visual poetry, a poetry interested in the word and new senses of syntax, and he sometimes creates with this intellect visual poems that seem to care little about their visual presentation. Then he will create visual poems almost totally inscrutable from a verbal point of view but which are still among the most beautiful visual poems around. His best work is among my favorite being created these days.

Somewhere I gave my opinion of this idea of Geof’s but I’ve been unable to find what I said. It wasn’t much, only that I wouldn’t call my intellect divided in two: it’s just the tool I use to define, distinguish and classify reality, among other things. Sometimes it is effective, sometimes not, but it’s the same intellect at all times. As for its creating “visual poems that seem to care little about their visual presentation,” this goes back to an ongoing difference of ours as to the importance of what I consider trivial decorative effects and he considers centrally important effects–because, I feel, I’m more committed to the conceptual meaning of poetry than he is, and less to the sensual meaning. A complicating factor is that I lack the means–e.g., a superior computer and printer–often to create poems that look as well on the page as I’d like them to. All of which may seem to have little to do with our taxonomy debate but which, I think, parallels his greater interest in trees than in forests compared with my greater interest in forests than in trees.

It would have been helpful if he’d provided an example of my “setting rules that are not in evidence in the facts, a tendency to muddle things a bit, to wander.”

So there’s the context for this, a little accounting of my point of view, which might be only an accumulation of my own biases. I’ve left a few things out. I’ve known Bob for just under 25 years. He is my oldest visual poetry friend. And we almost never agree on anything. We come to visual poetry with much different ideas. As a matter of fact, when Bob says “visual poetry” he means something considerably narrower than I mean when using the same term. We are not sympatico in that way.

Why Taxonomy?

Bob opens the booklet with “A Defense of the Taxonomization of Poetry,” which is an impassioned defense of taxonomies and the effort it takes to produce them. Part of the reason for his passion is that Bob has suffered through a few sometimes heated arguments over the years from poets, especially visual poets, who are themselves passionate in their opposition to taxonomies. These people see a taxonomy as the equivalent of an autopsy that produces no results. In this opening section, Bob does a reasonable, though quick, job of directly disputing the ideas of the critics of taxonomy, but he provides no justification for taxonomy at all, except to say that “an effective taxonomy” allows “the clarification of discussion.”

This is a big weakness to me. In the face of enormous criticism of taxonomy, Bob undermines the arguments of his opponents, but not in a way that argues the case for his own. All of his arguments are negative. None is positive. The one above is actually my reversal of his refutation of his detractors’. Bob needs to prove how his taxonomies do something valuable. What he does is insist that they do something valuable without clarifying those values or giving any evidence of any.

As I’ve elsewhere noted, I provided much more justification for taxonomy: for instance, I called it the basis of the conceptual appreciation of art, and declaimed that “At their best, taxonomies (and analysis in general) reveal ever-smaller mysteries, and ever-vaster interconnections to discover down or up to–while allowing us a vocabulary greater than ‘oooh’ and ‘ahhh’ with which to share our pleasure with others.” Geof has since shrugged these off as trivial. I’m in the processing of making much more elaborate points, but I consider these pretty good ones.

Upper Levels of the Taxonomy

This taxonomy of Bob’s is the most formal he’s ever created. It begins with the Universe of the taxonomy (in this case “Matter”), and narrows down from there:

Domain: Life

Kingdom: Human Life

Phylum: Mentascendancy (“the pursuit of meaningfulness”)

Class: Art

Order: Literature

Family: Poetry
Immediately, I’m thrown into a quandary, one of definitional confusion and doubt. Is Poetry really divided into Matter (instead of its opposing universe: Mind) or into Life (instead of Non-Life). Even if stored inside a human, aren’t poems really only inanimate? and are they not more things of the mind rather than of matter? A poem on a page is not so much the poem as a poem accepted into a mind. This is a serious issue, one that needs justification in the taxonomy.*

Frankly, I feel Geof has been thrown into goofiness here. But maybe that’s my fault, for not having defined “human life” as “everything having to do with human beings, including their activities and products.” I didn’t define “mind,” either. For me, it is irrelevant–a consciousness that observes matter but does not otherwise interact with it. It has no subclasses. I only put it in my taxonomy to be complete.

I agree with Geof that poems are only inanimate. However, while they are products of the brain, which I’m sure is what Geof means by the “mind,” so are cars. What counts in my taxonomy are what they are as matter, to wit: verbal expressions, oral or written. That they become sets of activated brain-cells is interesting, and I believe will ultimately vindicate the validity of my taxonomy (by showing which brain-cells are activate for each different kind of poetry in my taxonomy), but my taxonomy only deals with what’s out there in the real material world.

Even if that were not the case, I don’t see that it would make much difference. What defines poetries as written or spoken material artifacts would define them as mentally accepted artifacts.

