Entry 1669 — “A Bukowski Poem”

December 22nd, 2014

Did too much busywork in my practiceptual awareness today to be able to provide anything more here than a poem of mine I just came across that was in Harry Burrus’s O!!Zone 98, one of a series of O!!Zones that featured a lot of good work, much of it at a higher level than my poem–which isn’t to say that my poem ain’t pretty good.  I had been writing Poem poems by 1998, so am not sure why this one wasn’t one.  Possibly I later put Poem into it.  If not, I may yet.

A Bukowski Poem

Because it’s been nearly a
year since I last wrote
anything remotely like a poem I’ve
decided to try my
hand at just jotting down
what would be unpunctuated
agrammatical prose except
for its linebreaks what I
call a Bukowski Poem after its
inventor William Carlos O’Hara it might
be fun and who knows it
might also get me going
again or even turn out worth
while of itself in a minor
way as such poems can for
instance if after awkwarding
to the final drab of flatness you go
for just a little more like
say the alley side
of a North Hollywood delicatessen
awning just the way the shade’s
turned its red to rust
can by contrast bridegroom
a reader to oceanic
expansions at which point you
should end your poem unless you go
in for anti-climaxes which can
be effective too.



Entry 1668 — Additions & Blither

December 21st, 2014

First an addition to my taxonomy of awarenesses: I’ve decided to give what I was temporarily calling the “X-ceptual Awareness” one of the names I previously considered, then junked, “the Magniceptual Awareness.”  My problem with it was that it was too similar to “the Supraceptual Awareness,” the name I had given to   my system’s over-all awareness.  I made that problem go away by simply changing “Supraceptual Awareness” to “Cerebral Awareness.”  Pretty clever, wot?  It makes sense since both the Practiceptual Awareness and the Magniceptual Awareness are in, or mostly in, the cerebrum.  And I’m comfortable with the idea of a Sub-Cerebral Awareness located in the cerebellum and other parts of the brain, as well as various places in the secondary nervous system.

Next, a Noun cement that I hope will will cause those of you feeling guilty about getting all this blog’s incredible brilliance for free to express your gratitude with money–to someone on food stamps (due to his actual economic situation, not lies about it, although I did not report the $200 I made as a writer last year in my 2013 request to continue on the dole, nor will I report the $350! I made as a writer this year on my upcoming request).  You can do this by sending me $5 or more for an autographed numbered copy of a limited edition of 4 More Poem Poems.  It just came off the press.  Only 8 copies printed, each with a different cover from the others–in fact, I have just decided to paste a unique original visual image on each cover.  (Note: I really think $20 would be reasonable for anyone who is paying that or more for a subscription to any poetry-related magazine whatever.)  I claim that no one who likes Joycean foolery with the language and surrealism will find at least one of the poems delightful.  And there iz not one (1) but two (2) dreadfully wicked attacks in the collection on our country’s poetry gate-keepers–but only in passing!  Remember, Posterity will really be angry with you for not sending me any money!

To take advantage of this Fabulous Offer, send check & your name&address to:

Bob Grumman
1708 Hayworth Road
Port Charlotte FL 33952

Sorry for the begging, folks.  I’m really not badly off: I still have credit cards that will allow me to borrow over ten thousand dollar before I max them.  I just used on of the cards for $1500, in fact–to have some company try to get the data in an external drive of mine that went bad about a year ago, and has the only copies of a few of my poems, and a lot of my only copies of others’ poems including four or five of Guy Beining’s the originals of which are lost.  But I thought it’d be fun to play marketeer for a little while.  And at least I didn’t bold-face the above.

* * *

Okay, now to what seems to me an interesting question I just wondered into (note: it’s near impossible now for me not to qualify every opinion of mine in some way like this) while discussing Karl Kempton’s current central project, an exhaustively researched history of visual poetry from pre-history on: what poem should be considered the world’s first major full-scale visual poem.  Very subjective, I fear, because of the difficulty in defining both a full-scale poem (for me, it would be a poem that’d be mediocre or worse if not for what it does visually) and a major poem.

I have no idea what poem is but don’t think any of Mallarme’s was because not depending on the visual for anything truly central to them.  Nor Apollinaire’s, which seem primitive to me, although I’d have to look at them again to be sure.  Such a poem would have to have a highly significant and original visual metaphor at its core to get the prize, in my opinion.  Nothing before the twentieth century that I know about does.  I think I’d aware the prize to something by Cummings (although I’m not sure what, and he may not have composed what I’d call a full-scale visual poem); if not Cummings, then Grominger’s “silence,” but not with confidence because I don’t know what other superior visual poems came before it.

Here’s a related question I didn’t send Karl: what poet could be said to have been the world’s first serious, dedicated, lyrovisual poets, by which I mean poet who concentrated a fairly substantial portion of his thoughts and energy to lyrovisual poetry–as opposed to Lewis Carroll who (1) was not a lyrical visual poet and (2) wrote light visual poems (which were nonetheless an important contribution to poetry, or Mallarme or Herbert, neither of whom composed more than a few poems that could be called visual–or, from my standpoint, made primary visual poems, or poems whose visual content was at least as important aesthetically as its verbal content.

