Archive for the ‘Verosophy’ Category

Entry 149 — Considering What Numbers Ultimately Are

Friday, June 18th, 2010

Talking about mathematics with Gregory has gotten me wondering confusedly about the ultimate stimuli of mathematics, so I thought I’d spend a little time in this entry trying to get a start on that.  I think it begins with a brain’s awareness of “one” and “more than one.”  My guess right now is that this depends on a fairly sophisticated mechanism or set of mechanisms in the brain that notify the brain’s owner (in a manner of speaking) of a repeated stimulus–a dot in the environment, say.  As the eye scans what’s out there, it sees dotX1 when the eye is looking in direction A, so records the sighting as dotX1/A in the pre-visual awareness, and in the repetition-center, but only as dotX1 in the latter.  If  the eye then sees dotX1 (i.e., not really dotX1 but a twin of it) when the eye is looking in direction B, a record of  dotX1/B will go into the pre-visual awareness.  Meanwhile, the nervous system will try to record dotX1 again in the repetition-center, but fail, because the m-cells activated by the dot’s twin are still active.   Sensory-cells sensitive to such a failed attempt to activate will reflexively cause a tag meaning “two dotX1s” to be added to the person’s record of the moment.  Or some such operation will be carried out.

Result: the person experiences the visual perception of dotX1 at A and at B, and a numerical feeling of twoness related to dotX1, or a feeling of 2 times dotX1.  This, I should think, would come about fairly early in the evolution of animals, probably long before mammals evolved.  And it could easily be auditory, too–except the same sound in two close-together moments rather than in the same visual space.

With the coming of speech, true elementary numeracy would have begun, with the splitting off of twoness from particular dots or the like,  abetted by language in ways I’ve shown using my theory of knowlecular psychology (I hope) for similar epistemologic events.

Obviously, a sense of threeness and higher numericalnesses would evolved the same was the sense of twoness did–but not get two high due to the law of diminishing returns.  Once there were words for twoness (and oneness) and higher quantities (hey, I’m talking about quantification here, I just now realize), arithmetic and high mathematics would have developed.

I think I can give just-so stories for most of them, but not today.

My conclusion, I think, is that “asensual” numbers exist “out there.”  We can sense quantities without feeling their material.

I would add that numerals and words for numbers like “seven” are all part of our verbal language.

Odd thought I had: the sounds representing for numbers and colors I just realized all stay the same as adjectives.  “Cold,” too.  There are others.  It makes intuitive sense to me that all the colors and numbers would do this, but I can’t make rational sense of it yet.

Entry 68 — Verosofactuality

Friday, January 8th, 2010

Some of my most boring and infuriatingly frustrating arguments over the yearshave been over what poetry is, mainly with those who refuse to accept any definition of it.  The worst are the Philistines who find it impossible to accept anything as a poem that they don’t like.   Having gotten into another such argument this week with a Shakespeare Authorship Wack who won’t let me define poems objectively as little lineated verbal constructions intended to give aesthetic pleasure (to give the quickest, simplest definition) because then I would be able to call myself a maker of poems and thus more likely to know what went on in Shakespeare’s head when he made a poem than the wack, who is not a poet.  For him a poem is something indefinably wonderful made out of words that only a few persons are capable of making–Shakespeare and perhaps one or two others (He mentions Donne and Milton, but really believes only one poet ever existed, Oxford, the author of Shakespeares Sonnets and other works), but no one later than Milton, and most certainly not I.

What can I say?  Nothing.

Stewing about it after vacating the argument, I came up with my solution for any difficult intellectual problem: a coinage.  This one was, “verosofact.”  I do agree with the subjectivists that nothing is 100% objectively true, but don’t care.  That’s because, for me, there exist what I’ve just dubbed, “verosofacts,” which are close enough to being 100% objectively true to be taken as 100% objectively true.  True beyond reasonable doubt.  Of course, there are degrees of verosofactuality–as I believe I discussed in this blog of mine recently: scientific verosofactuality is closer to absolute certainty that historical verosofactuality, but the latter is still close enough to absolute certainty to be considered true beyond reasonable doubt.  Like the verosofact that William Shakespeare of Stratford-upon-Avon wrote the plays and poems attributed to him.

My coinage comes from my earlier coinage, “verosophy,” of the search for significant truths that science, history, philosophy and like endeavors are.  A verosofact is a verosophical absolute truth.

I don’t see how one can make any effort to find any even semi-consequential truth about existence without granting the eixstence of verosofacts.  I think almost everyone, for instance, accepts cause and effect as an absolute, although many do so only unconsciously.  Ditto the laws of logic.  And that there is a difference between material reality (for me, a verosofact) and other kinds of hypothesized realities, none of them capable of being verosofacts though not necessarily non-facts.

Sciences is not uncertain, only not absolutely certain, only verosofactual.  Well, a mixture of verosofactuality and uncertainty not yet classified as either verosofactual or contrafactual.

The ultimate verosofacts, the existence of material reality, and the validity of logic and cause and effect, are givens–the axioms that make verosophy possible.

Am I a child writing for infants?  Maybe.  I do believe everything I’ve said extremely simple and obvious.  It’s difficult to achieve such final simplicity, though.