At the Level of Prose and Poetry

Bob divides all literature into two main families, Poetry and Prose, and this might be a satisfactory division, though I would have, at least, discussed dramatic works and addressed the question of apparent hybrid forms, such as the verse novel and verse play. Here, Bob posits that “poetry is intended to be read slowly, read into rather than through: connotations, sounds, rhythms, flesh being emphasize rather than denotation only.” In general, the general direction of this definition is fine, but it’s too absolute and doesn’t take into account such facts as the inclusion of doggerel in the family of poetry, or that fact that many prose works depend on all the effects mentioned by Bob and also do not depend on denotation alone. This definition is complicated by Bob’s paragraph that consists of this sentence: “Literary prose is simply literature that is not poetry,” which seems to assume that any works that depend on denotation alone (or, let’s say, principally) are thus prose. This situation is quickly complicated again by Bob’s not-quite-stated-but-clearly-implied point that poetry is text that includes flow-breaks, the most well known of which is the linebreak. Whatever poetry or prose is or isn’t isn’t clarified here.

In other writings I’ve done, I’ve gotten into verse plays and other such things. In my unpreliminary taxonomy, I will, too. I didn’t here, which is a minor flaw Geof is right in pointing out. His main criticism may have resulted because I for got to say, as I usually do when differentiating poetry from prose, that poetry is verbal expression in which flow-breaks (as I define them) are clearly significant. Prose is verbal expression in which flow-breaks occur relatively very infrequently. Yes, it’s a subjective matter, and yes, there will be instances of works of verbal expression whose category will be difficult to decide. But expecting a taxonomy to be perfect is absurd.

The same argument holds for poetry’s being “intended to be read slowly, read into rather than through: connotations, sounds, rhythms, flesh being emphasize rather than denotation only.” I suppose I should have written that it is significantly more than prose “intended to be read slowly, read into rather than through: connotations, sounds, rhythms, flesh being emphasized rather than denotation only.” Again the problem of subjectivity (which no attempt to define or classify can avoid, but must only try its best to minimize) arises, and of the borblur where rare works of verbal expression occur that are hard to define. Note well, however, that what I say about poetry here is descriptive only. It has nothing to do with the classification of poetry, which depends entirely on whether or not its ratio of flow-breaks to words is sufficiently high to make it poetry or not.

I would add in passing that doggerel is, even without truning to flow-breaks, poetry on the basis of its sounds–since doggerel always has rhyme ends.

Flow-Breaks

Bob, next discusses, flowbreaks (I’m discarding the hyphen): 1. the linebreak, 2. variable indentation, 3. interior line-gap (which is simply a caesura), and 4. the intrasyllabic linebreak. Here is the genius of Bob Grumman. He sees and defines topographic features of poetry that others have virtually ignored and he sees how they fit together into one set of poetic tools. My only problem with this is that one of his examples of an intra-syllabic linebreak is really intersyllabic, and the the fact that a line breaks within a word or a syllable doesn’t make it significantly different from a traditional linebreak. What he should have used as his fourth category of a flowbreak was an instance of visual tmesis, which would be a different form of flowbreak.

I checked and was surprised to find that in obsolete verse, blocks of more than one space are used to form caesurae. I always thought of them as rhetorical breaks with nothing special indicating them but the sense of the text where they are, or a simple punctuation mark. The term, “line-gap” is still necessary, however, because it applies not only to blocks of spaces but blocks of anything else that clear put a blocking gap int&&&o a line.

My two examples of intrasyllabically broken words were “dev/ice” and “i/t.” line-break. For me, “device’s” two syllables are “de” and “vice,” but maybe I’m wrong.

I like “flow-break” as opposed to “flowbreak,” by the way, because I think the hyphen emphasizes its meaning.

Types of Poetry

This lengthy discussion has brought us only to the saddle-stapled middle of the chapbook, which is where Bob divides poetry into three classes: linguiexclusive poetry (poetry dependent on words alone) and pluraesthetic poetry (poetry that mixes “expressive modalities,” such as the verbal and the visual. This distinction is solid, though I have questions with the subsubtypes of poetry Bob identifies.

Linguiexclusive Poetry

Just one i in “linguexpressive.”

Bob divides linguexclusive poetry into three subsubtypes: orthological, xenological, and language. The first is fairly standard poetry (subdivided yet again into categories), the second is poetry that breaks with the conventions of normal sense and syntax in various ways, and the third subsubtype is both confusing and unnecessary. All of its pieces should appear under xenological. Bob has divided to use a term here (“language poetry”) that already has a meaning, though a taxonomically unhelpful one, and he gives it a new sense to no particular purpose.

