Archive for June, 2010

Entry 156 — Latest on the Anthroceptual Awareness

Wednesday, June 30th, 2010

I doubt anyone’s interested in this, but one of the purposes of this blog is to act as an archive of all my Serious Thinking regardless of anyone’s interest in it but me.

Recently a squabble about people like me who compare the thinking of those who don’t believe Shakespeare to have written the works attributed to him to Holocaust-deniers made me again think about people over-prone, in my opinion, to taking things personally, in this case those who automatically think themselves insulted as Nazis if their kind of reasoning is compared to the kind of reasoning of people they consider (in many cases wrongly) to be Nazis.  Consequently, I went back to my concept of the Anthroceptual Awareness.  My theory of psychology supposes, among other things, that we have many different awarenesses, ten or so being major.  The anthroceptual awareness, or people-centered awareness is one of them.

I’ve always claimed that each person puts his awarenesses in a near unique order of importance.  Where an awareness is in an individual’s order will determine how much attention he will pay to it in comparison to the attention he devotes to other awarenesses, and how strongly he’ll resist the environment’s urges to go to another awareness.

For some the Anthroceptual awareness is primary, for others it is of little importance, and for everyone else it is of varying intermediary importance.   The first reason some people can’t reason without taking things personally is that for them the anthroceptual awareness is stronger than those of their awarenesses in which objective reasoning takes place (the scienceptual awareness and reducticeptual awareness, for the most part).

It’s more complex than that, I believe.  For sometimes how personally we take something depends on the relative power of the sub-awarenesses I consider the Anthroceptual Awareness to contain.   That there are three of them is what is new.  For several months I felt there should be three but couldn’t fit the third in smoothly until now (if indeed I’ve done it).

My first two have to do, respectively, with the self alone and with the self in society.  These are close to identical to Howard Gardner’s two “personal intelligence.”  The first I considered calling the “solipceptual subawareness.”  It has to do with all of an individual’s thoughts and activities about what he does as a person alone, society not being or seeming relevant.  It needn’t concern only “selfish” activities, but simply asocial activities, like what to make himself for dinner if he’s alone in his kitchen.  The other sub-awareness had to do with how he relates to other beings, and they to him.  And it can concern “selfish” activities as easily as the other sub-awareness can contain “unselfish” activities–for instance, some plan he has for stealing something from a friend.

I called the first sub-awareness the “egoceptual sub-awareness,” the second the “scoioceptual sub-awareness.”  But I came to feel the need for a wholly objective people-involved sub-awareness, where one might analyze others–and oneself–scientifically or in some other way with no consideration of them as “people.”  What kept me from adding it to my system was that I couldn’t think how it would work.  Then, coming back to it because of the holocaust-denial baloney, I saw a way to make it work–as far as I could tell.  I also saw more precisely what it would do, what may be more important, and is related to finding a way it could work.

Now to one of the elements in my theory that is wholly uncertified, my theory about this being to this point being close enough to being shared with Harvard professor Howard Gardner’s to be sort of semi-certified.  Where I become less superficial than Gardner and the others in this field is that I try to give a theoretical neurophysiological explanation of my awarenesses–the knowlecular psychology I brought up now and again.  When it comes to the anthroceptual awareness, I believe in cerebral mechanisms unique to that awareness.  They are closely related to my (probably incomplete) understanding of Jung’s personae.

In any event, to put it roughly, I believe in little men (stick figures) who inhabit our Anthroceptual Awarenesses and represent ourselves and others.  The main one is the Urceptual Self.  Almost as important is the Urceptual Other.  I’ve explained these elsewhere, so will only say here that they consist of innate combinations of knowlecules, and are modified over a lifetime by one’s experience.

At the explanatory level I want to stay at here, all that needs to be known is that the Urceptual Self is by itself in the egoceptual sub-awareness.  But it is connected to a replica of itself that’s in the socioceptual sub-awareness, and to a second replica of itself in the third anthroceptual sub-awareness, to which I’ve given the name “anthrobjecticeptual awareness” (at least until I come up with a better one).   The urceptual other occupies the sociceptual sub-awareness and is connected to a twin in the anthrobjecticeptual awareness.

I won’t explain how that makes the system work, except to say it that when nothing in the environment tells the average individual that other people are around and important, and no other awareness is making any demands on him, he will tend to view life out of his eogceptual Self.  If people start to seem important, he may switch to his socioceptual Self, or view life out of both his egoceptual and sociceptual selves.  When something involving ideas about people intrudes, he will go to his anthrobjecticeptual Self to some degree.

That sub-awareness’s importance for him will determine to a great extent how able he is to attend to some idea about people without getting personally involved.  To put it another way, the sub-awareness’s importance will determine how easy it will be for him to shut down both his egoceptual and socioceptual awarenesses to focus objectively on some idea about people.