I’m not even sure Cummings would qualify for consideration since he did not compose all that many poems I’d call primary visual poems.  I’d have to go through my volume of his complete poetry to be sure of this, though.  So, we have a preliminary question: what poets devoted a fairly substantial portion of his thoughts and energy to lyrovisual poems.  My impression is that Kenneth Patchen was one of them.  I think Apollinaire probably was, too.  Most of the concrete poets seem to have been. I know I’ll annoy a number of you with my next pronouncement: it is that fewer and fewer people calling themselves visual poets devote much, or any, time to the composition of visual poems, preferring to make textual designs (and mostly doing extremely well at it).

Now another addition, this to my thoughts about urceptual personae:

It occurred to me that I made no attempt in yesterday’s entry to indicate the biological advantage of having . . . ursonae, so I’ll try to do that now.  I’ll need to go into some detail about the way an urceptual persona is created.  For an example, I’ll use the urnemy (no, I’m just foolin’ around: I won’t make that my new name for “the urceptual enemy”).  When a baby first sees its father, it will automatically be thrust into its socioceptual awareness[1] where its urceptual persona recognition mechanism is.  This mechanism will activate the baby’s urceptual other—due to such stimuli as the father’s face and arms.  The father will be unfamiliar to it (probably, although he may have experienced enough of him while in the womb for him to be familiar; or perhaps any face will be familiar enough not to cause the baby pain, or even to cause it pleasure; assume here, though, that the father is unfamiliar to the baby, maybe because he has a beard and is first encountered while he is sneezing or farting).  Since the unfamiliar causes pain according to my theory, and pain caused by another person has to be one of the stimuli causing the activation of a person’s urceptual enemy, the baby’s urceptual enemy will become active.

The baby will withdraw as much as possible from its enemy, the father, because urceptual personae automatically activate appropriate certain reflexive behavior.  This is value #1 of an urceptual persona.

At this point, I am going to drop the urceptual enemy for not being as good a choice as an example as I first thought.  I’ll go instead to the urceptual father.  In the scenario I began, the father will almost certainly not continue to activate the baby’s urceptual enemy for long, if he even does so when the baby first encounters him.  The baby’s mother will probably be with the father and say something like, “Here’s your daddy, Flugwick (or whatever the kid’s name is),” in a momvoice, accompanied by a mom smile, and many another mo0mfeature, so neutralize the father’s unfamiliarity.  And the father will smile and say something in a gentle voice and perhaps, tickle the kid under the chin—certainly something likely to seem pleasant to the kid.  In short, little Flugwick’s urceptual persona recognition mechanism will soon activate its urceptual father (I now think a baby will recognize the first male it encounters as its father—but be able to correct the error before long—rather than as a friend; if my hypothesis turns out valid, it will be easy to determine exactly what happens.

Be that as it may, eventually the baby will (in normal circumstance) automatically perceive its father as both a certain shape with a certain voice and smell—and as its urceptual father.  The activation of the latter will help it more quickly react to the father appropriately.  It will learn from its social environment—mainly its family—the details of appropriate reactions not instinctive like its smile will be until it learns enough to control it.

That an urceptual persona will double the ability of the real person it is attached to cause reactions is it second extremely important biological value.  For one thing, this will make people more important than almost anything else to a person, which would obviously help a species survive.

What might be as important to a person as people?  Here’s where my superspeculative nature takes over from my speculative nature.  The goals a person shoots for may become as important to a person as others, or even himself  Beauty, for an artist.  As I’ve already tried to demonstrate, an artist will almost surely be motivated to some small or large degree to create an object of beauty to gain others’ approval.  But simply to create something of beauty for its own sake can very well be his main motive, or even his only motive.  I’m back to the magniceptual awareness where one might go to concentrate on beauty free of interpersonal concerns.  Where I increase my speculativeness is in thinking puberty may open a person’s magniceptual awareness—give him doors into it, or significantly increase his doors into it.  I strongly suspect a male’s magniceptual awareness is significantly large than a female’s.  Just as a female’s anthroceptual awareness is much larger than a male’s. Of course, feminists will take this to be an insult to women, but I don’t see it as that.  Well, as a male, I have to think of what I am as superior to females, but nonetheless trying to be objective about it, there’s no reason to say that interpersonal matters require less talent than impersonal matters.

The joke is that all this will be moot when asexual computers take over the world, reproducing like protocytes—with ecstasy.  But who knows, they may be us.
* * *
[1] According to Me, among everyone’s ten major awarenesses[2] (so far) is an anthroceptual awareness, which consists of two sub-awarenesses, the egoceptual awareness which is where a person experiences himself as an individual, and the socioceptual awareness, where he experiences himself as a member of his society.  Each of these is one of the “intelligences,” in Howard Gardner’s writings on the subject.

[2] A major awareness is an awareness just under one of the primary awarenesses on my taxonomical chart of the awarenesses.



Entry 1667 — Immortality and Posterity

December 20th, 2014

There are few fantasies so absurd as the idea of living on through fame. So why does immortality still beckon?

There’s an interesting article by Steven Cave at Aeon here dealing with the question above.  Since I am near-fanatically lustful for “Everlasting Glory” (although rational enough to realize that for me, and other mortals, “everlasting” can only mean a few hundred thousand years at most), I read the article, finding it provocative and therefore worth reading, although I pretty much wholly disagree with Cave’s ideas.