Geof may be right, but I think of xenological poetry as breaking with logic, not breaking with syntax, although I can see that a breaking of syntax will also cause a break in logic . . . I think. Not to argue but for background, the reason for the split is that in an earlier version of my taxonomy I divided poetries on the basis of their innovativeness, and put surrealistic and jump-cut poetry under “xenological poetry” among the uninnovative poetries, since their innovations where much older than language poetry’s, and not, in my opinion, as great.

“Language poetry” has no real meaning. At least I’ve never seen it defined. well, unless you consider “language-centered poetry” a definition. In any case, I long avoided using it but finally decided that it was popular enough and appropriate enough to use, and that I could use it to mean “language-centered,” but go on to define it in much greater detail. I think I will keep it, but perhaps put it under “xenological”–after changing “xenological” to “xenexpressive.”

The definition he gives is “Language poetry is poetry in words [that?] seem to be used with almost maximum communicational responsibility. Language is at the center of such poetry, not semantics or sound.” This definition does not seem at all helpful to me, and I cannot imagine a poetry without semantics that still focuses on language.

I would guess my computer screwed me up when I wrote my “definition” of language poetry. However, the three kinds of language poetry I went on to define should have clarified everything sufficiently. Language poetry is poetry whose words seem to be used with almost maximal communicational IRresponsibility (I’m sure i mistake was mine, not my computer’s) Language is at its centr, not semantics or sound. That semantics is not at its center does not mean it does not have semantics. I’m trying to say that it focuses on what words do rather than what they mean. Then in my three kinds of language poetry, I show some of the ways it does that.

Pluraesthetic Poetry

In discussing the types of pluraesthetic poetry, I’ll skip any discussion of the fact that Bob redefines “visual poetry” for his own uses, because it is important for him to do it here in order for “visual poetry” to fit neatly into his definition of poetry. Bob, however, also distinguishes mathematical poetry and flowchart poetry (“poetry that uses the symbols of computers or other flow-charting in significantly expressive ways”) from visual poetry, but I do not. Mathematical poems add mathematical features that visualize the poetry, so I consider them visual poems, and to have a category for flowchart poetry assumes that process symbols are textual and thus not visual. I’d argue, again, that they are not orthodox text, so these poems are also visual poems.

I’ll just state my disagreement–and the reason for my disagreement, which is that the point of my taxonomy is to separate different members of the set, “Poetry.” A term is of value only to the degree that it is specialized. I should add that I flubbed my definition of flow-chart poetry; it should be simply “poetry that uses flow-charting symbols in significantly expressive ways.”

Also, Bob’s definition remains indefensible: “poetry that uses mathematical symbols that actually carry out mathematical operations.” These mathematical operations are not actual; they are apparent. That is a big different. Duck cannot be divided by yellow in any mathematical way, though it could in a metaphoric way that has nothing to do with math directly.

See my previous entry discussing this.

For reasons I don’t understand, Bob distinguishes between “cyber poetry” and “hypertextual poetry,” which is not a distinction. Hypertext poetry would be a subset of cyberpoetry. But the real taxonomic distinctions in the category would be between non-interactive and interactive digital poetries, not by the types of computer languages used in the coding of the poems.

To me the distinction is between poetry that consists of computer language and poetry that consists of regular language but may have embedded computer instructions that allow it to do things poetry without them can’t.

Bob leaves out of his poetry videopoetry, which might have some overlap with cyberpoetry that Bob will have to work out.

Videopoetry is just animated visual poetry.

Numbering

Finally, since Bob is presenting a complex nested taxonomy, he should design a numbering system that allows the user to determine their level in the taxonomy and, thus, be able to identify relationships more easily. At points I was briefly confused because I did not understand what certain headings were subsets of. Even the traditional outlining system once taught in school to students drafting essays could work here, but I think, given the number of levels in play, something direct though a little more complex, such as the number system in the Historical Thesaurus of the Oxford English Dictionary, would work better.

Good point.

Coda

Bob’s “Final Comment” includes this unsupportable statement: “I think no members of any other vocation care less about what they do than poets.” I’d say this is an unprovable statement, so it’s opening “I think” saves it, but I also believe everything after those first two words is false. Poets, in my experience, care more about poetics than about poetry. They are more likely to read someone writing about poetry than to read the poetry. They prefer, for instance, blogs on poetics over blogs that reproduce poetry. Poets are thinking people, even when guided by the heart, the spleen, the bone. But sometimes that interest in how poetry works does not extend to an interest in categorization. A general interest is not equivalent to an interest in taxonomy.

At the end of this, I realize that I’d like to see the next draft of this book. I like the idea of seeing how poetry can fall into categories, though I’m sure those categories will dissolve into one another. And I’m happy that Bob has made this book and glad that he has. But he still needs to prove how these defined categories could help us think about poetry. I don’t see it, even though I like the effort to make these categories and the entertainment of the results of that effort.