That really is all there is to the matter.  People without strong anthrobjecticeptual sub-awarenesses, though, will never be able to understand people who do.  Ditto, people with strong anthroceptual awarenesses will never be able to understand people with weak ones–and strong scienceptual awarenesses.  Nerds, say.

Entry 155 — Latest News & a New Version of a Poem

Wednesday, June 30th, 2010

I find it amazing how badly I’m keeping my blog going.  I will be worse at it over the next two weeks or so because I’ll be out of town.  I’m leaving this afternoon for New York City, where I’ll spend a day or two with friends, then head for Connecticut to spend days with siblings.  Eventually I’m to be at the Bowery Poetry Club for some sort of reading from 2 P.M. until 3:30 P.M. on Saturday, 10 July.  The subject will be mathematical poetry.

Now for an update of the poem I have, or will have, on the wall of mathematics-related art that is now at the Bowery Poetry Club as part of the month-long event the reading I will participate in will wrap up:

I owe this version to Connie Tettenborn: her comment about my original version that its  dividend, “mathematics,” ought to be switched with its quotient, “Spring,” didn’t make sense to me–but it did make me vaguely realize that I was claiming that arithmetic was of greater value than Spring, and that ain’t nothin’ of greater value than Spring.  When Connie explicitly made that same point, I recognized that I had to do something, but took a day to come up with the solution above.  I know think this may be one of my better poems instead of something I quickly made with a goal of being accessible.  And I’ve always like the device of showing a correction.

Entry 154 — Number into Mathematics

Friday, June 25th, 2010

I’m bothered to note that I have failed to blog two days in a row. What really bothers me is that I didn’t even notice I hadn’t blogged. Oh, well, I have something for today.

I scribbled this for the graffiti wall at the Bowery Poetry Club in New York where some of us will be doing some sort of reading 10 July.  Go to Gregory Eratio blog to see the wall.  (I don’t think my poem is on it although I sent it to John sims, the organizer of the reading and in charge of the wall, and asked him to add it to the wall.

Recently I also wrote the following:

.

.                           insigh(insigh(insigh)t)t)t

.

I’m not sure what it is.  I lean toward believing it “just” the representation of a rilly great insight that expands–and not a mathematical poem although I’d like it to be one.

. . . explan

Entry 153 — A Second Announcement

Tuesday, June 22nd, 2010

An interesting discussion of “vispo” and visual poetry that includes careful discussions of my poetic practice by Conrad Didiodato is now among this blog’s “Pages” under the category of “Discussions Of Bob Grumman’s Poetry.

Entry 152 — Announcement

Tuesday, June 22nd, 2010

Title: Poem Demerging. Author: ME!  $5 from Phrygian Press, 55-09 205th Street, Bayside NY 11364. 21 linguexpressive poems (i.e., poems that are linguistically expressive only) about my alter ego, Poem.

Here’s the opener, which I chose because it’s among the most accessible of the poems in the collection, it quickly lets the reader know that Poem is a person, and I like it:

.          A Bicycle Ride

.          Heat-blurred, brittle,
.          and crowded nearly numb
.          by what seemed like
.          a hundred drubbling obligations,
.          Poem abruptly took off on his bike.
.          For miles he rode,
.          no destination in mind,
.          or belief in the possibility of one.

.          Finally, late in the afternoon,
.          he came to a seaside lot
.          as yet untouched by urban planning.
.          there, as he drank in the fragments of harbor
.          a wind-stirred scruffy clump of mangroves was rendering
.          just-unsecret,
.          his arrival began.

Phyrgian Press is the one-man operation of Arnold Skemer. It has published seven other chapbooks in the series mine is in. They are by Arnold himself, Alan Catlin, Richard Kostelanetz, Leonard Cirino, Guy R. Beining, Geof Huth and Jon Cone. Arnold has also published a $10 collection by Jonathan Hayes.

Entry 151 — The Latest on my Career Progress

Sunday, June 20th, 2010

Just a note about my long journey toward cultural visibility: toward the end of 2009, Maria Damon, a friend of mine in vispo and related art, sent me an essay on my mathemaku by an undergraduate student in a class she was teaching on (I believe) “micropoetry.”  I don’t know whether I’m pleased or alarmed at how well a mere college student analyzed my work.  Of course, I did like fact that the essay was an appreciation, and that it got attention in a college class.  I figure that once college students, and blogger, start writing about my work, one of my main fast-lane ambitions will eventually come to pass: a whole book about my work (by someone other than myself).  The essayist, by the way, is Joey Engelhart.