I’m groping here, but I think no one really wants immortal fame.  What many want is genuine immortality–a trip to some heaven or endless reincarnations.  When a person says, as I did at the age of 18, that he’d rather be a short-lived tubercular genius like Keats than live to be eighty or ninety without accomplishing anything to speak of, he may speak of his ambition as as desire to immortalize his name, but what I feel he really (only) wants is to live a life that will make his name immortal.  In other words, I wanted to become (at age 18) a great writer like Keats and that meant producing a body of work that would “live forever.”  I would not enjoy any fame posthumously, but could enjoy posthumous fame while alive.  To put it simply: I could enjoy thinking of posterity’s admiring my work (and me) as much as I, as part of Keats’s posterity was admiring his, and him.

I think that at times we, in effect, live in the future.  It’s our version of the future, just as the past we more often live in is only our version of the past, and it’s nowhere near as accurate as it, but it’s not entirely inaccurate.  We often live in our futures as heroes.  Which brings me to my concept of the sagaceptual awareness, and my concept of the urceptual hero.  In my discussions of urceptual personae (or beings fully or potentially inside us from the very beginning of our lives) I posit that we start off with an urceptual self and an urceptual other.  These are neurophysiological puppets, the urceptual self being activated by anything we do:  that is, when a baby move its left arm, its urceptual self moves its left arm, and the baby experiences a sense of self in charge of the movement.

I hope I don’t go off in too many directions.  I’ll try not to.  What I’m hoping to do is account for the urceptual hero, which requires a lot background in urcept . . . ology.

The urceptual other is a neurophysiological puppet activated by any human being the baby encounters.  It is activated by any (gross) movement of that being: when the baby’s mother playfully pokes the baby’s nose, the baby’s urceptual other pokes its finger somewhere.  Assuming the situation allows it.  To put it most simply, the baby’s attention must be on its anthroceptual awareness–that is, the baby has to be in the part of its brain that has to do with inter-action with other human beings.  Mainly there, at least.

If so, various stimuli will enable the baby to make the urceptual other which is activated by its mother the basis of a secondary urceptual figure, an involved process I will ignore except to say I believe I can advance a plausible idea of how it works.  My taxonomy of urceptual personae is incomplete, to say the least, but I think the urceptual friend may be the first positive secondary urceptual persona a baby will form.  Its first negative urceptual persona will be its urceptual enemy.  The baby’s mother will almost surely be perceived as positive, and fairly soon activate an urceptual friend, which in turn will form the basis of an urceptual mother.  The reverse is equally likely, I should think.

In any case, the baby’s urceptual self will ten to make connections with the urceptual friend that will cause the baby’s urceptual self to imitate (i.e., learn from) its urceptual friend.

We have now gotten enough background, I hope, for me to jump to the urceptual hero.  This persona becomes active due to a complex group of stimuli indicating friend and father or authority, and a highly admirable person. Many real living people may have some of the stimuli, but so may fictional people.  A person’s final urceptual hero will be based on more than one person, possibly many more.

The first requirement to understanding the urceptual hero is to understand admirability.  I think one of our most important innate mechanisms is the need for the approval of others.  A major way we learn to get it is through imitating urceptual friends, adults or siblings who gain admiration.  That we will tend empathetically to experience the admiration a friend gains (likely along with other emotions I will ignore here) will give us enough pleasure to want to experience it for ourselves.  The empathetic experience will come about because our urceptual friend will not only tend to imitate what our actual friend does, but (albeit crudely) how he feels–through his expressions, and through what happens to him, like being given an ice cream cone).

We will also learn how to gain admiration directly whenever we do anything, accidentally or intentionally, that causes others to admire us.

The point: a person grows to particularly strive to make his urceptual self and urceptual hero.  This is possible because the urceptual self becomes the basis of secondary urceptual personae the same way the urceptual other does.

Both genders strive for a heroic role they can play when appropriate, to put it in another way.  But it differs significantly between males and females due to the biological division of labor feminists refuse to accept.  Because of this the great majority of males strive for cultural heroism of many different sorts, and females mainly for biological heroism consisting of bearing and raising children and making life bearable.  Males are more concerned with making life meaningful.

I ought to be speaking not of heroism here but of different degrees of cultural admirability.  Few really strive for what I’d call cultural heroism.  Cave, in the article I directed you to, uses Achilles as his example of a hero, and he’s a good one: he is still important to us.  As is Imhotep, for there are many kinds of heroic admirability.  I believe, to get back to the idea of simply living a life admirable enough for one to be esteemed for it by some posterity, if only one’s grandchildren, that most people and and do achieve “immortality.”

To undigress–that is, to go back to my idea of living in the future, that’s what we can and sometimes do when in our sagaceptual awarenesses, which I’ll now try to depict.  I hypothesize that it began, evolutionarily, as a simple mechanism encouraging organisms to carry out more and more complex kinds of goal-directed activities.  The mechanism could have been very simple, like many such now incorporated in various technological devices (as you will see, I hope).  A primitive example: a mechanism causes a primitive organism to move toward food; the closer it gets to the food, the more energizing pleasure it experiences, and the more it continues to keep doing what it has been doing; but the more distant the food goes from it, the more pain it experiences, and the more the mechanism makes the organism change what it is doing, trying always to maximize the organism’s closeness to food.  Guided missiles behave this way.