Finally, my thanks to Bob for giving me a special limited edition of one of the book, with a copy of one of his mathemaku pasted in. I’ve filled my copy with pencil marks of various kinds and notes to myself, but it is still a perfect copy. And I used pencil because I’m an archivist.

I truly thank Geof for his efforts. One of the reasons I say things like “no members of any other vocation care less about what they do than poets” is because, yes, they IN GENERAL are indifferent or hostile to projects like this of mine, even to my simple attempt over twenty or more years to get a list of contemporary poetry schools assembled. Two people suggested schools I didn’t have on my preliminary definitely incomplete list. I would add that I don’t think my idea of what poetics is comes very close to what most poets who think they’re discussing it think it is. But, hey, I’m a bitter old man long ignored by the public at large while tenth-raters make it big.

Not really. Just when I think about my situation in the world of poetry while writing entries like this one.

Entry 350 — Re: the Value of Taxonomy

Monday, January 17th, 2011

My good friend Geof Huth has challenged me to demonstrate why taxonomization is of value.  At first, I was somewhat dumbfounded by his belief that it was, if not useless, not of major importance.  Able occasionally to illuminate but not able to do so well enough for one to make a life-long project of, as I have.   I have always taken it as a given that an effective taxonomy is of value–of crucial value–in all fields.  Linnaeus’s Taxonomy, Mendeleyev’s Periodic Table of Elements, Euclid’s Geometry . . .   I termed it “the basis of the conceptual appreciation of art” (in a slightly different arrangement of those words), in the introductory defense of it in my A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry.  I also mentioned “the clarification of discussion that an effective taxonomy can accomplish.”  Later, I may have gone off the lyrico-mystical deep end when I said, “At their best, taxonomies (and analysis in general) reveal ever-smaller mysteries, and ever-vaster interconnections to discover down or up to–while allowing us a vocabulary greater than ‘oooh’ and ‘ahhh’ with which to share our pleasure with others.”  Granted, the idea that without taxonomy’s help, our vocabulary would be limited to ooohs and ahhhs is absurdly exaggerated.  Still, as I hope to show, only a taxonomy-based vocabulary is of maximal usefulness in the search for significant truths.

I soon admitted that I had not done much more than assert the worth of taxonomy, although it still seems to me that anyone who has done serious work in any kind of verosophy (i.e., field of significant material knowledge) would find plenty of support in his experiences for those assertions.  Ergo, I now must present a detailed case for taxonomy.  Not easy, for that requires a discussion of knowledge,  a main contention of mine being that taxonomies are either necessary or hard to do without in all attempts significantly to understand a discipline.  Here I ought to stop, for the possibility that I could convince anyone that my understanding of what knowledge is, and how we acquire and use it is valid is less than point oh one percent.  Nevertheless, I’ll try.  If I can figure out how to.

Warning: I’m now going to think out loud.  I will be hard to follow as I will probably jump around.  My logic will at times be very lax, and I’ll use coinages of mine unfamiliar to all but me.  Don’t expect too much in the way of articulateness, either.

I’m going to start with the knowleplex.  That’s what I call the complex of knowlecules (bits of knowledge) that a person’s brain forms when learning his way around a portion of reality containing interrelated matter–one’s neighborhood, for instance, or marine biology, or the study of the photon.  There are many kinds of knowleplexes.  The most effective, for verosophers, is the verosoplex.  That’s because it is systematically organized.  Not perfectly, but always aiming for maximal systemization.

I would claim that one reason many plenty dislike taxonomy (and reductive thinking and everything else having to do with science and related fields) is that they are incapable of forming verosoplexes.  Some whom I call “milyoops, tend because of their innate temperaments, mainly to form sloppy clumps of knowlecules some of which interrelate with some of the others in the knowleplex  but few of which interrelate to all or even a majority of the others in it.  The milyooplexes, as I call these, lack a unifying principle, something that makes a big picture possible.  An effective taxonomy is the ultimate such unifying principle.

It’s just like a city: an ideal system of streets will get you with maximal efficiency wherever you want to go; streets designed merely to connect one building to one or two others, will be worthless outside a give neighborhood.  Similarly, a city with an effective system of streets will tend to fill up with building at eay to find and get-to locations.  A really well-organized city (impossible because Nature must make it so) would have a center from which the whole of the center would be in view.

Another kind of knowleplex is the rigidniplex.  It’s formed by people I term rigidniks whose innate temperament compels them to create unsound unifying principles–conceptual skeletons, so to speak–that are too inflexible to form a unifying basis for sufficient knowledge to provide a rational understanding of a field.  They over-unify too little data.