I had meant to post his essay long ago, but something kept me from getting permission from him, then I got diverted into other projects.  I came across the e.mail Maria sent it to me in yesterday while searching my e.mail for something else, remembered that I wanted to post it and got in touch with Maria about it.  I now have Joey’s permission ot post it, and have done so: in the new “Discussions of Bob Grumman’s Poetry” slot among the “Pages” to the right of this entry.

A little later in the day, I got an e.mail from Conrad DiDiodato, the word-dreamer: poetics blogger, letting me know about an entry he’d made in this blog a month of so ago about my mathematical poetry.  It’s very positive.  Insightful, too, I think.  I’ll be asking him for permission to put it into my collection of “Discussion of Bob Grumman’s Poetry.”  Next, something by William Logan, I’m sure.  (Unironically speaking now, he is the critic I think I would most want to examine my work–because (1) he might find flaws in it I can correct, and (2) he would definitely provide idiocies for more intelligent critics to work off of, and for me to laugh at.

Entry 150 — More Discussion with Gregory

Saturday, June 19th, 2010

Gregory Vincent St. Thomasino and I are continuing our discussion about mathematical poetry at his blog. Below is the reply I made to his latest comment (with a little minor editing), him in regular type, me in italics:

You say you are “speaking of the set of language-objects used to represent the real world and that you and I differ in what those objects are.”

Would you explain that, please. And, by “language objects” do you mean words and symbols? Are numbers language objects? Are the names we call numbers by language objects?

The things used to express oneself with language: words, punctuation marks, numerals, whatever things like ampersands are called, square root symbols, etc.  Numbers if you mean numerals–that is, written numbers.  But there are also the numbers in the environment the words for numbers, and numerals, represent.

You say, “poets can be ungrammatical and not wrong but logicians, using words, can’t. You’re just finding users of language who use certain rules and ignore others, and other users whose use and non-use is different.” Would you explain that, please.

All great animals are male.  George is a green animal.  Therefore George is male.  Those are a logical statements.  They have to be grammatical.  Mathematicians similarly have to abide by their rules–their “grammatical” rules if you want to call them that.  Actually, anyone using words has to be reasonably grammatical in order to communicate.

A point of difference between “math grammar” and poetry grammar is that in the case of poetry grammar we can be ungrammatical and still be poetical — and not only that, we can still be meaningful — while if we are “mathematically ungrammatical” we then fall into error. I wish you had addressed this more fully.

I’m afraid I don’t see how I could have discussed it more fully.  I’m saying so what if a poet can be ungrammatical and still be meaningful, and a mathematician can’t.  A logician can’t, either.  I’m saying different specialists use different parts of the grammar of a language, and use it with different degrees of rigor.  Actually, I would say that poetry grammar is specialized grammar and that poets don’t break the rules when they break schoolroom grammatical rules.

I wonder:

Is the correctness of math but a matter of the correctness of “grammar”?

Is the correctness of math but a matter of the correctness of operation (of application of operational principle)?

I don’t know.  I don’t see what this has to do with your definition of mathematical poetry.

(Axiomatical?)

When I write math I am “doing” math. (So to be “mathematically ungrammatical” would apply here.)

When I read math I am “doing” math. (How could it apply here? Or does it: what if I don’t know the rules?)

Sorry, Gregory, dunno where you’re going.

So according to you “mathematical poetry” is a sub-category of “visio-textual art”?

I can’t imagine where you get that.

According to me, “mathematical poetry” is a sub-category of poetry.  It has

no more connection to visio-textual art than to music.

Sometimes you make up your own terms (“texteme”) and other times you use common terms or combining forms like “visio” and “textual.”

Why don’t you use, for example, “semanteme,” “sememe,” “morpheme,” “phoneme” and so on?

I try to use the available terms I know.  I believe there is no term for what I mean by “texteme.”  I’m not understanding why you are bringing this up.

You say, “no analogy need be involved.” How then do your math poems work, how do they signify, how do they function? Or are they, in the end, just pictures? (Visio-textual pictures.)

When I said no analogy need be involved, I meant–as the context, I think, makes clear–an analogy between the “mathematical sentence” and the “linguistic sentence.”  My mathematical sentences don’t act LIKE linguistic sentences, they ARE linguistic sentences.  Or so I claim, and that’s why I (at this point) don’t fully accept your definition of mathematical poems.

My mathematical poems work, signify, function just like any poem: they provide a reader with words and symbols (and sometimes other elements, when, for example, they are also visual poems) which the reader decodes just as he would a conventional poem.

How would you describe the grammar of your math poems?