I think an urceptual proto-hero happened into one of these mechanisms, and the mechanism became the first sagaceptual awareness millennia later.  I’m confident a plausible evolutionary path for all this could be worked out, but I haven’t done it.  This awareness, so far as I know, is unknown to science, so far.   I may be the only one who has intuited its presence, in fact.  All I c an say in its defense is that it makes sense to me, and that I don’t know of anything that makes it ridiculously unlikely.

I will use mine as an example (and I’ll speak of myself only because I’m sure of what’s true of me, but of no one else, and also to avoid making controversial but not very important material about how a male’s sagaceptual awareness differs from a female’s, or an Irishman’s from an Englishman’s–although the similarities are much more pronounced than the differences).  I think that at times my urceptual self enters my sagaceptual awareness because something I’ve encountered in the real world strikes me as desirably likely to gain me admiration.  Once in my sagaceptual awareness, I (and my “I’ is, to all intents and purposes, my urceptual self¹) and my urceptual hero become one, and the combination takes up a quest.  Its goal, in my case right now, is to gain my readers’ admiration, and others through them.  Including posterity, whom they will tell about me, and in some cases be part of.  Young persons visiting this discourse of mine are my posterity.

(Short digression to say that one enters one’s sagaceptual awareness for many other reasons than gaining admiration.  A big one is to pursue a mate, especially when one is young.  Pursuit of food is equally compelling at times.  A big complication is the pursuit of beauty or truth with little or now interest in gaining admiration.  I’m sure this is possible.  I want truth and beauty and maximal admiration for all I do to attain the former and produce the latter.  Another complication is that one may be in one’s sagaceptual while in other awarenesses as well, bouncing between them but sometimes simultaneously in more than one.  In short, I have a lot more to work out than I will be seeing to in this entry.)

Back to posterity.  I believe we may have an urceptual visitor-from-the-future.  No, not a real one, but an urceptual other who comes to represent what may happen in the future.  Someone our urceptual hero will try to convince that we deserve his admiration.  I believe one’s sagaceptual awareness builds him out of one of our secondary or tertiary urceptual others, our urceptual judge.  His make-up is strongly influenced by what we take from our reading about heroes.  (A main function of the sagaceptual awareness is to plug us into novels and the like, to make us their heroes, thus allowing us expanded experience as heroes.  Similarly, stories function to attract us into our sagaceptual awarenesses.  Ditto spectator sports.)

I’m probably going from one speculation to another too quickly but hope you take it as brainstorming, and necessary touching on every idea that comes us so as not to lose it.  In any case, I’m going back to Keats, whom I’ve been many times when on a quest to compose A Major Poem.  (Note: my urceptual hero has many identities.)  And it seems not absurd to me to believe that Keats’s posterity–all who have admired him including me–join Me-as-Keats.  Hence, in a certain respect, his posterity becomes mine.

Be that as it may, I become accustomed to taking it for granted that I can have a posterity like he had.  Making sure that it admires me thus becomes possible.  But I want it to admire me now.  I don’t really care what it does when I’m gone.  So I struggle to do what I think it wants me to do–rather than what the present certifiers of repute seem to prefer that I do.  Although I can’t keep from trying to find ways of gaining recognition from such people since I do believe the approval of one’s contemporaries does support the thesis that one’s admirability is “eternal,” so long as one has gained some approval from those one admires, and so long as the approval of gatekeepers is approval of what one is actually accomplishing.

That’s it for now.  I have no idea how much I covered, how much left out.  It’d probably be easier for me to tell if I were sure what my primary topic was.

¹ According to my metapsychology, my true self is my urwareness or that which senses the material reality that seems supplied to it by my brain.  My urceptual self is not that but my brain’s “I”–the exploits of which my urwareness passively observes and experiences.



Entry 1666 — Back to Beining

December 19th, 2014

Here’s the latest image I got from Guy R. Beining”

Strained Poem

It is part of a letter it grieves me to report on.  He asks if I think I could sell works like it on my website, suggesting a price of $200 for this.  I’d get a 33% commission on all sales.  Gah.  If I had any semblance of economic security, I’d buy this and four others sight unseen for $200 each.  I grieve because I know I can’t sell anything here, at any price.  I once offered 25 RASPbooks for $50 and Karl Kempton was the only one to buy a set (and he ain’t rich).  No complaints, because I hardly ever buy anything of anyone else’s.  Not only don’t I have the money to, but my concept-appreciation to ornament-appreciation (like the feel of hardened acylic, etc., even the size of an image) is much higher than most lovers of visimagery’s (i.e., “visual art”), so Internet access rather than physical ownership is enough for me in almost all cases.

Of course, I also grieve because Guy’s stuff should be in bigTime museums with articles in ARTnews about it.  If he can’t get the recognition he deserves, who can?  Or am I so out of it that I don’t see how much better New York stuff is than the above?

I wish I had time to really deal with the above critically, but the year is about to end, and I have so much to do!  For instance, I still haven’t finished either of my next two columns for Small Press Review, and I’ve had full-length fairly decent rough drafts of both of them ready for a final attack for over a week.  Wotta life.



Entry 1665 — Additions to Yesterday’s Entry

December 18th, 2014

Note: in yesterday’s entry, I opposed entities that are “real,” because capable of being sensorily perceived, to “imaginary” ones that cannot be perceived.  I should have used “communicatively perceived” in place of just “perceived,” or whatever term I used for that.  That’s because some believers in Eastern x-ceptualities, believe themselves actually perceiving gods and the like whom others cannot.  I say that if I see a tree, and say the tree is real and get almost any sane person to look at it and agree with me that it is, I have identified a communicably perceivable entity whereas if an Eastern mystic says he went somewhere in his mind, or some like place, and talked with his god, his god is only perceptible to him, if he cannot take me where I can also meet him; the god is not communicably perceivable.