Milyoops are satisfied by their milyooplexes because they allow pleasurable short-term connections–the pleasure of vaudeville versus the pleasure of a well-written full-length play.  Or pop songs versus classical symph0nies.  They can’t experience long-term pleasure or be other than bored by anything aimed to provide that, so they oppose it.  They love to learn small facts, but avoid systematic knowledge.  Another way of putting it is that a milyoop lacks much of an attention span–a pop song’s immediate variation on its initial theme will give them pleasure, but forget a second movement of a symphony’s providing a (probably more complicated) variation on a (probably more complicated) theme played ten minutes previously.  They can’t use a taxonomy, which does, basically, what a fine symphony does, so they reject it.

The whole idea is that a small understanding of some small portion of a knowleplex will give pleasure, but if one also can connect it to some other portion of the knowleplex, one can enjoy the second portion at the same time, and if one can also–do to one or more such connections, intuite something of the way everything in the knowleplex interrelate, one can enjoy a truly superior pleasure.  Indeed, such an understanding can suggest the sense of the oneness of all things that religions hype as the ultimate happiness–and which I believe all verosophers experience in their best moments, and have spoken of.  Artists, too–although not by means of a verosoplex, but by means of (this is a new idea of mine) an intuiplex–a knowleplex whose unifying principle is protoceptual rather than reducticeptual.  Or sensual rather than conceptual.

This is a good moment for me.  Due to the taxonomical thinking I always do when working with my theory of psychology.  I classify artistic temperaments as different from scientific temperaments on the basis of their brain make-up, which I won’t go into here.  And suddenly perceived how I could be nice to artists with this intuiplex, which I genuinely see can be a route to large truths equal to the verosoplex.  But also what causes the two cultures C. P. Snow wrote about, and which I fully accept.

The intuiplex much more than the verosoplex aids the pursuit of beauty, which I hold to be as important as the search for truth, but probably hinders the latter–except when used by someone who also is capable of verosoplexes.  Similarly, verosoplexes tend to get in the way of the pursuit and appreciation of beauty.

Again, I yield to the temptation of using my present reasoning to support the value of taxonomy.  Only because of taxonomy have I been able on the spur of the moment to hypothesize an intuiplex–because it is based on the knowleplex, which is only a taxonomical level one step above it, and the verosoplex, which it is recognizably identical to (to me) except for one thing, its being an arrangement of primarily protoceptual knowlecules (think of the somatic knowledge that some highly unintellectual highly effective athletes have) instead of reducticeptual knowlecules–which, by the way, is taxonomically very similar, and in the same taxon as protoceptual knowlecules, differing from them only in that their ultimate source is the data conveyed to the brain more or less directly from the senses rather than extracted from the senses pre-cerebralling and converted to reducticepts (or conceptual knowledge, like words, numbers or geometrical shapes).

An important point to recognize is that the validity of my theory of psychology is irrelevant so far as the value of its taxonomy is concerned: its taxonomy greatly facilitates my navigation of it, and ability to understand it–and find gaps worth trying to fill I’d never find without it,

I really think I know what I’m talking about, however little it may seem so.  I hope someone somewhere in time and space gets something out of this installment of my adventure in Advanced Thought.  More, I hope, tomorrow.

Entry 349 — My Subtaxonomy of Poetry

Sunday, January 16th, 2011

I’m excited this morning, for I have a brand-new enthusiasm: a taxonomy devoted entirely to classifying the attributes of a single poem!  Athena herself told me to work one out last night while I was in bed when I was pondering how poor the 30-box rectangle and its contents represented the taxonomy of a poem it was intended to be in my “Mathemaku in Praise of Taxonomy.”  I’d not intended to rectangle to be more than suggestive but the more I thought about it, the more I felt a serious taxonomy of the single poem would be useful.  More important, I thought I’d enjoy working on one.  I admit that the strong possibility that it would be the world’s first enthused me, too.  It also me me laugh since I’m sure almost everyone would consider it much too trivial to bother with.

Anyway, here goes–extremely preliminarily:

1. The Poem (i.e., something with words and flow-breaks)

2. A. Poetic Form &  2.B. Poetic Content

By poetic form I mean every generalized attribute of a poem: rhyme, for instance; by “poetic content,” I mean every specific attribute of a poem such as the specific “rhyme/grime” rhyme–in spite of what those nullinguists who abhor clarity of communication contend.  The abstract container and the concrete contained.  Very simple.

3.A.i. Classiform & 3.A.ii Idioform

By “classiform,” I mean those sets of “form-traits” making up a kind of poem that more than a few people repeat, or, to put it simply, an established poetic form; an “idioform” is simply a poetic form that used only for the poem it is in, or–if more than that, not enough to be considered established.  A traditional sonnet versus one of my free verse Poem poems.