One side of an equation has to equal the other.  I don’t know.  Some of my math poems use verbal grammar.  The “grammar” of mathematics is very simple, for the most part–at the mostly sub-calculus level of my math poems.  You follow algebraic rules like multiply both x and y by z in the expression z(x + y).  These rules, for me, are just an extension of “normal” grammatical rules, like putting an adjective next to the noun it modifies, using a pronoun in such a way as to make clear what its referent is, etc.  I don’t think of them as I use them.

My brain may not be working well, which may be why I’m having a little trouble following what you’re saying here and there.  (My doctor thinks I may be anemic.  It’s being checked.  In the meantime, I’m using that as my excuse.)

all best, Bob



Entry 149 — Considering What Numbers Ultimately Are

Friday, June 18th, 2010

Talking about mathematics with Gregory has gotten me wondering confusedly about the ultimate stimuli of mathematics, so I thought I’d spend a little time in this entry trying to get a start on that.  I think it begins with a brain’s awareness of “one” and “more than one.”  My guess right now is that this depends on a fairly sophisticated mechanism or set of mechanisms in the brain that notify the brain’s owner (in a manner of speaking) of a repeated stimulus–a dot in the environment, say.  As the eye scans what’s out there, it sees dotX1 when the eye is looking in direction A, so records the sighting as dotX1/A in the pre-visual awareness, and in the repetition-center, but only as dotX1 in the latter.  If  the eye then sees dotX1 (i.e., not really dotX1 but a twin of it) when the eye is looking in direction B, a record of  dotX1/B will go into the pre-visual awareness.  Meanwhile, the nervous system will try to record dotX1 again in the repetition-center, but fail, because the m-cells activated by the dot’s twin are still active.   Sensory-cells sensitive to such a failed attempt to activate will reflexively cause a tag meaning “two dotX1s” to be added to the person’s record of the moment.  Or some such operation will be carried out.

Result: the person experiences the visual perception of dotX1 at A and at B, and a numerical feeling of twoness related to dotX1, or a feeling of 2 times dotX1.  This, I should think, would come about fairly early in the evolution of animals, probably long before mammals evolved.  And it could easily be auditory, too–except the same sound in two close-together moments rather than in the same visual space.

With the coming of speech, true elementary numeracy would have begun, with the splitting off of twoness from particular dots or the like,  abetted by language in ways I’ve shown using my theory of knowlecular psychology (I hope) for similar epistemologic events.

Obviously, a sense of threeness and higher numericalnesses would evolved the same was the sense of twoness did–but not get two high due to the law of diminishing returns.  Once there were words for twoness (and oneness) and higher quantities (hey, I’m talking about quantification here, I just now realize), arithmetic and high mathematics would have developed.

I think I can give just-so stories for most of them, but not today.

My conclusion, I think, is that “asensual” numbers exist “out there.”  We can sense quantities without feeling their material.

I would add that numerals and words for numbers like “seven” are all part of our verbal language.

Odd thought I had: the sounds representing for numbers and colors I just realized all stay the same as adjectives.  “Cold,” too.  There are others.  It makes intuitive sense to me that all the colors and numbers would do this, but I can’t make rational sense of it yet.

Entry 148 — Response to Gregory Vincent St. Thomasino, Part 2

Thursday, June 17th, 2010

You say, “The ‘mathematical poem,’ if it is to be, or to contain, poetry, must have some poetic elements, as well as some formal symbols and operations of math.”

I don’t understand why you have, “if it is to be, or to contain, poetry.” If you call it a poem, claim I, you are saying that it is a poem, so much have poetic elements, however defined. That such a poem should have “some formal symbols and operations of math,” follows from its being called a “mathematical poem.” Ergo, I would rephrase your definition as “A mathematical poem is a poem containing mathematical elements.”

I would then ask you to say what you mean by “having” mathematical operations in a mathematical poem. That is, would a poem about a child who has to do five long division problems for homework “have” a mathematical operation in it?

Also, to be fastidious, I would want you to spell out whether the symbols and operations should be overtly in the poem. Some, as you probably know, seem to think a sonnet is a mathematical poem because the poet has to be able to count up to 14 to make one.

Which leads to the next important thing I think needs to be done: sort out all the kinds of math-related poems it seems reasonable to distinguish from one another. I would list the following five:

(1) poems that discuss math

(2) poems generated by mathematical operations.

(3) poems that use mathematical symbols but use them unmathematically: e.g., a poem with a square root sign next to the word “Sunday,” which is followed by seven plus-signs, whereupon the poem becomes standard verbal expression.

(4) poems that one or more persons claim arouse some kind of “mathematical feeling.”

(5) poems that perform one or more mathematical operation central to its aesthetic meaning.

Entry 147 — Post Awaiting Content

Wednesday, June 16th, 2010

Amazing how little I’m posting to this blog of mine of late.  It’s been a full week since my last post; I thought only a couple of days had gone by.