This goes back to the two realities idea of mine.  I’m not sure what nutto names I gave them, but they are the personal reality and the collective reality, and–for me–the only one the means anything is the collective reality: reality is what I and others agree it is.  I think my personal reality is almost the collective’s.  The important differences are no questions not yet genuinely decided by the collective: for instance, the value of my cultural contributions.  I suspect there will never be a fair way to determine that but the collective’s current answer would have to be”who knows.”

As I think more on it, it seems to me there might be two collective realities: the one with a city called New York separated by an ocean called the Atlantic from a city called London, and we go into our x-ceptual awareness to consider.  There most questions are a good deal less than 95% decided by the collective, and I think it fair not to consider something to be part of the collective reality (“objective reality” is or should be my name for this unless 95% of the clearly sane say it is.  It is insane, though, to reject something proposed as real because it hasn’t gotten enough votes; one must accept it as not sufficiently demonstrated only.

Maybe I’m saying objective reality is what we deal with in a practiceptual awareness, while insufficiently-demonstrated reality makes up most of what we deal with in our higher awareness.  From another slant, objective reality consists of entities; non-practiceptual possible reality consists of the inter-relationships of entities.

I’ve thought more about what to call x-ceptuality.  “Sapienceptuality” may be my best attempt, but it’s not right.  “Aristoceptuality” gets it almost exactly, but only if we put aside the fact that most aristocrats are not very bright.  And Aristotle, my favorite philosopher, had little to do with the arts.  Another miss: “Magnaceptual,” out because too similar to “Supraceptual,” which I want to keep for my ruling awareness.

I thought of following Siggy in using the names of gods which would have given me “Apolloceptual.”  But what god’s name could I use for “practiceptual,” assuming I could give up that name, which seems near ideal for what I want it to mean.  Also, Apollo seems to me to represent only part of where goes on in the “second” awareness.

“Significeptual?”  I like it but fear it’s too much of a slur on the practical.   I thought of “culturaceptual” because the practiceptual awareness has to do with survival and comfort, the other awareness with what I think of as culture.  But “culture” is a contaminated word.

“Abracaceptual?”  A good one, but no.

Fie on it.  I’m quitting for now.


Entry 1664 — Back to Important Stuff

December 17th, 2014

Today I”m back to my little third- or fourth-level theory of Intelligence.  Here are my latest thoughts on it:

(1)  I’m tentatively changing some terms: “pracsipience” to “practiceptual intelligence,” and “pracsipiceptual,” or whatever term I had for the awareness involved, to “practiceptual”; “cerebrasipience” to . . . I’m not sure.  I want “x-ceptual intelligence.”  Weird: may that’s it: “xceptual intelligence.”  Too cute?  My first thought was was “metapracticeptual intelligence.”  I love the German “hohen,” for “high,” but am not so sure “hohenceptual” would work.  It’s exactly right in meaning conveyed, but . . . I think I’ll leave the matter hanging for now.

Note to Marton: I’m claiming scholar’s use for my use of the ellipsis, so will not be sending you a royalty for use of it.

(2) Could the x-ceptual awareness be the first home of theology?  I distinguish “theology: from “religion.”  At the moment, I think of religion as the practiceptual worship of gods, and belief in various superstitions.  Theology is an attempt to work up a philosophy (or, better, metaphysics) of religion—to explain Jehovah, for instance.  Theology, in working almost entirely with abstract (really, imaginary) entities would seem surely to be a kind of practiceptual undergoing—“metaverosophy,” verosophy dealing rationally with entities one can perceive, metaverosophy dealing with all entities we are capable of thinking of, real and imaginary.

Digression: is there a difference between the imagined and any other kind of unreal entity?  I tend to think not, but the closer an imaginary entity is to something real, the more plausible it becomes: God as a man who is hiding rather than beyond human perception is about as plausible as an imaginary entity can be, it seems to me.  Or as a computer.

I can go along with the idea of the non-practiceptual awareness being caused, in part or wholly, by the need for a theology.  The need for meta-arithmetic would likely be a greater cause, however.

(3) Might the non-practiceptual awareness be a place to escape perceptual overload for many?  For our girl Emily, for sure.  But for me, too.  Which makes me think how my present ideas could make a psychotherapy book, and be useful: how to use your x-ceptual awareness to save your mind!  Or show it as a kind of East Indian practice—which it is, to a degree.

That makes me wonder if I need to divide my x-ceptual awareness in two, one division involved only with . . . reality, the other with both reality, since it’s impossible fully to escape it, and the imaginary.  Maybe call the first simply “Western x-ceptuality,” and the second “Eastern x-ceptuality,” each name being a derogatory epithet to a good number of people.

(4) The relationship of music to my new two awarenesses of the first rank is an interesting problem.  Music is both highly abstract and highly concrete.  The dance would be practiceptual: choreography above it.