3.B.i. Words and the equivalent alone & 3.B.ii. words and other matter

This is basically a repeat of my division of poetry into linguexclusive (words only) and pluraesthetic (words and other matter) except that I mention “the equivalent,” by which I mean all symbols that act, in my view, as words, such as the plus sign and other mathematical symbols and such verbal symbols as the ampersand.

4.A.i.I.  Metrical Shape & 4.A.i.II. Set Length

By “metrical shape,” I mean things like number and length of lines using some metric foot as the unit of measure. By “set length,” I mean length of lines or poem as a while using any unit of measure; most often that would be a syllable, as with the classical American haiku, which is suppose to be 17 syllables long, in three lines. I think there are few established forms that are set length. I can’t think of any other criteria traditional poems have to conform to but suspect there may be some.

4.A.ii.I. Width & 4.A.ii.II Length

I admit that I really had no idea what to put here. Idioformular poems come in too many varieties to be easily classifiable–I think.

4.B.i.I. Figurative & 4.B.i.II Plaintext & 4.B.i.III. Melodational & 4.B.i.IV. Imagistic

These are based on what is most prominent about the words and word-equivalents in a poem. Plaintext will have little or not figurative, melodational of imagistic language. The other three can be mixed if more than one variety of words is prominent: e.g., figurative-imagistic or even figurative-imagistic-melodational.

4.B.ii.I Words and Graphics & 4.B.ii.II Words and Heightened Sounds & 4.B.ii.III Words and Mathematics & 4.B.ii.IV Words and Cryptography & 4.B.ii.V Words and Computer Language & 4.B.ii.VI Words and Tactile, Gustatory or Olfactory Elements

All the pluraesthetic kinds of poetry, if I have them all.

5.A.i.I.1 Locked & 5.A.i.I.2 Flexible

The first would consist of relatively rigid forms like the sonnet and limerick, the second of fairly informal forms of no particular length but requiring rhyme (doggerel) or strict meter. At Level 6. all these varieties would be listed; there would be no Level 7.

5.A.i.II.1. Non-Classical Haiku & 5.A.i.II.2 Other Free Verse Poems

Not much more to be said about the form of free verse poems.

5.B.i. This level would divide figurative poems by what figures–metaphors, puns, etc., they have; melodational poems by what melodations–rhyme, alliteration, etc.-they use; and imagistic poems by what images (in general–such as animal) they have. 5.B.ii. would divide various pluraesthetic poems similarly–mathematical poems into kind of math used, crytographic poems into kind of code, etc. At Level 6, every variety in the Content Section of the Taxonomy would be divided based on subject matter, and that could continue into any desired level of specificity–say from animal to mammal to rabbit to variety of rabbit, or more.

Okay, I got tired toward the end. An okay start, though, I feel. But I’ve lost my excitement–and fear I see why nobody else (probably) has tackled this problem before.

Entry 348 — Endwar Enters the Taxonomy Discussion

Saturday, January 15th, 2011

Endwar had such intereseting comments to contribute to the discussion going on at Geof Huth’s blog concerning my A Preliminary Taxonomy of Poetry that I decided, with his permission, to give them a second printing here, with a few stray comments of mine to follow:

On mathematical poetry and mathematics:  I’m not sure I agree completely with anyone here.  It seems to me that in a mathematical poem one sees a mathematical operation with words (usually) operating in a metaphorical way (thus the poetry enters).  That said, the mathematical operations involved are usually well-defined for numbers, but not for various words and concepts.  “3+1=2” is something everyone (is taught to) agrees on in a literal way, and it follows from the definitions of each number and the signs “+” and “=”.  The statement “candy cane + child = happiness” is also probably pretty generally understood, but not with the same level of definiteness (or definition, as per the previous sentence) as the numerical example earlier.  You could write “candy cane + child = obesity”, which would probably also be understood, but because of the metaphorical nature of the math, you can’t conclude (via the law of substitution) that “happiness = obesity” (though some may point out the phrase “fat, dumb, and happy”, which could then lead us to conclude “happiness = obesity = stupidity” . . .  You can see, then where the multiple meanings of words (bifurcations of meaning, to throw in another mathematical metaphor popular in some at one time trendy lit-crit circles)) can lead.)

I would argue that a mathematical poem is a statement that represents a mathematical operation on the words involved, but which isn’t necessarily one that can be checked the way mathematical statements with numbers can be.  I will even go one step further and assert that one can create a mathematical poem that is mathematically wrong but which still makes a metaphorical point.  I have done this using matrix multiplication – a 2×2 matrix times a 2×1 vector is set equal to a 3×1 vector.   That’s not something you can do with real number (or even imaginary number) math, but I think it works as a poem.