I find I need a term for our over-all system of awarenesses.  Perhaps, “supraceptual awareness?” That which contains the practiceptual awareness and its sibling, with portions of (so far) ten major awareness shared or separately under those two?  One of the ten is the one I call the “compreceptual awareness”; so far I haven’t worked out a good definition of it but provisionally consider it always active, and the repository of a general overall picture of everything a person is experiencing during a given instacon, both his perception of the inner and outer environments, and his retroception of past experience.  The supraceptual awareness, whoever, is just a name: it has nothing in it except . . . all the other awareness and sub-awarenesses.

Back to the dance.  It must be the most practiceptual of the arts since it requires a continuing sense of what one’s muscles are doing.  But the abstract patterning that choreographical creativity becomes involved with would require the higher awareness.  Similarly music ascends out of simple practiceptual art into higher art as patterning takes over from simple instinctual love of basic sounds and rhythms.  I think its ascent is faster than dance’s.

(5) I find this scheme of two awarenesses of the first rank (under the supraceptual awareness) to support much of my musings on verosophy and the arts versus survival, and all the other practiceptual activities I’ve previously listed, who knows where.  Not surprisingly, it confirms many of my cultural prejudices such as my belief that visimagery (visual art) only became an art with the advent of non-representational painting, before that being a craft, albeit sometimes becoming more in the hands of its most gifted practitioners.  I see only non-representational visimagery as post-practiceptual.  Color and shape, of course, remain for it as important as sounds and rhythms are in music, but patterns, within compositions and intercompositionally (the way paintings and sculptures interact with other paintings and sculpture, and musical compositions interact with other musical compositions—by the artist involved himself, or by other artists, become much more important.

(6) Maybe “systeceptual awareness” may be a good term for the higher awareness, some relatively complex system (importantly) underlying everything that goes on in it.  The trouble is that some practiceptual activities are systematic, albeit only tactically so.  So, maybe “stratisysteceptual?”  Just kiddink.  I guess I now have two entities to name.

I can’t remember any more of my ideas, but know there were scores, all terrific.  So this entry is about done.  I may have gone about as far as I can with this topic: four entries and a little under three thousand words.  Not much, and it includes a lot of digressions like this.  It may be a good very rough start to the full presentation of my knowlecular psychology I’ve always hoped to compose.



Entry 1663 — Birds of Paradise

December 16th, 2014

A friend sent me this link and I thought it interesting enough to interrupt my latest outburst of super-genius with today: Birds of Paradise.

At first I thought, “Wow, this may be the first species capable of sensitivity to aesthetic variation besides ours, despite the amazing smallness of their nervous systems!” At first that seemed neat to me. Then I realized that it contradicted my theory of human sensitivity to boredom, which makes them desire aesthetic variation.  I couldn’t see how the complicated mechanisms I’d hypothesized for that could fit in a birdbrain.  Ergo, I now propose that Mother Nature is simply experimenting–what’s going on in natural-selection-in-progress.  But because it’s taking place in a rain forest cut off (I gather) from most of the world, the birds are protected from normal competition, so can take a long time letting the females of the species, and the forest, weather–and, now, human beings (who will probably let continuing variety be selected as they have done with orchids) select the fittest featheration to go with.

The birds aren’t necessarily reacting to variation (although some birds can, I now recall, apparently react to auditory variation . . .), but to different shapes and colors–and, perhaps, size.  In due course, if this is the case, they would (without interference from human beings) have chosen some fairly standard kind of tail, with the males with the most colorful, and/or biggest, passing on their genes.

To amplify: in more usual circumstances, a male coming up with an antenna with a bell on the top of it, or whatever, might be more easy to sight by predators, or have a little more trouble escaping because the thing would hit things as he took flight; but here, there apparently are few or no avian predators, so any drawbacks any given variation results in will have to be excessive to have a negative Darwinian effect on a bird.

Note: I had trouble with my speakers while watching the film, so missed most of the commentary.  I therefore may have repeated what was said–or missed something said that would refute something, or everything I said.  The main thing, though, is to enjoy the film–although, I of course hope my comments, right or wrong, will have some entertainment value.)


Entry 1662 — More on Prac- & Cerebra-ceptuality

December 15th, 2014

Questions in the Night: Big words only make it into the cerebrasipience zone?  Algebra and higher math goes to cerebraceptual awareness only?  Only strongly activated anthroceptual data gets in the cerebraceptual awareness?  High charactration required for use of cerebraceptual awareness?

Later I remembered enough of my model of the brain to begin making a little sense (I hope).  First off, I remembered how many awarenesses it contains, from the main ones like the reducticeptual (or conceptual) awareness through lesser ones like the matheceptual (or mathematics) sub-awareness down to even smaller ones I have not yet gotten down to but know are there.  Each basically contains little but master-cells (m-cells), associative-cells (a-cells) and a mnemoduct.  It is the activation of m-cells that gives us our experience of existence in the form of knowlecules, those being a sort of understood datum: “horse,” for instance, or “hoof” or “mammal,” depending on the context.  Each active m-cell contributes a knowicle to the experience—i.e., a unit of knowledge, perhaps a syllable or something much smaller.  They are activated either by sensory-cells reacting to stimuli in the outer or inner environment, or to memories of previously experienced knowlicles stored in their associated mnemoduct.

The a-cells are what count for this new cerebral set-up of mine, for they connect to m-cells in lower-order awarenesses unlinked to sensory-cells.  This allows me to hypothesize an entire cerebraceptual awareness with sub-awarenesses in touch through a-cells with many or all the awarenesses making up the practiceptual awareness.  Hence, the possibility that the latter sends only certain, potentially-“higher” to the cerebraceptual awareness.  Meanwhile, the cerebraceptual awareness may have sensory-cells in the practiceptual awareness (I’m really brainstorming here, so may not be making sense) that are aware of data beyond the competence of the practiceptual awareness—perhaps relationships in the latter’s knowlecules.  Hence, some m-cells in the cerebraceptual awareness will be activated by what is going on in the practiceptual awareness—and cause one to experience some new kind of knowledge.

To try feebly to give an example: a cerebraceptual sensory-cell in the practiceptual awareness’s matheceptual awareness might perceive some knowlecule as algebraic, tag it as such and activate an m-cell in the cerebraceptual awareness that causes us to experience something the practiceptual awareness could not have: “a3,” say.  But probably not.

The point is, that the cerebraceptual awareness could easily share only some data with the practiceptual awareness, and be sensitive to data the practiceptual awareness can’t be—except maybe in some roundabout way due to an exceptionally good popular science book for laymen.

In any case, I now believe that the brain’s attention center is important.  It’s where the brain determines where one’s attention should be focused.  I now think it could allow this new cerebral organization of mine by sensing when some awareness in the practiceptual awareness has been stymied by something requiring verosophical attention, and in effect shuts down the practiceptual awareness and turns on the cerebraceptual awareness.

Or a poet experiences something in his practiceptual awareness that becomes in effect a problem for him to solve as a poem.  He has fragments of thoughts that strike him as material for a poem but they bewilder him enough to cause his brain to flip his attention (assuming nothing important is happening in this day-to-day, that always over-rides cerebraceptual needs, although the two awarenesses may struggle).  Eventually he will be able to control his attention—more easily by simply by (1) reducing his day-to-day as much as possible, and (2) working his way into a frustrated mental state that will flip him into his cerebraceptual awareness.

Meanwhile, his cerebellum may help out by going automatic, thus leaving his practiceptual awareness with nothing to do, which will shut it down.  (Until something environmental alerts it powerfully enough—a loud sound, for instance.)  I think of Wordsworth’s turning his practiceptual awareness over to his cerebellum by taking long walks that the cerebellum tended to while he was (mostly) composing away in his cerebraceptual awareness.

Random thoughts: that much of the anthroceptual awareness is blocked from the cerebraceptual awareness.  It is in the latter that a person becomes impersonal, and the people in his life become objects.

Superior minds are those able to stay in their cerebraceptual awarenesses the longest.  This will require the ability to raise one’s cerebral energy and maintain a high level of it—although dropping it when appropriate.


Entry 1661 — Fuzzilier Re: Pracsipience, Etc.

December 14th, 2014

The first thought here in a continuation of my thinking about day-to-day-thinking I was annoyed into by another lawyer’s making a bundle out of the increasingly complete abandonment by our country of any belief in self-responsibility: a kid got killed by a negligent driver; for lawyers, though, the responsibility in such a case is only that of the individual who directly caused a death if he is the one with the most money who can be sued.  Hence, in this case, the party sued (successfully, for over a million) was the church owning the parking lot (because some bushes got in the driver’s view and there’s no reason that should have made him slow down and be extra cautious: those owning any kind of property most make sure it is 100% safe).

That made me think about the pracsipience of the lawyers involved.  Is it greater than other people’s?  I decided it wasn’t.  They are probably in the 60% of the people I believe are quite intelligent in day-to-day living.  But they have a special talent for swindling.  Similarly I believe that doctors are no more pracsipient than the rest of us, but they have a talent for their vocation (which I admire, as I do not admire the vocation of some, but definitely not all, lawyers).

On second thought, I’m not sure doctors have any special talent so much as they have concentrated some of their pracsipience into becoming doctors.  As everyone concentrates a certain portion of his pracsipience.  Perhaps a talent is such a concentration of pracsi-pience?  (Am I unfuzzying rather than the reverse as I certainly was in my mind when I began this entry?)

On third thought, it seems to me that concentrations of pracsipience are different from a talent.  The lawyer suing the church had a talent for swindling whereas my doctor has a concentration of pracsipience in the field of medicine.  Of course, many doctors also have talents related to doctoring, as well.  The normal academic is all concentrated pracsipiences, or must pretend to be if he is going to make a living in academia.

I forgot about my 10% of those whose pracsipience is a level above the 60%’s: perhaps it’s superior because of those with it are better at concentrating their otherwise normal pracsipience than others.  In any case, those who succeed at what most people consider the higher professions like law and medicine are no doubt mostly in the 10% of people of superior pracsipience.

To be reasonably effective in the day-to-day, one needs to have the ability to concentrate one’s pracsipience in some vocation, so it’s part of pracsipience–at all levels.

 I’m pretty sure I haven’t said all I want to on this topic but right now I’ve zeroed out.  I’m afraid I’ll be saying more on it tomorrow.  Sorry.



Entry 1660 — “Pracsipience”

December 13th, 2014

I’ve been thinking about a new way of thinking about anthreffec-tiveness, or an individual’s over-all intelligence.  It’s new for me, but I suspect it may be close to most person’s idea of it.  Anyway, it’s just a different way of sorting them for me.  But I’m wondering if it may have a neurophysiological basis in the existence of a cerebral basement.  I like the idea so will stick a “Pracsipiceptual Awareness” into my model of the cerebrum that is be responsible for all of an individual’s “pracsipience,” or practical, day-to-day cerebreffectiveness (“cerebreffectiveness,” remember, being my word for exclusively cerebral anthreffectiveness, which is an individual’s entire effectiveness).