Written mathematics is inherently visual, not verbal>:   I can grant Bob’s point that “3-1=2” is visually not interesting, and furthermore it hardly matters what font is used.  It does matter a bit what numbers are used – roman numerals will say “III-I=II”, and binary says “11-1=10”, and ternary says “10-1=2”, which are all the same numerically.  But it becomes evident for large numbers that roman numerals are unwieldy for calculating, and we are used to the decimal number system, so the non-decimal numbers need cumbersome subscripts or context to be read as intended.  I would argue, though, that the real test of whether we have something verbal versus something visual is whether the statement can be read aloud.  Again “Three minus one equals two,” is pretty straightforward, but that is merely because of the simplicity of the expression.  Try reading, say, a passage out of the middle of J.D. Jackson’s <I>Classical Electrodynamics</I> or any other graduate physics or mathematics text, and it will be immediately obvious why these equations aren’t written out in words and why mathematicians and scientists do nearly all their professional discussions with slides or in the presence of a blackboard.  And even if one does manage to put the text purely into words read aloud, you will find nobody in the audience who will understand what has been said who hasn’t at least written down some equations or a drawing as a guide.   One of the most tedious reading experiences I had was a few pages out of an algebra text written by Leonhard Euler, who felt it was necessary to write down an equation and then repeat the equation in words, such as:
“E=mv &sup2;/2

The kinetic energy is equal to half the product of the mass and the square of the velocity.”  This continues for page after page.

If you’re still not convinced, show me how to do read calculus aloud and make it intelligible.  Two pages minimum.

Because the visual representation is integral to the intelligible communication of all but the simplest mathematics, I would argue that mathematics is inherently visual language, and that by extension, mathematical poetry is also inherently visual poetry.  The visual poem may still not depend on which font is used (though I have examples where that is the case as well), but it still can’t be read aloud and have the same meaning, because it will not then register as mathematical.

On hypertext:  I think Bob is right that hypertext is not necessarily computer poetry, though the number of sequences need not be infinite.  There are primitive hypertexts preceding the web, if not the computer, perhaps the most literarily respectable being Julio Cortazar’s 1963 novel Hopscotch, or the near equivalent in the many children’s books where the reader gets to decide the adventure, where one reads the first page and at the bottom of each page one sees a sentence like “If Joe enters the gate, go to page 23.  If Joe continues down the road, go to page 42,” and continues until one reaches an ending.  (I suppose one can write out a tree or flow chart to describe the plot and then label it some sort of finite state machine or finite automaton, which is sort of a representation of a simple computer, but I digress.)  The point that I am agreeing with Bob is that a hypertext does not necessarily require a computer, though using a computer and particularly one with html, greatly facilitates the process.  Hypertext is thus distinct from code poetry like that which might be like that of Sondheim (or Jim Andrews or Ted Warnell (poems by Nari)).  And just as there is a difference between mathematics with numbers and mathematical poetry, a poem written in/with computer code need not be an actually compileable program.  There are of course many other approaches to poetry using a computer (starting with using a text editor to pound out cantos), for which I will refer the reader to the books of Jorge Luiz Antonio, who is trying to catalog them all (to see his long list of links to Brfazilian digital poetry samples, see http://vispo.com/misc/BrazilianDigitalPoetry.htm).

BTW, for another experience of the difference between computer code and a written document, try viewing the source code of this web page (or the dbqp blog itself), and contrast the instructions for the computer (the part read and understood by the machine) and the human readable part.

endwar

First a very quick acceptance, I think, with Endwar’s definition of mathematical poetry, except that I’d use different words to define it than he has: mathematical poetry is poetry that carries out mathematical operations, metaphorically, on non-mathematical terms.  This is, I believe, the first time I’ve accepted that the operations are metaphorical, as Gregory St. Thomasino tried to convince me six months or so ago.  My trouble (still) is that the operations seem actual to me–the sun really does multiply a field to get flowers!

Then my two comments at Geof’s blog:

Thanks for all the comments, endwar. I’ll get to all of them, I hope. Right now, just some thoughts in response to your comments about mathematical poetry.

I don’t care whether a poem can be read aloud or not. Mathematics is written in text just as ordinary verbal material is. Text printed standardly is effectively not visual, as far as I’m concerned: it’s symbolic. So a purely mathematical poem, in my definition, would be expressed in verbal and mathematical symbols.

On further thought, it seems to me all mathematics can be read out loud. So what if one needs to see it on the page to understand it? That would be true of many linguexclusive poems, too. Even relatively simple ones. I’ve almost never understood poems I was unfamiliar with when read at poetry readings.

As for the child and candy cane, I like your reasoning, but it now seems to me you have simple shown that “candy cane + child = happiness” and “candy cane + child = obesity” are both incorrect! They should be “candy cane + child = happiness + X” and “candy cane + child = obesity +Y.” And “happiness – obesity + X – Y.”

* * * * * * *
.
By the way, I love this discussion of mathematical poetry. I suddenly wondered, though, if there’s a subject fewer people in the world would be interested in.

One futher note: even if we admitted that difficult math must be seen to be understood, that would not make “candy cane + child – X = happiness” a visual poem since that particular poem would not have to be seen to be understood. That said, I can’t wait for the first mathematical poem based on mathematics you have to see on the page to understand.

–Bob

Entry 346 — The Definition of Visual Poetry, Yet Again

Thursday, January 13th, 2011

In a comment to the entry Geof Huth made to his blog about my taxonomy, Kaz Maslanka said, “I like what I understand to be Karl Kempton and Karl Young’s definition of: ‘Visual Poetry is a Poetry that has to be seen.’ This is such a simple yet powerful definition that seems to me to be true in every case of vizpo that I have seen.”

My definition is not so simple–because while the double-Karl definition probably does cover every case of visual poetry, it fails to distinguish certain works that I do not consider visual poetry: illustrated poems and captioned or labeled visimages; ordinary poems whose visual appearance has been improved by calligraphy or special graphic touches like ornate capitals at the beginning of stanzas–poetry, in other words that has been graphically decorated enough to make it more pleasing but not enough to significantly increase its aesthetic effect; certain infraverbal texts like Joyce’s “cropse,” which must be seen to be appreciated but are not visual, if by “visual” we mean “of any special interest to the eye.”  Of course, the definition works for those for whom just about any combination of textual and graphic material is visual poetry–but then we would still need a special term for artworks in which the interrelation of words and graphics causes has a significant aesthetic effect (or is intended to).  For that, the double-Karl definition won’t work, and that more than any of the other combinations of text and graphics is what requires definition.  Because, in my view, only that will jolt an engagent in both the reading section and the seeing section of his brain simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously.

This latter, by the way, is only one example of the way that my taxonomy of poetry is, like a proper theory of science, falsifiable.   Eventually superior forms of cat-scans will be able to determine where in the brain different forms of poetry are appreciated.  I claim each of the main kinds I classify will have a unique brainprint.  Moreover, that brainprint will prove close to exactly what one would expect it to be: visual poems, by my definition, will have a visioverbal brainprint (which will be different from textual designs’ visiotextual brainprint); linguexclusive poems will have a purely verbal brainprint–initially, for most of them will give rise to visual imagery; avisual mathematical poems will have a purely verbomathematical brainprint, but visiomathematical poems will have a visioverbomathematical brainprint.   The brainprints of more specialized poems–particular kinds of visual poems should–if my taxonomy is valid and my theory of psychology right–each have its own unique visioverbal brainprint.

One brainprint that especially intrigues is the one a cryptographic poem would have.  It’d have to be verbal, of course, but also something caused by a conceptual part of the brain I haven’t worked out yet.  Okay, crazy maybe, but don’t be too sure about that until it’s tested.

Entry 368 — Of Signifliture and Other Matters « POETICKS

Entry 368 — Of Signifliture and Other Matters

Yesterday, I posted the following snide comment to The Best American Poetry website: “It seems to me that a Worst American Poetry series would be beneficial–composing a kind of poetry ignored by the editors of the Best American Poetry series is not anywhere enough of an affirmation.”

Later I read that “Nobel laureate Seamus Heaney. Famous for retelling that medieval dragon drama Beowulf, the Irish poet, 71, declared in 2003 that Eminem ‘”created a sense of what is possible. He has sent a voltage around a generation. He has done this not just through his subversive attitude but also his verbal energy.’”  The subject header for the poet quoting the above was “Eminem becoming a force in the literary world.”

That inspired a new coinage: “signifliture,” for significant literature.  The adjective would be “signiflerary.”  Distinguished from “literary” because not including people like Eminem . . . and Nobel Prize Winners.

Meanwhile, I visited Geof Huth’s dbqp blog yesterday.  He does a piece on me every Groundhog Day.  This one was Very Nice–although he as usual said a few things I do not entirely agree with.   He also featured one of my mathemaku, one–in fact–that I changed after sending him the version he posted.  Now I more and more feel his version is better.  What I changed (or maybe it’s the main thing I changed–I’m too lazy to try to find my later version) was the quotient–from “soon” to (I think) “Persephone.”  I always liked “soon, but Geof told me that one of the Poetry editors who rejected it for their magazine dissed “soon” for rhyming with “June,” and I agreed that it shouldn’t for a while.  I can be very suggestible, however stubborn many think me.

Oddly, I hadn’t even noticed that “soon” rhymed with “June” when I picked it–I was revved up by the way I’d converted it from an adjective to an image.  I’m almost sure I’ll bring it back.  Should I cancel the other version or label it a variation?  I don’t know.

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