Frankly, I haven’t figured out how it would work.  Its mission would be to guiding an individual to maximally effective choices in his day-to-day tactical activities.  Making a living, keeping house, marketing, bringing up children, etc.  Not writing poetry or music, and designing bridges, etc.  Not, that is, strategic cerebreffectiveness, although a person using his pracsipience will often also being using his . . . cerebracip-ience, or what he needs from his mental equipment to go beyond day-to-day living into the arts, verosophy or the other higher human activities, if there are any (right now my mind’s a blank about them).

I now have divided the cerebrum into two sections: the pracsipiceptual awareness and the cerebrasipiceptual awareness.  I think of them as one under the other like the cerebellum under the cerebrum, but suspect each is all over the place.  My need now is to find a way for only certain “day-to-day date,” whatever that might be, to get into the pracsipiceptual awareness, and higher data into the cerebrasipiceptual awareness.  With the former passing on anything that might be useful to the higher awareness to it?

The only thing so far clear to me is that all the awarenesses would be involved with both these two new awarenesses.  I must think more on it.

My first interest, though, is in sorting an individual’s intelligences or competences in his pracsipience . . . and the minor and major talents  i believe just about everyone has, like the ability to sing or play bridge well on up to the ability to make large-scale scientific discoveries or novels that his cerebrasipiceptual awareness oversees.  All I’m saying to this point is that each individual has a pracsipience and talents, which I think is a standard way of looking at a person’s mental equipment: intelligence, and talents.  Although the word, “intelligence,” is used (in my view) confusingly too often to mean only ability at academics or the like.

My guess is that a good 60% of us are pracsipient, or effective in our day-to-day lives.  Another 20% are just adequately effective in our daily lives, most of them about as pracsipient as most people except for some condition that keeps them always or occasionally . . .  stupid: alcoholism, for instance, or rigidnikry (i.e., what I call a theoretical mental dysfunction that makes a person excessively inflexible of mind and cerebraffectively flawed in a number of other related ways) or poor eyesight, etc. . . . or, interesting, excessive cerebrasipience!

A further guess of mine is that only 10% of us (not me!) are an order of magnitude more pracsipient than the average 60%, and another 10% an order of magnitude (or more, in the case of the truly mentally handicapped) less pracsipient than the just adequately pracsipient.

What I’m doing, it seems to me, is explaining to myself the fact that I find almost every one to be “intelligent” (every bit as “intelligent” as I), 80%, in fact, if I count the 20% whose basically effective pracsipience is flawed).  I’m also trying to explain the not too common people I know or have known who seem to me gifted in . . . simply, living (but never, so far as I know, having the highest kind of cerebrasipience, genius).  but not too many.  Finally, I’m hypothesizing that I am right in assuming that what I call pracsipience does not really vary much.  Except for those with extreme inborn defects, or who have suffered horrendous damage to the wrong organs, we’re all about as much the same in this characteristic as we are in . . . the ability to eat.  Exaggeration–to give my drift.

Now, genius is the one talent that very few have, if you define it to mean something as special as I do.  One in a million?  Perhaps, although that would mean the USA has over 300 geniuses in it, and my sense is that we have quite a bit less: my friends–ME, needless to say–and what?  maybe fourteen or fifteen others.  Seriousfully, 300 may be right.  But just a few would be have a genius an order of magnitude greater than the best of the others.  The only American genius I’m even sorta sure is one, is Murray Gell-Mann; but I don’t understand advance theoretical physics or–and this is important–am not an expert in its history; therefore, I can’t evaluate the importance or originality (this latter being what I need to be an expert in the history of recent physics to determine) of what he’s done.  All I can say is that he is definitely a minor genius, at least–a “minor genius” as opposed to a major one being most of thus in my genius class.

I feel certain intuitively that America has a few Beethovens although I’m not sure who they are.  Nobody in America since Pollock  doing visimagery (i.e., visual art) exclusively is for me a Pollock–but my opinion is next to worthless because I don’t know very much about what’s going on in either art–and the media certainly isn’t any help.

To finish up, the one firm belief I’m considering holding until new data invalidates it is that most everyone is intelligent and talented, which means they have both pracsipience and cerbrasipience (although, as I didn’t mention, some vary a lot in number of talents as well as quality of one or more talents), but very few have a talent I would call genius, and almost none a talent I would call major genius.

It occurs to me that intelligence may be my favorite subject to pronounce and blither about, I guess because the world I grew up in seemed to me to make more of it than of anything else.  Ultimately it has to be–by my definition, which is “that which accounts for a person’s full lifetime effectiveness as a human being.”  But the “intelligence” made so much of by the world in general is only a small part of that.

In any case, no doubt whatever intelligence is, I have a need to know it well so I can rate myself.  But I also think I have simply been drawn to its study out of an innate proclivity to understand myself and others.  That’s impossible without getting significantly into a study of whatever intelligence is.

I hope to say more about the loose ends in what I’ve said here.  I hope also, as I always do, that a few people will read this with interest.  I’d love to get feedback, but don’t expect any.